Nazir 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

“She gained precedence by four generations in Israel.”

It appears from the Tosafot and the commentator that the reading “limalkhut” is absent.

That is to say: The elder sister became integrated into Israel four generations before her younger sister. For from Ruth the “Moabite” was born Oved, and he fathered Jesse, and he fathered David, and he fathered Solomon; and Solomon married Naama the “Ammonite.” Thus, she preceded her by four generations, namely: Oved, Jesse, David, and Solomon.

Mishna:

Earlier, in the Gemara on 21b, the Gemara was uncertain whether a husband’s annulment uproots the vow entirely or cuts it off from that point onward. The Gemara’s conclusion is that a husband’s annulment cuts it off from that point onward; therefore, our Mishna will be explained in accordance with this side of the question.

A woman who took a nazirite vow and set aside her animal

that is, three animals: a female sheep for a sin-offering, a ram for a burnt-offering, and a ram for a peace-offering—for the offering of a pure nazirite,

and afterward her husband annulled it—

what should be done with the offerings that she set aside?

If the animal was his

that she had set aside,

it shall go out—

all the animals—

and graze in the herd;

that is to say: It has no sanctity at all. Her husband transferred an animal to her for an offering only if she would require it. But once her nazirite status was annulled and she no longer required an offering, presumably her husband did not transfer the offering to her with this possibility in mind. Therefore, the animal has no sanctity at all. The Gemara will explain this further.

And if the animal was hers:

The sin-offering shall die,

because, since she is no longer a nazirite, as her husband annulled her vow, this is equivalent to a case in which its owners “died,” and a sin-offering whose owners died is sent to die, by a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

And

if the animal that she had set aside for a

burnt-offering—

shall be sacrificed

as a burnt-offering,

and

the animal that she had set aside for a

peace-offering shall be sacrificed as a peace-offering.

The Tosafot, s.v. “and the burnt-offering,” wrote: “And if you say: According to Rabbi Yishmael, who said above [19a] that the [burnt-offering of an impure nazirite] is not a gift and is not sacrificed [if the husband annulled the vow of a nazirite woman who became impure], does he also disagree with our Mishna here, which explicitly teaches that the burnt-offering is sacrificed as a burnt-offering!” Their question refers to the side that the annulment “uproots the vow entirely,” because only according to this side was it explained above in the Gemara that if the burnt-offering is not a gift, she need not bring it ;

And

the

peace-offerings

shall not be eaten אלא

for one day

only, in accordance with the stringency applicable to a nazirite’s peace-offerings, and not like other peace-offerings, which are eaten for two days and one night.

And they—

the peace-offerings—

do not require loaves,

for the Torah states, with regard to the waving of the loaves, that it is “on the palms of the nazirite,” and there is no nazirite here, since her husband annulled her vow.

And

if she had money

that she had set aside for the offerings of pure naziriteship, and it was

unallocated

—that is, she did not specify which money was for the sin-offering and which was for the burnt-offering and peace-offering, but simply said: “This money shall be for my nazirite offerings”—

all the money shall fall

all the money

to voluntary offerings

—for the summer offerings of the altar— and this is a novel halakhic ruling. In the Gemara, the amoraim dispute whether it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai or whether this law is derived through exegesis of the verses.

And if she had

allocated money

—that she had set aside three groups of money, specifying: this money is for a sin-offering, this for a burnt-offering, and this for a peace-offering:

The money for the

sin-offering shall go to the Dead Sea

to be destroyed, since if the animal had been before us, it would have been sent to die by a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

One may not derive benefit

from this money, by rabbinic decree,

but there is no misuse of consecrated property with it

—one is not liable to bring an offering for misuse of consecrated property because of it—for since it is not destined to be sacrificed, it is not included among “the sacred property of the Lord,” for which one is liable to bring an offering for misuse.

The money for the burnt-offering shall be used

for

a burnt-offering

and there is misuse of consecrated property with it.

The Tosafot wrote: “For it is a gift, and there is misuse of consecrated property with it, since it is sacrificed on the altar.” One must inquire into their intent: Is the reason they needed the rationale that “a burnt-offering is a gift” specifically if the husband’s annulment uproots the vow entirely, or perhaps even if the annulment cuts off the vow from that point onward, if the burnt-offering were not a gift, she would not bring it?

The money for the peace-offering shall be used

for

peace-offerings.

The law of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to them, since even with an actual peace-offering animal there is no misuse of consecrated property except with regard to the sacrificial portions after the blood has been sprinkled.

And they shall be eaten,

the peace-offerings that they will bring with this money,

for one day,

in accordance with the stringency applicable to a nazirite’s peace-offerings, since they were set aside for nazirite peace-offerings,

and they do not require loaves,

as was explained in the Mishna above with regard to a peace-offering animal that she had set aside.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If the animal was his, it shall go out and graze in the herd; and if the animal was hers, the sin-offering shall die, and the burnt-offering shall be sacrificed as a burnt-offering, and the peace-offering shall be sacrificed as a peace-offering:

The reason for the law—according to the Gemara’s present understanding—is that the husband gave her the animal from his own property only if she would require it. Since in the end the woman did not require an offering, he therefore did not give it with this possibility in mind. Accordingly, the Gemara asks: It must be that the husband is not obligated to bring offerings for her. For if he were obligated to her to do so, there would be no basis for distinguishing between an animal that was his and an animal that was hers. Since he is obligated to her by virtue of the conditions of the marriage contract, he should be obligated to her even if ultimately she does not require an offering —

And if so,

who is the tanna

who holds this view and taught our Mishna,

that the husband is not obligated to her

by the conditions of the marriage contract to bring her offerings on her behalf?

Rav Hisda said: It is the Rabbis—

who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda in the beraita cited below—

that is so!

For if it enters your mind

that if you say that our Mishna is

Rabbi Yehuda’s, why

did we learn: If the animal was his,

it shall go out and graze in the herd,

and

the husband is obligated

to

her!?

As it is taught:

A woman who gives birth is obligated to bring an offering. There is a distinction between a wealthy woman and a poor woman: A wealthy woman brings a lamb for a burnt-offering and a dove or pigeon for a sin-offering, whereas a poor woman brings only two doves or two pigeons, one for a burnt-offering and one for a sin-offering. We likewise find other offerings with regard to which there is a distinction between a wealthy person and a poor person, such as a leper bringing an offering for his purification, a sin-offering brought for impurity of the Temple or its sacred offerings, an oath of utterance, and an oath of testimony.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

A person—

a husband who was wealthy—

brings a wealthy person’s offering on behalf of his wife,

who is obligated to bring an offering for which there is a distinction between a wealthy person and a poor person. He cannot say: “But she has nothing; let her bring a poor person’s offering.”

And likewise,

he brings

all the offerings that she is obligated to bring—

The Tosafot wrote: This applies specifically to obligations that she is obligated to bring, such as the offering of a woman who gives birth or a menstruant, but not to vows and voluntary offerings, for it is not within her power to vow to bring a thousand burnt-offerings a day ;

For

this is

what she writes

to her husband when he divorces her: “

All liability”—

that is, liability for the offerings—“

that I have toward you from before” [that is, all liability that I have toward you from before—namely, from the period of the marriage], meaning: When the woman is divorced and receives her ketubba, she writes to her husband: “I have received my ketubba, and I have waived all liability that I have toward you from before”—including even though she has not yet brought the offerings. Thus, the husband is responsible for her offerings; otherwise, she would not have needed to waive the liability.

[that is, all responsibility that I have against you from earlier, namely, from the time of the marriage]. That is: When the woman is divorced and receives her marriage settlement, she writes to her husband: “I have received my marriage settlement, and I have waived all responsibility that I had against you from before [even though I have not yet brought the offerings].” Thus, the husband is responsible for her offerings; otherwise, she would not need to waive this responsibility.

Rava said: You can even say

that the Mishna

is Rabbi Yehuda’s

, and nevertheless, if the animal was his, she should release it and let it graze with the herd.

And is it merely because

when he binds himself to her

the husband does so only

in a matter that she needs

[in something that she will ultimately need], but

in a matter that she does not need

ultimately—

not

does he bind himself to her, and consequently the consecration is nullified.

Some say

that Rav Ḥisda and Rava disagreed in a different manner: according to Rav Ḥisda, on the contrary, our Mishna is more readily explained according to Rabbi Yehuda; whereas according to Rava, our Mishna can be understood even according to the Rabbis—

Who is the tanna

responsible for the ruling of our Mishna?

Rav Ḥisda said:

It is specifically

Rabbi Yehuda, and

the reason that the animal is not consecrated, even though he bound himself to her to bring her offerings, is

that when he binds himself to her in a matter that she needs, but

in a matter

that she does not need, he does not.

And since he is not bound to her in such a case, the offering is consequently not consecrated if in the end the woman did not need the offering.

For if

you say that our Mishna is

according to the Rabbis, it is difficult:

it says that

he is not bound to her at all

to bring her offerings on her behalf;

but under what circumstances is he bound to her?!

That is, how is it possible for the animal to be his even though he is not bound to her? It must therefore be:

for example, he transferred ownership of it to her,

as he gave her the animal as a gift so that she could designate it for her offering—

And

if so,

since he transferred ownership of it to her

it became hers

[since he gave her the animal, it is considered her animal], and by law the animal should have been offered even though he nullified her vow, as is the law with regard to her own animal.