Moed Katan 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

Rava raised an objection from our Mishna, in which we learned:

“

cloths

used for drying

the hands,

and they are soiled. And similarly,

cloths

for the books

that are made of linen may be laundered during the intermediate days of the Festival.”

And Rava infers: Only

these—

the cloths for the hands and the cloths for the books mentioned in the Mishna—

not

other linen

garments—

may not

be laundered during the intermediate days of the Festival. But this proves the opposite of what Rav Yitzḥak bar Yaakov bar Giyorei said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: All linen garments are permitted to be laundered during the intermediate days of the Festival.

Abaye said

to Rava: Actually, all linen garments are permitted to be laundered during the intermediate days of the Festival. Rather, the intention of the

Mishna

is to say that the cloths for the hands and the cloths for the books may be laundered

even if they are of other kinds

—that is, even if the cloths for the hands and the books are made of wool, and laundering them involves considerable effort, it is nevertheless permitted to launder them during the intermediate days of the Festival because they are soiled.

But other garments of all types, apart from linen garments, may not be laundered because of the effort involved. Conversely, all linen garments are permitted to be laundered.

Bar Hediya said: I myself saw

—I saw on the shore of the Sea of Galilee, which is

the Sea of Tiberias, that they brought out to it

—that they took out to it—

large bowls

, large cups,

of linen

, filled with linen garments,

during the intermediate days of the Festival

, and they laundered the garments on the shore of the Sea of Galilee.

Their actions therefore prove that it is permitted to launder all garments made of linen during the intermediate days of the Festival!

Abaye objected to this: Who can say that

those people who laundered the linen garments on the shore of the Sea of Galilee

acted with the consent of the Sages!?

Perhaps

they

acted without the consent of the Sages!

If so, there is no proof from their practice that it is permitted to launder linen garments during the intermediate days of the Festival.

Mishna:

And these are the documents that may be written during the intermediate days of the Festival:

documents of

betrothal

of women.

A man who betroths a woman by means of a document writes her a document of betrothal in the following wording: “Behold,

you

[so-and-so, daughter of so-and-so,]

are betrothed to me

[so-and-so, son of so-and-so]

,” and he gives her the document. Through this she becomes betrothed to him.

And

documents of

divorce.

And documents of acknowledgment

of the repayment of a debt.

A dikteki,

documents of wills.

Documents of

gifts.

And prosbul documents.

The enactment of the “prosbul” was instituted for the benefit of the poor, so that they would be able to borrow money before the Sabbatical year, and lenders would not be deterred from lending them money out of concern that the seventh year might cancel the loan and they would not repay it.

The Sages instituted that before the time arrives when the Sabbatical year cancels loans, the lender should come to court and inform them that he is transferring to them the debts owed to him by the borrowers. From that point onward, he can collect them whenever he wishes, even after the time of the Sabbatical year has arrived, by virtue of the court.

The foundation of the enactment is based on the halakha that the Sabbatical year cancels only a debt owed to a private individual, and not a debt owed to a court.

Documents of assessment.

When a court divides an inheritance, it issues documents to each of the heirs, containing an assessment [shuma] of the value of the property that each of the inheriting brothers received, so that each one will know the value of the field he received in the division of the property.

And documents of sustenance,

when a man marries a woman who has a daughter from another man, if he assumes responsibility for supporting her daughter, the court writes the woman a document stating that so-and-so has assumed responsibility for supporting his wife’s daughter.

Documents of ḥalitza,

which the court writes for the yevama who undergoes ḥalitza, stating that after her ḥalitza she is permitted to marry anyone.

And documents of refusal.

A minor whom her mother or brother married off through a rabbinic betrothal can refuse the marriage to her husband, thereby leaving without a bill of divorce. However, the court writes her a document recording her refusal.

And documents of clarification,

when the court has ruled between two litigants and clarified each one’s portion, writing its ruling in a document.

Decrees,

rulings of

the court.

And letters of authority.

Gemara:

Shmuel said: It is permitted to betroth a woman during the intermediate days of the Festival

because of the concern

lest another precede him

—a man

else

—and betroth her before him.

The Gemara proves Shmuel’s statement:

Let us say that it supports him

from our Mishna:

“And these are the documents that may be written during the intermediate days of the Festival”:

documents of

betrothal of women.

What, is it not referring to actual documents of betrothal

? This proves that it is permitted to betroth a woman during the intermediate days of the Festival!

The Gemara rejects this:

No

, our Mishna is not referring to actual documents of betrothal, but to

documents of stipulation,

which are written at the time of the match,

and in accordance with what Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav

: When people match their children with one another, the father of the daughter asks the father of the son: “

How much will you give your son

for the marriage?” The father of the son answers him: “

Such and such

I will give.” And likewise, the father of the son asks the father of the daughter: “

How much will you give your daughter

for her marriage?” The father of the daughter answers him: “

Such and such

I will give.”

If,

after stating their commitments, they proceed to betroth

after making their commitments,

—they acquire

—that is, the commitments of the father of the son and the father of the daughter take effect through speech alone, without the need for an act of acquisition.

And these are the matters that are acquired through speech.

They would write a document containing the details of the mutual obligations. However, the obligations themselves took effect through their verbal declaration, when they betrothed one another by making that declaration.

The Hazon Ish explains that the entire purpose of the kinyan is to create complete reliance, and here there is reliance even without a kinyan. The Hazon Ish further added that in several places we find that a kinyan is effected through the benefit that the purchaser provides the seller; however, such a kinyan applies only where it is explicitly found in the words of the Sages, and we may not explain in other places that a kinyan takes effect through benefit.

The Gemara continues to bring proof for Shmuel’s statement:

Let us say that this supports him

from the Mishna [on page 8b] cited above:

We learned:

One may not marry women during the intermediate days of a Festival, neither virgins nor widows.

And

likewise

one may not perform levirate marriage

during the Festival,

because it is a source of joy for him.

And one may not combine one joy with another.

The Gemara infers: specifically, one may not marry during the Festival.

But betrothal—

is permitted!

The Gemara rejects this: The tanna used the expression

“it is not necessary”

—he said it!

And this is what he said:

It is not necessary to say that betrothal

is prohibited during the Festival—

for

after all,

he performs no

any

mitzva

through it, so long as he has not married her, since the foundation of the mitzva of marriage is the mitzva of procreation, and that mitzva is not fulfilled before marriage.

Rather, even marriage, which involves performing a mitzva

, as he is engaged in fulfilling the mitzva of procreation,

is prohibited

during the Festival.

Come and hear,

a proof for Shmuel from this

that was taught in the school of

[that is, an aphorism of the tannaim taught in the study hall of]

Shmuel:

One may betroth

women during the Festival,

but one may not bring them into the wedding canopy

—one may not marry them.

And one may not make

during the Festival

a betrothal feast

, despite the fact that one may betroth during it,

and

likewise

one may not perform levirate marriage, because

it is a source of joy for him

[the betrothal feast, and likewise levirate marriage], and one may not combine one joy with another.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from this

statement support for Shmuel.

The Gemara raises a question:

And did Shmuel say

that the permission to betroth during the Festival is due to concern

that someone else may precede him

—a man

other

?

But Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Every day a Divine voice goes forth and says, “So-and-so’s daughter is destined for so-and-so.”

And likewise it proclaims every day,

“So-and-so’s field is destined for so-and-so.”

Since a person’s match is determined by a Divine voice, why should he fear that someone else may precede him?!

Because of this difficulty, the Gemara changes the wording of Shmuel’s statement:

Rather,

this is what Shmuel said: He should fear

that another may precede him through prayer

, and thereby prevent him from attaining the match assigned to him by the heavenly court.

As in this

incident

that

occurred with

Rava:

Once he heard

—Rava heard

a certain man seeking mercy

, a man who prayed that the Holy One, blessed be He, should have mercy upon him.

And

this is what he

said

and requested:

“Let there be granted to me

a

certain woman

, that she should marry me.”

He said to him

, Rava:

“Do not request

—do not seek

mercy in this manner!

For

if she is suitable for you

, if she is destined for you, as the Divine voice proclaimed,

she will not leave you! She will not go to another man; you alone will marry her, and there is no need for you to multiply your prayers concerning this.”

She will not go to another man; you alone will marry her, and there is no need for you to plead at length for this.

And if not

—if that woman is not granted to you because Heaven did not proclaim that she was designated for you—

“You will deny God.”

That is, you will come to deny the power of prayer and say that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not hear prayer, since He did not grant your request to marry this woman.

Afterward

,

he heard

—Rava

that he was saying

in the continuation of his prayer: If this woman is not granted to me, but another man takes her, I make one of two requests:

Either he

[he was requesting this for himself, using a euphemistic expression]

should die before her

, meaning that he asked to die before another man married her, so that he would not suffer upon seeing another man attain her.

Or she should die before him

, before another man married her.

From this incident we learn that one must fear that another man may pray for the death of the woman designated for him, since that man too wishes to marry her and requests that she die if he will not marry her.

One must therefore fear that the woman may die before he marries her as a result of the other man’s prayer. Hence Shmuel maintains that one may betroth a woman even during the Festival.

He said to him

, Rava said to that man who wished to marry her:

“Did I not tell you

earlier that

you should not pray concerning this matter!”

For

this is what Rav said in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itztrobili: From the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings, it is determined by God that

a

woman is destined for a man!

The matter does not depend on choice or prayer!

From the Torah

—

as it is written

: “Laban and Bethuel answered and said: The matter has come from God.”

We have no power to oppose it.

From the Prophets

—

as it is written

concerning Samson when he married Delilah: “His father and mother did not know

that it was from God.”

From the Writings

—

as it is written

: “A house

and wealth are an inheritance from fathers,

but from God

comes an understanding wife.”

Since the Gemara has cited a statement in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itztrobili, it cites additional statements in his name:

And Rav said in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itztrobili—and some say

that

it was taught in a baraita

[and Rav did not say it]:

Rabbi Reuven ben Itztrobili said: A person is not suspected

, made suspect in the eyes of people and accused by them,

of

a transgression—

unless

he actually

committed it.

And if he did not commit

it

all

—he committed part of it.

And if he did not commit part of it

—he contemplated committing it in his heart.

And if he did not contemplate committing it in his heart

—he saw others commit it and rejoiced.

Rabbi Yaakov raised an objection

: Is it not written in II Kings [chapter 17],

“They fabricated

[they slandered and accused]

the Children of Israel of things that were not so, against God their God”?!

This proves that people accuse and suspect others even concerning something entirely untrue?!

And we answer:

There—

they did it to provoke

, and they knew that what they said was untrue.

We challenge this:

Come and hear

from what is written in Psalms [chapter 106],

“They were jealous of Moses in the camp, of Aaron, the holy one of God.”

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: This teaches that each one was jealous of his wife because of Moses!

They suspected and accused her of committing adultery with him, although this was entirely untrue.

This proves that people suspect a person even concerning something in which he has no involvement whatsoever.

And we answer:

There—

it was because of hatred

toward Moses that

they did it

, and they themselves knew that the matter was untrue.

The Gemara raises another difficulty:

Come and hear; Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be with those who are suspected of something in which they have no involvement.

And

likewise

Rav Pappa said: As for me, they suspected me

of a transgression,

but it was not in me!

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

This

—the case in which a person is suspected of something in which he has no involvement at all—is

with a rumor

, a defamatory report circulating about him,

that ceases

after some time.

This

—the case in which a person is suspected only when he has some connection to the matter—is

with a rumor that does not cease

, but continues.

And a rumor that does not cease

—until

how long

a certain

period is it called a rumor that does not cease?

Abaye said: My mother told me: The talk

[the discussion of the suspicion that a person committed a transgression]

of the city

continues for

a day and a half.

That is, one and a half days.

And this applies

when, if the rumor emerges and the discussion of the suspicion continues for a day and a half, it is proof that the person has some involvement in the matter,

that the rumor did not cease

during

in between.

But

if the rumor

ceased

during

in between—

we have no concern.

This is not a continuing suspicion.

And when it ceased in between

[in which case we do not say that he has some involvement in the transgression]—

we said this only when it did not cease

because of

because of fear.

But

if the rumor

ceased

because of

because of fear—

no, the interruption is not considered an interruption; rather, this is like a rumor that continued throughout without interruption.

And we said

that the interruption is considered an interruption

only when the rumor did not return and

sprout anew

, that is, grow again

—sprout

—a new growth, excluding a rumor that continued after the interruption.

But

if it

sprouted again

, meaning that the rumor returned and emerged anew,

it is not

considered an interruption; rather, this is a continuing rumor, and it proves that the person has some connection to that transgression.

And we said

that a continuing rumor proves involvement in the transgression

only when he has no

—when the person about whom the rumor emerged has no

enemies.

But

if he

has

enemies,

enemies, the rumor does not prove that he has any connection to the transgression, since

it was his enemies who spread the rumor

.

His enemies were the ones who circulated it as part of their campaign against him; it did not emerge because he was involved in the transgression.

Mishna:

One may not write debt documents

for a loan

during the intermediate days of a Festival. .

But if he does not trust him

—the lender does not trust the borrower to lend without a document, because he fears that the borrower will deny the loan—

or if he has no

—the scribe who writes documents has nothing

to eat

, and needs to write debt documents for his sustenance—

he may write it. .

One may not write Torah scrolls, phylacteries, or mezuzot during the intermediate days of a Festival. .

And one may not correct even a single letter

, even

not

in the Scroll of Ezra

, which is especially important.

Rabbi Judah says: A person may write tefillin and mezuzot for himself,

in order to place them on his body and on the doorposts of his house. But he may not write for the public, since that is a form of labor.