Niddah 7b (ז:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard only

in the case of a virgin,

but the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Who is considered a virgin? Any woman who has never seen blood in her life, even though she is married.

A pregnant woman –

from when her pregnancy becomes known.

A nursing woman –

from the birth

until she weans her child.

But if

she gave her child to a wet nurse,

or if she

weaned him, or

if he

died –

Rabbi Meir says: She conveys impurity retroactively for the entire twenty-four-hour period. And the Sages say: She has only the time of her discovery,

until twenty-four months have passed from the birth.

Who is an old woman? Any woman upon whom three menstrual periods have passed

without her seeing blood during them,

close to the onset of her old age.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

The fact that we learned that an old woman has only the time of her discovery does not mean specifically an old woman; rather,

any woman upon whom three menstrual periods have passed has only the time of her discovery.

Rabbi Yosei

disagrees with the ruling that a pregnant woman has only the time of her discovery from when her pregnancy becomes known, and that a nursing woman has this status from the birth, and

says:

Also,

a pregnant woman and a nursing woman

specifically must be women

upon whom three menstrual periods have passed

without their seeing blood; only then

do they have only the time of their discovery.

The Mishna then returns to explain the law that these women whose blood has ceased have only the time of their discovery:

And with regard to what did they say

“she has only the time of her discovery”?

With regard to the first sighting

alone, when she sees blood again after having ceased to menstruate.

But with

the

second sighting,

she returns to her previous status, since she is once again considered a woman whose blood is present, and she

conveys impurity retroactively for the entire twenty-four-hour period

retroactively.

And if she saw

the

first

sighting after her blood had ceased,

due to an external cause,

such as jumping or being struck [Tosefta], the sighting caused by the external factor is not considered a return of her blood. Therefore,

even with the

sighting

second –

she has only the time of her discovery!

Gemara:

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: You did not hear

the law applying to all the women whose blood had ceased –

but I heard

the law applying to all of them.

You heard only

the law applying to

one

of them [a virgin],

whereas I heard many

[four women].

We do not say to one who did not see the new moon, “

Come –

and testify

that you saw it”!

Rather,

we say this only

to one who saw it!

Throughout Rabbi Eliezer’s lifetime, they followed Rabbi Yehoshua

[who held that only a virgin has only the time of her discovery].

But

after Rabbi Eliezer’s death, Rabbi Yehoshua restored the matter to its original state –

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer!

And we explain:

During the lifetime

of Rabbi Eliezer,

what was the reason that

Rabbi Yehoshua did not rule in accordance with him?

Because Rabbi Eliezer was shammuti

[as they had placed him under a ban of ostracism]

he was.

And

Rabbi Yehoshua

reasoned: If we act in accordance with him in one matter,

in this halakha,

we will act in accordance with him

also

in other matters,

[and in other halakhot one should not rule in accordance with him when he disagrees with others, because he was shammuti]. And if people err and rule in accordance with him in additional halakhot, then

because of Rabbi Eliezer’s honor, we will be unable to strike them,

the erring ones.

But after Rabbi Eliezer’s death, when we could strike them,

those who would rule in accordance with him improperly,

he restored the matter to its original state,

for in this halakha Rabbi Yehoshua agreed with Rabbi Eliezer that all four women have only the time of their discovery.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer in four

disputes in which he disagreed with others.

One –

as we said

here: After Rabbi Eliezer’s death, the halakha was established that all four women whose blood had ceased have only the time of their discovery.

And the other:

The case that we learned later: A pregnant woman

who is in labor,

who was seized by labor pains and saw blood for three days, which were “days of menstruation,” has the following law: If the pains continued until close to the birth, the blood does not have the status of menstrual blood; rather, it is considered labor blood, and the woman does not become a menstruant because of seeing it.

But if the pains ceased for a period of time, as will be explained, and she gave birth only after that period, the blood she saw during the days preceding the interruption is not considered labor blood; rather, it is ordinary menstrual blood.

And the tanna'im disagreed in the Mishna concerning the length of the interruption, which the Mishna calls “shefiya”:

And how long

a period must she

have respite

[cease] from the labor pains

and become

considered

a menstruant

because of the blood she saw before the interruption?

If she has respite [ceases to feel the labor pains] for

a full twenty-four-hour period

before the birth,

these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer!

And we learned there:

And the halakha follows his words,

those of Rabbi Eliezer!

And the other –

the case that we learned later:

A zav and a zava who examined themselves on the first day

of counting the seven clean days following their discharge

and found

themselves

pure.

They likewise examined themselves on

the seventh day and found themselves pure.

And the rest of the days

between the first and the seventh

they did not examine themselves –

Rabbi Eliezer says: These women retain a presumptive status of purity!

It is sufficient for us, after the fact, that they examined themselves at the beginning and end of the seven days.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: They have no days,

other than, as a matter of uncertainty,

the first day and the seventh day alone,

which are considered as though they counted only two clean days. Therefore, they must count another five clean days, because according to his view one must examine oneself on every day counted among the seven clean days.

Rabbi Akiva says: They have only the seventh day,

because they require a count of seven consecutive clean days, whereas here five days passed without her examining herself between the first and seventh days.

And it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosei say –

the words of Rabbi Eliezer

who establishes all seven days with a presumptive status of purity appear more convincing

than the words of Rabbi Yehoshua,

who permits counting the first and seventh days as two days, even though the middle days do not have a presumptive status of purity, and if we are concerned that she became impure during them, the purity of the first day is invalidated.

And the words of Rabbi Akiva

appear even more convincing

than the words of them all,

as it is possible to count only the seventh day as one day .

However,

in practice –

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer!

And the other –

the case

that we learned: “The backs of vessels” that became impure through liquids,

such as liquids that became impure through a creeping creature and thereby became a first degree of impurity, and the liquids touched the back of the vessel and rendered the back of the vessel impure –

by rabbinic decree [for by Torah law, liquids that are a first degree of impurity cannot render vessels impure],

Rabbi Eliezer says: They render

those backs of vessels, after they became impure by rabbinic decree,

the liquids impure!

And even ordinary food,

and those liquids that became impure through the backs of the vessels will then render impure any food that touches them.

But they do not disqualify

the backs of the vessels

from rendering food impure, liquids—even ordinary liquids—and they do not disqualify food, even teruma,

because the entire impurity of the back of the vessel is rabbinic, and they decreed that it render only liquids impure, but not food.

The distinction between the language “renders impure” and the language “disqualifies” is that “renders impure” means that the contaminating entity has the power to render the contaminated object impure with a form of impurity that enables it to render others impure as well. “Disqualifies,” by contrast, means that only the object touching the disqualifying entity is “disqualified”; it does not have the power to render other objects impure or disqualified.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: They render the liquids impure and disqualify the food.

Rabbi Yehoshua said –

by means of a kal va-chomer:

And if a “purified person awaiting sunset,”

the less severe case, who is a second degree of impurity,

does not render ordinary liquids impure,

for we have established that anything that disqualifies teruma renders liquids impure, making them first-degree impurity, except for a purified person awaiting sunset (Rashi),

he nevertheless

disqualifies food of teruma

by Torah law, because a second degree of impurity disqualifies third-degree teruma.

“The backs of vessels,”

which are more severe in their impurity by rabbinic decree,

which render ordinary liquids impure

by rabbinic decree,

should they not certainly disqualify food of teruma

by rabbinic decree?

But Rabbi Eliezer

held that this kal va-chomer should not be expounded. For

the backs of vessels

have an impurity that is only

rabbinic, whereas

the

purified person awaiting sunset

has an impurity that is

by Torah law. And the Sages,

in their decrees concerning impurity, do not derive

from

impurity

by Torah law by means of a kal va-chomer!

The reason the Sages differentiated in their decree concerning the impurity of the backs of vessels, decreeing that they render only liquids and not food impure, is

that by Torah law food does not render a vessel impure, and liquids do not render a vessel impure.

It follows that all impurity of the back of a vessel that became impure through liquids is only rabbinic,

and

only

the Sages decreed

that the backs of vessels upon which impure liquids fell should render objects impure.

The reason they decreed this was

because of the liquids of a zav and a zava

[which are their saliva and urine, and are an origin of impurity by Torah law]. However, they did not make their decree so stringent as to render the back of a vessel that became impure through liquids completely impure, so that it would render everything touching it impure.

Rather, they decreed that it render only

liquids

impure, which are more susceptible to impurity, because

they are liable to contract impurity

since they do not require “preparation by water” and can become impure immediately; therefore,

the Sages issued a decree concerning them.

But

food,

which is not as severe,

is not liable to contract impurity

unless it has been “prepared” by water being placed upon it –

the Sages did not issue a decree concerning it.

We raise a difficulty:

What is different about “the backs of vessels,” which the tanna mentioned,

given that even if impure liquids fall inside the vessel, they render it impure only by rabbinic decree? The law should therefore be the same: The inside of a vessel that became impure by rabbinic decree should render only liquids impure and should not disqualify food.

And we answer:

Because they are lenient!

For the reason we were lenient concerning the backs of vessels that became impure through liquids, so that they do not disqualify food, is that the impurity of the backs of vessels is less severe than the impurity of the insides of vessels. Therefore, the law of the inside of a vessel cannot be compared with that of the back of a vessel.

And what is the greater severity of the inside of a vessel compared with its back?

As we learned: A vessel that became impure through liquids on its back –

its back

alone

is impure.

But

its inside, its rim, its receptacle, and its handles –

are pure.

And if

its inside became impure

through liquids –

the entire vessel is impure,

both its inside and its back.

The Gemara returns to explain Shmuel’s ruling that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer in four disputes:

We raise a difficulty:

What does Shmuel teach us?

For

in all of them we learned

explicitly that the

halakha

is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer!

And if you say

that it is specifically concerning

the backs of vessels that he teaches us

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, since

we did not learn

there that the halakha follows him,

then this is difficult:

Let

Shmuel

say, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer concerning the backs of vessels,”

and why did Shmuel need to include all four halakhot, when concerning the first three we learned explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer?

And we answer:

Rather, this is what Shmuel teaches us:

—

The halakha is not learned from the wording of the Talmud!

The fact that the Mishna states that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer is the conclusion of the tanna'itic Talmud; one does not rule according to the tanna'im, but according to the amora'im, after they carefully analyzed their statements and established the halakha clearly.

We raise another difficulty:

And

if

there are no more

rulings that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

but there is

the case

that we learned:

Two sisters, orphans from their father, one an adult and the other a minor, were married to two brothers. The elder was married according to Torah law, while the younger was married only by rabbinic law, as the Sages instituted that a minor can be betrothed through her brother or mother.

The brother who was the husband of the elder died, and she thereby fell before the other brother for levirate marriage by Torah law, while that brother was married by rabbinic law to her younger sister.

It follows that the elder levirate’s bond to him, which is by Torah law, renders his wife, the younger sister, forbidden to him under the prohibition of “the sister of one bound to him,” [for the Torah prohibition against the sister of his levirate wife overrides his marriage to the younger sister for levirate marriage].

[And he cannot divorce his younger wife and perform levirate marriage with the elder levirate, because she would then be the sister of his divorced wife and would be forbidden to him by rabbinic law].