Moed Katan 2b — the Talmud in English

And this is why Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with Rabbi Meir and prohibited it in a beit haba'al, because

perhaps he will come to a collapse;

there is concern about excessive exertion that may be caused by irrigating from a newly emerged spring.

However,

where there is no concern that exertion will occur, such as

a spring that did not emerge initially, for

we do not fear that

he will come to a collapse,

it is possible that Rabbi Yehuda permits irrigating from it

even a beit haba'al as well!

If so, this is difficult: From where do we know that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with our Mishna, which maintains that it is prohibited to irrigate a beit haba'al even from a spring that did not emerge initially, since this is merely irrigation for enhancement?

And we answer:

If so,

if you say that Rabbi Yehuda also permits irrigating a beit haba'al from a spring that did not emerge initially, this presents a difficulty for us:

the Mishna—

according to whom will you assign it!?

According to whose opinion will you interpret it?

After all, we do not find that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov prohibited exertion where there is a loss. Rabbi Meir permits even irrigation for enhancement. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya prohibits using a spring that emerged initially even for a beit hashelahין.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that he holds

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

that

it makes no difference whether the spring emerged initially or whether the spring did not emerge initially:

a beit hashelahin, yes,

it may indeed be irrigated, but

a beit haba'al, no,

it may not be irrigated under any circumstances, in accordance with our Mishna.

And that which it teaches

in the beraita in the Tosefta,

“a spring that emerged initially,”

is not intended to teach us that Rabbi Yehuda permits a spring that did not emerge initially in a beit haba'al. Rather, it is only

to inform you of

the

strength of Rabbi Meir,

who disagrees and permits it in every case,

for even a spring that emerges initially—

one may irrigate from it even a field of a beit haba'al!

This is despite the fact that it is irrigation for enhancement and despite the concern that he may come to a collapse and thereby incur exertion!

It was stated: One who weeds

on Shabbat—he pulls out weeds from among the good plants in a field, and as a result the good plants that remain grow better .

As for weeding, he cannot be liable on account of the labor of reaping, because the essence of the labor of “reaping” is a labor performed for the purpose of obtaining the thing that is reaped, and it differs fundamentally from the work of weeding. The purpose of weeding is the benefit of the good plants that remain, and not the weeds that are cut, since the person who weeds has no desire to take the weeds that he uprooted from the field.

And

likewise,

one who waters seeds on Shabbat—

on account of what

particular prohibited labor

do we administer a warning to him—

do the witnesses warn him not to do it, so that if he does it he will be liable?

Rabba said:

They warn him

on account of

the labor of

plowing.

Rav Yosef said:

They warn him

on account of

the labor of

sowing.

Rabba said: It is logical according to my position.

It is logical that his liability is on account of the labor of plowing, and he must be warned on account of the labor of plowing!

The proof is:

Just as

it is the case that

the manner of a plower

is

to soften the soil,

to loosen it so that it will be better suited for sowing,

so too,

when he uproots weeds, and likewise when he waters the field, he

softens the soil.

And since the act of labor involved in weeding or watering resembles plowing in its execution, we take into consideration what he is doing now, at the time he performs the labor.

Rav Yosef said: It is logical according to my position,

that his liability is on account of sowing, and he must be warned on account of the labor of sowing!

The proof is:

Just as the manner of a sower is to cause fruit to grow,

so too here,

the primary intention of his weeding is that through his actions

he causes fruit to grow .

And we do not follow the similarity to softening the soil, but rather the result of the growth .

Abaye said to Rabba:

The difficulty applies

both according to you, and

both

according to Rav Yosef.

According to you, it is difficult:

Is it the case that only

on account of plowing, yes,

he is liable, whereas

on account of sowing, no,

he is not liable?

Why should he not be liable on account of both labors? After all, it is possible to incur two liabilities for a single action that contains two labors. In weeding or watering, he performs both labors; why should we not hold him liable for both?

And also,

according to Rav Yosef, it is difficult:

Is it the case that only

on account of sowing, yes,

he is liable, whereas

on account of plowing

he is

not

liable?

And if you would say,

if you wish to answer both Rabba and Rav Yosef and say that

wherever there are

in one action

two

acts of two different labors,

he is not liable

for them

except for one—

That is not correct. For:

And

indeed,

Rav Kahana said:

One who

prunes

branches from a tree on Shabbat,

and needs the branches

that he cut while pruning the tree , is

liable for two—

one on account of planting,

since through pruning the tree grows more.

And one on account of reaping,

since he needs the branches that he pruned .

It follows that it is possible to incur two liabilities for two labors performed through a single action. Why, then, did Rabba and Rav Yosef hold him liable for only one?

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba,

who said that he is liable on account of plowing:

We have indeed learned in a beraita in the Tosefta:

One who weeds

in a field sown with mixed species, removing the bad weeds from among the good plants, and thereby assists in the growth of the mixed-species crops,

and one who covers

the seeds of

mixed species,

who covers with earth the seeds that are mixed species [such as a grape pit and grains of produce] so that they will take root properly in the soil—he

is flogged

on account of “You shall not sow your field with mixed species.”

Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains

mixed species sown in his vineyard and does not uproot them—he is flogged.

And Rav Yosef raises an objection to Rabbah:

Granted, according to me, for I say

that one who weeds on Shabbat is liable

on account of sowing—this is

understandable, that which we learned, that one who weeds in a field sown with mixed species is flogged for this, since

sowing mixed species is forbidden,

as it is written, “You shall not sow your field with mixed species,” and one who weeds in a field in which mixed species are growing is like one who sows them, because the weeding assists the growth of the mixed species

. But according to you, for you say

that one who weeds on Shabbat is liable

on account of plowing—

why is he flogged for weeding a field of mixed species? Is

plowing in

a field in which there are

mixed species—

forbidden!?

He said to him,

Rabbah replied to Rav Yosef: One who weeds among mixed species is flogged not because of the weeding, since weeding is merely plowing, and there is no prohibition against plowing in a field of mixed species. Rather, he is liable

—

on account of maintaining

mixed species in his vineyard, and for this he is flogged even without any action whatsoever!

And we raise an objection:

But from that which it taught

in the

latter clause

of that beraita,

“Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains

mixed species in a vineyard is flogged,”

by inference,

you learn

that the

first tanna,

who says that one who weeds is flogged,

it is not on account of maintaining

mixed species

that he

is flogged, but only on account of weeding in a field in which there are mixed species! And it is proved that one who weeds is liable on account of sowing.

And we answer: This is what Rabbah is saying:

The entire

that beraita—

it is Rabbi Akiva, and

in the wording

“For what reason”

does the tanna say

his statement? And this is what he said:

For what reason is one who weeds and one who covers among mixed species flogged,

even though weeding is not considered an act of sowing? —

On account of maintaining

mixed species! According to

what Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains

mixed species is flogged

. And the Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Akiva?

For it was taught:

“You shall not sow your field with mixed species.”

I have only

that one who

is flogged is

only

one who

sows

mixed species with his hands.

One who

maintains

mixed species without performing an action with his hands—

from where

do we know that he too is flogged?

The verse states:

“Mixed species—

not your field!”

That is, although the verse says, “You shall not sow mixed species,” we remove the word “sow” and expound: “Not mixed species”!

That is, you shall not have mixed species in any manner; and if mixed species exist in your possession, you must abolish them. Therefore, one who maintains them in his possession and does not abolish them transgresses a prohibition and is flogged for it [and see Rashi’s commentary in tractate Makkot 21b].

We learned

in the Mishna:

They water irrigated fields during the intermediate days and in the Sabbatical year.

And we raise an objection:

Granted,

during the

intermediate days

it is permitted, since the prohibition of labor during them

is on account of exertion.

And in a place of loss, the Sages permitted

exerting oneself somewhat.

But the Sabbatical year is difficult:

whether according to the one who says [Rav Yosef above] that one who waters seeds is liable

on account of sowing, and whether according to the one who says [Rabbah above] that one who waters is liable

on account of plowing—

sowing and plowing in the Sabbatical year, are they permitted!?

For it is written with regard to the Sabbatical year, “You shall not sow your field,” and also with regard to plowing it is stated [concerning Shabbat], “At plowing and at harvest you shall rest,” and we learned from it [through the exposition, “If it does not apply to Shabbat, apply it to the Sabbatical year”] with regard to the Sabbatical year. And even the one who says below that one is not flogged for plowing in the Sabbatical year nevertheless concedes that plowing in the Sabbatical year is forbidden by Torah law! And we answer:

because of plowing—

are planting and plowing during the Sabbatical Year permitted!?

Later in the Gemara, Abaye and Rava dispute this matter. According to Abaye, all agricultural activities performed in a field or vineyard are prohibited by Torah law during the Sabbatical Year, and one receives lashes for them. According to Rava, one receives lashes only for the four activities mentioned explicitly in the Torah: planting, pruning, harvesting, and gathering grapes. Shaar HaMelekh [Sabbatical Year 1:1] writes that nevertheless, the Gemara’s challenge here is valid even according to Rava. Although according to him there are no lashes for plowing during the Sabbatical Year, since it is not one of those four activities, as is explicit later in the discussion, it is nevertheless prohibited by Torah law, because it is stated: “During plowing and harvesting you shall rest.” This verse is expounded as referring to the Sabbatical Year, as will be learned below. There are no lashes for it, however, because it is merely a positive commandment.

Abaye said: That which we learned, that it is permitted to water, refers to

the Sabbatical year nowadays,

when its prohibition is only rabbinic. And in a place of loss, the Sages permitted it.

And it is Rabbi’s

opinion, who holds that the Sabbatical year nowadays applies only by rabbinic law.

For it was taught: Rabbi says: That which is written regarding the remission of debts,

“And this is the matter of the remission: you shall remit

every creditor the loan of his hand.” Why is the language of remission written twice in the verse?

The verse speaks of two remissions: one, the remission of land, and one, the remission of debts.

And the verse compared the two remissions to one another, to teach you that:

At a time when you remit the land,

from the entry of Israel into the Land until they were exiled,

you remit debts.

And

at a time when you do not remit the land,

such as before they entered the Land, while they were in the wilderness, and likewise after they were exiled from the Land,

you do not remit

debts!

That is, nowadays Rabbi holds that “you do not remit the land” by Torah law, and the entire prohibition is only rabbinic, and the Sages were lenient in a place of loss. Rava said: Even if you say that what we learned in our Mishna, that one waters in the Sabbatical year, follows the view of the Sages, who disagree with Rabbi and hold that even nowadays the Sabbatical year is by Torah law, it is nevertheless satisfactory. For only

And

if

there is a time when you do not remit the land,

such as before Israel entered the Land, when they were in the wilderness, and likewise after they were exiled from the Land,

you do not remit

debts!

Rashi in Gittin [36] explains this according to its plain meaning: when there is no remission of the land, meaning in the present era, the mitzva of remission of debts also does not apply. But Rabbi still has not explained why remission of the land does not apply now. Therefore Rashi adds that remission of the land does not apply because it is derived from the Jubilee Year, and the law of the Jubilee Year applies only when all of Israel reside on their land. From the time the ten tribes were exiled from their places, the mitzva of the Jubilee Year was nullified, as we learned in Arakhin [32]. Tosafot in Gittin explain that “when you do not remit the land” refers to the Jubilee Year [and it is called “remission of the land” because the fields return to their owners in the Jubilee Year]. At that time, the mitzva of the Sabbatical Year also does not apply. It is called by Rabbi “remission of debts” because remission of debts is stated specifically with regard to the Sabbatical Year and not the Jubilee Year; but Rabbi’s primary intention is to teach that the mitzva of remission of the land does not apply now. Kesef Mishne [Sabbatical Year 4:25] writes that Maimonides explains it differently: when the mitzva of the Jubilee Year does not apply [and it is called here “remission of the land,” as stated above], the mitzva of remission of debts also does not apply. The mitzva of remission of land during the Sabbatical Year, however, applies by Torah law even in the present era. Mishna LaMelekh raises a difficulty against him: our discussion clearly proves that, according to Rabbi, even remission of land during the Sabbatical Year is permitted by Torah law, for otherwise Abaye has not answered the Gemara’s challenge at all. See also Kesef Mishne [there, 4:29]; the later authorities discuss this matter at length.

the primary categories

of agricultural labor, which are stated explicitly in the Torah,

did the Merciful One forbid

in the Sabbatical year [and they are: sowing, pruning, reaping, and harvesting, which are stated in the language of a prohibition in the Torah].

who disagree with Rabbi and hold that the Sabbatical Year remains a Torah obligation even in the present era; even so, the matter is understandable.

For only the

primary categories

of agricultural labor, which are stated explicitly in the Torah,

the Merciful One prohibited

during the Sabbatical Year [namely, planting, pruning, harvesting, and gathering grapes, which are stated in the form of prohibitions in the Torah].