Pesachim 46b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehoshua said:

Even if the ḥalla becomes leavened, he does not thereby transgress any prohibition. For

this is not the leaven concerning which one is warned by “it shall not be seen”

and by “it shall not be found.”

For ḥalla is one of the gifts of the priesthood, and it belongs to the tribe of the priests; it is not the property of the owner of the dough who separates it, nor is it the absolute property of the priests, for they have not yet received it into their hands.

In light of this, Rabbi Yehoshua’s words can be explained in two ways:

A. No Israelite transgresses on account of the presence of another Israelite’s leaven in his domain.

Therefore, the owner of the dough does not transgress on account of keeping the leavened ḥalla in his domain, since it belongs to the priests and he is not its owner.

Likewise, the priests do not transgress on account of it, since they have not yet received it, and it is not considered leaven found in the domain of the priests.

B. In principle, one does transgress “it shall not be seen” even concerning leaven belonging to another Israelite.

But all this is when the leaven has absolute owners.

However, ḥalla has no absolute owners, for it belongs to the tribe of the priests and not to a particular priest, and it has not yet reached his hand. Therefore Rabbi Yehoshua said that this is not the leaven concerning which one is warned, for concerning leaven that has no absolute owners, neither do the priests transgress, who are its non-absolute owners, nor does the Israelite who keeps in his domain leaven that has no absolute owners [examine carefully Rashi’s wording]!

Rather, from the time she separates it

for ḥalla,

she leaves it until evening.

And then she burns it.

And if the ḥalla becomes leavened

the ḥalla—

becomes leavened,

and there is nothing in this.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: She should not designate it by name until it has been baked.

Rabbi Yehoshua said: This is not the leaven concerning which one is warned by “it shall not be seen” and by “it shall not be found.”

And we raised an objection to it:

Shall we say

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua

are

in dispute over the definition of ownership resulting from the right of

benefit-right

in property,

they differ?

For although the priestly gifts are essentially the property of the priests, and although it is forbidden for an Israelite to receive property from the priest in exchange for giving him the gifts, nevertheless the Israelite is entitled to derive a small monetary profit from the gifts.

For the Israelite has the ability to give the priestly gifts to whichever priest he chooses.

Likewise, one Israelite may say to another Israelite: “Take a sela from me, and in return give all your terumot to my grandson, my daughter’s son, who is a priest.”

It follows that an Israelite has the opportunity to receive property in exchange for his right to decide to which priest he will give the gifts, and this matter is called “benefit-right.”

And Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disputed the meaning of the ownership resulting from this benefit-right.

Rabbi Eliezer held: Benefit-right

that the Israelite has in this ḥalla causes it to be as though he possesses a certain ownership of

property.

And by virtue of this certain ownership, he transgresses on account of it “it shall not be seen.” For a certain ownership such as this is sufficient to call this leaven “yours”: “you shall not see.”

Therefore Rabbi Eliezer holds that the dough has no other remedy except to designate it as ḥalla only after the baking.

And Rabbi Yehoshua held: Benefit-right is not property.

For this entitlement does not define the Israelite as one who has a certain ownership of the ḥalla. Therefore, he does not transgress on account of it during Passover.

And we reject this:

No,

they do not differ over this.

Rather,

everyone holds

that

benefit-right is not property.

And here they differ over

the definition of ownership by virtue of the possibility called

“since”—

they differ.

For Rabbi Eliezer held

that although at present the ḥalla is not considered the property of an Israelite, nevertheless it is considered his with regard to “it shall not be seen,” since

we say

“since

if he wishes, he can have the vow annulled concerning it” —

it is his property!

That is to say, the ḥalla is considered his property because he has the ability to remove from it the designation of ḥalla and restore it to his ownership.

This possibility exists by inquiring concerning it before a sage, thereby uprooting the designation of ḥalla that took effect through his speech. For just as a sage permits a vow, so does he remove any sanctity created through speech, such as consecrated property, teruma, and ḥalla.

And through the “inquiry,” the dough returns—

A. to being untithed produce.

B. to the ownership of the Israelite.

Therefore, even before he inquires concerning the separation of the ḥalla, we apply to it: “You shall not see what is yours.”

Therefore, according to him, it is permitted to bake loaves from the dough, even though one of the loaves is not fit for eating because it is destined to be separated as impure ḥalla, whose law is that it must be burned.

For concerning every loaf one can say that this is not the loaf that will be separated as ḥalla, and even if it is separated as ḥalla, he has the ability to inquire concerning it.

And since he has the ability to inquire concerning it and return it to being ordinary property, and to permit it to be eaten in impurity, we consider it already now as though it were fit for eating. Therefore, its baking is the labor of “food for the soul.”

And what Rabbi Eliezer said, “She should not designate it by name until it has been baked,” is only for the sake of practical convenience. Wherever it is possible to bake on a Festival without using the permission of “since,” it is preferable not to require this permission.

And since Rabbi Eliezer held that it is possible to separate one ḥalla for all the loaves even after the baking [by placing them all together in one basket], she should not designate it by name until after the baking.

And Rabbi Yehoshua held: We do not say

“since

if he wishes, he can have the vow annulled concerning it”—it is his property. Rather, as long as he has not actually inquired, it is still ḥalla, and it is not his property. We do not apply to it “you shall not see what is yours.” Therefore, he does not transgress on account of its becoming leavened.

But he is forbidden to make loaves from the dough and bake them, since one of the loaves is not fit for eating, because it is destined to be separated as impure ḥalla, whose law is that it must be burned; and we do not say that since he can inquire concerning it, it is considered as though it were fit for eating.

And the Gemara brings another matter in which amoraim disputed concerning “since.”

It was stated: One who bakes on a Festival for

the needs of a weekday

weekday—

Rav Hisda said: He is liable to lashes

for performing labor on a Festival, since the labor of food preparation was permitted only for the needs of the Festival and not for the needs of a weekday. And since he has already finished eating his Festival meal, the bread that he is now baking is no longer intended to be eaten on that same day.

Rabba said: He is not lashed,

because this bread is fit to be eaten on the Festival itself. The Gemara explains the basis of their dispute:

Rav Hisda said

“He is lashed,”

because he holds that we do not

say

“since perhaps guests will happen to come to him

on the Festival,

it is fit for him.”

Rather, since in reality he has no guests available to him, the baking is not considered a need of the Festival, but a need of an ordinary weekday. And

Rabba said

“He is not lashed,”

because we say: “Since

perhaps guests would happen to come to him on the Festival, this bread would be fit to be eaten by them that same day; therefore, its baking is considered a need of the Festival.”

Rabba said to Rav Hisda: According to you, who say

“We do not say ‘since’”—

how can one bake from a Festival for

the needs of

Shabbat

that immediately follows it?

It is understandable according to me, since I hold that we say, “Since, if guests happened to come to him on the Festival, the baking would be needed for them,” the baking is considered a need of that day.

But according to you, what can be said?

He said to him,

Rav Hisda: They permitted baking from a Festival for Shabbat

because of an eruv tavshilin!

On the eve of the Festival, one sets aside bread and a cooked dish for the needs of Shabbat; this is called an eruv tavshilin. Since he began preparing the needs of Shabbat before the Festival, they permitted him to continue preparing them on the Festival, because this is not the beginning of the preparation but its continuation.

Rabba also knew the law of an eruv tavshilin.

His question, however, concerned the basis of the permission to bake according to Torah law. The permission of an eruv tavshilin, which is only rabbinic, was instituted to permit rabbinic prohibitions, and cannot be effective against a Torah prohibition.

Rav Hisda’s answer, as Rabba understood it, was that the enactment of an eruv tavshilin is effective even to permit a Torah prohibition.

Rabba then expressed his astonishment:

Rabba said to him:

And

is it the case that

because of an eruv tavshilin,

which is only a rabbinic enactment,

we permit

cooking from a Festival for Shabbat, which is

a Torah prohibition?!

He said to him,

Rav Hisda: I did not mean this.

Rather,

according to Torah law, the needs of Shabbat may be prepared on a Festival

even without an eruv tavshilin!

For it is written: “However, that which may be eaten by every person, only that may be performed for you.” Just as labor for food preparation is permitted on a Festival for the needs of the Festival, so too it is permitted for the needs of Shabbat, because Shabbat and the Festival have one sanctity, since the Festival is also called “Shabbat.”

And

the fact that one may not bake from a Festival for Shabbat—

the Sages instituted a decree concerning it, lest

if we permit baking on a Festival for Shabbat,

they will say

that one may also

bake from a Festival for an ordinary weekday.

For an ordinary weekday, it is certainly a Torah prohibition.

And since the Sages required

one to make

an eruv tavshilin

on the eve of the Festival,

there is a reminder

for this cooking, showing that it is permitted specifically because it is needed for Shabbat. They will then not come to permit baking even from a Festival for an ordinary weekday.

They raised an objection

Rabba raised against Rav Hisda from the following

beraita:

A dangerously ill animal,

one may not slaughter

it on the Festival

unless

there is still enough time during the day

for him to be able to eat an olive-sized portion of it roasted before nightfall.

.

That is, even if only a short time remains in the day—enough to eat that olive-sized portion roasted [which is the quickest form of cooking]—it is permitted to slaughter the animal. In such a case, the slaughter is considered a need of the Festival. But if there is not enough time during the day to eat any of it, it is a need of an ordinary weekday, and it is prohibited.

This implies that it is sufficient that, with regard to the time available, he

can eat

an olive-sized portion of it.

And even though he does not need

[that is, he does not need]

to eat

from it in practice, it is nevertheless considered a need of the Festival.

Rabba concluded his question:

It is understandable according to me, who say

“since,”

that here too we say:

“Since, if he wants to eat

it that same day,

he can eat it.”

And

for this reason he should slaughter it,

because the need does not have to be an actual need of that day; it is sufficient that there is a possibility of eating it that day.

But according to you, who say

“we do not say ‘since,’”

but require an actual need of that day—

why should he slaughter it?

He has already eaten his meal and does not need to eat any more.

He said to him,

Rav Hisda:

Because of the loss of his money,

he is permitted to slaughter it, since if he does not slaughter it, it will die and become prohibited for consumption.

Rabba said to him:

And

is it the case that

because of the loss of his money

we permit him

to violate

a Torah prohibition

of “You shall not perform any labor”?!

He said to him:

This is what I mean:

Because of the loss of his money, he

resolves in his heart

to force himself and

eat an olive-sized portion

of it before nightfall, even though he is already full from his earlier meal. For he knows that if he does not eat from it, the slaughter will be prohibited to him and he will lose the animal.

And

once he has resolved in his heart to eat an olive-sized portion before nightfall, the slaughter is considered slaughter for the needs of the Festival. For

it is impossible to

eat from the animal

an olive-sized portion of meat without slaughtering it.