Pesachim 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

Is that not the point of their dispute:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that

“you shall not eat”,

which is written with regard to forbidden fat,

indicates both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit,

in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu. Therefore,

when the verse

“any labor”

came

to permit deriving benefit from the fat of

a carcass, that is what it came to permit.

And Rabbi Akiva holds that

“you shall not eat”

indicates a prohibition against eating.

But

a prohibition

of deriving benefit

is not indicated, as stated by Hezekiah. Therefore,

when the verse

“any labor”

came to address ritual impurity and purity,

that is what it came to address. But no verse is needed to permit deriving benefit from it.

And we reject this:

No,

that is not the point of their dispute.

Rather,

according

to

everyone,

“you shall not eat”

indicates both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit,

in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu. However, with regard to a carcass, we find that the Torah permitted deriving benefit from it, as it is written: “You shall give it to the stranger who is within your gates, that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a gentile.”

And here, this is the point of their dispute:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds: When a carcass was permitted, it

[its flesh] alone

was permitted.

But

its forbidden fat and its sinew

were not permitted

along with it, because the fat is not included within the flesh of the carcass. And for this reason as well, the verse did not need to purify it from the ritual impurity of a carcass. Rather,

when the verse was needed

“any labor” with regard to the fat of a carcass,

it came to permit deriving benefit from it.

And Rabbi Akiva holds:

A verse is not needed to permit deriving benefit from the fat, because

when a carcass was permitted, its fat and its sinew were also permitted

along with it.

And when the verse was needed

with regard to the fat,

for impurity and

purity,

that is what it came for: to state that it is not included within the ritual impurity of a carcass.

We inquire:

And

according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who holds that “its fat and its sinew were not permitted,”

we find that the Merciful One permitted the fat,

as it is written: “It shall be used for any labor.”

But

the sinew

concerning which it is written: “They shall not eat,” is it possible to

say that it is prohibited

from deriving benefit?!

And we answer:

If you wish, say:

Yes,

indeed, it is

prohibited

from deriving benefit, and he follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon cited above, who prohibits it.

And if you wish, say: In fact, even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the sinew is permitted for deriving benefit, because

he derives it by means of a kal va-homer

from forbidden fat.

And if forbidden fat, for eating which one is liable to receive karet,

is nevertheless

permitted for deriving benefit, then the sinew, for eating which one is not liable to receive karet,

but which is prohibited merely by a negative mitzva,

all the more so

is it permitted for deriving benefit.

And Rabbi Shimon, who prohibits

deriving benefit from the sinew, does not accept this kal va-homer. Because

there is room to refute it: What is distinctive about forbidden fat? It was permitted in part in the case of a wild animal,

as the Torah permitted the fat of a wild animal; and for that reason the Torah permitted deriving benefit from it even in the case of a domesticated animal. But can

you say

the same

with regard to the sinew, which was not permitted in part in the case of a wild animal,

as it is prohibited both in a wild animal and in a domesticated animal?!

And the other one

[Rabbi Yosei HaGelili] holds that this is not a valid refutation, because

with regard to a domesticated animal

we are saying

that the fat is more stringent than the sinew. For

in a domesticated animal

at least, the fat was not permitted

under any circumstances.

We inquire:

Now,

we have already

challenged Rabbi Abbahu with

to Rabbi Abahu from

all these verses

that concern prohibitions against eating, and we asked why they should not also prohibit deriving benefit.

And we answered

[and already resolved this] that in each case there is some exposition permitting deriving benefit from it. If so,

in what do Hezekiah and Rabbi Abbahu disagree?

Surely

they do not

disagree except

with regard to leaven on Passover, and according to the Rabbis

[of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili], who prohibit it for deriving benefit. But with regard to

the stoned ox,

it is

everyone

agrees that it is prohibited for deriving benefit.

Hezekiah derives

their prohibition

from “it shall not be eaten.”

And Rabbi Abbahu derives it from a carcass!

Since the verse was needed to permit deriving benefit from a carcass, infer from this that all prohibitions against eating in the Torah are also prohibited for deriving benefit unless the verse explicitly states that they are permitted.

And we conclude the question:

Now, according to both this master and that master,

leaven and the stoned ox

are prohibited for deriving benefit.

If so,

what practical difference is there between them

in law?

And we answer:

The difference between them concerns non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard.

As was explained above, according to Rabbi Yehuda [who requires the verse concerning a carcass for another matter, so that it is not available to derive from it a rule applying to the entire Torah], Rabbi Abbahu derives that all prohibitions against eating are also prohibited for deriving benefit from what is written with regard to an animal torn apart: “You shall cast it to the dog.” And we expound: “It”—you may cast it to a dog. But you may not cast any other prohibition in the Torah to a dog, because they are prohibited for deriving benefit.

If so, according to

Hezekiah, who holds

that

“it shall not be eaten”

came

to exclude these

[leaven and the stoned ox] and to prohibit them for deriving benefit,

“it”

written with regard to an animal torn apart is superfluous, and

it came to exclude non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard!

You may not cast them to a dog; rather, they are prohibited for deriving benefit.

But

Rabbi Abbahu holds

that there is no distinction between “you shall not eat” and “it shall not be eaten.” And he derives from

“it”

written with regard to an animal torn apart

to exclude these

and to prohibit them for deriving benefit. If so, “it” is no longer available to exclude

non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard

and to prohibit them for deriving benefit. It follows that according to him, their prohibition against deriving benefit

is not of Torah origin!

They are not included among all the prohibitions of the Torah, because no expression of a prohibition against eating is written with regard to them.

A certain scholar sat before Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, and sat and said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: From where do we know with regard to all prohibitions in the Torah that just as they are prohibited for eating, so too are they prohibited for deriving benefit?

We inquire about his question:

And what are they

the prohibitions in the Torah that are prohibited even for deriving benefit? They are nothing other than

leaven on Passover and the stoned ox

[since with regard to all other prohibitions against eating, the verse explicitly states that they are permitted for deriving benefit, as stated above].

If so, why does he ask, “From where do we know that they are prohibited for deriving benefit?”

Let him derive it from “it shall not be eaten,”

which indicates a prohibition against deriving benefit as well, as Hezekiah said: “So that they should not have a permission to be eaten.”

And we answer: He does not hold like Hezekiah. Rather,

“it shall not be eaten” indicates

only

a prohibition against eating.

But

it does not indicate a prohibition against deriving benefit.

And we ask further: Why, then, does he still inquire?

Let him derive it from a carcass.

Since a verse was needed to permit deriving benefit from a carcass, infer that with regard to the other prohibitions against eating, even deriving benefit is prohibited.

And we answer:

He holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says

“matters are as they are written”!

The verse “You shall give it to the stranger who is within your gates” was needed for its own purpose: to teach that the Torah permitted only giving it to a stranger and selling it to a gentile. Therefore, one cannot derive from it a general prohibition against deriving benefit.

And we ask further:

If he holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, let him derive

the prohibition against deriving benefit from leaven and the stoned ox

from where

Rabbi Abbahu

derives

the approach of

Rabbi Yehuda, from

what is written with regard to an animal torn apart:

“You shall cast it to the dog.”

And he expounds: “It”—you may cast it to a dog; but you may not cast any other prohibition in the Torah to a dog, because they are also prohibited for deriving benefit. And casting something to a dog constitutes deriving benefit.

And we answer:

He holds that non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard

are prohibited for deriving benefit

by Torah law.

And we derive their status from this exposition of “it”: Specifically, “flesh in the field that is torn”—that is, a limb of a fetus that emerged beyond the boundary of the mother before slaughter [and is therefore treated as a limb from a living animal]—is permitted for deriving benefit. But non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard [whose prohibition is likewise due to the boundaries of the Temple courtyard] are prohibited for deriving benefit.

And since “it” came for this purpose, that scholar properly asked:

From where

do we know that all prohibitions in the Torah are prohibited for deriving benefit?

And he answered: We derive it from

what is written:

“Any sin-offering

whose blood is brought

into the Tent of Meeting to effect atonement in the Sanctuary shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire.” The blood of external sin-offerings is placed on the altar of the burnt-offering. If some of their blood was placed on the golden altar, as is done with internal sin-offerings, they become disqualified.

This law had already been written on the eighth day of the inauguration, when the sons of Aaron burned the goat of Nahshon, which was an external sin-offering. Moses became angry with them for burning it and said to them: “Behold, its blood was not brought inside the Sanctuary; you should certainly eat it in the Sanctuary, as I commanded.” Infer from this that if its blood had been brought into the Tent of Meeting, it would properly have been burned.

It follows that the verse “Any sin-offering whose blood is brought inside … it shall be burned in fire” is superfluous and was not needed for its own subject.

And

if it does not concern its own subject,

since it had already

been written

with regard to the goat of Nahshon

“and behold, it is burned,”

as stated,

apply it to all prohibitions in the Torah!

[This is a method transmitted to Moses from Sinai, like all the methods by which the Torah is expounded: Anything written unnecessarily is expounded with regard to another matter.]