Nedarim 82a (פב.) — the Talmud in English

He may dissolve his portion,

so that she will be permitted to him,

and have relations with her.

And she shall be prohibited to all other men.

The vow nevertheless remains in force with regard to all other men, and if she is divorced, she is forbidden to everyone.

And if you say

that abstention from marital relations

is a vow involving affliction of the soul—

why should she be prohibited to all other men!?

Why should she be forbidden to all of Israel?

But

since this is considered a vow involving affliction of the soul, the husband can dissolve the vow with regard to everyone.

Infer from this

that abstention from marital relations

is a matter between him and her,

and not affliction of the soul.

Therefore, he dissolves the vow only with regard to himself; but if she is divorced, she is forbidden to everyone.

And he rejects this:

For the Rabbis, you still have a question

since the tanna of the Mishna is Rabbi Yosei, and he indeed holds that abstention from marital relations is not affliction of the soul, as we learned in the beraita on the previous page. But with regard to the Rabbis, it is still uncertain whether abstention from marital relations is affliction of the soul or not.

It is because Rabbi Yosei taught the case of “I am prohibited to all other men”

and because Rabbi Yosei is the author of the Mishna concerning one who is prohibited to all other men.

And from where do we know that the tanna of the Mishna is Rabbi Yosei?

As Rav Huna said: The entire chapter is Rabbi Yosei’s.

All the anonymous Mishnayot taught in this chapter are the words of Rabbi Yosei.

From where—

and from where does Rav Huna derive this?

Since it teaches

in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei says: These are not vows involving affliction of the soul,

why does it need to teach further

why must the Mishna repeat and write:

This is a matter that he may dissolve, the words of Rabbi Yosei.

Infer from here onward

that all the Mishnayot in this chapter

are Rabbi Yosei’s,

but with regard to the Rabbis, it is still uncertain whether abstention from marital relations is considered affliction of the soul or not 27 .

Shmuel said in the name of Levi:

A husband may dissolve all vows for his wife

all vows that cause affliction to the woman are considered vows involving affliction of the soul.

Except—

for “My benefit is forbidden to so-and-so,” which he cannot dissolve,

when she forbids herself from benefiting so-and-so, since this does not involve affliction of the soul, the husband cannot dissolve it.

But

if she forbids herself from

benefiting from so-and-so,

even though she has not forbidden herself from all people,

he may dissolve it,

as this is affliction of the soul.

We learned—

if she said: Konam,

“The produce of this country is forbidden to me,” he may bring her produce from another country,

since he can bring her produce from another country, this is not included among vows involving affliction of the soul, for she has the option of eating produce from another country,

It is thus evident that if she completely forbade herself from benefiting from a particular thing, but has the option of obtaining that benefit from elsewhere, this is not considered affliction of the soul. If so, certainly, if she forbade herself from benefiting from a particular person, while she remains permitted to benefit from the entire world except him, this is not affliction of the soul.

And he rejects this:

Rav Yosef said: It is speaking of a case where she said that he should bring it,

for example, she said: Konam, “The produce of this country is forbidden to me,” if her husband brings her the produce. Since she has the option of benefiting from “produce” by having her husband himself bring her produce from elsewhere, it is not affliction of the soul and he cannot dissolve the vow ; but when she says, “The benefit of so-and-so is forbidden to me,” since she has no possibility of benefiting in any way from that particular person, one may say that this is considered affliction of the soul.

Come and hear—

we learned in the latter clause of the Mishna:

“The produce of this shopkeeper is forbidden to me”—he cannot dissolve it,

since he can bring her produce from another shopkeeper, this is not affliction of the soul. Here too, even though she is forbidden to benefit from one person, it should not be affliction of the soul, since she has the option of benefiting from someone else.

Here too,

the case is one

where she said that you should bring it.

Since she has the option of benefiting from “produce” because her husband himself can bring her produce from another shopkeeper, it is not affliction of the soul and he cannot dissolve the vow. But when she says, “The benefit of so-and-so is forbidden to me,” since she has no possibility of benefiting from that particular person, one may say that this is considered affliction of the soul.

And he challenges this—from the latter clause of the Mishna:

“If her sustenance came only from him,

since only this shopkeeper gives her husband on credit, and he will not find another who will give him on credit, and at times he has no money, the woman consequently suffers,

this is a matter that he may dissolve,”

since this is affliction of the soul.

And if you say

that the entire Mishna is speaking in a case

where she said that you should bring it,

and she forbade the vow only with regard to her husband,

why may he dissolve it

in the latter clause? We explained above that this is not considered affliction of the soul.

Rather, since the latter clause

must necessarily be speaking in a case

where the husband does not bring it,

where she did not formulate her vow specifically so that only her husband would be prohibited from bringing her produce; therefore, if her sustenance comes only from him, it is considered affliction of the soul.

It follows that the first clause is also speaking of a case where she herself brings it.

The first clause, too, is speaking of a case where she forbade herself from benefiting from the produce of this shopkeeper, so that not only is her husband forbidden, but she herself cannot purchase produce from him either .

Rather, in the first clause he cannot dissolve it, and she herself brings it.

Rather, it is certainly as we demonstrated: The first clause is speaking of a case where she forbade herself from benefiting from the produce of this shopkeeper, so that even she herself cannot purchase produce from him.