Pesachim 46b (מו:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehoshua said:

Even if the ḥalla becomes leavened, he does not thereby transgress any prohibition. For

this is not the leaven concerning which one is forewarned by “it shall not be seen”

and “it shall not be found.”

This is because ḥalla is one of the gifts of the kehuna, and belongs to the tribe of priests. It is not the property of the owner of the dough who separated it, nor is it yet the absolute property of the priests, since they have not yet received it.

In light of this, Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement can be explained in two ways:

A. A Jew does not transgress on account of another Jew’s leaven that is in his possession.

Therefore, the owner of the dough does not transgress by allowing the leavened ḥalla to remain in his possession, since it belongs to the priests and he is not its owner.

Likewise, the priests do not transgress on account of it, because they have not yet received it, and it is not considered leaven found in the possession of the priests.

B. One does in fact transgress the prohibition of “it shall not be seen” even with regard to leaven belonging to another Jew.

However, this applies only when the leaven has absolute owners.

But ḥalla has no absolute owners, since it belongs to the tribe of priests and not to any particular priest, and it has not yet reached his possession. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua said that this is not the leaven concerning which one is forewarned, for with regard to leaven that has no absolute owners, no one transgresses the prohibition of “it shall not be seen”: neither the priests, who are its nonabsolute owners, nor the Jew who allows leaven without absolute owners to remain in his possession [see Rashi’s wording carefully]!

Rather, from the time he separates it

as ḥalla,

he leaves it until evening.

And then he burns it.

And if it becomes leavened

the ḥalla—

it becomes leavened,

and there is nothing wrong with that.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: He should not designate it by name until it has been baked.

Rabbi Yehoshua said: This is not the leaven concerning which one is forewarned by “it shall not be seen” and “it shall not be found.”

And we raise an objection:

Shall we say that

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua

disagree

over the definition of ownership arising from the right of

benefit of ownership

in property,

and this is the issue over which they disagree?

For although the gifts of the kehuna are essentially the property of the priests, and although a Jew is forbidden to receive money from a priest in exchange for giving him the gifts, nevertheless the Jew is entitled to derive a small financial benefit from the gifts.

For the Jew has the right to give the gifts of the kehuna to whichever priest he chooses.

Likewise, one Jew may say to another Jew: “Take a sela, and in exchange give all your terumot to my grandson, my daughter’s son, who is a priest.”

It follows that a Jew has the opportunity to receive money in exchange for his right to decide to which priest he will give the gifts, and this is called “benefit of ownership.”

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree concerning the meaning of the ownership arising from this benefit of ownership.

Rabbi Eliezer holds: The benefit of ownership

that the Jew has in this ḥalla causes it to be as though he has a certain ownership of

property in it.

By virtue of this partial ownership, he transgresses the prohibition of “it shall not be seen” on account of it. For such a degree of ownership is sufficient for the leaven to be described by the verse as “yours”: “your leaven you shall not see.”

Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer holds that the dough has no other remedy except to designate it as ḥalla after baking.

And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: Benefit of ownership is not property.

This entitlement does not define the Jew as one who has a certain ownership in the ḥalla. Consequently, he does not transgress on account of it during Passover.

And we reject this:

No,

that is not the issue over which they disagree.

Rather,

everyone holds

that

benefit of ownership is not property.

And here they disagree

over the definition of ownership arising from the possibility called

“since”—

and this is the issue over which they disagree.

For Rabbi Eliezer holds

that although the ḥalla is not presently considered the Jew’s property, nevertheless it is regarded as his for purposes of “it shall not be seen,” since

we say

“since

if he wished, he could have the vow annulled with regard to it,”

it is his property!

That is, the ḥalla is considered his property because he can remove the designation of ḥalla from it and restore it to his ownership.

This possibility exists by asking a Sage to annul it, thereby uprooting the designation of ḥalla that took effect through his speech. For just as a Sage annuls a vow, so too he removes any sanctity created through speech, such as hekdesh, teruma, and ḥalla.

Through this “asking for annulment,” the dough returns—

A. To being tevel.

B. To Jewish ownership.

Therefore, even before he asks for annulment of the separation of the ḥalla, the verse applies to it: “Your own you shall not see.”

Therefore, in his view it is permitted to bake loaves from the dough, even though one of the loaves is unfit to eat because it is destined to be separated as impure ḥalla.

For with regard to every loaf it can be said that this is not the loaf that will be separated as ḥalla, and even if it is separated as ḥalla, he can ask for its annulment.

And since he can ask for its annulment, return it to the status of ordinary food, and permit it to be eaten in a state of ritual impurity, we regard it already now as though it were fit to eat. Therefore, baking it constitutes the labor of preparing food.

And what Rabbi Eliezer said, “He should not designate it by name until it has been baked,” was only stated as a preferable course. Whenever it is possible to bake on a Festival without relying on the leniency of “since,” it is preferable not to require that leniency.

And since Rabbi Eliezer holds that one ḥalla may be separated for all the loaves even after baking [by placing them all together in a single basket ], he should not designate it by name until after baking.

And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: We do not say

“since

if he wished, he could have the vow annulled with regard to it”—it is his property.” Rather, as long as he has not actually asked for annulment, it is still ḥalla and is not his property. The verse does not apply to it: “Your own you shall not see.” Consequently, he does not transgress on account of its becoming leavened.

However, he is forbidden to make loaves from the dough and bake them, since one of the loaves is unfit to eat, as it is destined to be separated as impure ḥalla, whose status is that it must be burned; and we do not say that since he can ask for its annulment, it is considered as though it were fit to eat.

And the Gemara introduces another matter in which the amoraim disagreed concerning “since.”

It was stated: With regard to one who bakes on a Festival for

the needs of a weekday,

Rav Ḥisda said: He is liable to lashes

for performing labor on the Festival, since the labor of preparing food was permitted only for the needs of the Festival, and not for the needs of a weekday. And once he has finished eating the Festival meal, the bread he is now baking is no longer destined to be eaten on that same day.

Rabba said: He does not receive lashes

, since this bread is destined to be eaten on Yom Tov itself. The Gemara explains the basis of their dispute:

Rav Ḥisda said

“He receives lashes”

, because he holds that we do not

say

“since perhaps guests will happen to come to him

on Yom Tov, it is fit for him”

. Rather, since in fact he has no guests present, the baking is not considered a need of Yom Tov, but a need of the weekday.

And

Rabba said

“He does not receive lashes”

, because we say: Since

if guests were to happen to come to him on Yom Tov, this bread would be fit to be eaten by them that very day, its baking is therefore considered a need of Yom Tov.

Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda: According to you, who say

“We do not say ho'il”

—how does one bake on Yom Tov for

the needs of

Shabbat

that immediately follows it?

It is understandable according to me, since I hold that we say, “Since, if guests were to happen to come to him on Yom Tov,” the baking is found to be a need of that day.

But according to you—what can be said?

He said to him

Rav Ḥisda: They permitted baking from Yom Tov for Shabbat

because of eruv tavshilin!

This is established on the eve of Yom Tov by setting aside bread and a cooked dish for the needs of Shabbat; this is called an eruv tavshilin. Because he began preparing the needs of Shabbat while it was still the eve of Yom Tov, they permitted him to continue preparing them on Yom Tov, since this is not the beginning of the preparation but its continuation.

Rabba also knew the law of eruv tavshilin.

His question, however, concerned the basis of the permission to bake according to Torah law, since the permission provided by eruv tavshilin, which is only rabbinic, comes to permit rabbinic prohibitions and cannot be effective against a Torah prohibition.

Rav Ḥisda’s answer, as Rabba understood it, was that the enactment of eruv tavshilin is effective even to permit a Torah prohibition.

Rabba therefore expressed his astonishment:

Rabba said to him:

And

if

because of eruv tavshilin

, which is merely a rabbinic enactment,

we permit

cooking from Yom Tov for Shabbat, which is

a Torah prohibition!?

It follows from the words of Ramban in the Milchamot of God that Rabba holds that the needs of Shabbat may not be prepared on a Festival because of the prohibition against preparation: a Festival does not prepare for Shabbat. Anything prepared on a Festival for Shabbat is prohibited on Shabbat, even if it was prepared automatically, such as an egg laid on a Festival, which is prohibited on Shabbat. All the more so, preparation by human action is prohibited. But even according to Rabba, there is no prohibition here on account of performing labor on the Festival. However, Tosafot wrote in Beitzah [4b] that the prohibition against preparation applies only to something that did not exist in the world at all before that time, such as an egg laid on a Festival. But cooking and baking are not considered preparation, since the item already existed and required only ordinary improvement. According to their view, Rabba necessarily prohibited this because of the prohibition against performing labor. Later authorities.

He said to him

Rav Ḥisda: That is not what I intended.

Rather,

according to Torah law, the needs of Shabbat may be prepared on Yom Tov

even without eruv tavshilin!

For it is written: “However, that which may be eaten by every person, that alone may be performed for you.” Just as labor for the preparation of food was permitted on Yom Tov for the needs of Yom Tov, so it was permitted for the needs of Shabbat, since Shabbat and Yom Tov have a single sanctity, as Yom Tov is also called “Shabbat.”

And

the reason that one may not bake from Yom Tov for Shabbat is that

the Sages enacted a decree lest

if we permit baking on Yom Tov for Shabbat, they

say

that one may also

bake from Yom Tov for the weekday

. For the needs of the weekday, there is certainly a Torah prohibition.

And since the Sages required

one to prepare

an eruv tavshilin

on the eve of Yom Tov,

there is a reminder

regarding this cooking: it is permitted specifically because it is needed for Shabbat. They will therefore not come to permit baking from Yom Tov even for the weekday.

He raised an objection

Rabba to Rav Ḥisda from that which was taught:

An animal in danger

, such that if it is not slaughtered that day it will become unfit through improper slaughter and be prohibited for consumption,

one may not slaughter

it on Yom Tov

unless

there remains sufficient time during the day

to eat an olive-sized portion of it roasted while it is still day

.

That is, even if only a short time remains in the day, sufficient to eat that olive-sized portion by roasting [which is the quickest form of cooking], it is permitted to slaughter it. In such a case, the slaughter is considered a need of Yom Tov. But if there is no time during the day to eat any of it, it is a need of the weekday and is prohibited.

This implies that it is sufficient that, in terms of the available time, he

can eat

an olive-sized portion of it.

And even though he does not need

[that is, he does not need]

to eat

from it in practice, it is nevertheless considered a need of Yom Tov.

Rabba concluded his objection:

It is understandable according to me, who say

“ho'il”

, since here too we say

“since, if he wishes to eat

it that day, he

can eat it

”

—and therefore he should slaughter

, since it is not necessary for the need of the day to exist in practice; it is sufficient that there is a possibility of eating it that day.

But according to you, who say

“we do not say ho'il”

, but require an actual need of the day—

why should he slaughter it?

He has already eaten his meal and has no need to eat any more.

He said to him

Rav Ḥisda:

Because of the loss of his money

he is permitted to slaughter it, since if he does not slaughter it, it will die and become prohibited.

Rabba said to him:

And

if it is

because of the loss of his money

—

do we permit him

to violate

a Torah prohibition of “You shall not perform any labor”!?

He said to him

: This is what I am saying:

Because of the loss of his money

, he

has resolved in his heart to force himself and

eat an olive-sized portion

of it while it is still day, even though he is already satiated from having eaten earlier. For he knows that if he does not eat from it, its slaughter will be prohibited to him, and he will lose the animal.

And

since he has resolved in his heart to eat an olive-sized portion while it is still day, the slaughter is considered slaughter for the needs of Yom Tov. For

it is impossible to

eat from the animal

an olive-sized portion of meat without slaughtering it.