Nazir 8a (ח.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

one who says: “

I am a nazir like the hair of my head, like the dust of the earth, and like the sand of the sea,”

is a nazir forever.

That is, he accepted upon himself as many periods of nezirut as the number of hairs on his head, or as the dust of the earth and the sand of the sea; and since they are extremely numerous, it follows that he is a nazir forever.

And

he brings the offerings of a nazir, and

shaves

the hair of his head

once every thirty days,

because every thirty days constitutes the completion of a period of nezirut.

Rabbi says: He does not shave once every thirty days,

because the meaning of his statement is that he accepted one long period of nezirut, whose days equal the number of hairs on his head, and therefore he cannot shave in the middle of the nezirut.

And who is the one who shaves once every thirty days?

With what wording must he speak for his words to be understood as accepting a large number of periods of nezirut?

One who says: I accept upon myself periods of nezirut

[periods of nezirut]

like the hair of my head, like the dust of the earth, and like the sand of the sea.

The tanna of the Mishna continues:

And if an empty house or an empty basket was before him, and he said: “

I am a nazir

like

the full capacity of the house”

or “

I am a nazir like

the full capacity of the basket.”

They investigate him

to determine what he intended by his words.

If he said:

“nezirut”

I accepted one great period,

I accepted only one period of nezirut, and when I said “the full capacity of the house or basket,” I intended only to say: “The matter is extended for me, as though I had accepted upon myself as many periods of nezirut as would fill the basket”—he is

a nazir for thirty days.

And if he said: I accepted it without specification.

His words are uncertain to us, and we

view the basket

[due to the uncertainty]

as though it were full

of small seeds of

mustard, and

he is

a nazir all his days.

His status depends on the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages.

According to the Sages, he is uncertainly obligated in many periods of nezirut, corresponding to the number of mustard seeds needed to fill the basket.

According to Rabbi, he is uncertainly a nazir of one long period of nezirut.

And if he said: “

I am a nazir from here until such-and-such a place,”

he is a nazir for the number of days of travel from here to such-and-such a place.

Therefore,

we estimate how many days

of travel there are

from here until such-and-such a place.

If there are fewer than thirty days

of travel from here until such-and-such a place, he is

a nazir for thirty days,

because nezirut cannot be less than thirty days.

And if not,

but there are more than thirty days from here until such-and-such a place, he is

a nazir

for one long period of nezirut

corresponding to the number of days

from here until such-and-such a place.

And if he said: “

I am a nazir corresponding to the number of solar days,”

since he said “corresponding to the number,” this implies that he will count a number of periods of nezirut equal to the number of solar days in a year—

And he

counts periods of nezirut

many

corresponding to the number of solar days

in a solar year.

Rabbi Yehuda said:

Indeed, this is the law: he counts a number of periods of nezirut corresponding to the days of the year, and not one period of nezirut corresponding to the number of days in the year.

For

an incident occurred

with a man who said, “I am a nazir corresponding to the number of solar days,” and the Sages required him to count 365 periods of nezirut, corresponding to the number of solar days in the year, and

when he completed

them,

he died.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “I am a nazir like the full capacity of the house or the full capacity of the basket,” and if he said, “I accepted it without specification,”

we view the basket as though it were full of mustard, and he is a nazir all his days

[according to the Sages, many periods of nezirut; and according to Rabbi, one long period of nezirut]:

And we raise a difficulty:

But why

is he a nazir all his days!?

Let us view it

[let us view the basket]

as though

it were

full of cucumbers and pumpkins,

which are large and relatively few in number, or even as though it were full of dough,

and let there be a remedy for him

[let there be a remedy for him, so that he counts only one period of nezirut, since perhaps his words are interpreted as referring to a filling of dough]!?

Because it is logical that a person does not place himself in a situation whose uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty.

For if he were certainly obligated in nezirut equivalent to the full house of mustard seeds, he would count thirty days each time, bring offerings, and shave. Yet in a state of uncertainty, he would shave only once after thirty days—according to the Sages who dispute Rabbi—and would not shave again.

For after the first shaving, he is uncertain whether he is obligated to observe many periods of nezirut or is obligated in nothing. And when he observes the second period of nezirut due to the uncertainty, he cannot shave, since he cannot bring offerings: perhaps he is not a nazir, in which case his offerings would be unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard. And any nazir who does not bring offerings does not shave his hair.

Ḥizkiya said:

This law of our Mishna

is stated as a dispute

among tannaim

. It is taught

and our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Shimon, who says: A person does place himself in a situation whose uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty.

As it is taught:

one who says, “

I am a nazir provided that there are

[if there are]

one hundred kor in this heap.”

And

after he vowed,

he went and found that the heap had been stolen or lost,

and he could no longer know how much it had contained.

Rabbi Shimon prohibits him

in all the laws of nezirut, since

an uncertainty concerning nezirut is treated stringently,

and perhaps there were one hundred kor in that heap when he spoke.

And although his uncertainty is more stringent than his certainty, for if he becomes impure it follows that he is an uncertain impure nazir, and he has no remedy, since he cannot bring the offering of an impure nazir: perhaps there were not one hundred kor in the heap, in which case the offering would be an unconsecrated animal in the Temple courtyard.

Rabbi Yehuda permits him, for an uncertainty concerning nezirut is treated leniently,

since its uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty, and a person does not place himself in a situation whose uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty. Necessarily, then, his intention was that he would be a nazir only if it were found that there had indeed been one hundred kor in the heap.

It follows that the tannaim dispute this principle: whether a person places himself in a situation whose uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty.

According to Rabbi Shimon, a person does place himself in a situation whose uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty. Otherwise, he should have said, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning, that this person intended to be a nazir only if it would certainly be found that there were one hundred kor in the heap.

And our Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said,

to explain our Mishna, which states that when one says, “I am a nazir like the full capacity of the house,” he is a nazir all his days, and we do not say that since his uncertainty is more stringent than his certainty, he should be a nazir for only one period—

You may even say

that our Mishna follows even the view of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that a person does not place himself in a situation whose uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty. For there is a distinction between Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling concerning the heap and the case in our Mishna:

There,

in the case of the lost heap—

he did not enter into nezirut

[this person did not enter into nezirut].

That is, a person does not place himself in a situation whose uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty only where we can say that, for this reason, he did not accept nezirut at all. For example, in the case of the heap, we say that since its uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty, he did not intend to enter such an uncertainty; rather, he intended to be a nazir only if, when he examined the heap, it would be clear to him that this heap contained one hundred kor.

But

here,

in the case of one who says that he is a nazir like the full capacity of the house,

he did enter

into nezirut

[certainly he accepted one period of nezirut upon himself], since there is no possibility that he is not obligated in nezirut at all: even if his words are interpreted as referring to a house full of dough, in the end he accepted one period of nezirut—

And now,

by what means

can he

withdraw from it,

how can he withdraw from the nezirut?

For in either event he entered into nezirut, and according to the possibility that his words are interpreted as referring to a house full of mustard seeds, he accepted one long period of nezirut upon himself—as the Gemara proceeds to explain, this resolution is stated according to Rabbi’s view—and we are uncertain whether he has yet completed the nezirut into which he certainly entered. In such a case, he remains in nezirut.

For once he began observing the nezirut in which he is certainly obligated, and we are uncertain whether he has yet completed his nezirut, since he intended one long period of nezirut, in such a case, even though its uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty, he is obligated to continue observing nezirut due to the uncertainty.

The Gemara asks in astonishment:

Why can he not,

why can he not withdraw from the nezirut—

Let us view the basket,

why do we not view the basket

as though it were full of cucumbers and pumpkins,

or even as though it were full of dough,

and let there be a remedy for him,

so that there will be a remedy for him!? The Gemara explains the basis of the question:

For it might have entered the questioner’s mind

[of the one who raised the difficulty],

that periods of nezirut

many

he accepted upon himself.

That is, the questioner who raised this difficulty understood that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s resolution applies also according to the Sages: if he intended mustard seeds, he is obligated in many periods of nezirut and not in one long period of nezirut. According to their view, then, after he observes the one period of nezirut in which he is certainly obligated, he can shave and complete his nezirut, since even if he accepted many periods of nezirut upon himself, he shaves at the end of thirty days and completes the first period of nezirut—

And once he has completed his nezirut, there is no difference between him and one who has not observed nezirut at all until now. Just as in the case of the heap we say, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that he is not obligated to observe nezirut, since its uncertainty is more stringent than its certainty, so too here we should say the same.

And we answer: One cannot say, as the questioner understood Rabbi Yoḥanan’s resolution, that it follows the Sages, who hold that even if he intended a house full of mustard seeds, he is not obligated in one long period of nezirut, but rather in many periods of nezirut.