Nedarim 54a — the Talmud in English

One who vows

to abstain from deriving benefit

from vegetables,

is prohibited from every item called yerek, namely, green leaves. However, produce of the ground is not included in this expression.

Therefore,

he is permitted

to derive benefit

from

пользу от

pumpkins.

This is for two reasons:

First, pumpkins are not “vegetables,” since they are not leaves, but rather produce of the ground.

Second, pumpkins differ from other vegetables in the manner in which they are eaten: they are not eaten raw, but only when cooked. Therefore, people do not call them vegetables.

And Rabbi Akiva

disagrees, and

prohibits

one who vows to abstain from vegetables from deriving benefit even from pumpkins.

The Sages said

to

Rabbi Akiva:

Is it not possible to prove our position from everyday practice?

Does not

a person who wishes to send an agent to shop in the marketplace

say

to

the person

who is

his agent: “Buy vegetables for me

from the marketplace and bring them to me”?

And

when the agent does not find vegetables and returns empty-handed,

he says:

“I did not find

any vegetables in the marketplace; there was

only pumpkins,

and if you wish, I will go and bring them to you.”

From the fact that this is the way people speak, we see that pumpkins are not included among vegetables. For an agent who was sent to bring vegetables would not bring pumpkins without receiving explicit permission.

This proves the position of the Rabbis, that pumpkins are not included among vegetables.

Rabbi Akiva said

to the Rabbis: Indeed,

that is the case,

and the agent is accustomed to return and say this to the head of the household.

Or perhaps he says

to the head of the household:

“I did not find

vegetables,

only legumes?”

That is to say, indeed, the usual practice is as you say: the agent offers the head of the household pumpkins as a substitute for vegetables.

However, it is from this very matter that I prove my position. For he does not offer the head of the household legumes as a substitute for vegetables, since legumes do not resemble vegetables at all; whereas he does offer him pumpkins as a substitute.

Rather,

we are necessarily compelled to see from this

that pumpkins

are indeed

included among vegetables, whereas legumes are not included among vegetables —

for the agent does not offer legumes to the head of the household as a substitute for vegetables.

Therefore, when a person prohibits vegetables to himself, pumpkins are also prohibited according to Rabbi Akiva.

And the Mishna continues:

And

both according to Rabbi Akiva and according to the Rabbis,

this person is prohibited

who prohibited himself

from

vegetables,

from Egyptian beans

when they are

fresh. And he is permitted

to eat Egyptian beans when they are

dry,

as at that point they are not considered vegetables.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who vows to abstain from vegetables”

and

so on:

The Gemara examines the statement of Rabbi Akiva, that if one vows to abstain from vegetables, he is also prohibited from pumpkins.

But he vowed to abstain from vegetables,

and pumpkins are not vegetables?

And although Rabbi Akiva explained his reasoning—that from the fact that the agent offers the head of the household pumpkins as a substitute for vegetables, it is evident that pumpkins are to some degree included among vegetables—nevertheless, is this not contrary to the plain meaning of the word “vegetables”?

Ulla said:

Here we are dealing

with

a person who

says: “Vegetables for a pot”

shall be prohibited

to me,

and he did not simply say “vegetables.”

Since he intended by his wording to include additional items, and not merely to prohibit ordinary vegetables—for he did not simply say “vegetables,” but said “vegetables for a pot”—he is therefore also prohibited from pumpkins.

And we challenge this:

Perhaps

what he prohibited to himself,

“vegetables

for a pot,” means that he intended to include vegetables

that are eaten in a pot?

That is, he intended to include garlic and onions, which are added to impart flavor to a pot, and this alone was his intention when he said “vegetables for a pot”; he did not intend to include pumpkins. If so, from where does Rabbi Akiva know that one who says “vegetables for a pot” is prohibited from pumpkins?

The Gemara answers: This is not referring to one who prohibited vegetables without qualification, nor to one who said “vegetables for a pot.” Rather, it is referring

to

a person who

says: “Vegetable that is cooked in a pot, be prohibited to me!”

Therefore, we say that his intention in using such wording was to include pumpkins as well. Since we see that this person came to include more than ordinary vegetables—for he said “vegetable that is cooked in a pot”—and pumpkins are considered somewhat like vegetables, as is evident from the fact that an agent brings them as a substitute for vegetables, Rabbi Akiva therefore prohibited pumpkins as well.

The Gemara proceeds to explain:

In what do they disagree,

the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva — in what point do they disagree?

The Rabbis hold: Any item regarding which the agent must consult him,

meaning that the agent does not purchase it on his own initiative without the explicit permission of the head of the household,

is not of its kind

as a vegetable

—

for we see that he must consult the head of the household and cannot rely on the head of the household’s instruction to buy vegetables.

And Rabbi Akiva

disagrees, and

hold

that

he

who

consults the agent regarding an item —

meaning that the agent offers it to the head of the household as a substitute — this necessarily shows that it is included to some degree in his original words. Otherwise, the agent would not offer it as a substitute, just as he would not offer something entirely different. Since the agent offers pumpkins in place of vegetables, it is possible to say that

it is of its kind

as a vegetable

.

that it is included among vegetables.

Abaye said: The statement of Rabbi Akiva, that pumpkins too are included in the vow concerning vegetables and are prohibited, applies only in a case of uncertainty.

Therefore,

Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to lashes

that if he violated his vow and derived benefit from pumpkins,

he does not receive lashes,

since lashes are administered only when a person certainly violated a prohibition, whereas here we say only in a case of uncertainty that pumpkins were prohibited as part of vegetables.

The Gemara now discusses who the tanna of the following Mishna is:

We learned there

in tractate Me’ila, regarding the law of agency, that although with regard to all matters a person’s agent is considered like the person himself, this does not apply where the agency is for the performance of a transgression, since there is no agency for a transgression.

However, with regard to misuse of consecrated property, the Torah instituted that there is agency even for a transgression. Thus, if one mistakenly sent an agent to remove an item from consecrated property and transfer it to non-sacred use, the agent is considered his agent, and the sender is liable under the law of one who misuses consecrated property.

Therefore,

if the agent who performed

the

agency

of the head of the household who sent him to transfer consecrated property to non-sacred use, the law is that

the head of the household misused the consecrated property,

since, with regard to misuse, the halakha was instituted that a person’s agent is considered like the person himself.

But if the agent

did not perform

the

agency

of the head of the household, but deviated from the head of the household’s intention and transferred the consecrated item to non-sacred use in a manner inconsistent with the sender’s instructions,

the agent misused the consecrated property,

since he acted on his own initiative. This is not the agency of the head of the household; he is responsible for his actions, and not the sender.

The Gemara asks:

Who is the tanna,

who taught this Mishna?

Rav Ḥisda said:

It is possible to prove from the latter clause of

the Mishna

that it holds

not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva!

For

we

learned

in the latter clause of the Mishna:

“How

is the situation in which the agent is considered not to have performed the agency of the head of the household?”

For example, if

he said to him,

the head of the household to the agent:

“Give meat to the guests,”

and this meat was consecrated meat.

Had the agent acted in accordance with the head of the household’s words, the head of the household who sent him would have misused the consecrated property, and not the agent.

But the agent did not act in accordance with the head of the household’s words. Instead, he went

and gave them

in place of meat

liver.

Or, conversely, if the head of the household said to the agent,

“Give

the guests

liver,”

and the agent went

and gave them meat.

He did not fulfill the words of the head of the household.

In that case, the law is that

the agent misused the consecrated property,

since he performed the act on his own initiative, and he is the one who becomes liable for it.

It is evident from here that when the head of the household asked the agent to transfer consecrated meat to non-sacred use, and the agent deviated and gave liver, this is considered a deviation, since this act is not included in the agency of the head of the household.

And if

we say that the tanna of the Mishna concerning agency in misuse of consecrated property is

Rabbi Akiva, then,

it is evident from our Mishna that

Rabbi Akiva said: Any item regarding which

the

agent

consults the head of the household, asking whether he should bring it as a substitute for the original item, we can say

is of its kind,

and is included in the original item.

And likewise, when the sender said to the agent to give the guests meat, the agency is not limited to giving meat; rather, it includes anything that is generally included as a substitute for meat, such as liver. For if there is no meat, the agent would certainly offer the sender liver as a substitute for meat.

If so, feeding the guests liver is included in the same agency for which the agent was sent—to give the guests meat—and the law should therefore be that

the head of the household misused the consecrated property, and not the agent.

Why, then, does that Mishna state that the agent misuses the consecrated property and not the sender?

Rather, it is necessarily the case that the tanna of that Mishna is not Rabbi Akiva, but the Rabbis.

For they hold that even an item which the agent offers to the head of the household is not included in the original item.

Therefore, according to the Rabbis, an agent who deviated from his agency by substituting liver for meat is considered not to have performed the agency of the head of the household, and he misused the consecrated property.

The Gemara rejects the proof:

Abaye said: Even if you say

, you can say that that Mishna is, even according to

Rabbi Akiva.

For even according to Rabbi Akiva, it is possible to say that the agent misused the consecrated property and not the sender, despite the fact that the agent customarily offers liver as a substitute for meat.