Nedarim 53a (נג.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

As a continuation of the previous Mishna, our Mishna discusses one who vows to derive no benefit from certain produce, whether he is permitted to use products derived from it. However, the previous Mishna dealt with grapes and olives, whose products have distinctive names, namely, “wine” and “oil,” whereas our Mishna deals with produce whose products are called by the name of the original produce, such as “date honey” and the like.

One who vows to derive no benefit from dates

the law is that he

is permitted to use date honey,

as the one who vowed intended only the fruit and not what is derived from it

. One who vows to derive no benefit

from setuvanit

—hard grapes that do not ripen, which are left in the vineyard during the winter and used to make vinegar—the law is that he

is permitted to use setuvanit vinegar.

And although the setuvanit grapes themselves are not intended for eating but only for making vinegar, we do not say that one who vows to derive no benefit from setuvanit intended to prohibit vinegar. Rather, since he said “setu vanit” in his vow, he is prohibited only from the setu vanit grapes themselves, and not from the vinegar derived from them.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Any

fruit

whose derivative

[that emerges from it]

is called by its name,

by the name of that fruit—for example, “date honey” and “setu vanit vinegar,” which are not called simply “honey” or simply “vinegar”—

and one who vows against it

—against the fruit—the law is that he

is prohibited

even

from what is derived from it,

since the name of the fruit applies to it.

And the Sages

disagree with the first tanna, who holds that one who vows against setu vanit is permitted to use setu vanit vinegar but is prohibited from using the setu vanit grapes themselves, and they

permit

the setu vanit grapes and prohibit setu vanit vinegar.

For the Sages hold that when a person vows against something that is not ordinarily eaten, but only what is derived from it is eaten, he is permitted to use it and prohibited from using what is derived from it, since the one who vowed intended only what is customarily eaten.

But with regard to one who vows against dates, even the Sages agree that he is permitted to use date honey and prohibited from using dates, since the dates themselves are intended for eating.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: And the Sages permit.

The simple meaning is that the Sages come to permit what Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira prohibited: They permit the product derived from the object concerning which the vow was made, even if the name of that object applies to the product.

If so, it is difficult: The statement of

the Sages—is

exactly like the statement of

the first tanna,

who stated the same ruling, namely, that one who vows against dates or setu vanit is permitted to use date honey or setu vanit vinegar.

And we answer:

There is a difference between them

[there is a distinction between the first tanna and the Sages]

in this

[in this matter]—

as it was taught:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated this general principle:

1.

Anything that is ordinarily eaten, and what is derived from it is also ordinarily eaten, such as dates and date honey,

the law is that if one

vowed against it, he is prohibited

also

from what is derived from it,

and if he

vows against

what

is derived from it, he is prohibited from using it,

2.

Anything that is not ordinarily eaten, but what is derived from it is ordinarily eaten,

the law is that if one

vowed against it, he is prohibited only from what is derived from it,

as it may be said

that this person intended

in his vow

only what is derived from it.

And it is with regard to this matter that the first tanna, Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, and the Sages in our Mishna disagree,

For Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, in the beraita, holds that with regard to one who vows against dates, since they are ordinarily eaten and what is derived from them is also ordinarily eaten, he is prohibited from both. But with regard to one who vows against setu vanit, he holds that since it is not ordinarily eaten while what is derived from it is ordinarily eaten, he is prohibited only from what is derived from it.

The first tanna in our Mishna comes and disagrees with him both with regard to dates and with regard to setu vanit. He holds that whether the produce is ordinarily eaten or not ordinarily eaten, if one vows against it, he is prohibited from using it and permitted to use what is derived from it.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, by contrast, agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar concerning dates: Since they are ordinarily eaten and what is derived from them is ordinarily eaten, he is prohibited from both. But he disagrees with him concerning setu vanit, holding that there too he is prohibited from both, even though it is not ordinarily eaten and what is derived from it is ordinarily eaten.

And the Sages disagree with the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira concerning setu vanit. They permit the setu vanit and prohibit the vinegar derived from it, since it is not ordinarily eaten while what is derived from it is ordinarily eaten, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar:

Mishna:

Our Mishna teaches that one who vows against a particular food is permitted to use a similar food that is called by the same name if it has an accompanying designation.

One who vows against wine is permitted to use apple wine

since it has an accompanying designation, whereas he vowed against wine without qualification, and unqualified wine means grape wine and not apple wine.

Similarly, one who vows

against oil is permitted to use sesame oil,

as unqualified oil means olive oil and not sesame oil.

One who vows

against honey is permitted to use date honey,

as in ordinary human speech, unqualified honey means date honey.

One who vows

against vinegar is permitted to use setu vanit vinegar,

as unqualified vinegar means wine that has turned sour.

One who vows

against karshein (

leeks—a type of vegetable resembling an onion),

is permitted to use kapelot,

for although they are a type of karshein, since they have a name of their own, they are not included in his vow.

One who vows

against vegetables is permitted to use wild vegetables

that grow on their own, because

it is an accompanying designation;

wild vegetables are not called simply “vegetables,” but by their accompanying designation, “wild vegetables.” One who vows against vegetables without qualification intends only garden vegetables

. Gemara:

It was taught: One who vows against oil—

In Eretz Yisrael, he is permitted to use sesame oil and prohibited from using olive oil.

Since the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael use only olive oil, the intention of one who vows there is to prohibit only olive oil.

And in Babylonia, he is prohibited from using sesame oil and permitted to use olive oil.

For the inhabitants of Babylonia use sesame oil and not olive oil.

In a place where they use

[where they are accustomed to use]

both this and that,

both olive oil and sesame oil,

he is prohibited from using both.

This concludes the statement of the beraita.

And we raise an objection: What is the novelty of the statement of the beraita that in a place where both types of oil are used, one who vows against oil is prohibited from using both?

It is obvious

that this is the law!?

And we answer:

It is necessary,

as the beraita is speaking of a case

where most use one of them

[where most of the inhabitants use only one type of oil].

And the novelty is:

Lest you say

[that I would say]

I should follow the majority

[that we follow the majority of the inhabitants of the place], and since most of the inhabitants use only one type of oil, I would say that he intended to prohibit only that type of oil.

It teaches us

that since there is a possibility that he intended to prohibit the type of oil used by the minority as well, the law is that he is prohibited from using both, because

in a case of uncertain prohibition, one rules stringently.

The continuation of the statement of the beraita:

One who vows against vegetables,

if he made the vow not during the Sabbatical year but rather

during the other years of the seven-year cycle,

the law is that he

is prohibited from using garden vegetables and permitted to use wild vegetables,

as unqualified vegetables refers to garden vegetables.

But

during the Sabbatical year—

if he vows against vegetables during the Sabbatical year, it is impossible to say that he intended garden vegetables, since one does not sow during the Sabbatical year. Rather, he certainly intended wild vegetables, which grow on their own. Therefore, the law is that he

is prohibited from using wild vegetables and permitted to use garden vegetables.

This concludes the statement of the beraita.