Niddah 9a — the Talmud in English

And if you say

that a wind pregnancy is called a complete pregnancy, then also a wind birth

is a superior birth.

And if so, why does she become a zava? Yet blood that flows because of

difficulty close to birth—

the Merciful One declared her pure!?

Rav Pappi said:

In fact, a wind birth is not considered a birth, and likewise a wind pregnancy is not considered a pregnancy. And the law of the beraita is not difficult: why do we not render the pure items impure retroactively after it became clear that this had been a wind pregnancy? Because

leave aside the impurity of from-time-to-time,

which is only an impurity

by rabbinic enactment,

and therefore they were lenient in it, to consider a wind pregnancy like an ordinary pregnancy.

Rav Pappa said:

One must distinguish between a wind pregnancy and its birth. For although a wind is not a fetus, and a woman who gives birth to it with blood due to difficulty is called a zava, nevertheless, regarding the law of from-time-to-time for a menstruating woman, we say that she has only her time.

And the reason for the matter is:

is its reason anything

in an ordinary pregnant woman, for whom she has only her time,

except that her head is heavy upon her and her limbs are heavy upon her

and because of this her blood is withheld? And if so,

here too,

in a wind pregnancy, behold,

her head and limbs are heavy upon her,

and she is one from whom blood is withheld; therefore, according to the fundamental law, she has only her time.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: She saw

blood,

and afterward,

immediately after her seeing,

her fetus became recognizable—

what is the law?

Do we say

since at the time when she saw, her fetus had not become recognizable, she becomes impure

retroactively,

or perhaps, since it was close to it,

the recognition of the fetus,

she saw, she does not become impure

retroactively, but she has only her time?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira to Rabbi Yirmeya:

is its reason anything

for a pregnant woman

except that her head is heavy upon her and her limbs are heavy upon her,

but in the case of this woman who saw before her fetus became recognizable, although the seeing was close to it, in the end,

at the time when she saw—

her head was not heavy upon her and her limbs were not heavy upon her!

Every woman who has a menstrual cycle is obligated to examine herself at the time of her cycle, and if she did not examine herself, she has the presumption of being impure by doubt. Later in the Gemara they disagree whether the obligation of examination [and the impurity by doubt if she did not examine herself] is from the Torah or rabbinic.

The novelty in this obligation of examination is that the woman cannot rely on the fact that she did not feel and did not see the blood; rather, she is obligated to examine herself, whether by Torah law or rabbinic law, and if she did not examine herself, she is impure by doubt.

An old man asked Rabbi Yohanan:

Her menstrual time arrived during her pregnancy,

after her fetus became recognizable,

and she did not examine herself

with the examination required at the time of her cycle—

what is the law?

And that old man added and explained his question:

This

is what I am asking

only

according to the one who says, “menstrual cycles are from the Torah”

[that the obligation of examination at the time of the cycle, and the impurity by doubt if she did not examine herself, are from the Torah].

And this is what I am asking:

what [is the law]? Since menstrual cycles are from the Torah—

she requires examination

even during her pregnancy, and since she did not examine herself, she is impure by doubt.

Or perhaps, since her blood is withheld

because she is pregnant,

she does not require examination at all?

But according to the one who says that menstrual cycles are rabbinic, and according to Torah law she may rely on the fact that she did not feel and did not see blood at the time of the cycle, it is obvious that in the case of a pregnant woman, who is one from whom blood is withheld, the Sages did not initially obligate her to examine herself.

And the foundation of the old man’s question is: to what extent can one rely on the presumption that a pregnant woman is called “one from whom blood is withheld,” so that we can dispense with the Torah obligation of examination at the time of the cycle?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira to that old man:

You learned it

for this question: that the presumption of “one from whom blood is withheld” is effective to prevent the Torah obligation of examination.

For we learned:

Rabbi Meir says:

A woman who has a menstrual cycle,

if she was in hiding, and the time of her cycle arrived and she did not examine herself,

she is

pure.

Because

the

anxiety

when she is in hiding

withholds the blood. And she may rely on the presumption of “one from whom blood is withheld” without examining herself.

She may rely on the presumption that her blood has ceased to flow without examining herself.

And Rabbi Zeira proves that this presumption is effective even according to the one who says that the obligation of examination is from the Torah:

The reason is that there is anxiety,

that is why we declared her pure without an examination;

but if there is no anxiety, and her cycle arrived and she did not examine herself, she is impure,

and an examination afterward will not help her, since she did not examine herself at the time of the obligation, at the time of her cycle. But according to the one who says that menstrual cycles are rabbinic, she may examine herself even afterward, and if afterward she finds herself pure, she is pure.

Thus

Rabbi Meir holds

that vesatot are by Torah law.

And despite the fact that the obligation of examination is by Torah law,

since there is anxiety,

behold,

her blood

is presumed

to have been removed,

and they rely upon this presumption in place of an obligation of examination by Torah law,

and examination is not required.

If so,

here too,

with a pregnant woman, since

her blood has been removed,

it is possible to rely upon this presumption

and examination is not required

in order to declare her pure.

We learned in the Mishna: A nursing woman—

until she weans [the child], and so forth.

The Sages taught: A nursing woman whose son died within twenty-four months

[which is the period of nursing]

is like all women, and renders impure from time to time and from examination to examination,

because the sighting of blood does not depend upon the period of nursing but upon actual nursing.

Therefore, if she had been nursing him and continued

and continued in nursing for

four or five years—

her status is from the present time, the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon say: Their status is from the present time

of nursing women

for all twenty-four months,

even if they stopped nursing in the middle of the period. For the reason that they do not see blood is the pain of childbirth, because their limbs become disjointed, and not because of the nursing.

Therefore, if she had been nursing him for four or five years,

and she saw blood after twenty-four months, she

renders impure from time to time and from examination to examination.

And the Gemara explains the reasoning of the tannaim who disagree in the beraita:

When you examine the matter closely, according to Rabbi Meir—

the blood

of menstruation, through the nursing,

becomes spoiled and turns into milk,

and therefore everything depends upon the nursing.

But

according to Rabbi Yosei, Rabbi Judah, and Rabbi Shimon,

the reason that a nursing woman does not see blood is that

her limbs become disjointed

from the childbirth,

and her vitality

[her blood]

does not return until twenty-four months,

whether she is nursing or not.

And the Gemara explains the wording of the beraita: “

therefore,” of Rabbi Meir—

why do I need it?

Since Rabbi Meir said that if she stopped [nursing] within twenty-four months, the blood returns, it is proven that the matter depends only upon actual nursing. If so, it is obvious that the same law applies if she continues nursing after twenty-four months: the nursing prevents the sighting of blood, for according to Rabbi Meir twenty-four months has no significance whatsoever. If so, what is “therefore”?

And the Gemara answers that the expression “therefore” in Rabbi Meir’s words is only

because of “

therefore”

of Rabbi Yosei,

for the tanna wanted to employ similar wording in both of them.

And “therefore” of Rabbi Yosei—

why do I need it?

But since the matter depends only upon the twenty-four months after childbirth, because during that time her limbs become disjointed, it is obvious that afterward she will see [blood], even if she continues nursing?

What might you have said? Rabbi Yosei has two [reasons],

both that the blood becomes spoiled and turns into milk and that “her limbs become disjointed”; therefore, if she continues nursing after twenty-four months, she will not see [blood] because of the reason that the blood becomes spoiled and turns into milk.

It teaches us “therefore” of Rabbi Yosei: the reason is only that her limbs become disjointed, and therefore, even if she continues nursing after twenty-four months, the nursing will not prevent the return of her blood.

“therefore” of Rabbi Yosei: the reason is only that her limbs are dislocated. Therefore, even if she continues nursing after twenty-four months, the nursing will not prevent the return of her blood.

It was taught likewise,

as the Gemara explained the reasoning of the tannaim who disagree:

The blood becomes spoiled and turns into milk—

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: Her limbs become disjointed, and her vitality does not return to her until twenty-four months.

Rabbi Ela'i said: What is the reason,

what is his source,

of Rabbi Meir?

For it is written: “Who can bring forth purity from impurity—

is it not One?”

[That is to say: Who is able to transform an impure thing, such as menstrual blood, into a pure thing, such as milk, if not the One who is Master of the world?]

And the Rabbis,

how do they interpret this verse?

Rabbi Yohanan said: This is semen. It is

itself

impure, but

the

person created from it—

is pure.

And Rabbi Elazar says: These are the waters of the niddah,

mixed with the ashes of the red heifer.

The one who sprinkles

the water,

and the one upon whom he sprinkles

the water,

is pure,

whereas

the one who touches

the water—

is impure!

And we raised the question:

And

if

the one who sprinkles

the waters of the niddah is

pure? But it is written: “And the one who sprinkles the waters of the niddah

shall wash his garments,”

which implies that he and his garments become impure.

And we answer:

What is “the one who sprinkles”

spoken of in the verse?—

The one who touches!

And we object:

But it is written

also

“the one who sprinkles,” and it is written

also

“the one who touches,”

and it is proven that the one who sprinkles is not the one who touches, but they are two separate people?

Furthermore,

the difficulty remains, for the verse explicitly distinguished between the law of the one who sprinkles and the law of the one who touches,

in that

the

one who sprinkles requires washing

his garments, whereas the

one who touches does not require washing

of garments, but only he himself is impure until evening. How, then, is it possible to say that “the one who sprinkles” written in the verse refers to the one who touches?

And we answer:

Rather, what is “the one who sprinkles”

of whom the Torah says that he becomes impure?—

one who carries

the waters of the niddah. But one who sprinkles the waters of the niddah upon the impure person does not become impure.

But if so, the Gemara asks:

let it write, “

and

one who carries

the waters of the niddah shall wash his garments”; and why did the verse state “the one who sprinkles”?

And we answer: That which is written, “the one who sprinkles,”

teaches us

the verse this: that one who carries the waters of the niddah does not become impure

until he carries

[them]

according to the measure of sprinkling.

And we object:

This works according to the one who says, “sprinkling requires a measure,”

and therefore the one who carries does not become impure until he carries the measure of sprinkling.

But according to the one who says “

sprinkling does not require a measure”—

what can be said?

And we answer:

Even according to the one who says “

sprinkling does not require a measure,”

that statement applies

when there is no measure for the sprinkling water that is sprinkled

upon the back of the person

[who is being purified].

But in a vessel,

in the vessel from which the water is sprinkled,

we require a measure!

[Therefore, if this measure is lacking, the one who carries the water is pure.]

As we learned: How much water must there be

in the vessel

so that there will be in it “the measure of sprinkling”—

enough that he can immerse

[so that he can immerse in the water the]

heads of

the

stalks

of the hyssop [through which they would sprinkle upon the impure person in order to purify him],

and sprinkle!

And this is

that concerning this matter—that the one who sprinkles and the one upon whom they sprinkle are pure, whereas the one who touches the water is impure—

Solomon said, “

I said—

I will become wise,

but

it

the wisdom concealed in the laws of the waters of the niddah—

is far from me!””

We learned in the Mishna:

Who is an elderly woman? Any woman upon whom three periods have passed close to her old age!

And we raised the question:

What are the circumstances?

When is the period of

“close to her old age”? Rav Judah said: Any woman concerning whom her companions say, “She is elderly.”