Nazir 30b (ל:) — the Talmud in English

This teaches us: the halakha

is that the daughter does not shave at all using her father’s money, and all the more so the other heirs.

We learned in the Mishna: “How so? If he and his father were both nazirites, and his father set aside money for his naziriteship, and [the father] died, Rabbi Yosei says: This money shall be brought for freewill offerings. And who is the one who shaves using his father’s naziriteship? If his father was a nazirite and had unspecified money, and he died, and [the son] said: ‘I hereby become a nazirite on the condition that I will shave using my father’s money,’ this is the one who shaves using his father’s naziriteship.”

They raised a dilemma

[the members of the academy were uncertain]: a. Do

the Sages disagree

[with Rabbi Yosei]

with Rabbi Yosei,

as implied by the wording of the Mishna: “Rabbi Yosei

says,”

or do the Sages not disagree with Rabbi Yosei?

b.

And if you should say

that indeed

they disagree

with Rabbi Yosei, it is necessary to determine what they disagree about: Is it

the first clause

—that is, the son became a nazirite while his father was still alive, and they maintain that even in this case the son shaves using his father’s money—

or

perhaps, on the contrary, they disagree

about the latter clause—when he became a nazirite after his father’s death—and the Sages maintain that even in this case he does not shave using his father’s money, as this halakha was never stated at all, and the money is in every case brought for freewill offerings?

Come and hear

that the Sages disagreed, and that it was the first clause about which they disagreed, saying that in every case the son shaves using his father’s naziriteship:

As it was taught in a beraita: How did they say that a man shaves using his father’s money? If his father was a nazirite, and his father set aside money for his naziriteship, and died, and

the son said:

“I hereby become a nazirite on the condition that I will shave using my father’s money,”

he

shaves using his father’s money. But if he and his father were both nazirites, and his father set aside money for his naziriteship, and died, this money shall be brought for freewill offerings,

and the son may not shave using it,

the words of Rabbi Yosei.

Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Yehuda say:

even

this is the one who shaves using his father’s naziriteship.

Thus, the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Yosei, and it was the first clause about which they disagreed.

Rabba raised a dilemma:

If he has—

the father who set aside money for his naziriteship and died—

two sons who are nazirites

who are eligible to shave using their father’s money,

What

is their status regarding the money their father left? Is

the halakha received that whoever is first to shave, shaves,

that is, was the halakha stated only that the sons shave using their father’s money, without the law of division that applies to other inheritances, so that whoever first undertakes naziriteship will be the one who shaves?

Or perhaps: the halakha received is that it is an inheritance, and each receives half

[half the money for each son], that is, just as division was stated with regard to an inheritance, so division was stated with regard to this money as well.

Rava raised a dilemma:

If a firstborn and an ordinary son

—who, with regard to other inheritances, receives one portion while the firstborn receives two portions—and they are

nazirites, what

is the law governing their division of the unspecified money their father left?

Is

the halakha received

that the fact that the son shaves using his father’s money is a halakha given to Moses from Sinai, which has no connection to the laws of inheritance at all,

and therefore he need not shave according to the amount he takes

in an ordinary inheritance, [and therefore the money is not divided in the manner in which other inheritances are divided]?

Or perhaps:

“It is an inheritance”

that

the son inherits the money in order to shave with it,

and

if so,

just as he takes two portions

[just as he receives two portions in other inheritances],

so

[in that same proportion—he]

shaves,

with one shaving using two-thirds and the other using one-third.

Rava adds another uncertainty:

And if you should say

that indeed

it is an inheritance, and according to what he takes

in other inheritances, the firstborn

shaves

using his father’s money, namely, the firstborn receives two portions; it is still necessary to determine whether the firstborn shaves two portions in every case:

Does

in

the language of

ordinary property

alone

does he have two portions,

that is, does the firstborn receive two portions only when the father did not use language referring to an offering or consecration when setting aside the money, but said: “This money is for my naziriteship”—

but in

the language of

consecration,

when the father said: “This money is for the offerings of my naziriteship,” in this case

the firstborn does not

receive two portions.

Or perhaps: since he acquires it

the son

for shaving

[since the halakha states that the son acquires the money for shaving], then

it makes no difference

which wording the father used when setting it aside. Rava raised another uncertainty:

If his

father was a permanent nazirite

and set aside money for his haircut,

and he

the son was

an ordinary nazirite,

that is, naziriteship that is not lifelong but lasts for a fixed period, or if

his father was an ordinary nazirite and he

the son was

a permanent nazirite, what is the law?

The Gemara explains the two sides of the uncertainty:

Perhaps the halakha was received only with regard to ordinary naziriteship

[the halakha was stated only with regard to ordinary naziriteship] and not with regard to permanent naziriteship.

Or perhaps: it makes no difference.

And if you should say

that even when one was a permanent nazirite and the other an ordinary nazirite, the son may shave using his father’s money, since

here

[in the case of a permanent and an ordinary nazirite]

both this and that

[the father’s naziriteship and the son’s]

are pure naziriteship,

that is, the money was set aside for pure naziriteship, and the son too brings offerings for pure naziriteship; but

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma:

If his

father was an impure nazirite

and set aside money for the offerings of the “impurity haircut,”

and he

the son was

a pure nazirite,

that is, the son wishes to add to the money and bring with it the offerings of the “purity haircut.”

Or if

his father was a pure nazirite and he was an impure nazirite, what is the law?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

We shall return to you, chapter “One Who Said.”

At the beginning of the chapter, the Mishna presents a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerning one who consecrated something in error: whether the consecration takes effect.

Since it is stated concerning a nazirite, “He shall be holy” [and therefore it is possible to ask about the nezirut, just as it is possible to ask about a consecration, as explained above in Tosafot and in the Rosh on page 9a], the Mishna presents the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerning consecration in error, as an introduction to nezirut undertaken in error.

Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: Consecration in error ,

when a person consecrates something in error to the Temple treasury or as an offering, it is

consecrated.