Moed Katan 18b — the Talmud in English

Rava raised an objection from our Mishna, in which we learned:

:

cloths

with which they wipe

the hands,

and they are repulsive. And likewise

cloths ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

of the books

that are made of linen—it is permitted to launder them on the intermediate days of the festival.

And Rava infers: only

these,

the cloths of the hands and the cloths of the books mentioned in the Mishna,

not,

it is permitted to launder them on the intermediate days of the festival. But other

linen utensils—

not

do they launder them on the intermediate days of the festival. And this proves the opposite of what Rav Yitzhak bar Yaakov bar Giyori said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, that all linen utensils are permitted to be laundered on the intermediate days of the festival.

Abaye said to him

to Rava: Indeed, all linen utensils are permitted to be laundered on the intermediate days of the festival. Rather, the intention of

our Mishna

is to say that the cloths of the hands and the cloths of the books are permitted to be laundered

even [when they are] of other kinds.

That is, the cloths of the hands and the books—even if they are made of wool, and there is great exertion in laundering them—nevertheless, it is permitted to launder them on the intermediate days of the festival, on account of their becoming soiled.

But other garments of all kinds, except for linen garments, are forbidden to be laundered on account of the exertion. On the other hand, all linen utensils are permitted to be laundered.

Bar Hedya said: I myself saw

I saw on the shore of the Kinneret, which is

the Sea of Tiberias, that they take out to it

that they bring out to it

large bowls,

large cups,

filled with linen,

filled with linen garments,

on the intermediate days of the festival,

and they launder the garments on the shore of the Kinneret .

And it is proved from their actions that it is permitted to launder on the intermediate days of the festival all garments made of linen!

Abaye attacked this: Who can say to us that

the people who laundered the linen garments on the shore of the Kinneret—

acted with the consent of the Sages!?

Perhaps,

perhaps

they acted without the consent of the Sages!

And if so, there is no proof from their practice that it is permitted to launder linen garments on the intermediate days of the festival.

Mishna:

And these are the things that one writes on the intermediate days of the festival:

documents of

betrothal

of women .

A man who betroths a woman by means of a document writes for her a document of betrothal in these words: “Behold

you

so-and-so daughter of so-and-so

are betrothed to me

so-and-so son of so-and-so

,” and he gives her the document. And through this she is betrothed to him .

And

documents of

divorce .

And quittances

for repayment of a debt.

Testamentary documents,

documents of a will.

Documents of

gifts .

And prosbul documents.

The enactment of “prosbul” was instituted for the needs of the poor, so that they would be able to borrow money before the Sabbatical year, and the lenders would not be deterred from lending them money because of the concern lest the seventh year cancel the loan and they would not repay the loan.

And the Sages instituted that before the time arrives when the Sabbatical year cancels the loans, the lender should come to the court and inform them that he is transferring to them the debts that the borrowers owe him. From now on he can collect them whenever he wishes, even if the time of the Sabbatical year has arrived, by virtue of the court.

And the foundation of the enactment is built upon the halakha that the Sabbatical year cancels only a debt owed to a private individual, and not a debt owed to a court .

Documents of valuation.

When the court divides an inheritance, they issue documents to each of the heirs, containing an assessment [“valuation”] of the value of the assets that each of the inheriting brothers received, so that each one will know the value of his field that he received within the division of the assets.

And documents of maintenance,

when a man marries a woman who has a daughter from another man, if he accepts upon himself the obligation to support her daughter, the court writes the woman a document, in which it is explained that so-and-so accepted upon himself to support his wife’s daughter.

Documents of halitza,

which the court writes for the yevama who undergoes halitza, stating that she is permitted to marry any person after her halitza.

And documents of refusal.

A minor whom her mother or brother married off through betrothal by rabbinic enactment can refuse her marriage to her husband, and thus she leaves without a bill of divorce. However, the court writes her a document concerning her refusal.

And documents of clarification.

The court ruled between two litigants and clarified each one’s portion, and they write their ruling in a document.

Decrees,

rulings of

the court.

And documents of authority .

Gemara:

Shmuel said: It is permitted to betroth a woman on the intermediate days of the festival

because of the concern

lest he be preceded

by a man

another,

and he betroth her before him .

And the Gemara proves in accordance with Shmuel’s words:

Let us say that it supports him

from our Mishna:

And these are the things that one writes on the intermediate days of the festival:

documents of

betrothal of women.

What, is it not actual documents of betrothal?

And it proves that it is permitted to betroth a woman on the intermediate days of the festival!

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

our Mishna is not speaking of actual documents of betrothal, but of

documents of stipulations,

which are written at the time of the match,

and in accordance with what Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav:

People who match their children to one another: the father of the daughter asks the father of the son, “

How much will you give for your son

for the sake of the marriage?” And the father of the son answers him, “

Such and such

I will give.” And likewise, the father of the son asks the father of the daughter, “

How much will you give for your daughter

for the sake of her marriage?” And the father of the daughter answers him, “

Such and such

I will give.”

If

they arose and betrothed

after stating their commitments—

they acquired.

That is, the commitments of the father of the son and the father of the daughter take effect through speech alone, without the need for an act of acquisition. And

these are the things acquired through speech.

And they would write a document containing the details of the mutual obligations. But the obligations themselves took effect through the very utterance of them, when they betrothed through the utterance of the obligations.

The Chazon Ish explains that the entire purpose of the acquisition is for complete reliance of mind, and here there is reliance of mind even without an acquisition. The Chazon Ish added that in several places we find that there is an acquisition through the benefit that the purchaser provides the transferor, but such an acquisition applies only where we find it explicitly in the words of the Sages; we may not explain in other places that the acquisition takes effect through the benefit .

And the Gemara continues to bring proof for Shmuel’s words:

Shall we say that this supports him

from the Mishna [on page 8b] above:

We learned:

One may not marry women during the festival, neither virgins nor widows.

And

likewise

one may not perform yibbum

during the festival,

because it is a joy for him.

And one does not mingle one joy with another.

And the Gemara infers: specifically, one may not marry during the festival.

But to betroth—

it is permitted!

And the Gemara rejects: the tanna is stating the expression

“it is not necessary”

he says!

And this is what he said:

It is not necessary to say that betrothal

is forbidden during the festival—

for

after all,

he does not perform

through this

a mitzva,

as long as he has not married, since the foundation of the mitzva of marriage is the mitzva of procreation, and it is not fulfilled before marriage .

Rather, even marrying, too, since he performs a mitzva

by engaging in the fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation,

is forbidden

during the festival.

Come and hear,

a proof for Shmuel from this,

for the school of

[meaning, we learned a statement from the words of the tannaim in the academy of]

Shmuel:

One may betroth

women during the festival,

but one may not bring them into the marriage canopy

—them.

And one does not make

during the festival

a betrothal feast

despite the fact that one betroths during it,

and

likewise

one may not perform yibbum, because

it is a joy for him

[the betrothal feast and likewise the yibbum], and one does not mingle one joy with another.

And we conclude: indeed,

learn from it

from this statement in accordance with Shmuel.

And we raise a difficulty:

But did Shmuel say

that the permission to betroth during the festival is because of the concern

lest someone precede him

—a person—

another?

person?

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Every single day a heavenly voice goes forth and says, “So-and-so’s daughter is for so-and-so”;

and likewise it proclaims every day,

“So-and-so’s field is for so-and-so.”

And since a person’s match is determined according to a heavenly voice, why should he be concerned lest another precede him!?

Because of this question, the Gemara changes the wording of Shmuel’s statement:

Rather,

this is what Shmuel said: he should be concerned

lest another precede him through prayers

in his prayer, and prevent from him the match that was determined for him by the heavenly court.

As in this

incident

that

occurred with

Rava:

Once he heard,

Rava heard

a certain man who was seeking mercy,

a person who requested in his prayer that the Holy One, blessed be He, have mercy upon him.

And

so

he said

and requested:

Let there be given to me

a woman

so-and-so,

who will marry me.

He said to him

Rava:

Do not request,

do not ask for

mercy in this way!

For

if she is suitable for you,

if this woman is suitable for you, in accordance with the proclamation of the heavenly voice—

she will not go away from you!

She will not go from you to another person; only you will marry her, and you need not multiply requests for mercy concerning this.

And if not,

if that woman does not come to you, because they did not proclaim in Heaven that she is designated for you—

you will deny the Lord.

That is, you will come to deny the power of prayer, and say that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not hear prayer, since He did not grant your request to marry this woman.

After this,

afterward,

he heard

Rava

saying

that same man continued in his prayer: if this woman does not come to me, but another person takes her, I request one of two things:

Either he

[he was requesting for himself, using an expression of euphemism]

should die before her.

That is, he requested to die before another person married her, so that he would not suffer upon seeing another person merit her.

Or she should die before him,

that she should die before another person married her.

From that incident we learn that one must be concerned lest another person pray for the death of the woman designated for him, since he too requests to marry her and requests that she die if he does not marry her.

And one must be concerned lest that woman die before he marries her as a result of the other person’s prayer. Therefore Shmuel holds that it is permitted to betroth a woman even during the festival.

He said to him

Rava to that man who requested to marry her:

Did I not tell you

did I not tell you earlier that

you should not request concerning this matter!

For

this is what Rav said in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itztrobili: From the Torah, and from the Prophets, and from the Writings, from the Lord—

is determined—

a woman for a man!

And the matter does not depend upon choice or request!

From the Torah—

as it is written

[Genesis 24],

“And Laban and Bethuel answered and said: The matter has come forth from the Lord.”

And it is not in our power to oppose it.

From the Prophets—

as it is written

concerning Samson when he married Delilah [Judges 14],

“And his father and his mother did not know

that it was from the Lord.”

From the Writings—

as it is written

[Proverbs 19],

“House

and wealth are an inheritance from fathers.

But from the Lord—

an intelligent wife.”

Since the Gemara brought a statement in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itztrobili, it brings additional statements in his name:

And Rav said in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itztrobili, and some say

there are those who say that

it was taught in a baraita

[and Rav did not say this]:

Rabbi Reuven ben Itztrobili said: A person is not suspected,

made suspect in the eyes of people and accused by people,

of a matter

of transgression—

unless

indeed

he did it.

And if he did not do

it

all—

he did part of it.

And if he did not do part of it—

he contemplated doing it in his heart.

And if he did not contemplate doing it in his heart—

he saw others who did it, and rejoiced.

Rabbi Yaakov objected:

But it is written in the Second Book of Kings [chapter 17],

“And they slandered

[they fabricated accusations against and accused]

the children of Israel with things that were not so, against the Lord their God”!?

And it is proven that people accuse and charge someone even concerning something that is entirely untrue!?

And we answer:

There—

they did it to provoke,

and they knew that it was not as they said.

And we raise a difficulty:

Come and hear

from what is written in the Book of Psalms [chapter 106],

“And they were jealous of Moses in the camp, of Aaron, the holy one of the Lord.”

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said: This teaches that each one was jealous of his wife because of Moses!

He suspected and accused her of having committed adultery with him, although this was not true.

And it is proven that people suspect a person even concerning something in which he has no involvement at all.

And we answer:

There—

because of hatred

toward Moses

they did it,

and they themselves knew that the matter was untrue.

And the Gemara raises another difficulty:

Come and hear, Rabbi Yosei said: Let my portion be with those whom people suspect of a matter that is not in them.

And

so

Rav Pappa said: As for me, they suspected me

of a transgression,

and it was not in me!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

case, in which they suspect him of something in which he has no involvement at all, is

with a rumor

—with a defamatory rumor that goes out about the person—

that ceases,

which ends after some time.

This

case, in which they suspect him only if he has some connection to the matter, is

with a rumor that does not cease,

but continues.

And a rumor that does not cease—

until

what length

of

time is it called a rumor that does not cease?

Abaye said: My mother said to me: The talk

[the occupation with suspicion of a person concerning a transgression]

of the city,

of the city, continues

a day and a half.

A day and a half.

And these words

apply when, if the rumor went out and the occupation with the suspicion continued for a day and a half, it is proven that there is something to that matter,

that it did not cease

the rumor

in between.

But

if

the rumor ceased

the rumor

in between—

we have no concern with it.

This is not a continuing suspicion.

And when it ceased in between

[so that we do not say that he has a connection to the transgressive act]—

we said this only when it did not cease

the rumor

because of fear.

But

if

the rumor ceased

the rumor

because of fear—

not

is the interruption considered an interruption; rather, this is as though the rumor continued the entire time without interruption.

And we said

that the interruption is considered an interruption

only when the rumor did not return and

sprout,

sprout anew,

grow anew [from the language of sprouting, which is new growth, excluding a rumor that continued after it stopped].

But

if

it sprouted again,

so that the rumor returned and emerged anew,

it is not

the interruption considered an interruption; rather, this is a continuing rumor, and it is evidence that that person has a connection to that transgression .

And we said

that a continuing rumor is evidence of a connection to the transgression

only when he has no

—the person about whom the rumor went out—

enemies.

But

if

there are

there are

enemies for him,

the rumor is not evidence that he has a connection to the transgression, since

it was his enemies who put out the rumor.

His enemies put out the rumor about him in their struggle against him, and the rumor did not emerge because he has a connection to the transgression .

Mishna:

One may not write promissory notes

for a loan

during the festival .

And if he does not trust him

the lender does not trust the borrower without a document, because he is concerned that the borrower will deny the loan,

or if he has nothing

for the scribe who writes the documents

to eat,

and he needs to write promissory notes for his sustenance —

he may write it .

One may not write Torah scrolls, tefillin, or mezuzot during the festival .

And one may not correct even one letter

, even

not

in the Scroll of Ezra,

which is especially important .

Rabbi Judah says: a person writes tefillin and mezuzot for himself,

in order to put them on his body and on the doorposts of his house. But he does not write for the public, because it is a form of work .