Nedarim 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

One might have thought: Since

and if

the nazir

shaved

from one of the three offerings, the three offerings that he is obligated to bring—an olah, a sin offering, and a peace offering

he has fulfilled

his obligation, and he need not wait to shave until he has offered all three offerings for which he is liable. If so, the Torah did not insist that they be brought immediately upon the completion of his naziriteship; therefore

the nazir would not transgress

the

with regard to it

the delay in bringing the nazir’s offerings,

the prohibition of “do not delay”—

Therefore

it teaches us

that the exegetical comparison establishes that the prohibition of “do not delay” applies to delaying the bringing of the nazir’s offerings.

And if you wish, say instead: What is its novelty

with regard to the nazir?

It is because the nazir’s

sin offering

is not made the subject of a vow.

But what troubles you

is this: After all, every

sin offering for unwitting consumption of forbidden fat

cannot be made the subject of a vow to bring a sin offering unless one sinned; so what leniency is there that is novel with regard to the nazir’s sin offering?!

Your answer is:

A sin offering for unwitting consumption of forbidden fat

comes for atonement. Since it comes for atonement, a person is obligated to bring it in order to achieve atonement, and this constitutes a stringency that balances the leniency that a sin offering for unwitting consumption of forbidden fat cannot be made the subject of a vow if one did not sin.

But

But

the nazir’s sin offering—

what purpose does it serve?

After all, it does not come to atone for a sin. Why, then, should a person not be able to make an animal the subject of a vow to bring a nazir’s sin offering even if he is not a nazir? Since there is a leniency in this matter, one might have said that the prohibition of “do not delay” does not apply to it; therefore the exegetical comparison was needed to teach that the prohibition of “do not delay” applies to it as well.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

After all, the sin offering

that a

woman after childbirth brings does not come for atonement,

and there is a leniency with regard to it, as a person cannot make an animal the subject of a vow to bring that sin offering,

and

nevertheless

one transgresses with regard to it because of the prohibition of “do not delay.”

And this is so without any need for an exegetical comparison to establish it. If so, why was the verse concerning the nazir needed to introduce the notion that the prohibition of “do not delay” applies to it?

And we answer:

That

sin offering of a woman after childbirth has another stringency, as

it permits her

by providing the woman after childbirth with permission

to eat sacrificial meat.

For until the woman after childbirth brings her sin offering, she is forbidden to enter the Temple and to eat sacrificial meat. The nazir’s sin offering, by contrast, has only a lenient aspect, as it does not grant permission for anything; therefore the verse had to state that nevertheless one transgresses with regard to it by violating the prohibition of “do not delay.”

The Master said

in the beraita:

Just as with vows—

the father may annul his daughter’s vows and the husband may annul his wife’s vows—so too with naziriteship—

the father may annul his daughter’s naziriteship and the husband may annul his wife’s naziriteship.

And we examine this:

Why do I need the exegetical comparison

of naziriteship to vows, teaching that the father may annul his daughter’s naziriteship and the husband may annul his wife’s naziriteship?

Let it be derived

that you should learn this

by

the ordinary derivation of

“what do we find”

with regard to vows!

Just as with vows the father and husband may annul them, so too with naziriteship, since the basis of naziriteship is a vow.

And we answer:

Perhaps

it is specifically

with regard to vows that the father or husband may annul them

them

because they have no fixed duration.

That is, the Torah allowed the father and husband to annul them because a vow has no set time limit and constitutes a prohibition that lasts forever.

But with regard to naziriteship, which does have a fixed duration,

as naziriteship has a set period,

ordinary naziriteship

is

thirty days—

perhaps not

did the Torah allow its annulment, but rather the person should wait until the naziriteship has ended?

It teaches us

that the father and husband may annul the vow of naziriteship as well.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who says to another: “I am prohibited by a vow from you”

“I am separated from you,” or “I am distanced from you.”

Shmuel said: In all of them,

in all these expressions, he is not rendered prohibited

until he says

in addition to them the expression at the end of the Mishna:

“that I eat from you,”

or

“that I taste from you.”

The beraita raises an objection

to Shmuel, as we learned in it: A. One who says to his fellow:

“I am prohibited by a vow from you; I am separated from you; I am distanced from you”—

he is prohibited.

B.

“That I eat from you; that I taste from you”—

he is prohibited!

And we answer:

This is what it teaches

in the beraita:

A. One who says to his fellow: “I am prohibited by a vow from you,” or “I am separated from you,” or “I am distanced from you.”

B.

When are these words applicable,

that “I am prohibited by a vow from you” and similar expressions render him prohibited?

When he says

at the end of his statement:

“That I eat from you; that I taste from you.”

And we raise an objection:

But was it not taught to the contrary,

as the beraita’s statements were taught in the reverse order, with the latter clause preceding the first, so that it is impossible to say that the latter clause completes the first?

As it was taught:

“That I eat from you; that I taste from you”—

he is prohibited.

“I am prohibited by a vow from you; I am separated from you; I am distanced from you”—

he is prohibited!

And we answer:

Teach

this beraita

as follows:

“That I eat from you” is prohibited,

and

only if he

already

preceded it and

said

“I am prohibited by a vow

from you.”

And we raise an objection:

If so, this is

precisely the statement of the beraita cited in the

first clause

[namely, the preceding beraita, and not “first clause” in its literal sense]. What, then, does this beraita add?!

Furthermore,

the tanna repeated the statement and said

“prohibited”

in the first clause, and then repeated and said

“prohibited”

in the latter clause—

why do I need it to teach

“prohibited” twice? After all, according to your explanation, the entire beraita concerns only one matter, and the tanna should have said “prohibited” only once, at its end!

In light of this objection, Shmuel retracted his statement:

Rather, Shmuel said:

In fact, when one says only “I am prohibited by a vow from you,” or “That I eat from you,” he is rendered prohibited. Indeed, the two beraitot stated two separate matters: both “I am prohibited by a vow from you” and “That I eat from you”; and they said “prohibited” twice. They should not be emended as though they stated only one matter, using the expression “when are these words applicable.”

But our Mishna, in which “prohibited” is stated only once, must be understood as referring to one matter—for example, when he said, “I am prohibited by a vow from you, that I eat from you.” The Mishna comes to teach and say:

The reason is that he said

in addition to “I am prohibited by a vow from you”

“that I eat from you,”

or

“that I taste from you.”

It is only then that he is

alone

prohibited

from deriving benefit from his fellow,

and

if it were

his fellow—

he is permitted

to derive benefit from him!