Moed Katan 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain: The uncertainty is, even

if you should say

that if

one damages the ear of a firstborn animal

, meaning that he slightly cuts the ear of a firstborn animal in order to permit it for himself to be used for work, and he dies, the law is that

his son is penalized after him

, and just as his father is prohibited from deriving benefit from the firstborn animal, due to a rabbinic penalty, for having violated the prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon it, so too his sons may not benefit from it; nevertheless, we are still uncertain whether, if one deliberately arranged his work for the intermediate days and died, his son is penalized.

For perhaps it was only in the case of one who damaged the ear of a firstborn animal that his sons were also penalized

because it involves a prohibition by Torah law

. But in the case of work involving a matter that will be lost, which is prohibited only by rabbinic decree—for if he had not deliberately arranged it for the intermediate days, it would have been permitted ab initio—perhaps his sons are not penalized if their father deliberately arranged to perform it during the intermediate days .

And

likewise,

if you should say

that if

one sells his slave to an idolater

, in which case the Sages penalized him by decreeing that if the slave escapes from the gentile, the slave goes free, and the seller cannot compel him to return to his service,

and

even if the law is that in the event that the seller

dies

,

his son is penalized after him

, so that the son cannot compel the slave to return to his service, we are still uncertain whether the son of one who deliberately arranged his work for the intermediate days is penalized .

For perhaps it was only in the case of one who sells his slave to a gentile that his son was also penalized

because every day

that the slave is with the gentile who acquired him, the gentile

deprives him of mitzvot

, since while he is in the gentile’s possession he does not engage in the mitzvot incumbent upon him as upon a woman. Therefore, it is fitting to be stringent with regard to this penalty.

However,

here

, in the case of one who deliberately arranged his work for the intermediate days, we are uncertain:

what

is the law concerning his son?

Is it only the

person

who deliberately arranged his work whom the Sages

penalized

by decreeing that he may not perform it during the intermediate days?

But he is not present,

since he has already died.

Or perhaps

it is the

property

with which he intended to engage that the Sages

penalized, and it

—the property—

is present

even after his death, when it is in his son’s possession!

Rabbi Zeira said

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

You have learned it

—we have a Mishna in tractate Sheviit stating that the sons of one who deliberately arranged his work were not penalized.

For we learned with regard to work during the Sabbatical year:

A field from which the thorns were removed

, meaning that the thorns that had been in it were removed,

in

the

Sabbatical

—

may be sown after the Sabbatical year

, since removing thorns is not considered significant work of improving the soil, such that the Sages would penalize the one who performed it by prohibiting him from benefiting from his field after the Sabbatical year . But if the field was

fertilized

, meaning that it was fertilized by transporting manure through it in carts,

or if it was fertilized by penning animals there

, meaning that it was fertilized by bringing animals into it so that they would deposit dung there—

it may not be sown after the Sabbatical year

. Since fertilizing is included among the forms of working the soil that are prohibited by rabbinic decree, the Sages penalized him by prohibiting him from benefiting from it by sowing it after the Sabbatical year .

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: We have established

as the practical halakha that if one

fertilized the field and died

—his son was not penalized, and it is permitted for

his son

to

sow it.

Rabbi Zeira proved from this Mishna:

Apparently

, only

him

, the one who performed the transgression, did the Sages

penalize

; but

the Sages did not penalize his son.

And if so,

here too

, in the case of one who deliberately arranged his work for the intermediate days, only

him did the Sages penalize

; but

the Sages did not penalize his son .

Abaye said: We have established

as the practical halakha: One who

rendered his fellow’s ritually pure produce impure

[for which the Sages penalized him to pay even though the object itself remains intact],

and

the one who rendered it impure

died, his son was not penalized after him

to pay the damage .

What is the reason?

Since the damage caused by the impurity is

unrecognizable damage

, and

it is not called damage

, the payment for the damage is governed by the laws of penalties imposed by the Sages. Only

him did the Sages penalize

for rendering his fellow’s ritually pure produce impure; but

his son

, who did not cause the damage—

the Sages did not penalize

.

Mishna:

One may not purchase

—buy—

houses, slaves, or animals except

if the purchase is

for the needs of the intermediate days

, such as houses in which to live, and slaves and animals for his needs ,

or

if the purchase is

for the needs of the seller who has nothing to eat

, so that he will have money for food during the intermediate days, or for additional funds in honor of the Festival.

Gemara:

Rava asked Rav Naḥman

: May one assign a laborer work that is not needed for the intermediate days and hire him so that there will be

wages for the work

for a laborer

who has nothing to eat

[and with these wages he will be able to purchase food for consumption during the intermediate days]—

what is the ruling?

He said to him

, Rav Naḥman

said

: We have learned this law in our Mishna, which permits it!

For we learned in it:

Or for the needs of the seller who has nothing to eat!

For the beginning of the Mishna has already taught that one may sell and purchase houses, slaves, and animals during the intermediate days when the purchaser acquires them for the needs of the intermediate days; whereas the permission for the seller to sell is due to the money he receives for them, with which he will purchase the needs of the intermediate days.

It necessarily follows that the phrase in the latter clause, “who has nothing to eat”—

what does it come to include?—

Does it not come to include wages for work!

That is, the permission granted for the needs of a seller who “has nothing to eat” also permits hiring a laborer, so that he will have wages for work with which to eat.

Rava rejected Rav Naḥman’s proof from the Mishna:

He said to him

, Rava:

No

, this is not the intention of the latter clause of the Mishna. Rather,

he is explaining

the first clause in the latter clause: The “needs of the seller” on account of which the sale is permitted means, for example, that the seller has nothing to eat and needs the money. But there is no proof from the Mishna that it is permitted to hire a laborer in order to give him wages with which to purchase food.

Abaye raised an objection

to Rava: It is implied from the following Mishna that wages for work are permitted.

For we learned:

One may not write promissory notes during the intermediate days

, since it is prohibited to perform work that he can perform after the intermediate days; therefore, the lender should lend him the money now and write the document later.

And if he does not trust him

the lender may lend to the borrower without a document,

or if he has nothing to eat—

he may write one.

And Abaye carefully inferred: The words “or

if he has nothing to eat”

are superfluous, for either way: If the borrower has nothing to eat, it is permitted to write if the lender does not trust him. And if he trusts him, he does not write during the Festival.

And certainly, the latter clause cannot be intended to explain the first clause, saying that if the lender does not trust the borrower’s claim that he has nothing to eat, it is permitted to write a document. For even if the borrower has something to eat, it is permitted to write if the lender does not trust him regarding the loan.

And necessarily,

what does it come to include— is it not

the case of

payment for labor? .

And this is the explanation of the latter clause: Even if the lender trusts the borrower regarding his loan, if the scribe who writes documents has nothing to eat, it is permitted to give him the writing, so that the scribe can purchase food with the payment for writing it.

Infer from this:

It is permitted to give work to a laborer who has nothing to eat during the Festival, so that the laborer can earn money and purchase food during the Festival with his wages.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

to Rav Naḥman and Abaye: It is implied by the Mishna in tractate Pesaḥim that it is prohibited to give work to a laborer who has nothing to eat during the Festival.

As we learned:

And the Sages say: Three

craftsmen

may perform labor on the eve of Pesaḥ until midday,

even in a place where the custom is not to perform other types of labor.

And they are:

tailors, barbers, and launderers,

because we find a leniency with regard to their labor on the intermediate days of the Festival themselves: The leniency of

tailors

is that

we learned above:

An ordinary person may sew in his usual manner on the intermediate days of the Festival,

and therefore, on the eve of Pesaḥ, which is more lenient than the intermediate days of the Festival, they permitted even a professional.

The leniency of

barbers and launderers

is that

we learned below:

Those who come from overseas, and one who leaves the prison,

are permitted to have their hair cut and to launder clothing on the intermediate days of the Festival!

And since we found some allowance for them during the Festival, they were lenient regarding all of them on the eve of Pesaḥ.

And Rav Sheshet proves:

And if it enters your mind that payment for labor

is permitted for one

who has nothing to eat—

why did they permit this on the eve of Pesaḥ only for three craftsmen?

For

all types of labor should likewise be permitted, since there is

an allowance during the Festival, with regard to all types of labor, to give work in exchange for

payment for labor

to a laborer

who has nothing to eat,

as one may give the laborer any type of work to perform.

And because of this leniency, we should permit the performance of all types of labor on the eve of Pesaḥ, which is more lenient than the intermediate days of the Festival, just as the three craftsmen were permitted to work on the eve of Pesaḥ because they had been granted a limited leniency regarding their work during the Festival itself.

And necessarily, it is prohibited to give a laborer work during the intermediate days of the Festival in order to receive payment for labor.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to this: If that is so,

that the reasoning follows Rav Sheshet, that the reason for the permission on the eve of Pesaḥ is the leniency we find regarding these types of labor during the Festival—labor of

construction

should

likewise be permitted

on the eve of Pesaḥ,

as

we learned above:

A wall that leans toward the public domain may be demolished and rebuilt in the usual manner because of the danger.

Thus, there is a leniency regarding construction on the intermediate days of the Festival in a situation of danger; let us permit it entirely on the eve of Pesaḥ. Why, then, did they permit only the work of the three craftsmen!?

And furthermore,

Ravina raised an objection to this: If that is so,

the writing of

a scribe should likewise be permitted

on the eve of Pesaḥ,

as

we learned below that

one may write documents of betrothal, bills of divorce, and receipts,

and this leniency regarding writing should result in permitting writing entirely on the eve of Pesaḥ.

Rather, Rav Ashi said

in answer to Rav Sheshet’s objection, that all types of labor should be permitted on the eve of Pesaḥ because of the payment for labor available during the intermediate days of the Festival:

But

are you comparing the intermediate days of the Festival to the fourteenth of Nisan!?

Is there proof from the permission on the intermediate days of the Festival regarding the eve of Pesaḥ!?

For the

intermediate days of the Festival are different, as

the prohibition of labor is

because of the exertion involved,

and labor is prohibited;

but in a case involving loss,

such as a matter involving loss,

the Sages permitted it.

However, regarding the types of work that they permitted on

However, the labor that they permitted on

the fourteenth

is not permitted for the reason given by Rav Sheshet, that these crafts were treated leniently during the Festival. Rather, the reason for the permission is

because it is for the needs of the Festival day,

so that people can have their hair cut and launder their clothing before the Festival. Only

something

that is labor

for the needs of the Festival day did the Sages permit.

But

something that is not for the needs of the Festival day—

the Sages did not permit!

Therefore, they did not permit the other types of labor on the eve of Pesaḥ.

Mishna:

One may not move

utensils or produce

from one house to another

that is far from it, because of the exertion involved.

But one may move them

from his house

to his courtyard,

to another house in the same courtyard.

One may not bring utensils

that are not needed for the Festival

from the craftsman’s house

who repaired them before the Festival, because of the exertion involved in bringing them.

But

if he is concerned about them,

that they may be stolen from the craftsman’s house, or that the craftsman is demanding his payment and he fears that he may demand it again and retain his utensils—

he may move them to another courtyard

adjacent to the craftsman’s house, but he may not bring them into his own house because of suspicion, lest people say that he gave them to the craftsman to repair during the Festival and that the craftsman repaired them during the Festival.

And if they will not be secure in another courtyard, he may bring them into his house discreetly, because of suspicion.

Gemara:

From the wording of the Mishna, which permits moving them to his courtyard, the Gemara understood that one may bring them from a house in another courtyard to his own courtyard.

Therefore, we raise an objection:

But you said

in the

first clause

that

one may not move them at all,

even from one house to another; all the more so, one may not move them from a house in another courtyard to his own courtyard.

And we answer:

Abaye said: The latter clause,

which permits moving them to his courtyard—

we arrive

at permission to move them from his house only

to a house

that is another

that is

in the same

courtyard,

because moving them in this manner involves no exertion and is also done discreetly within the courtyard.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one may not bring utensils from the craftsman’s house.

Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us,

asking whether we would know how to answer his difficulty, and this is what he asked:

We learned

in our Mishna:

One may not bring utensils from the craftsman’s house.

And we juxtapose it with another teaching: One may lead and bring utensils from the craftsman’s house, even though they are not needed for the Festival.

And we answered him: Here,

where they permitted bringing them, the case is

the fourteenth

of Nisan, the eve of Pesaḥ, on which labor is prohibited, but it is permitted to bring utensils, since it is still an ordinary weekday and there is no prohibition because of exertion.

And

here,

where they prohibited bringing utensils, it is

the intermediate days of the Festival.

Alternatively,

the case in which they prohibited it

and the case

in which they permitted it were both stated

with regard to the intermediate days of the Festival, and the distinction is:

Here,

where they prohibited bringing them, it is when he

trusts the craftsman not to steal from him or demand payment twice, and there is no need to take the utensils from his house.

the craftsman not to steal from him or demand payment twice, and there is no need to take the utensils from the craftsman’s house.

And

here,

where they permitted bringing them, it is

when he does not trust the craftsman, and he needs to take the utensils from him.

the craftsman, and he must take the utensils from him.