Nedarim 18a — the Talmud in English

And a tiyu vta against Rav Huna!

And we answer:

No.

Actually,

the beraita is speaking of a case where he said, "

I am a nazirite today; I am [a nazirite] tomorrow."

And what is "

the second naziriteship counted for him against the first"? —

vtoraya nazoreystvo vmeste s pervoy"? —

Except for that extra day,

which he must continue to observe as a nazirite.

Alternatively,

the beraita is speaking of

a case where he accepted two periods of naziriteship at once,

such as where he said, “I am a nazirite twice,” in which case, even according to Rav Huna, two naziriteships take effect upon him.

Rav Hamnuna raised an objection

from a beraita:

For it is taught: It is written [Numbers 6], "

a nazirite to make himself a nazirite" —

from here

the Sages learned

that naziriteship takes effect upon naziriteship.

One might have thought

that it should be otherwise. For

is it not a

kal va-chomer

that

it should be otherwise:

And just as an oath,

which is

more stringent —

an oath does not take effect upon an oath.

Naziriteship,

which is

less stringent —

all the more so

should naziriteship not take effect upon naziriteship.

The verse says: "

a nazirite to make himself a nazirite"!

From here, that naziriteship takes effect upon naziriteship.

And Rav Hamnuna analyzed the words of the beraita:

What are the circumstances?

How is this speaking here?

If you should say

that it is speaking of a case such as

where he said, "

I am a nazirite today; I am a nazirite tomorrow" —

It is impossible to say this.

For,

this,

such an obvious matter —

does it require a verse!?

Does it require a teaching from Scripture for this?

Rather,

Rav Hamnuna proves,

no,

necessarily the beraita is speaking of a case such as

where he said, “I am a nazirite today; I am a nazirite today."

And it teaches

in the beraita that

naziriteship takes effect upon naziriteship!

And this is difficult for Rav Huna!

And the Gemara rejects Rav Hamnuna’s proof from the beraita:

No,

the beraita is not speaking in such a manner.

Rather,

here, with what are we dealing —

with

a case where he accepted two periods of naziriteship upon himself at once.

And Scripture teaches anew that both of them take effect.

And now the Gemara proceeds to discuss the words of the beraita:

And what is the stringency,

in what is the stringency expressed

of an oath over a vow,

which the beraita stated?

If you should say,

if we say that the stringency of an oath is

because it takes effect

that the oath takes effect

even upon something that has no substance,

such as when a person obligates himself by an oath to eat, whereas a vow takes effect only upon an object, which is something that has substance —

Yet, on the other hand,

a vow is also stringent, for

the vow

takes effect upon a mitzva,

and prevents its performance, such as when he forbids the sukkah to himself from sitting in it,

podobno

just as it takes effect upon a

permitted matter!

But an oath takes effect not upon a mitzva matter, but only upon a matter that is permitted; a person cannot swear not to perform a mitzva, and if he swore not to sit in a sukkah, his oath does not take effect.

Rather,

the stringency of an oath is

because it is written concerning it, concerning an oath, [Exodus 20], "

Shemot 20]: "

he will not leave unpunished."

We learned in the Mishna: One who swore, "

An oath that I will not eat,"

and then swore again, "

An oath that I will not eat,"

and he ate —

he is liable for only one.

Rava said: If he seeks release from

the oath

first — the

oath

second takes effect upon him.

And

from where

do I learn this? —

From the fact that it did not teach

in the beraita, "

there is only

one oath

only,"

and it taught "

he is liable for only one" —

it follows that only with regard to lashes is he not liable for two sets of lashes, but only for one; however, the second oath also has validity.

For the reason that he does not receive lashes also for the second one is that, as long as the first oath exists and obligates him,

room [a spacious, vacant place]

[to est svobodnogo, nezanyatogo mesta],

is what it lacks

for the second oath to take effect, and it remains suspended.

But

when he seeks release

when he seeks release

from its companion,

the first oath,

the second oath takes effect

the second oath.

Another formulation,

this is how one should infer from the beraita:

It is liability that is absent

for the second oath.

But this

the validity of

an oath is present.

I

For what halakhic purpose?

In what matter is the validity of the second oath expressed, since he is not flogged for it?

For the law of Rava.

For Rava said:

If he

seeks release from the first —

the second is counted for him in its place.

And we raise this question about it:

shall we say that what we learned

supports Rava, from what we learned:

One who vowed two periods of naziriteship, counted the first, set aside a sacrifice, and sought release from it —

it is counted for him,

the

second naziriteship in place of the first!

And the Gemara rejects the proof, for it is possible to say that this law applies only

in a case where he accepted two periods of naziriteship upon himself at once.