Pesachim 38a (לח.) — the Talmud in English

And likewise,

the mitzva of second tithe—

according to Rabbi Meir, one does not fulfill his obligation with it on Passover

because it does not belong to him.

And according to

the statement of the Sages, one does fulfill his obligation with it on Passover!

For it is his property.

And likewise,

an etrog of second tithe—

according to Rabbi Meir, one does not fulfill his obligation with it on the first Festival day

of Sukkot, because it does not belong to him.

And according to

the statement of the Sages, one does fulfill his obligation with it on the Festival day!

Rav Pappa challenged

Rav Asi:

Granted, with regard to dough, it is written

in connection with it: “When you take the first portion of your

kneading bowls

you shall give a dough offering”; therefore it must be

from yours

in order to become subject to the dough offering, for this is what the expression “your kneading bowls” implies. And likewise,

an etrog

on the Festival day

also

cannot be used to fulfill one’s obligation unless it belongs to him, as

it is written

with regard to it:

“And you shall take for yourselves

on the first day.” And we expound:

“for yourselves”—

it shall be from yours!

Therefore, if they are etrogim of second tithe, the matter is dependent on the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda as to whether second tithe belongs to the Most High or is ordinary property.

But matza

of second tithe—why does one not fulfill his obligation with it according to Rabbi Meir? Even if it does not belong to him,

is it written

in the Torah

“your matza”?

Rava said, and some say Rav Yemar bar Shelemya:

Even with regard to matza, one fulfills his obligation only with matza that belongs to him, because

matza is derived

by a verbal analogy of

“bread”

“bread”

from the law of the dough offering.

It is written here

with regard to matza:

“bread of affliction.”

And it is written there

with regard to the dough offering:

“When you eat from the bread of the land.”

Just as there,

with regard to the dough offering, its obligation applies only to dough that is

from yours,

as we derive from “your kneading bowls,”

so too here,

with regard to matza, you fulfill your obligation only with matza that is

from yours.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Meir, who says that “second tithe belongs to the Most High,” it cannot be called “from yours,” and one does not fulfill his obligation of matza with it.

We raise the following question:

Shall we say that the

beraita

supports Rav Asi? For it teaches:

“Dough of second tithe is exempt from the dough offering”—

the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages say: It is obligated!

We ask: Is it correct in this case to say

“shall we say that it supports him”?

Are the words of the beraita and the words of Rav Asi

identical

?

We explain:

This is what it means: Shall we say that the beraita supports all of Rav Asi’s statements, including his assertion that the law of an etrog of second tithe on the Festival day is dependent on the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda?

Do we say:

Since they dispute with regard to dough

of second tithe, do they

also dispute with regard to these

[the etrog]?

Or perhaps, there it is different,

with regard to the dough offering, because

it is written

there: “When you take the first portion of your

kneading bowls

you shall give a dough offering.” And it is written again: “From the first portion of your

kneading bowls

you shall give it to the Lord.” Since

“your kneading bowls” is written

twice, we properly derive that the dough must be from yours. But with regard to an etrog, where “for yourselves” is written only once, perhaps it comes to exclude only a borrowed or stolen etrog, but not an etrog of second tithe. For it is given to its owner to eat. And although it is not his property, but he eats it from the table of the Most High, it can properly be called “for yourselves.”

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish asked: What is the law as to whether a person fulfills his obligation

on Passover

with a dough offering of second tithe in Jerusalem?

The second tithe too is subject to the separation of a dough offering and to giving it to a priest. It possesses two sanctities: the sanctity of second tithe and the sanctity of the dough offering.

We explain:

According to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili

—who derives from “bread of affliction” that one fulfills his obligation only with bread that may be eaten in a state of acute mourning, and not with second tithe, which may not be eaten in that state—

you need not ask,

and it is obvious that one does not fulfill his obligation with the dough offering of second tithe. For

now, if

the second tithe itself, which is

ordinary produce

and does not have the sanctity of the dough offering,

one does not fulfill his obligation, with its dough offering

would it be necessary

to say that one does not fulfill his obligation?!

You need to ask only according to Rabbi Akiva,

who does not derive this from “bread of affliction.”

For he too concedes that we require bread that may be eaten throughout all your settlements, and one does not fulfill his obligation with bread that may be eaten only in Jerusalem. The reason that

with ordinary produce

[the second tithe itself]

he does fulfill his obligation, although it may be eaten only in Jerusalem, is that

if it becomes impure,

the second tithe may be redeemed even after it has entered Jerusalem. It then

has permission to be eaten even

throughout the settlements.

But the dough offering

of second tithe has no permission to be eaten throughout the settlements, whichever way one considers it. As long as it has not become impure, it may be eaten only in Jerusalem because of the sanctity of the second tithe it contains. And second tithe that is pure cannot be redeemed after the walls of Jerusalem have taken hold of it.

And if it becomes impure,

it still

has no permission to be eaten throughout the settlements, because of the sanctity of the dough offering it contains. The sanctity of the dough offering cannot be redeemed at all.

And

once it becomes impure,

it goes to be burned and one does not fulfill his obligation

with it.

Or perhaps, although in practice the dough offering of second tithe has no permission to be eaten throughout the settlements, nevertheless,

since, if he had not designated it

as a dough offering

and it had become impure,

[and had become impure],

it would have permission to be eaten throughout the settlements

through redemption, as ordinary second tithe,

and

he

would have fulfilled his obligation with it

of matza. Therefore, even

now,

after he has designated it as a dough offering,

he also fulfills his obligation with it

! For by virtue of its sanctity as a dough offering, it was not excluded from the law of matza, since an ordinary dough offering may be eaten throughout the settlements. And by virtue of its sanctity as second tithe alone, it likewise has permission to be eaten throughout the settlements through impurity. Although the combination of the two sanctities means that it no longer has permission to be eaten throughout the settlements, one nevertheless fulfills his obligation with it.

and

he would

fulfill his obligation

of matza with it, therefore even

now,

Some say: This certainly is not a question for you,

and it is obvious that one fulfills his obligation with the dough offering of second tithe, because

we certainly say: Since if he had not designated it as a dough offering, it would have had permission to be eaten throughout the settlements in a state of impurity, one fulfills his obligation with it. The question arises only with regard to a dough offering separated from dough purchased

with the money of second tithe!

The sanctity of second tithe that rested on the money was transferred and took hold of this dough offering.

According to the Sages, you need not ask

even in this case.

Since they say

that even an item

purchased with money of second tithe that became impure

shall be redeemed!

The law of this dough offering

is the same

as that of the

second tithe itself, and one fulfills his obligation with it on Passover because of the principle of “since,” as stated.

The question arises only according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says

that an item purchased with money of second tithe that became impure cannot be redeemed. Rather,

it shall be buried.

As we learned:

A food item

purchased with money of second tithe

that has transferred to it the sanctity of the tithe that had been in the money—

if it becomes impure, it shall be redeemed!

Just as second tithe itself can be redeemed, so too can food that acquired the sanctity of second tithe through the transfer of sanctity.

itself, and one fulfills his obligation with it on Passover because of the principle of “since,” as stated.

You need to ask this question according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says

Rabbi Yehuda says:

An item purchased with money of second tithe that became impure

shall be buried!

Redemption applies only to second tithe itself or to the money of second tithe. But an item purchased with the money of second tithe has already had its sanctity weakened. Its sanctity is not sufficiently powerful, like the sanctity of second tithe, to transfer its sanctity to another item.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, an item purchased with money of second tithe has no permission whatsoever to be eaten throughout the settlements. For even if it becomes impure, it cannot be redeemed, but must be buried. When it is pure, it may be eaten only in Jerusalem. The uncertainty of Reish Lakish according to Rabbi Yehuda is as follows:

Do we say: Since, if it had not been purchased

with money of second tithe,

it would have been

ordinary second tithe itself, and if it became impure, it would have had permission to be eaten throughout the settlements through redemption—just as one fulfills his obligation with second tithe itself, so too one fulfills his obligation with an item purchased with the money of second tithe? For all its sanctity derives only from the second tithe itself. And although in practice it has no permission to be eaten throughout the settlements, this is not because of its greater stringency. On the contrary, its leniency causes it to lack redemption: because its sanctity is weaker, it does not transfer to the object received in its redemption. Therefore, it is not reasonable that with regard to matza on Passover it should be more stringent than second tithe itself.

And also with regard to the sanctity of the dough offering contained in it, it should not be considered something that has no permission to be eaten throughout the settlements. For we already said above:

since

if he had not designated it as a dough offering

and it had become impure, it would have permission to be eaten throughout the settlements, and one would fulfill his obligation with it of matza,

now too one fulfills his obligation with it.

Or perhaps, only one

“since”

do we say. For example, in the case of the dough offering of second tithe: “Since, if he had not designated it as a dough offering”; or in the case of an item purchased with money of second tithe: “Since, if it had not been purchased, it would have been [second tithe itself].” But with regard to the dough offering of an item purchased with money of second tithe, where, in order to render it valid for matza on Passover, we must employ both of the aforementioned principles of “since,” perhaps

two

“since” we do not say. [One might ask: Even with regard to the dough offering of second tithe itself, we require two principles of “since.” First, one can say: “Since, if he had not designated it as a dough offering,” its status would have been that of ordinary second tithe. Even ordinary second tithe can be used to fulfill one’s obligation only through the principle of “since”: We say concerning it, “Since, if it becomes impure, it can be redeemed and eaten throughout the settlements, now too it is considered to have permission to be eaten throughout the settlements.”

One can say that second tithe itself does not require the reasoning of “since.” Rather, it is considered to have permission to be eaten in practice, since it is within his power to render it impure and redeem it.

Rashi.]

Rava said: It is reasonable

that even with the dough offering of dough purchased with money of second tithe, one fulfills his obligation of matza, and even according to Rabbi Yehuda. For

the designation “tithe” is one and the same!

Just as one fulfills his obligation with second tithe, so too one fulfills his obligation with an item purchased with money of second tithe, since all its sanctity derives from second tithe itself. And just as one fulfills his obligation with that item, one fulfills his obligation with its dough offering, since the sanctity of a dough offering in its own right does not prevent one from fulfilling the obligation of matza. Therefore, even when it joins the sanctity of second tithe, one fulfills his obligation with it.

We learned in the Mishna:

A dough offering of a thanksgiving offering and the wafers of a nazirite

—if he made them for himself, he does not fulfill his obligation with them!

“since”

do we apply.

For example, in the case of the dough-offering of second tithe: “Since, if he had not designated it by name”; or in the case of an item purchased with money of second tithe: “Since, if it had not been purchased, it would have been” the second tithe itself. But in the case of the dough-offering of an item purchased with money of second tithe, in order to make it fit for matza on Passover we must use both of these arguments of “since” together. Perhaps

two

“since”

arguments are not applied.

One might ask: Even with the dough-offering of second tithe itself we need two arguments of “since.” First, we must say: “Since, if he had not designated it by name,” it would have the status of ordinary second-tithe produce. And even ordinary second-tithe produce can be used to fulfill the obligation only through an argument of “since”: We say that since, if it becomes impure, it can be redeemed and eaten in the settlements, it is now likewise considered something that has permission to be eaten in the settlements.

One can answer that the second tithe itself does not require the reasoning of “since.” It is considered to have permission in practice, since he can render it impure and redeem it.

We inquire concerning this:

From where are these matters derived?

that even with the dough-offering of dough purchased with money of second tithe, one fulfills his obligation of matza, even according to Rabbi Yehuda. For

the designation “second tithe” is one and the same!

Just as one fulfills his obligation with second tithe, so too one fulfills his obligation with an item purchased with money of second tithe, since all its sanctity comes by virtue of the second tithe itself. And just as one fulfills his obligation with that item, so too one fulfills his obligation with its dough-offering. The sanctity of the dough-offering in itself does not prevent one from fulfilling the obligation of matza; therefore, even when it joins the sanctity of second tithe, one fulfills his obligation with it.

We learned in the Mishna:

the dough-offering of a thanksgiving-offering and the wafers of a nazirite—

if he made them for himself, he does not fulfill his obligation with them!

We ask about this:

From where are these matters derived?