Nedarim 33a (לג.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

But

only

from food did he vow

not to derive benefit from that other person; why, then, is he also prohibited from using a sieve, a sifter, a mill, or an oven?!

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

Our Mishna is speaking

of one who says: “The benefit of your food is upon me.”

Since he used this expression, it is reasonable that he prohibited upon himself anything that causes food to be prepared. He said “your food” because through the benefit he derives from it, the food is prepared.

And we raise an objection:

Still, why is he prohibited from using these items?

Say

that when he said, “The benefit of your food is upon me,” he intended to say

that

not only may he not eat food belonging to the other, but he may also

not chew wheat

belonging to the other

and place it on his wound

[since chewed wheat is beneficial for a wound ], that is, he may not derive any benefit at all from the food itself. But why should he be prohibited from using a sieve, a sifter, and so on?!

Rava said:

Our Mishna is speaking

of one who says: “The benefit

that leads to your food is upon me,”

and therefore he is prohibited even from using utensils that lead to the preparation of food.

Rav Pappa said:

It is not only these matters that are considered benefit that leads to food, but also

a sack to bring

in it

fruit, and a donkey to carry fruit upon it, and even merely a basket

[a basket]

alone ,

even though he does not prepare the food with them, but merely transports it in them; nevertheless,

it is benefit that leads to food,

for the fruit was far away from him and was brought closer through these means. Therefore, he may not borrow these items from the person who imposed the vow.

However,

Rav Pappa raised a question:

To take the

horse

of the person who imposed the vow in order

to ride it

to a banquet,

and

likewise to take the

ring

of the person who imposed the vow in order

to appear distinguished with it

so that an important person will see him and give him a fine portion —

what is

the ruling? Is this considered benefit that leads to food?

Or perhaps this is not analogous to a sack and a donkey, where he performs an action with the food itself, transporting it in the sack or on the donkey. Here, by contrast, he performs no action with the food itself, and this is therefore merely an indirect cause—and is permitted?

Rav Pappa further raised a question:

To cut across and walk through his land,

that is, to pass through the land of the person who imposed the vow so that he will reach the food more quickly—

what

is the ruling? Is this considered benefit from food, or since he performs no action with the food itself, is it not considered benefit from food?

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

But he may lend him

the person who imposed the vow may lend him

a garment and a tallit, earrings and rings.

What are the circumstances?

What is the purpose for which he lends them to him?

If we say that he is not

speaking of one who borrows them in order

to appear distinguished with them,

but merely for his personal use,

is it necessary to state this?

Does the tanna need to teach us that he may lend him these items, given that the vow prohibited him only from food and not from other matters?!

Rather, is it not

certainly the case that the Mishna is speaking

even

of one who lends him these items in order

to appear distinguished with them, and

nevertheless

it teaches

that he

may lend them to him!

And we reject this proof:

No. Actually

it is speaking of one who lends them to him

not

for the purpose of

appearing distinguished

with them, and indeed there is no novel point in this.

And since he teaches

in the

first clause,

with regard to a sieve, a sifter, a mill, and an oven, the expression

“he may not lend them to him,”

where the tanna comes to teach us that he may not lend him utensils used in preparing food,

he taught

also in the

final clause, “he may lend them to him” .

Mishna:

And any object that is not used in preparing food,

in

a place where

it is customary

to rent out similar objects,

such objects

are prohibited

even to one who is forbidden by a vow from deriving food from him.

For we explained above that the statement in the Mishna, “one who is forbidden by a vow from deriving food,” refers to one whom the other prohibited from benefit that leads to food. Accordingly, when the person who imposed the vow lends him an object that people generally rent out and for which they receive payment, and he lends it to him without charge, this is benefit that leads to food, since with the rental fee that the person who imposed the vow waived for him, the person under the vow could purchase food for himself.

Gemara:

By inference

the wording of the Mishna indicates

that in the first clause,

where we learned that he may not lend him a sieve, a sifter, and the like, the case is

even though people do not rent out

similar objects!

Who is the tanna?

Who is the tanna who holds that it is prohibited to lend him these objects?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It is Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds that a concession is prohibited to one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit. Therefore, it is prohibited even to borrow these objects, despite the fact that people waive payment for them and do not charge rent for them.

Mishna:

One who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from another—the other may weigh his

half-shekel

for him,

that is, the person who imposed the vow gives the half-shekel on his behalf, which all Jews give each year in the month of Adar for the Chamber of Hewn Stones collection, for the sake of the communal offerings. This is either because he does not give it directly into his hand and is therefore not considered to be benefiting him from his property [the commentator], or because in any event they would contribute the three collection boxes on his behalf from all the half-shekel money located in the chamber, from which the communal offerings are purchased.

And he may pay

for him

his debt

that he owes another person, since he does not give him money directly [the commentator].

And he may return his lost object to him.

For he is not giving him anything, but merely returning what belongs to him.

And

in a place where they take

[for returning a lost object]

payment,

that is, for example, when returning the lost object causes him to neglect his work and lose money, in which case the owner of the lost object must pay him for his service, then, if the finder does not wish to accept that payment,

that

benefit

must go to the Temple treasury.

That is, the person under the vow must give it to the Temple treasury . Otherwise, it would emerge that the person who imposed the vow benefits him by waiving the payment owed to him.

Gemara:

Apparently,

it follows that weighing his half-shekel and paying his debt

is merely driving away a lion,

that is, it is like driving away a lion that has come upon him: he has not given him anything of his own, but merely removed the harmful agent from him.

Likewise, when he pays his debt, he gives him nothing; he merely removes his creditor from him so that the creditor will not come to demand payment from him.

Likewise, when he weighs his half-shekel, he gives him nothing, since in any event he has a share in the communal offerings. This is because the three collection boxes are contributed from the half-shekel funds, and the communal offerings are purchased from them even on behalf of those who have not yet contributed their half-shekels. Thus, the communal offerings belong to all Israel, including those who did not participate in the half-shekel collection , but he merely removes his debt from him—

And

therefore

it is permitted.

Who is the tanna?

Who is the tanna who holds that this matter is permitted?