Niddah 7b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Joshua said: I heard only

“a virgin,” ![](pamud.bmp "

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but the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Who is a virgin? Any woman who has never seen blood in her lifetime, even though she is married.

A pregnant woman —

from when her pregnancy is known.

A nursing woman —

from the birth

until she weans her son.

But if

she gave her son to a wet nurse,

or

she weaned him, or

he

died —

Rabbi Meir says: she becomes impure from time to time. And the Sages say: her present time is sufficient

until twenty-four months from the birth are completed.

Who is an old woman? Any woman upon whom three periods have passed

without her seeing during them

close to her old age.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

the fact that we learned “an old woman” has only her present time does not mean specifically an old woman, but

every woman upon whom three periods have passed has only her present time.

Rabbi Yosei

disagrees with the law that a pregnant woman has only her present time from when her pregnancy is known, and a nursing woman from the birth, and

says:

also

a pregnant woman and a nursing woman

specifically when

three periods have passed over them

and they did not see; only then

do they have only their present time.

And the Mishna returns and explains the law of “her present time is sufficient” with regard to women whose blood has ceased:

And with regard to what did they say

“her present time is sufficient”?

With the first sighting

alone, when she returns and sees after her blood had ceased.

But with

the

second sighting,

she returns to her former status, for she is again considered a woman whose blood is present in her, and she

becomes impure from time to time

retroactively.

And if she saw

the

first sighting

after her blood had ceased,

by accident,

such as she jumped or was struck [Tosefta], the accidental sighting is not considered as though her blood had returned; therefore

even with the

sighting

second —

her present time is sufficient!

Gemara:

It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Joshua: You did not hear

the law of all the women whose blood had ceased —

but I heard

the law of all of them.

You heard only

the law of

one

of them [a virgin],

whereas I heard many

[four women].

One does not say to one who did not see the new moon:

“Come” —

“and testify

that you saw it”!

Rather,

one says this only

to one who saw it!

Throughout all the days of Rabbi Eliezer, they acted in accordance with Rabbi Joshua

[that only a virgin has only her present time].

But,

after Rabbi Eliezer’s death, Rabbi Joshua restored the matter to its original state —

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer!

And we explain:

During the lifetime

of Rabbi Eliezer,

for what reason did Rabbi Joshua not

rule in accordance with him?

Because Rabbi Eliezer was under a ban

[for they imposed a ban of ostracism upon him]

he.

And

Rabbi Joshua reasoned:

if we act in accordance with him in one matter,

in this halakha,

we will act in accordance with him

of Rabbi Eliezer also

in another matter,

[and in other laws one should not rule in accordance with him when he disagrees with others, because he was under a ban]. And if they err and rule in accordance with him in additional laws, then

because of Rabbi Eliezer’s honor, we cannot strike them,

those who err.

But, after Rabbi Eliezer’s death, when we can strike them,

those who decide in accordance with him unlawfully —

he restored the matter to its original state,

for in this halakha Rabbi Joshua agreed with Rabbi Eliezer that all four women have only their present time.

Rav Judah said in the name of Samuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer in four

disputes in which he disagreed with others.

One —

as we said

here: after Rabbi Eliezer’s death, it was ruled as halakha that all four women whose blood had ceased have only their present time.

And the other:

that which we learned below: a pregnant woman

who is suffering

in labor, whom labor pains seized, and who saw blood for three days, and those days were “days of ziva,” if the pains continued until close to the birth, the blood does not have the status of ziva blood; rather, it is considered the “blood of difficulty” of childbirth, and the woman does not become a zava through seeing it.

But if the pains ceased for a period of time, as will be explained, and only after that period did she give birth, the blood she saw during those days preceding the cessation is not considered “blood of difficulty”; rather, it is ordinary ziva blood.

And the tannaim disagreed in the Mishna concerning the measure of the period of the cessation, which is called in the Mishna “shefiya”:

And how much

time

must she be relieved

[must cease] from the labor pains

and become

considered

a zava

because of the sighting of blood before the cessation?

If she is relieved [ceases to feel the labor pains] for

a twenty-four-hour period

before the birth,

these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer!

And we learned there:

And the halakha is in accordance with his words

of Rabbi Eliezer!

And the other —

that which we learned below:

A man with a discharge and a woman with a discharge who examined themselves on the first day

of the counting of the seven clean days following their discharge

and found

themselves

pure.

And they also examined themselves on

the seventh day and found themselves pure.

And the other days

between the first and the seventh

they did not examine —

Rabbi Eliezer says: These have the presumption of purity!

For, after the fact, the examinations at the beginning and end of the seven days suffice for us.

Rabbi Joshua says: They have no

certainty

except the first day and the seventh day alone,

for it is considered as though they counted only two clean days; therefore they must count five more clean days, because according to his view they are required to examine on every day that they count among the seven clean days.

Rabbi Akiva says: They have only the seventh day,

for they require a count of seven consecutive clean days, whereas here they omitted five days, on which she did not examine, between the first and the seventh.

And it was taught: Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosei say —

the words of Rabbi Eliezer

who establishes all seven days with the presumption of purity appear more plausible

than the words of Rabbi Joshua

who permits counting the first day and the seventh day as two days, even though the middle days do not have a presumption of purity, and if there is concern that she became impure during them, the purity of the first day is undermined.

And the words of Rabbi Akiva

appear more plausible

than the words of them all,

for it is possible to count only the seventh day as one day .

But,

in practice —

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer!

And the other —

that

which we learned: “the backs of vessels” that became impure through liquids,

such as liquids that became impure through a creeping creature and thereby became a first degree of impurity, and the liquids touched the back of the vessel and rendered the back of the vessel impure through impurity —

by rabbinic decree [for by Torah law, liquids that are a first degree of impurity cannot render vessels impure],

Rabbi Eliezer says: They render

those backs of vessels, after they became impure through rabbinic impurity,

the liquids impure!

And even ordinary liquids,

and those liquids that became impure from the backs of the vessels will continue and render impure foods that touch them.

And they do not invalidate

the backs of the vessels

that render foods impure, render liquids impure, and even ordinary liquids, and do not invalidate foods, even teruma

since all the impurity of the back of the vessel is rabbinic, they decreed that it should render only liquids impure and not foods.

The distinction between the wording “renders impure” and the wording “invalidates” is that “renders impure” means that the impure object has the power to render the object rendered impure with an impurity such that it too can render others impure. Whereas “invalidates” means that only the object touching the invalidating object is “invalid,” but it does not have the power to render others impure or invalidate them.

Rabbi Joshua says: They render the liquids impure and invalidate the foods.

Rabbi Joshua said —

a kal va-chomer:

And if a “person who immersed that day,”

the less severe one, who is second-degree impurity,

does not render ordinary liquid impure,

for we hold that anything that invalidates teruma renders liquid primary, except for a person who immersed that day (Rashi),

then he

invalidates teruma foods

by Torah law, because a second degree invalidates a third degree in teruma.

“The backs of vessels,”

which are more severe in their impurity by rabbinic decree,

which render ordinary liquid impure

by rabbinic decree,

is it not all the more so that they should invalidate teruma foods

by rabbinic decree?

And Rabbi Eliezer

held that one should not expound this kal va-chomer. For

the backs of vessels

have an impurity that is only

by rabbinic decree, and

these

people who immersed that day

have an impurity that is

by Torah law. And the Sages,

with their decrees concerning impurity, do not derive a kal va-chomer

from

impurity

by Torah law!

The reason that the Sages distinguished in their decree concerning the impurity of the backs of vessels, that they should render only liquids and not foods impure, is

that by Torah law neither food renders a vessel impure, nor liquid renders a vessel impure.

It follows that all the impurity of the back of a vessel that became impure from liquids is only rabbinic,

and

only

the Sages decreed

concerning the backs of vessels upon which impure liquids fell, that they should render impure.

The reason they decreed is

because of the liquids of a man with a discharge and a woman with a discharge

[which are their saliva and urine, which are a primary source of impurity by Torah law], but they did not make this decree stringent enough to make the back of a vessel that became impure through liquids completely impure, so that it would render every object touching it impure.

Rather, they decreed that they should render only

liquids

impure, which are more severe, because

they are liable to receive impurity,

since they do not require “preparation by water” and can become impure immediately; therefore

the Sages decreed concerning them.

But

foods,

which are not so severe,

are not liable to receive impurity

without being “prepared” through water being placed upon them —

the Sages did not decree concerning them.

And we inquire:

And what is different about “the backs of vessels,” which the tannay mentioned,

for even if impure liquids fall inside the vessel, they render it impure only by rabbinic decree, and the law should have been the same: that the inside of a vessel that became impure by rabbinic decree should render only liquids impure and should not invalidate foods?

And we answer:

Because they are lenient!

For the reason that we were lenient concerning the backs of vessels that became impure through liquids, that they do not invalidate foods, is that their impurity is less severe than the impurity of the inside of vessels; therefore the law of the inside of a vessel should not be compared to the back of a vessel.

And what is the greater severity of the inside of a vessel than the back of a vessel?

For we learned: A vessel that became impure through its back from liquids —

its back

alone

is impure.

But

its inside, its rim, its receptacle, and its handles —

are pure.

And if

its inside became impure

through liquids —

the entire vessel is impure,

both its inside and its back!

And the Gemara returns to explain Samuel’s ruling that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer in four disputes:

And we inquire:

What does Samuel teach us?

For

in all of them we learned

explicitly that the

halakha

is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer!

And if you say

that concerning

the backs of vessels he teaches us

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

for we did not learn

there that the halakha is in accordance with him,

then this is difficult —

let Samuel say

that

“the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer concerning the backs of vessels,”

and why did Samuel need to include all four laws in his statement, when concerning the first three we learned explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer?

And we answer:

Rather, this Samuel teaches us

—

that one does not derive the halakha from the wording of a teaching!

For what is written in the Mishna, “the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,” is the conclusion of the teaching of the tannaim, and one does not rule according to the tannaim, but according to the amoraim, after they carefully examined their words and established the halakha in its proper form.

And further we inquire:

and

if

there is no longer

a halakha in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer?

But there is

that

which we learned:

two sisters, orphans from their father, one an adult and the other a minor, who were married to two brothers. The adult was married in accordance with law, by Torah law, while the minor was married only by rabbinic law, for the Sages instituted marriage for a minor so that she could become betrothed through her brother or mother.

And the brother who was the husband of the adult died, and she fell before the second brother for yibbum by Torah law, while he was married through a rabbinic marriage to her minor sister.

It follows that the yibbum bond by Torah law of the adult yevama to him prohibits his wife, the minor, through the prohibition of “the sister of one bound to him” [for the prohibition of the sister of his yevama by Torah law overrides his marriage for yibbum].

[And he cannot divorce his minor wife and perform yibbum with the adult yevama, because then the yevama would be the sister of his divorced wife and would be prohibited to him by rabbinic law].