Pesachim 21b (כא:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: It is forbidden to sell koteḥ and all types of koteḥ thirty days before Pesaḥ.

“And it is permitted to derive benefit from it”: Obviously. No, it is necessary for a case where he charred it before its time. And we accept Rava’s ruling, as Rava said: If he charred it before its time, it is permitted to derive benefit from it even after its time. “When its time has passed, benefit from it is forbidden”:

Obviously. No, it is necessary with regard to the rabbinic hours, as Rav Giddel said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to one who betroths a woman from the sixth hour onward, even with Kordenaean wheat, we have no concern for the betrothal.

“And one may not use it to heat an oven or a stove”: Obviously. No, it is necessary according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says: The elimination of chametz is only through burning. One might have thought that since Rabbi Yehuda says that its mitzva is through burning, while he is burning it he may derive benefit from it. Therefore, it teaches us that this is not so.

Ḥizkiya said: From where is it derived that it is forbidden to derive benefit from chametz on Pesaḥ? As it is stated: “One shall not eat chametz.” This means: There shall be no permitted manner of eating it. The reason is that the Merciful One wrote “one shall not eat chametz”; had it not written “one shall not eat,” I would have said that it indicates a prohibition against eating, but it does not indicate a prohibition against deriving benefit. And this disagrees with Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said: Everywhere that the Torah states “shall not eat,” “you shall not eat,” or “you shall not eat,” it indicates both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit, unless the verse specifies otherwise, as it specified with regard to an animal carcass. For it was taught in a beraita: “You shall not eat any carcass; to the stranger who is in your gates you shall give it, that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a gentile,” and so on. From this I have only that one gives it to a resident alien and sells it to a gentile. From where do we know that one may sell it to a resident alien? The verse states: “To the stranger who is in your gates you shall give it, or you may sell it to a gentile.” From where do we know that one may give it to a gentile? The verse states: “You shall give it, that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a gentile.” You therefore conclude that both a resident alien and a gentile may receive it either through a sale or as a gift; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The words are to be understood as they are written: to a resident alien through a gift, and to a gentile through a sale.

What is Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning? If it enters your mind that his view is as Rabbi Meir said, let the Merciful One write: “To the stranger who is in your gates you shall give it, that he may eat it, and sell it.” Why do I need “or”? Infer from it that the words are to be understood as they are written. And Rabbi Meir: The word “or” serves to give precedence to giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, is this verse not necessary? Since you are commanded to sustain a resident alien, whereas you are not commanded to sustain a gentile, no verse is needed; it is a logical inference. Granted, according to Rabbi Meir, who says that both a resident alien and a gentile may receive it either through a sale or as a gift, since a verse was necessary to permit deriving benefit from an animal carcass, it follows that all prohibitions in the Torah are forbidden both for eating and for benefit. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says that this verse comes to establish the matters as they are written, from where does he derive that all prohibitions in the Torah are forbidden for benefit? He derives it from the verse, “To the dog you shall cast it.”