Pesachim 31b — the Talmud in English

And we conclude:

Rather,

everyone agrees that a creditor collects from here onward. And

here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he pledged it,

the borrower pledged the leavened bread to him [to the lender], and it is a pledge in his possession.

And they disagree

about the law

of Rabbi Yitzhak.

For Rabbi Yitzhak said: From where is it established that a creditor acquires a pledge,

and it is considered like his property, and is not merely a deposit in his possession? —

As it is stated

regarding a lender who took the borrower’s night garment as a pledge: “You shall surely return his pledge to him when the sun comes, and he shall lie in his garment and bless you,

and it shall be righteousness for you

before the Lord your God.”

And since the return of the pledge is called “righteousness,” evidently the lender is considered to be giving the borrower something of his own. And

if

the lender

does not acquire

the

pledge,

“righteousness”

from where [does this apply]?

But it belongs to the borrower. Rather,

from here [it is established] that a creditor acquires

the

pledge.

Therefore, by returning to him the garment of the pledge in order that he sleep in it, he performs righteousness with him, by lending him something of his own.

And for this reason, the law of the lender is not like the law of an unpaid guardian or a paid guardian, who are exempt in cases of accident. Rather, the pledge stands entirely within his authority. And if it was lost through an accident, he is liable for it. And likewise, it stands within his authority with regard to the prohibition of “it shall not be seen.”

However,

the first Tanna holds: This applies

that a creditor acquires a pledge only when a

Jew

who borrowed

from a Jew

another left him a pledge. For in such a case we call it, “and it shall be righteousness for you”—for this is what the verse concerning the return of the pledge is discussing.

But

the verse is not discussing a

Jewish

lender who took a pledge

from

a

gentile borrower.

Therefore,

he does not acquire

the pledge from him, and it is not considered his property. And for this reason he holds that if he pledged leavened bread for the duration of Passover, it is not prohibited as leavened bread over which Passover passed. For it is the gentile’s leavened bread.

And Rabbi Meir holds that a Jew acquires even a gentile’s pledge. For

it is

a kal va-chomer.

If

a Jew acquires a pledge from a Jew,

a pledge,

does a Jew from a gentile not all the more so?!

For the power of the Jew is not inferior to the power of the gentile.

But

in the latter clause, which is dealing with a

gentile who lent to a Jew against his leavened bread

and pledged it, there

according to everyone

it is considered the Jew’s leavened bread, and he

transgresses

because of it. For it is specifically a Jew who acquires a pledge. But

there, certainly,

a

gentile from a Jew does not acquire it.

And we challenge: We learned in the Mishna: “A gentile who lent to a Jew against his leavened bread—after Passover, the leavened bread is permitted for benefit!” And it was explained above that it is dealing with a case where the gentile took the leavened bread as a pledge. And since a creditor acquires a pledge, it is considered like a gentile’s leavened bread over which Passover passed, and it is permitted.

And according to what was explained in the beraita above, this is difficult. For

even if you say that he pledged it to him, have you not said

that

a gentile

who took a pledge

from a Jew

according to everyone

does not acquire

the pledge?

And we answer:

It is not difficult. This

that we learned in the Mishna, that the gentile acquires the pledge, is dealing with a case where

he said to him

the Jew said to the gentile: If I do not repay you the debt by such-and-such a day, the pledge will be yours

from now! And he does not acquire it by the law of Rabbi Yitzhak. Rather, he transferred it to him through a complete acquisition from the time of the loan. And if ultimately he did not repay him, certainly it was the gentile’s leavened bread from the outset.

He does not acquire it by virtue of Rabbi Yitzḥak’s law. Rather, the Jew transferred it to him through a complete acquisition from the time of the loan. If he ultimately did not repay the debt, the leavened bread was certainly the gentile’s from the outset.

And

this

that it was taught that a gentile from a Jew does not acquire it is dealing with a case where

he did not say to him, “from now”!

Rather, he encumbered it to him, so that if he did not repay him, he would collect the pledge from the time of repayment onward. And since he did not transfer it to him from the time of the loan, and the law “a creditor acquires a pledge” does not apply with a gentile, it is the Jew’s leavened bread. Therefore, he transgresses because of it.

And we consider the matter:

And from where do you say

[where do you know]

that

even when he pledged it to him,

that

he

distinguishes between the case where he said

the borrower to the lender that he should acquire the pledge

“from now,”

and

between the case where he did not say

to him

“from now”?! And where he said “from now,” even the gentile acquires the pledge.

And we answer: We learn this from

the following:

It was taught: A gentile who pledged

[pledged]

a large loaf

[a large loaf. And it stated the ordinary circumstance, for because of its importance he takes it as a pledge]

to a Jew,

and it remained with him during Passover,

the

Jew

does not transgress

because of it on account of “it shall not be seen.” This is the position of the first Tanna of the beraita, that a Jewish creditor does not acquire a pledge from a gentile.

And if he said to him

the gentile

“It has reached you,”

[that is, if I do not repay you at the end, then I am repaying you from now with this pledge what is due to you for the debt],

the Jew transgresses

because of this leavened bread! And we consider the matter:

What is different in the first clause

that he does not transgress,

and what is different in the latter clause

that he transgresses?

And we establish by proof:

Rather, is it not evident that

that

it is different where he said to him

“from now,” from

the case

where he did not say to him

“from now”! And in the latter clause, where the gentile said to him, “It has reached you,” which is equivalent to transferring it to him from now, the Jew acquires the pledge even from a gentile.

And although he acquires the leavened bread only if he does not repay him from another source, and he still does not know whether he will repay him or not, nevertheless it is forbidden for him to leave the leavened bread with him during Passover. Perhaps he will not repay him, and it will emerge that he retroactively transgresses “it shall not be seen.”

And we conclude:

We learn from it!

The Sages taught: A Jewish shop, and

also the

stock

[the wine and bread sold there] is

Jewish,

and gentile workers enter there—

leavened bread found there

in the shop

after Passover

is

forbidden for benefit. And it is unnecessary

to say that it is

forbidden to eat!

For one cannot attribute it to the gentile workers; rather, ordinarily it is from the stock in the shop. And it is Jewish leavened bread, which is forbidden after Passover.

A gentile shop, and

even the

stock

is

gentile, and Jewish workers enter and leave there—

leavened bread found there after Passover,

is

permitted to eat. And it is unnecessary to say

that it is permitted

for benefit!

For we attribute it to the gentile’s stock. And a gentile’s leavened bread over which Passover passed is permitted for benefit.

Mishna:

Leavened bread upon which a collapse fell

is not transgressed because of it during Passover. For

it is like something burned!

Therefore, it is unnecessary to clear the collapse from above it in order to destroy it.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

When is the leavened bread considered like something burned?

Whenever

a collapse fell upon it

such that the dog is unable

to tunnel beneath it and

search for it

and find it.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Leavened bread upon which a collapse fell is like something burned!

Rav Chisda said:

Although he does not transgress because of it on account of “it shall not be seen,”

he must nullify it in his heart !

For we are concerned that perhaps he will clear the collapse during the festival, and then transgress because of it on account of “it shall not be seen.” For once he exposes it, it is no longer something burned.

We learned in the Mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Whenever the dog cannot search for it!

A Tanna taught:

Up to

how much

does he raise the collapse under which there is the possibility of

a dog’s searching? —

Up to

three handbreadths!

For from this measure onward, the dog can no longer search for the leavened bread and find it.

Rav Acha, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: This which Shmuel said:

“Money

of a deposit

has no protection except in the ground,”

and if the guardian did not bury it in the ground and it was lost, he was negligent in guarding it and is liable to pay it—

do we require

there also that he bury it to a depth of

three handbreadths

in the ground,

or not?

Rav Ashi said to him: It is not necessary to conceal them three handbreadths deep. For it is not similar to leaven.

here

with regard to leaven, is it not

because of the smell

that

we require

the collapse to be at a height of

three handbreadths!

For up to this height the dog still smells the smell of the leaven, and it digs after it and removes it. But

there

with regard to money, this that we require concealment in the ground is it not

because it is being concealed from the eye

[so that it will be concealed from the eyes of people]. Therefore

it does not require

concealment at a depth of

three

handbreadths.

And we raised it:

how much

is the depth required for concealing money?

Raphram bar Pappa of Sikra said

[a place-name]: A depth of

one handbreadth!

Mishna:

A non-priest who eats teruma unintentionally pays the kohen fruits in the measure of the fruits that he ate, with the addition of a fifth. As it is written: “And if a person eats a sacred thing unintentionally, he shall add its fifth to it, and give the sacred thing to the kohen.”

And he is obligated to pay specifically with something fit to be teruma, such as fruits. And those fruits become teruma in place of the fruits that he ate. And the basis of this obligation is as atonement.

And this law applies only to one who eats teruma unintentionally. But one who eats it intentionally pays only the value of the principal, like an ordinary robber.

A non-priest

who eats leavened teruma on Passover,

if he ate it

unintentionally

[because the prohibition against non-priests eating teruma had escaped him], he

pays

the kohen

the principal and a fifth!

For such is the law of a non-priest who eats teruma.

And although leavened teruma on Passover is forbidden for benefit, and has no value whatsoever, one who eats it is obligated to pay the kohen its equivalent. For the Torah obligated him not to pay its monetary value, but to pay the measure of the fruits that he ate.

But one who eats leavened teruma on Passover

intentionally,

he is

exempt from payment!

For his obligation is only because of robbery, as stated. And since leaven on Passover is fit for nothing and has no monetary value, he caused him no loss.

And he is exempt not only from the value of the fruits, but even

from the value of firewood!

And he is not like one who eats impure teruma intentionally, for although it is not fit for eating, he is obligated to pay the kohen the value of firewood [since it is fit to be burned beneath his cooked dish]. For leavened teruma is forbidden for benefit and is not fit even for fuel. Therefore one who eats it intentionally is entirely exempt.

This is the explanation of the Mishna according to one approach. And another explanation of the words of the Mishna will further be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned there: One who eats teruma unintentionally pays

the kohen fruits in the measure of the

principal

of the fruits that he ate,

and

adds to them

a fifth.