Nedarim 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

Since they had been discussing the matter for a long time, the rays of the sun reached the place where the Sages were seated, and the Sages periodically had to change their place of seating.

And the Sages were distressed

by having to move

from sunlight to shade

from a place with sunlight to the shade,

and from shade to sunlight.

That is, they had been discussing the matter for a long time.

Batanit, son of Abba Shaul ben Batanit, said to him

to provide an opening for his vow:

Did

you

vow

also

with the intention of causing the Sages distress,

when they would discuss the dissolution of your vow and the discussion would continue until they had to change their place

from shade to sunlight

from shade to sunlight

and from sunlight to shade

and from sunlight to shade?

He said: No!

And they dissolved it,

dissolving his vow on the basis of this opening.

Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yosei had a vow that required dissolution.

He came before the Sages.

They said to him,

to provide an opening for his vow:

Did you vow with this in mind?

And they indicated a particular opening to him.

He said to them: Yes.

They returned to find him another opening:

Did you vow with this in mind?

He said to them: Yes.

And so they questioned him in an attempt to find an opening for him, and each time he answered them that he had also vowed with that in mind,

several times.

When he saw

that he saw

that launderer,

a launderer who was passing there,

that the Sages were distressed

in order to find an opening for him,

he struck him,

the launderer struck him

with a launderer’s utensil,

with one of the launderers’ implements.

Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yosei said:

:

Had I intended that he strike me

that he would strike me

the launderer—

I would not have made my vow, and he dissolved his vow himself.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said

in amazement

to Ravina:

But

this

incident in which the launderer struck him is

a newly arisen circumstance

it is,

since

he had not considered

at all

the possibility

at the time of his vow

that

he would strike

him, the launderer.

And we learned in a Mishna: One does not provide him with an opening

to dissolve his vow

with

an opening based on

a newly arisen circumstance,

which is something that arose after the vow and is not common.

For it is impossible to provide him with an opening based on an error, for if he had considered such a situation at the time of his vow, he would not have vowed; rather, this applies only if he could have conceived of it and erred by failing to conceive of it at the time of his vow.

But if it was impossible for him to conceive of something at the time he vowed, and that thing arose only afterward, this is not an error at the time of the vow; therefore, it cannot serve as an opening for the dissolution of his vow!

Ravina said to him:

:

This is not a newly arisen circumstance,

since

informers are common

heretics

who cause the Sages distress.

And the one taking the vow could have imagined a situation in which he would be struck.

Abaye’s wife

his wife

had a certain daughter,

and they argued between themselves to whom she should be married.

He said: She should be married to my relative,

to my relative.

And

she said: To her relative,

to my relative.

Abaye said to her

Abaye:

Let my benefit from you be forbidden to you if you act against my wishes and marry her

and marry my daughter

to your relative,

to your relative.

She went

she went

and acted against his wishes,

Abaye’s,

and she married her to her relative.

Abaye came

Abaye

before Rav Yosef

to have his vow dissolved.

He said to him: Had you known that

your wife

would act

would act

against your wishes and marry her to her relative, would you have imposed a vow upon her?

Abaye said

Abaye:

No! And Rav Yosef dissolved it.

And we raised an objection:

Can one dissolve a vow in such a manner,

dissolving the vow by means of an opening based on the fact that she acted against his instruction and the vow took effect, rather than because of some other reason? After all, everything he vowed was intended to prevent her action, as that was precisely why he imposed the vow upon her; so how can her acting against his instruction constitute an opening for saying that he would not have vowed with that in mind?!

And we answer:

Yes,

this too is an opening. Although he imposed the vow in order to prevent her from marrying her relative, he thought that the vow would suffice to prevent her from doing so; he did not imagine that she would act against his wishes and that the vow would take effect.

And

the proof for this is from

that which was taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving a certain man who imposed a vow upon his wife prohibiting her from going up for the pilgrimage Festival, but she acted against his wishes and went up for the pilgrimage Festival, and he came before Rabbi Yosei.

He said to him: And had you known that she would act against your wishes and go up for the pilgrimage Festival, would you have imposed the vow upon her?

He said to him: No.

And Rabbi Yosei dissolved it.

Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Even one who wishes to impose a vow upon another

prohibiting him from his property, in order

that he eat with him,

intending to encourage him to eat with him, and if he does not eat with him, he will prohibit his property to him by a konam, making it forbidden for him to derive benefit from it, but in fact he wishes that his vow should not take effect—he should inform him of this, and

say to him: Any vow that I am destined to make

with regard to you

is nullified!

Provided that he remembers this at the time of the vow,

this notification of his.

And it will be explained in the Gemara that the latter clause is an independent matter.

Gemara:

And we raise an objection: What benefit did the other person gain from his vow after he had given him such a notification?

For

after all,

once he said

to his fellow:

“Any vow that I am destined to make shall be nullified,”

the other person will not heed him

his fellow,

and will not come along with him,

and he will not come to eat with him even if he prohibits his property to him through a vow, since he had nullified his vow in advance.