Nazir 32a (לב.) — the Talmud in English

He

also designated

and consecrated

the lamb

the ninth!

and

the lamb

the eleventh,

alone! This is a special innovation introduced here by the verse: since the ninth and the eleventh are adjacent in their numbering to the tenth, if the counter should happen to err and call the lamb adjacent to the tenth [before it or after it] by the name “tenth,” consecration takes effect upon it [although it does not acquire the sanctity of animal tithe].

But with regard to the other lambs, concerning which the verse introduced no such innovation, no consecration takes effect at all!

If so, it is impossible to derive from animal tithe that an erroneous consecration is a valid consecration, since with regard to animal tithe itself it was not stated that an erroneous consecration takes effect in the case of the other lambs.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna that a nazirite who drank wine during his nazirite term counts his days of naziriteship “from the time he vowed.”

The Gemara now assumes that the Mishna means that he counts his nazirite term normally, as though he had not drunk wine, and need not observe a prohibition against drinking wine as a penalty corresponding to the days during which he drank wine.

At most, it could be explained that when the Mishna said “he counts from the time he vowed,” it means that he counts some of the days on which he drank wine, but need not observe a prohibition corresponding to all the days on which he drank wine as a penalty.

And we raised this objection:

According to whom is our Mishna?

In accordance with whose opinion was this Mishna taught? —

For it is

not

in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Yosei

and

not

in accordance with the view of

the Rabbis!

For it was taught in a beraita:

If one vowed

to be a nazirite,

and violated his naziriteship,

drinking wine, and came before the court to be released from his naziriteship [or came to the Temple to bring his nazirite offerings]—

they penalize him for violating the laws of his naziriteship—

and therefore,

they do not attend to him;

the court does not allow him to seek release from his naziriteship [or, if he wished to bring his offerings, they do not allow him to sacrifice them],

unless he

will

count among them,

observing an

abstention

from drinking wine

for

the number of all the

days during which he observed permission.

For example, if one accepted a nazirite term of one hundred days, and during sixty of them he drank wine, the Sages penalized him by requiring him now to observe a prohibition against drinking wine for sixty days.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Since he observed the laws of naziriteship for forty days, thereby observing naziriteship properly for a period of thirty days, which is called “a short nazirite term,”

it is sufficient

that he be penalized with a prohibition against drinking for

thirty days

alone, and he need not be penalized for all sixty days.

But if he accepted upon himself a short nazirite term of thirty days and drank wine for several days, he must observe a prohibition corresponding to all the days on which he drank wine, so that his observance of naziriteship will last at least thirty days!

Now, if we say that the intent of the Mishna’s phrase “he counts from the time he vowed” is that he observes the prohibition against drinking wine for only some of the days, but not for all of them, this presents a difficulty—

If,

if our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who do not distinguish between an extended nazirite term and a short nazirite term as Rabbi Yosei does, but in every case penalize him by requiring him to observe a prohibition against drinking wine corresponding to all the days on which he drank wine,

it is difficult

if the Mishna is speaking of one who accepted upon himself a

long nazirite term

of one hundred days, and drank wine during some of them: why need he not observe a prohibition corresponding to all the days on which he drank wine?

And all the more so if we establish the Mishna as referring to one who accepted a short nazirite term of thirty days and drank wine for twenty days. According to the Rabbis, he is penalized for twenty days during which he may not drink wine, whereas in our Mishna he is penalized only for some of them.

For even Rabbi Yosei concedes that since he did not observe naziriteship properly for thirty days, the Sages penalized him by requiring him to observe a prohibition against drinking wine corresponding to all the days on which he drank wine.

If it is Rabbi Yosei, it is difficult

if we establish our Mishna as referring to one who accepted upon himself

a short nazirite term,

for even according to Rabbi Yosei he is penalized for all the days on which he drank wine, whereas our Mishna penalizes him for only some of the days.

The Gemara answers:

If you wish, say

that our Mishna is in accordance with

Rabbi Yosei

and

if you wish, say

that our Mishna is in accordance with

the Rabbis.

The Gemara explains:

If you wish, say that our Mishna is the view of

Rabbi Yosei

and a distinction must be made:

Here,

where Rabbi Yosei said that he counts only some of the days on which he drank wine, it is

in an extended nazirite term,

of one hundred days. Since he observed naziriteship for thirty days and was penalized with abstention from wine for thirty days, that is sufficient.

Here,

in our Mishna, the case is

a short nazirite term,

which he did not observe properly for thirty days; therefore he must observe a prohibition corresponding to all the days on which he drank wine.

And if you wish, say: The Rabbis,

and

do not say

that in our Mishna the phrase

“from the time he vowed”

means that he observes the prohibition for only some of the days on which he drank wine.

Rather, say

“as from the time he vowed,”

meaning that he must observe a prohibition for the number of all the days on which he drank wine.

We learned in the Mishna:

He consulted the Sages and they released him,

and he had an animal that had been set aside [for his offering]; it is to go out and graze among the herd.

Jeremiah said: What

did

Beit Shammai say? Let us hear the view of Beit Hillel.

No—do

the members of

Beit Shammai not say that an erroneous consecration is a valid consecration? Nevertheless, here they said:

Once the matter has been revealed

retroactively,

that he did not vow properly, let it go out,

the animal that he had set aside for his offering,

and let it graze among the herd.

If so,

it should likewise be said according to

Beit Hillel:

even though

they say

that an erroneous substitution is a valid substitution,

this applies only where the original consecration is still present—

that is, the first offering, from which he made the substitution with an unconsecrated animal, still exists.

But where the original consecration is uprooted,

when he consults about the first offering and it becomes unconsecrated,

the sanctity is likewise uprooted

from the offering of the

substitution, since it is now clarified retroactively that there was no first offering, and consequently no sanctity took effect upon the substituted offering.

The Master said,

in our Mishna:

The members of Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel:

Do you not concede that if he called the ninth “tenth,”

it becomes consecrated?

It was stated:

The amoraim disagreed concerning the Torah’s innovation that the ninth and the eleventh also become consecrated if he called them “tenth.” Is the case specifically one of error, or even if he deliberately called the ninth “tenth,” did the Torah teach that the ninth becomes consecrated?

Animal tithe,

in which the Torah taught that even the ninth, over which he passed the staff as though it were the tenth, becomes consecrated—

Rav Naḥman said: His error

consecrates it,

but not his intention.

For if the counter knew that it was the ninth and deliberately called it “tenth” instead of “ninth,” the Torah did not teach that it becomes consecrated.

Whereas

Rav Ḥisda and Rabbah bar Rav Huna said: His error

consecrates it,

and all the more so his intention,

when there was no error in his consecration and the one consecrating knew that it was the ninth.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: According to you, who say that it is his error but not his intention—

If so, what of

the statement of Beit Shammai to Beit Hillel: “Do you not concede that if he called the ninth ‘tenth,’ the tenth ‘ninth,’ and the eleventh ‘tenth,’ all three become consecrated?”

This proves that an erroneous consecration is a valid consecration.

And Beit Hillel were silent,

not answering their claim on its own terms. Rather, they merely argued against them: Why are the eighth and the twelfth not consecrated? And they brought proof that this is a special innovation concerning the animals adjacent to the tithe animal.

According to your words, Beit Hillel could have refuted Beit Shammai’s proof on its own terms and

said to them: What is true of animal tithe? Since

the ninth

does not

become

consecrated if he consecrated it as the tenth

intentionally,

knowing that it was the ninth; rather, its consecration as the ninth takes effect only in error, when he does not know that it is the ninth but thinks that it is the tenth!

And this itself would prove that the Torah’s innovation applies specifically to animal tithe, and cannot be derived from it for another case, since in every other context, if he consecrated an item intentionally, his consecration takes effect!

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: This is the reason they did not say this to them:

Beit Hillel did not give this reason to Beit Shammai, because Beit Shammai would have answered them that

it is a kal va-chomer to derive the opposite from this case:

Just as with animal tithe,

the ninth animal,

which is not consecrated when it is done

intentionally, is nevertheless

consecrated when it is done

in error,

with regard to consecration

in another context,

which becomes consecrated intentionally, it is all the more so

that it should become consecrated in error!

But Rav Shimi continues and says:

That is not so!

This kal va-chomer that Beit Shammai would have asserted is not a valid kal va-chomer, and it cannot refute Beit Hillel, because

consecration—

depends on the owner’s mind.

The Torah made consecration dependent upon the owner’s intention, and not upon his error, as the Torah states: “A man who consecrates his house,” implying that it is done willingly and knowingly.

And animal tithe is an innovation, and cannot be used as a basis for deriving other cases.

Mishna:

Our Mishna deals with seeking release from naziriteship on the basis of a “new circumstance.”

The Sages and Rabbi Eliezer disagreed in several places in tractate Nedarim whether a person may seek release from his vow on the basis of a “vow-opening” involving something that occurred after his vow and is not an ordinary occurrence, called a “new circumstance.”

According to the Sages, the opening that permits regret concerning a vow is based on the ability of the one who vowed to say: Had I considered this matter at the time I made my vow, I would not have vowed. It follows that I was not fully aware when I made the vow, for if my mind had been clear, I would have considered the possibility of such an occurrence, and then I would not have vowed. Thus, it is as though he vowed in error, because his awareness was incomplete at the time of the vow.

However, an unusual event that has not yet occurred, called a “new circumstance,” cannot serve as an opening by which to say that he was not of sound mind because he did not consider such a possibility at the time of his vow, since even a person of sound mind does not anticipate such an event in the future.

And Rabbi Eliezer disagrees, maintaining that even an opening based on a new circumstance is a valid opening for the release of a vow.

One who vowed to be a nazirite,

and had animals at the time he vowed, intending to make the vow because he had the option of bringing these animals as his nazirite offerings,

and went to bring his animal, and found that it had been stolen,

the animal—

If he became a nazirite before his animal was stolen,

and the animal was stolen only after he accepted naziriteship,

he is a nazirite.

He cannot seek release from his vow on the basis of a “new circumstance,” saying that had he known that his animal would be stolen after he accepted naziriteship, he would not have vowed, because theft is an unusual event, and he was not required to have considered it.

But an unusual event that has not yet occurred, called a “new development,” cannot serve as a condition by which to say that his intention was incomplete because he did not consider such a possibility at the time of the vow. Even a person with a clear mind does not consider the future occurrence of such an event.

Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that even a condition based on a new development is a valid basis for annulling a vow.

One who undertook naziriteship,

and had animals at the time he made the vow, intending to undertake naziriteship because he had the possibility of bringing these animals as the offerings of his naziriteship.

And he went to bring his animal, and found that it had been stolen,

the animal—

If he became a nazirite before his animal was stolen,

and the animal was stolen only after he undertook naziriteship,

he is a nazirite.

He cannot ask to have his vow annulled on the basis of a “new development,” by saying that had he known that his animal would be stolen after he undertook naziriteship, he would not have made the vow, because theft is an unusual event and he was not required to consider it.