Moed Katan 13a — the Talmud in English

And we explain: The doubt is even

if you should say

that if

one blemished the ear of a firstborn animal

, meaning that he cut a little from the ear of a firstborn animal in order to permit it to himself for work, and he died, the law is that

they penalized his son after him

. And just as his father is forbidden to derive benefit from the firstborn animal, because of a rabbinic penalty for having transgressed the prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon it, so too his sons may not benefit from it; we still have a doubt concerning one who deliberately arranged his work for the Moed and then died.

For perhaps they penalized his sons also only in the case of one who blemished the ear of a firstborn animal

because it is a prohibition from the Torah

, but work involving a lost matter, which is only a rabbinic prohibition—for if he had not deliberately arranged it for the Moed, it would have been permitted from the outset—perhaps they would not penalize his sons when their father deliberately arranged to perform it during the Moed.

And

likewise

if you should say

that if

one sold his slave to an idolater

, for which the Rabbis penalized him that if the slave escapes from the gentile, the slave goes free, and the seller cannot force him to return to his service,

and

even if the law is that when the seller

dies

, they

penalized his son after him

, so that the son cannot force the slave to return to serving him, we still have a doubt whether they penalized the son of one who deliberately arranged his work for the Moed.

For perhaps they penalized the son also only in the case of one who sold his slave to a gentile

because every day

that he is with the gentile who acquired him, he

is prevented by him from performing mitzvot

, since when he is in the gentile’s possession he does not engage in the mitzvot in which he is obligated like a woman. If so, it is appropriate to be stringent concerning this penalty.

But

here

, in the case of one who deliberately arranged his work for the Moed, we have a doubt:

what

is the law concerning his son?

Is it only the

person

who deliberately arranged his work whom

the Rabbis penalized

so that he should not perform it during the Moed?

But he is not here

, since he has already died.

Or perhaps

it is the

property

in which he intended to engage that

the Rabbis penalized, and behold

the property

is present

even after his death, when it is in the possession of his son!

He said to him

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya:

You have learned it

: We learned in a Mishna in tractate Sheviit that they did not penalize the sons of one who deliberately arranged his work.

For we learned concerning work during the Sabbatical year:

A field whose thorns were removed

, meaning that the thorns that had been in it were removed

in

the

Sabbatical

year—

may be sown after the Sabbatical year

; since removing the thorns is not considered important work of improving the soil, the Sages did not penalize the one who performed it by preventing him from benefiting from his field after the Sabbatical year. But if it was

well-prepared

, meaning that it was fertilized when he transported manure through it,

or if it was manured

, meaning that it was fertilized by bringing animals into it so that they would deposit excrement in it—

it may not be sown after the Sabbatical year

. Since fertilizing is included among the rabbinically prohibited forms of working the soil, the Sages penalized him so that he should not profit from it by sowing after the Sabbatical year.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Chanina said: We have established

as a practical ruling that if

he improved the field, and died

—they did not penalize his son, and it is permitted for

his son

to

sow it.

And Rabbi Zeira proved from this Mishna:

Apparently

, only

him

, who committed the transgression,

did the Rabbis penalize

, but

the Rabbis did not penalize his son.

And if so,

here too

, in the case of one who deliberately arranged his work for the Moed, only

him did the Rabbis penalize

, but

the Rabbis did not penalize his son.

Abaye said: We have established

as a practical ruling: One who

rendered his fellow’s pure items impure

[for which the Sages penalized him to pay even though the object itself is present], and

died,

the one who rendered them impure—

they did not penalize his son after him

to pay the damage.

What is the reason?

Since the damage caused by the impurity is

unrecognizable damage

, and

is not called damage

, the payment for the damage is among the laws of penalties imposed by the Sages; only

him did the Rabbis penalize

for rendering his fellow’s pure items impure, but

his son,

who did not cause the damage—

the Rabbis did not penalize

. Since his father was not obligated by Torah law to pay for the damage, the Sages did not penalize his son after him.

Mishna:

One may not purchase

—buy—

houses, slaves, or animals except

if the purchase is

for the needs of the Moed

, such as houses in which to live, and slaves and animals for his needs,

or

if the purchase is

for the needs of the seller, who has nothing to eat

, so that he will have money for food during the Moed, or for additional means toward the joy of the Festival.

Gemara:

Rava asked Rav Nachman

: To give a laborer work that is not needed for the Moed, and to hire him so that there will be

payment for work

for a laborer

who has nothing to eat

[and with this payment he will be able to buy food for eating during the Moed]—

what is the law?

Таннай лишь разъясняет в заключительной части то, что сказал в начале: «для продавца» означает, что продажа разрешена, например, когда продавцу нечего есть и ему нужны деньги. Но из Мишны нельзя доказать, что разрешено нанимать рабочего, чтобы дать ему заработок на покупку еды.

He said to him

Rav Nachman

I have learned

this law in our Mishna, that it is permitted!

For we learned in it:

“Or for the needs of the seller who has nothing to eat!”

For we already learned at the beginning of the Mishna that it is permitted to sell and purchase houses, slaves, and animals during the Moed when the purchaser acquires them for the needs of the Moed. The permission for the seller to sell is on account of the money he receives for them, with which he will purchase the needs of the Moed.

And necessarily, the permission in the latter clause, “who has nothing to eat”—

what does it come to include?—

Does it not come to include payment for work!

That is, the permission for the needs of a seller who “has nothing to eat” also permits hiring a laborer, so that he will have payment for work with which to eat.

Rava rejected Rav Nachman’s proof from the Mishna:

He said to him

Rava:

No

, this is not the intention of the Mishna in the latter clause. Rather,

he explains

in the latter clause his words in the first clause: “For the needs of the seller,” on account of which selling was permitted, means, for example, that the seller has nothing to eat and needs the money. But there is no proof from the Mishna that it is permitted to hire a laborer in order to give him payment for work with which to purchase food.

Abaye raised an objection

to Rava: It is implied from the following Mishna that payment for work is permitted.

For we learned:

One may not write promissory notes during the Moed

, since it is forbidden to perform work that one can perform after the Moed; therefore, he should lend now and write the document later.

And if he does not believe him

the lender, to lend to the borrower without a document,

or if he has nothing to eat—

he may write it.

And Abaye was precise: the words “or

if he has nothing to eat”

are superfluous, for in either event: if the borrower has nothing to eat, it is permitted to write if he does not believe him. And if he believes him, he does not write during the Festival.

And certainly the latter clause cannot be intended to explain the former clause, and to say that if the lender does not believe the borrower that he has nothing to eat, it is permitted to write a document, for even if the borrower has something to eat, it is permitted to write if he does not believe him concerning the loan.

And necessarily,

what does it come to include—does it not

mean:

to include payment for work .

And this is the explanation of the latter clause: even if the lender believes the borrower concerning his loan, if the scribe who writes documents has nothing to eat, it is permitted to give it to him to write, so that the scribe may acquire food with the payment for the writing.

Infer from it,

it is permitted to give work to a laborer who has nothing to eat during the Festival, so that the laborer can earn and purchase food during the Festival from the payment for the work .

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

to Rav Naḥman and Abaye: it is implied from the Mishna in tractate Pesachim that it is forbidden to give work to a laborer who has nothing to eat during the Festival.

For we learned:

And the Sages say: three

craftsmen

perform work on the eve of Passover until midday,

even in a place where they were accustomed not to perform other work.

And they are:

tailors, barbers, and launderers,

because we find in them a leniency concerning work during the Festival itself: the leniency of

tailors—

for

we learned above:

an unskilled person sews in his ordinary manner during the intermediate days of the Festival,

and therefore, on the eve of Passover, which is more lenient than the Festival, they permitted even a professional.

The leniency of

barbers and launderers—

for

we learned below:

those who come from overseas, and one who leaves the prison,

are permitted to cut their hair and wash clothes during the intermediate days of the Festival!

And since we found some permission for them during the Festival, they were lenient concerning all of them on the eve of Passover.

And Rav Sheshet proves:

And if it should enter your mind that payment for work

for one

who has nothing to eat is permitted—

why did they permit on the eve of Passover only three craftsmen?

After all,

all work should likewise be permitted, for there is

permission during the Festival in all work to give work for

payment for work

to a laborer

who has nothing to eat,

so that one may give the laborer any work to perform.

And because of this leniency, we should permit the performance of all work on the eve of Passover, which is more lenient than the Festival, just as the work of the three craftsmen was permitted on the eve of Passover because they were treated leniently in some aspect of their work during the Festival itself.

And necessarily, it is forbidden to give a laborer work during the intermediate days of the Festival in order to receive payment for work.

Rav Pappa challenged this: But if that is so,

if the reasoning is according to Rav Sheshet, that the reason for the permission on the eve of Passover is the leniency that we found concerning these types of work during the Festival—

building

also

should be permitted

on the eve of Passover,

for

we learned above that

a wall that leans toward the public domain: one demolishes and builds it in his ordinary manner, because of the danger.

Thus there is a leniency concerning building during the intermediate days of the Festival in a place of danger, and we should permit it entirely on the eve of Passover; why did we permit only the work of the three craftsmen!?

And further,

Ravina challenged this: But if that is so,

the writing of

a scribe should also be permitted

on the eve of Passover,

for

we learned below that

one writes documents of betrothal of women, bills of divorce, and receipts,

and this leniency concerning writing should cause writing to be permitted entirely on the eve of Passover.

Rather, said Rav Ashi

to answer Rav Sheshet’s challenge—that all work should be permitted on the eve of Passover because of payment for work that is permitted during the intermediate days of the Festival:

And is it so that

you compare the Festival to the fourteenth!?

And is there evidence from the permission during the Festival concerning the eve of Passover!?

After all, the

Festival

is different, for

it is because of exertion

that work is forbidden,

but in a place involving loss,

such as a matter involving loss,

the Sages permitted it .

However, regarding the types of work that they permitted on

However, the work that they permitted on

the fourteenth

does not have the reason given by Rav Sheshet, that it is because they were lenient concerning these crafts during the Festival. Rather, the reason for the permission is

because it is for the needs of the Festival,

so that they may cut their hair and wash clothes before the Festival. And only

something

that is work

that is for the needs of the Festival did the Sages permit.

But

something that is not for the needs of the Festival—

the Sages did not permit!

Therefore they did not permit the other types of work on the eve of Passover .

Mishna:

One does not move

vessels or produce

from house to house

that is distant from it, because of the exertion involved .

But he may move them

from his house

to his courtyard,

to another house in the same courtyard.

One does not bring vessels

that are not needed for the Festival

from the craftsman’s house

who repaired them before the Festival, because of the exertion involved in bringing them .

But

if he is concerned about them

that they may be stolen from the craftsman’s house, or that the craftsman demands his payment and he fears that he may demand it from him again and retain his vessels—

he moves them to another courtyard

close to the craftsman’s house, but he does not bring them to his own house because of suspicion, lest people say that he gave them to the craftsman to repair during the Festival and that he repaired them during the Festival.

And if they are not protected in another courtyard, he brings them to his house discreetly, because of suspicion.

Gemara:

From the wording of the Mishna, which says that he moves them to his courtyard, the Gemara thought that he may bring them from a house in another courtyard to his own courtyard.

And therefore we ask:

But you said

in

the first clause

that

one does not move them at all,

even from house to house; all the more so, one may not move them from a house in another courtyard to his courtyard.

And we answer:

Abaye said: The latter clause,

which says that he moves them to his courtyard—

we come

to permit moving them from his house only

to a house

in another

that is

in the same

courtyard,

for such moving involves no exertion and is also done discreetly within the courtyard .

We learned in the Mishna:

And one does not bring vessels from the craftsman’s house.

Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us,

whether we would know how to answer his question, and this is what he asked:

We learned

in our Mishna:

One does not bring vessels from the craftsman’s house.

And we juxtapose to it: One may transport and bring vessels from the craftsman’s house, even though they are not needed for the Festival.

And we answered him: Here,

where they permitted bringing them, it is referring to

the fourteenth

of Nisan, on the eve of Passover, on which work is forbidden, but it is permitted to bring vessels on it, since it is still an ordinary weekday and there is no prohibition of exertion.

And

here,

where they prohibited bringing vessels, it is

during the intermediate days of the Festival .

If you wish, say instead:

this one, where they prohibited it,

and that one, where they permitted it, were both

stated

concerning the intermediate days of the Festival, and the distinction is:

Here,

where they prohibited bringing them, it is

when he trusts him,

the craftsman, not to steal or demand payment twice, and there is no need to take the vessels from his house.

And

here,

where they permitted bringing them, it is

when he does not trust him,

the craftsman, and he needs to take the vessels from him.