Nedarim 4b — the Talmud in English

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and if

the nazir

shaved

one of the three, one of the sacrifices that he is obligated to bring [a burnt-offering, a sin-offering, and peace-offerings],

he has fulfilled

his obligation, and he need not wait with his shaving until he brings all three sacrifices that he is obligated to bring, then the Torah did not insist that they be brought immediately upon the completion of the nazirite period, and therefore

the nazir would not transgress

the nazir

concerning it

concerning delaying the bringing of the nazir’s sacrifices

the prohibition of delaying—

Therefore

it teaches us

the inference that there is bal te’acher for delaying the bringing of the nazir’s sacrifices.

And if you wish, say: What is its novelty

of the nazir?—

Because one does not attach

the nazir’s sin-offering

by a vow.

But that which is difficult for you—

behold, every

sin-offering for forbidden fat

cannot be designated as a sin-offering unless he sinned, so what lenient novelty is there in the sin-offering of a nazir?!

Your answer is:

a sin-offering for forbidden fat—

it comes for atonement

since it comes for atonement, a person is obligated to bring it in order to attain atonement, and there is a stringency in this, which balances the leniency that a sin-offering for forbidden fat cannot be designated if he did not sin.

But

the nazir’s sin-offering—

for what does it come?

Behold, it does not come to atone for a sin, and why should a person not be able to designate an animal as a nazir’s sin-offering even if he is not a nazir? And since there is a leniency in the matter, it would have been possible to say that it has no bal te’acher, and the inference was needed to say that even in its case there is bal te’acher.

But the Gemara objects:

behold, the sin-offering

that

a woman after childbirth brings, which does not come for atonement,

and there is a leniency in its case, for a person cannot designate a sin-offering through it,

and

nevertheless

he transgresses concerning it because of bal te’acher.

And this is without a need for an inference to reveal it. If so, why was the verse concerning the nazir needed to innovate that there is bal te’acher in its case?

And we answer:

that one

the sin-offering of a woman after childbirth has a stringency from another aspect, for

it permits her

for it permits the woman after childbirth

to eat consecrated food.

For until the woman after childbirth brings the sin-offering of a woman after childbirth, she is forbidden to enter the Temple and to eat consecrated meat. Whereas the nazir’s sin-offering has only an aspect of leniency, for it does not permit anything; therefore the verse was needed to say that nevertheless one transgresses concerning it through bal te’acher.

The Master said

in the beraita:

And just as vows—

the father may annul his daughter’s vows and the husband may annul his wife’s vows, so too naziriteship—

the father may annul his daughter’s naziriteship and the husband may annul his wife’s naziriteship.

And we discuss it:

Why do I need an inference

of naziriteship from vows, that the father can annul his daughter’s naziriteship and the husband his wife’s naziriteship?—

Let it be derived

learn this

by

the ordinary derivation of

“what do we find”

from vows!

Just as with vows the father and the husband annul, so too with naziriteship, for the foundation of naziriteship is a vow.

And we answer:

Perhaps

specifically

with regard to vows is it that he annuls

the father or the husband

because it has no fixed limit.

That is, the Torah enabled the father and the husband to annul it because a vow has no time limit and is a prohibition forever.

But with regard to naziriteship, which has a fixed limit,

for the nazirite period has a fixed time,

for ordinary naziriteship

is

thirty days—

say no

the Torah enabled its annulment; rather, they should wait until the days of naziriteship are completed—

it teaches us

the verse that the father and the husband also annul the vow of naziriteship.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who says to his fellow: I am mudar

from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you.

Samuel said: In all of them,

in all these expressions, he is not prohibited

until he says

in addition to them also the expression at the end of the Mishna—“

that I eat from you,”

or “

that I taste from you.”

It raises an objection

against Samuel from a beraita, in which we learned: A. One who says to his fellow:

I am mudar from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you—

this person is prohibited.

B.

That I eat from you, that I taste from you—

this person is prohibited!

And we answer:

This is what it teaches

in the beraita:

A. One who says to his fellow: I am mudar from you, or I am separated from you, or I am distanced from you.

B.

When are these words applicable

that “I am mudar from you” and the like is prohibited?—

When he says

at the conclusion of his words:

that I eat from you, that I taste from you.

And we object:

But it was taught oppositely,

for the words of the beraita were taught in the reverse form, with the words of the latter clause preceding the first clause, so that it is impossible to say that the latter clause is the completion of the first clause:

For it was taught:

That I eat from you, that I taste from you—

prohibited.

I am mudar from you, and I am separated from you, and I am distanced from you—

this person is prohibited!

And we answer:

Teach

this beraita

as follows: “That I eat from you” is prohibited,

“that I eat from you” is prohibited,

and

only if

already

he preceded and

said “

I am mudar

from you.”

And we object:

If so, this is

literally the words of the beraita brought in the

first clause

[that is, the preceding beraita, and not “first clause” in its simple sense], so what does this beraita come to add?!

Furthermore,

the tanna repeated and said

“prohibited” in the first clause, and then said again

in the first clause, and then said again

“prohibited”

in the latter clause—

why do I need it to teach

“prohibited” twice? Behold, according to your words, the entire beraita concerns only one matter, and the tanna should have said only once, at its end, “prohibited”!

And on the strength of this objection, Samuel retracted his statement:

Rather, Samuel said,

in the case of “I am mudar from you” alone or “that I eat from you,” he is prohibited, and indeed the two beraitot stated two matters in their words, both “I am mudar from you” and “that I eat from you,” and “prohibited” was said in them twice; they should not be changed as though they said only one matter, with the expression “when are these words applicable.”

But our Mishna, in which “prohibited” is said only once, must be established as referring to one matter, for example, where he said, “I am mudar from you, that I eat from you,” and the Mishna comes to innovate and say:

The reason is that he said

in his expression, in addition to “I am mudar from you,” also “

that I eat from you,”

or “

that I taste from you” —

it is that

only he

is prohibited

from deriving benefit from his fellow,

and

if

his fellow—

is permitted

to derive benefit from him!