Nazir 32a — the Talmud in English

it

also this one, who made the designation anew and

sanctified

the lamb

the ninth ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

and

the lamb

the eleventh,

only! And this is a special innovation that Scripture innovated here: since the ninth and the eleventh are adjacent in their counting to the tenth, if it happens that the counter errs and calls the lamb adjacent to the tenth [before it and after it] by the name “tenth,” sanctity takes effect upon it [although not the sanctity of animal tithe].

But regarding the other lambs, concerning which Scripture did not innovate, no sanctity takes effect at all!

And if so, it is impossible to learn from animal tithe that an erroneous consecration is a consecration, since in animal tithe itself it was not stated that an erroneous consecration takes effect regarding the other lambs.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna that a nazirite who drank wine during the days of his naziriteship counts his days of naziriteship “from the time that he vowed.”

And the Gemara now assumes that the intention of the Mishna is to say that he counts his naziriteship as usual, as though he had not drunk wine, and he need not observe a prohibition against drinking wine as a penalty corresponding to the days during which he drank wine.

At most, it is possible to explain that what the Mishna said, “he counts from the time that he vowed,” means that he counts some of the days during which he drank wine, but he need not observe a prohibition corresponding to all the days during which he drank wine as a penalty.

And we raised the matter:

Whose is the Mishna?

According to whose words was this Mishna taught? —

But

not

according to the method of

Rabbi Yosei

is it,

and not

according to the method of

the Rabbis

is it!

For it was taught: One who vowed

na-ziriteship,

and transgressed his naziriteship,

and drank wine, and came before a court to ask about his naziriteship [or came to the Temple to bring the offerings of his naziriteship] —

They penalize him for having transgressed the laws of his naziriteship —

And accordingly,

they do not attend to him,

the court does not allow him to ask about his naziriteship [or, if he wishes to bring his offerings, they do not allow him to sacrifice them],

unless

he will be

counting among them,

observing

a prohibition

against drinking wine

as

the number of all the

days during which he observed permission.

For example, one who accepted naziriteship for one hundred days, and during them he drank wine for sixty days: the Sages penalized him, so that he must now observe a prohibition against drinking wine for sixty days.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Since he observed the days of naziriteship for forty days, and thereby fulfilled the conduct of naziriteship properly for a period of thirty days, which is called “short naziriteship,”

it is enough

that he be penalized with a prohibition against drinking for

thirty days

only, and he need not be penalized for all sixty days.

But if he accepted upon himself short naziriteship of thirty days, and drank wine for several days, he must observe a prohibition corresponding to all the days during which he drank wine, so that there will be conduct of naziriteship for at least thirty days!

And from now, if we say that the intention of the Mishna, “he counts from the time that he vowed,” is to say that he observes a prohibition against drinking wine for some of the days, but does not observe it corresponding to all of them, it is difficult —

If,

if our Mishna is according to the method of

the Rabbis,

who do not distinguish between extended naziriteship and short naziriteship as Rabbi Yosei does, but in every case penalize him to observe a prohibition against drinking wine corresponding to all the days during which he drank wine,

it is difficult

if the Mishna is speaking of one who accepted upon himself

extended naziriteship

of one hundred days, and during part of them drank wine: why does he not need to observe a prohibition corresponding to all the days during which he drank wine?

And all the more so if we establish it as referring to one who accepted short naziriteship of thirty days, and drank wine for twenty days, for according to the words of the Sages they penalize him for twenty days, during which he may not drink wine, whereas in our Mishna he is penalized only for part of them.

For even Rabbi Yosei concedes that since he did not observe thirty days of naziriteship properly, the Sages penalized him to observe a prohibition against drinking wine corresponding to all the days during which he drank wine.

If it is Rabbi Yosei, it is difficult

if we establish our Mishna as referring to one who accepted upon himself

short naziriteship,

for even according to Rabbi Yosei they penalize him corresponding to all the days during which he drank wine, whereas our Mishna penalizes him only for some of the days.

And the Gemara answers:

If you wish, say

our Mishna is according to

Rabbi Yosei

and

if you wish, say

our Mishna is according to

the Rabbis.

And the Gemara explains:

If you wish, say that our Mishna is the view of

If you wish, say

our Mishna is

Rabbi Yosei

and one must distinguish and say:

Here,

where Rabbi Yosei said that he counts only some of the days during which he drank wine, it is

with extended naziriteship,

of one hundred days, since he fulfilled naziriteship for thirty days, and we penalized him with drinking wine for thirty days, that is sufficient.

Here, our Mishna is speaking

of

short naziriteship,

in which he did not fulfill thirty days of naziriteship properly, and therefore he must observe a prohibition corresponding to all the days during which he drank wine.

And if you wish, say: the Rabbis,

and

do not say,

do not say in our Mishna “

from the time that he became a nazirite,”

the meaning of which is to observe only part of the days during which he drank wine,

but rather say, “

as the time from which he became a nazirite,”

for he must observe a prohibition according to the number of all the days during which he drank wine.

We learned in the Mishna:

He asked the Sages, and they permitted him, and he had an animal set aside, it shall go out and graze among the herd.

did

Jeremiah said: What

is

that

they said,

“The House of Shammai, let us hear the words of the House of Hillel.”

No,

did

the House of Shammai say, “An erroneous consecration is a consecration”,

and nevertheless they said here,

“Since the matter has become clear”

now

“retroactively that he did not vow properly, it shall go out”

the animal that he set aside for his offering

“and graze among the herd.”

If so,

for the House of Hillel as well

let us say that

even though they say

the House of Hillel that

“an erroneous substitution is a substitution, this applies when the original consecration exists”. The first offering, from which he made a substitution to the unconsecrated animal, still exists.

that is, when the first offering, from which the animal of unconsecrated property was substituted, still exists.

But where the original consecration is uprooted,

that he asked about the first offering and it became unconsecrated,

it too is uprooted

the sanctity from the

substitution offering,

for the matter has now become clear retroactively that there was no first offering, and consequently sanctity did not take effect upon the substitution offering.

The Master said

in our Mishna:

The House of Shammai said to the House of Hillel:

“Do you not concede that if he called the ninth ‘tenth,’

it is sanctified?”

It was stated:

The amoraim disagreed regarding the Torah’s innovation that the ninth and the eleventh are also sanctified if he mistakenly called them “tenth”: is the matter specifically referring to an error, or even if he intentionally called the ninth “tenth,” did the Torah innovate that the ninth is sanctified?

Animal tithe,

in which the Torah innovated that even the ninth, over which he waved the staff as over the tenth, is sanctified —

Rav Naḥman said: His error

sanctifies it,

but not his intention.

For if the counter knew that it was the ninth, and intentionally called it “tenth” instead of “ninth,” the Torah did not innovate that it is sanctified.

But

Rav Ḥisda and Rabbah bar Rav Huna said: His error

sanctifies it,

and all the more so his intention,

for there was no error in his consecration, and the consecrator knew that it was the ninth.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: According to you, who say, “His error but not his intention” —

If so, this

that the House of Shammai said to the House of Hillel: “Do you not concede that if he called the ninth ‘tenth,’ and the tenth ‘ninth,’ and the eleventh ‘tenth,’ all three of them are sanctified?”

And it is proven that an erroneous consecration is a consecration.

And the House of Hillel fell silent

from answering them regarding their claim itself, but only argued against them: why are the eighth and the twelfth not sanctified? And they brought proof that this is a special innovation regarding those adjacent to the tithe.

Thus, according to your words, the House of Hillel could have refuted the proof of the House of Shammai itself, and

said to them: “What is the case with animal tithe? Since

the ninth

is not

made

sacred

if he consecrated it as the tenth

intentionally,

knowing that it was the ninth; rather, all its consecration as the ninth takes effect only through error, when he does not know that it is the ninth but thinks that it is the tenth!

And this itself is proof that the Torah’s innovation is specific to animal tithe, and one cannot learn from it to another place, for everywhere else, if he consecrated intentionally, his consecration takes effect!

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: This is the reason that they did not say to them

the House of Hillel this reason to the House of Shammai: since the House of Shammai would answer them

“It is a kal va-chomer”

to learn from here in the opposite direction:

Just as animal tithe,

regarding the ninth,

which is not sanctified

if it is made

intentionally,

nevertheless it is

sanctified

when it is made

in error.

A consecration

in another place,

which is sanctified intentionally, all the more so

that it should be sanctified in error!

But Rav Shimi continues and says:

That is not so!

This kal va-chomer that the House of Shammai would argue is not a valid kal va-chomer, and there is no refutation from it against the House of Hillel, since

consecration —

depends upon the owner’s intention.

The Torah made consecration dependent upon the owner’s intention, and not upon his error, for thus the Torah said: “A man who consecrates his house,” which implies that it is through his will and intention.

And animal tithe is an innovation, and one cannot learn from it.

Mishna:

Our Mishna deals with asking about naziriteship on the basis of a petah of “a development.”

The Sages and Rabbi Eliezer disagreed in several places in tractate Nedarim whether a person can ask about his vow on the basis of a “petah” involving something that occurred after his vow and is not ordinarily likely to occur, called “a development.”

According to the Sages, the permission through a petah for regret over a vow is based on the fact that the one who vowed can say: Had I considered this matter at the time that I vowed, I would not have vowed. It follows that my mind was not complete when this matter was hidden from me, for had I been clear-minded, I would have considered the possibility of such a thing, and then I would not have vowed. It follows that he is as one who vowed in error, because of the deficiency in the completeness of his mind at the time of the vow.

But an occurrence that is uncommon and has not yet happened, called “a development,” is not a petah for saying that my mind was not complete because I did not consider such a possibility at the time of the vow, for even a clear-minded person does not think about the occurrence of such an event in the future.

But Rabbi Eliezer disagrees, and holds that even a petah of a development is a valid petah for the annulment of a vow.

One who vowed to be a nazirite,

and had animals when he vowed, and intended to vow because he had the possibility of bringing these animals as the offerings of his naziriteship.

And he went to bring his animal, and found that it had been stolen,

the animal —

If he became a nazirite before his animal was stolen,

and only after accepting his naziriteship was the animal stolen,

he is a nazirite.

And he cannot ask about his vow on the basis of “a development,” saying that had he known that after accepting his naziriteship his animal would be stolen, he would not have vowed, for theft is an uncommon event, and he was not required to consider it.