Nedarim 23a — the Talmud in English

Since they had discussed the matter for a prolonged time, the rays of the sun entered the place where the Sages were sitting, and the Sages had to change their place from time to time.

And the Sages were distressed

by moving

from the sun to the shade

from a place where there was sun to the shade,

and from the shade to the sun.

That is, they had discussed the matter for a prolonged time.

Batanit, son of Abba Shaul ben Batanit, said to him

to open an opening for his vow:

Did

perhaps

you vow

also

with the intention of distressing the Sages,

when they would discuss the annulment of your vow, and the discussion would continue until they would have to change their place

from the shade to the sun

from shade to sun

and from the sun to the shade

and from sun to shade?

He said: No!

And they released him,

they annulled it for him on the basis of this opening.

Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yosei had a vow to release.

He came before the Sages.

They said to him,

to open an opening for his vow:

Did you vow with this in mind?

And they presented before him a certain opening.

He said to them: Yes.

And they returned to find another opening for him: Did

you vow with this in mind?

He said to them: Yes.

And so they asked him in an attempt to find an opening for him, and so he answered them that he had also vowed with this in mind,

several times.

When he saw,

that he saw

that certain launderer,

a launderer who passed there,

that the Sages were distressed

in order to find an opening for him,

he struck him,

the launderer struck him

with a launderer's vessel,

with the launderers' utensil.

He said

Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yosei:

Had I had in mind that he would strike me

that he would strike me,

the launderer—

this would not have been my vow, and he released himself.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina

in wonder:

He said to him:

Behold,

this

incident in which the launderer struck him—behold,

it is a newly arisen circumstance,

it is,

since

he did not at all consider

at all

it

at the time of his vow

that he would strike

that he would strike

him, the launderer.

And we learned: One does not open for him

to annul his vow

with

an opening of

a newly arisen circumstance,

which is something that arose anew after the vow and is not common.

For it is impossible to open for him with an opening of error: had he thought at the time of the vow about such a situation, he would not have vowed, but only if he could have conceived of it, and he erred בכך שלא העלהו על הדעת at the time of his vow.

But something that he could not have conceived of at the time that he vowed, and that thing arose afterward—is not an error at the time of the vow, and therefore it cannot serve as an opening for the annulment of his vow!

He said to him,

Ravina:

This is not a newly arisen circumstance,

since

heretics are common

heretics

who distress the Sages.

And the one who vows can conceive of a situation in which he will be struck.

Abaye's wife

his wife

had a certain daughter,

and they argued between themselves to whom she should be given in marriage.

He said: To my relative,

she should be given to my relative.

And

she said: To her relative,

to my relative.

He said to her,

Abaye:

My benefit shall be forbidden to you if you transgress my דעת and marry her,

and you give my daughter in marriage

to your relative,

to your relative.

She went,

she went

and transgressed his דעת,

Abaye's,

and was married to her relative.

Abaye came

Abaye

before Rav Yosef

to annul his vow.

He said to him: Had you known that

your wife

would transgress

would transgress

your דעת and marry her to her relative, would you have made her vow?

Abaye said,

Abaye:

No! And Rav Yosef released him.

And we raise an objection to this:

And does one release in such a manner,

to annul the vow by an opening on account of the fact that she transgressed his words and the vow took effect, and not on account of another reason? But everything that he vowed was intended to prevent her act, for it was for this that he made her vow; so how can her transgressing his words constitute an opening for saying that with this in mind he would not have vowed!?

And we answer:

Yes,

this too is an opening, for indeed he made her vow in order to prevent her from giving her to her relative in marriage, but he thought that the vow would suffice to prevent her, and he did not think that she would transgress his will and that the vow would take effect.

And

the proof for this is from

what was taught: There was an incident involving a certain man who made his wife vow not to go up for the pilgrimage Festival, and she transgressed his דעת and went up for the pilgrimage Festival, and came before Rabbi Yosei.

He said to him: And had you known that she would transgress your דעת and go up for the pilgrimage Festival, would you have made her vow at all?

He said to him: No.

And Rabbi Yosei released it for him.

Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Even one who wishes to make his fellow vow

from his property, in order

that he eat with him,

who intends to spur him on so that he will eat with him, and if he does not eat with him he will prohibit his property to him by a konam, from benefiting from him, but in practice he wishes that his vow should not take effect—he should inform him of this, and

say to him: Every vow that I am destined to vow

toward you—

is null!

Provided that he remembers at the time of the vow

this notification of his.

And it will be explained in the Gemara that the latter clause is a separate matter.

Gemara:

And we raise an objection to this: What benefit did the other gain from his vow after giving such a notification to his fellow?

And

behold,

since he said

to his fellow, “

Every vow that I am destined to vow shall be null,”

he did not heed him

his fellow,

and did not come along with him,

and he will not come to eat with him even if he prohibits his property to him by a vow, for he had nullified his vow from the outset.