Menachot 64a — the Talmud in English

I can say

that even Rabbi Ishmael

holds like the Rabbis,

that he removes all of it.

Alternatively,

it is possible to reject in the opposite direction as well:

It is only there that Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka said,

regarding removing the hide of the Paschal offering, not to exert oneself in removing all of it,

but

because

it

already

had its need for the Most High performed [

through removing part of it, the need of the Most High was performed, to burn its sacrificial portions],

and there is no need to desecrate Shabbat [

and there is no need to desecrate Shabbat further by removing all of it].

But here,

regarding harvesting the omer,

because

by harvesting three seahs only

its need for the Most High was not performed,

for in any event the tenth of an ephah is more excellent when it comes from five seahs,

and it is necessary to desecrate Shabbat, say

that even Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka

holds like the Rabbis

of our Mishna

hold, that they desecrate Shabbat even through an increase of labors.

Rather, Rabba said: Rabbi Yishmael in our Mishna and Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy of the priests,

Rather, Rabba said: Rabbi Ishmael

in our Mishna

and Rabbi Hanina, the deputy of the kohanim,

in our Mishna,

said one thing,

that one must reduce exertion.

As we learned: Rabbi Hanina, the deputy of the kohanim, says: On Shabbat

it was

harvested by one person, with one sickle and with one basket.

And on a weekday

it was harvested

by three

people,

with three baskets and with three sickles.

And the Sages say: Whether Shabbat or a weekday,

it was harvested

with three baskets and with three sickles.

And Rabba is precise that they said “one matter,” for behold,

did Rabbi Hanina, the deputy high priest, not say there—

regarding the manner of the reaping—

since it is possible

to reap with one person,

we do not trouble ourselves

to do it with many people, even though there is publicity in this, to remove the Boethusians’ mistaken notion—

here,

regarding the increase of the grain that is reaped,

also, since it is possible

with three seah, and with only one increase of labor,

we do not trouble ourselves

to make it from five seah with an increase of several labors, even though through this the tenth of an ephah is better.

And the Gemara also rejects this proof of Rabba:

From where!?

But perhaps

Rabbi Yishmael said only here,

that one should not increase the labors,

but there is no

matter of

publicizing the matter

through the increase of the labors—

but there,

with regard to reaping with three people,

where there is publicizing the matter

through the increase of the people,

say that he holds like the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Hanina, the deputy high priest,

and hold

that even on Shabbat they do it with several people.

Alternatively,

one may distinguish also in the opposite direction:

Rabbi Hanina, the deputy high priest, said only there,

regarding the reaping of the omer with many people, only because

whether with one or whether with three, the need of Heaven is performed according to its law

(with one as with three, the need of Heaven is performed according to its law), and only because of publicizing the matter is there an advantage to reaping it with many people—

but here,

regarding many labors in the omer,

where the need of Heaven is not performed according to its law,

for in any event “the matter is better” in taking a tenth of an ephah from five seah,

say

that even Rabbi Hanina, the deputy high priest,

holds like the Rabbis

to permit many labors on account of this.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Rabbi Yishmael

in our Mishna

and Rabbi Yose

in tractate Rosh Hashana

said one matter:

For we learned:

Witnesses who saw the newly renewed moon at the beginning of the month are permitted to desecrate Shabbat in order to come and testify before the court about their sighting, and the court will sanctify the month on the basis of their testimony. But this halakha was not said regarding every new moon, אלא only regarding testimony about the months of the festivals, the new moon of Nisan and the new moon of Tishrei, in which the messengers of the court go out to Syria, and through them the festival dates are arranged. And when the Temple stood, they would desecrate Shabbat even for all of them, because of the regulation of the new-moon offering, so that it would be offered at its proper time.

Whether it was seen

the moon

plainly

[before everyone], and the court could sanctify [the month] even without the testimony of these, for the court itself saw it,

and whether it was not seen

the moon

plainly

and the court required the testimony of these,

they desecrate Shabbat on its account.

For otherwise, there is concern that in the future they might refrain from coming and testifying even in a situation in which the court requires their testimony.

Rabbi Yose says: If the renewal was seen

of the moon

plainly, they do not desecrate Shabbat on its account,

since they are not needed. And this is what they said, “one matter,” for behold,

did Rabbi Yose not say there, since it is possible

to sanctify the month without their testimony,

we do not trouble ourselves

to go and testify while desecrating Shabbat, even though there is concern that they may refrain from doing so in the future.

Here too, since it is possible

with three seah and one labor many times,

we do not trouble ourselves

to perform many labors with five seah, even though through this the tenth of an ephah will be better.

And the Gemara rejects:

From where!?

But perhaps,

Rabbi Yishmael said only here, but there is no

reasoning of “

you will thereby cause them to stumble in the future.”

But there, for “

you will thereby cause them to stumble in the future,”

for if we do not permit them to desecrate Shabbat, they will say another time as well, “Just as we saw it, so did the court see it, and we will not desecrate Shabbat,” and the result will be an obstacle, that the month will not be sanctified at its proper time,

say

that even Rabbi Yishmael

holds like the Rabbis

of there

and holds

that they do not desecrate Shabbat.

Alternatively,

one may distinguish in the reverse manner:

Rabbi Yose said only there, but there is no need of Heaven

for it is not an offering,

and

also

Shabbat was not made liable to be set aside

for that day on account of another matter.

But here, where there is a need of Heaven,

for the offering is better,

and

also it has already

been made permissible for Shabbat to be set aside

through the reaping of three seah, and one may say: since Shabbat is set aside for three seah, it should also be set aside for five seah,

say

that even Rabbi Yose

holds like the Rabbis,

that because “the matter is better,” they set aside Shabbat through many labors.

It was stated: If he slaughtered

on Shabbat

two communal sin offerings,

such as the sin-offering goats that come on the festivals, and they set aside Shabbat,

and he needed

to slaughter

only

one

sin offering,

and he did so because he thought that since this sin offering was a communal sin offering, it was possible to offer two sin offerings, and he erred in this, for once the first sin offering had been slaughtered, it was no longer possible to offer a second communal sin offering—

Rabba said, and some say

there are those who say that

Rabbi Ami

was the one who stated this halakha:

He is liable

a sin offering

for the second,

which was not slaughtered lawfully,

and he is exempt for the first,

which was slaughtered lawfully—

And

he is liable for the slaughter of the second

even

if ultimately

atonement was achieved for him through the second,

and not through the first, for example, the blood of the first was spilled after the slaughter of the second, and he needed to bring the second; nevertheless, he is liable for a sin offering for its slaughter —

And although one might say: For the first he is exempt, since he slaughtered it with permission, and even though ultimately atonement was not achieved for him through the first, and for the second as well he should be exempt, since ultimately this sin offering atoned for the community, it teaches us that one follows the time of the slaughter, and he is liable for the second, since at the time of slaughter it was not fit to be slaughtered on Shabbat.

And

he is liable for the slaughter of the second

even if it was found

the

first to be lean

before he slaughtered the second, and he slaughtered the second so that the community would attain atonement through the fat one and not through the lean one.

And the Gemara asks:

Did Rabba indeed say this,

that he is liable for the second even though the first was found to be lean before he slaughtered the second!?

But Rabba said: If there were before him two sin offerings

belonging to the community on Shabbat,

one fat and one lean,

if

he slaughtered the fat one and afterward slaughtered the lean one, he is liable.

But if he slaughtered

the lean one and afterward

slaughtered the

fat one,

he is

exempt.

And furthermore, they say to him, “

Bring the fat one,”

initially, and slaughter it.

And if so, certainly he is not liable for having done what is according to law and according to halakha!?

And we answer:

If you wish, say: Remove “lean” from the first [statement],

remove and subtract from Rabba’s earlier words what he said, “He is liable for a sin offering

even if the first was found to be lean.”

And if you wish, say: That

first teaching was stated not by Rabba but

by Rabbi Ami.

But Rabba in truth disagrees. Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

According to Rabba, who exempts him for the second when the first was found to be lean, what is the law if

the first was found to be lean in the intestines,

so that before the slaughter of the second the first appeared fat, and only after the slaughter of the second, when they examined the intestines of the first, did they find that it had been lean, with the result that at the time of slaughter of the second he did not slaughter it with permission, for he still did not know that it was lean—what is the law: is he exempt in this situation as well for the second?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Is he liable for a sin offering for the second because

we follow the thought

of the slaughterer,

and

this

person

[the slaughterer] after all

intended for a prohibited act,

for he did not know that it was permitted and necessary to slaughter the second.

Or perhaps

, he is exempt for the second one, because

we follow his actions

, and his actions were performed in a state of exemption, for in truth the first one was lean, and he should have slaughtered the second, fat one.

He said

—

to him

Rav Ashi said to Ravina: Is this case

not the dispute of Rabbah and Rava?

Is it not possible to learn from the fact that Rabbah and Rava disagreed concerning another matter that, in our matter, everyone agrees that he is liable!?

For it was stated:

A person heard on Shabbat that a child had drowned in the sea, and he spread a net to bring him up, but brought up only fish; he is exempt from anything. And there is no dispute concerning this matter.

But if

a person heard that a child had drowned in the sea, and spread

it in that place

a net

[not in order to save the child] but in order

to bring up fish

[for this is one of the principal forms of labor, included among the labor of “trapping”],

and brought up fish

only in his net, he is

liable

, and here too there is no dispute.

But if he spread it in order

to bring up fish, and brought up fish and a child

, Rabbah and Rava disagreed concerning this:

Rabbah said: He is exempt.

Rava said:

Even so, he is

liable.

And

from what was stated, “A person heard that a child had drowned in the sea,” one may learn:

Rabbah exempted only up to this point

, namely

since he heard

that a child had drowned,

we estimate

that

his intention was also for the child

[that is to say, his thought in spreading the net was also for saving the child], and therefore he is exempt.

But

if he

did not hear

that a child had drowned, and certainly his thought was not for the child,

not

did Rabbah say that he is exempt, for we follow his thought, by which he intended for a forbidden act, and despite the fact that he brought up the child together with the fish, this is not an act of rescue for which he is exempt, but an act of trapping for which he is liable. Likewise, in our case, the slaughtering of the second one is not considered a permitted act, despite the fact that it was permitted on Shabbat, because “we follow his thought,” and he did not know that it was permitted.

And some say:

Thus

he said to him

Rav Ashi to Ravina:

Is this not their dispute, that of Rabbah and Rava

, that is, just as they disagreed there, so did they also disagree in our matter: according to Rabbah he is exempt, and according to Rava he is liable.

For it was stated: He heard

a person on Shabbat

that a child had drowned

in the sea, and he spread

there

a net, and his intention was not to save the child but rather

to

bring up fish, and

indeed

he brought up fish

in his net; he is

liable

according to everyone.

And if he spread it in order

to bring up fish, and brought up fish and a child:

Rabbah said: He is exempt;

and

Rava said:

Even so, he is

liable.

And the reason for their dispute is this:

Rabbah said: He is exempt,

even if he did not hear about the child, because he holds

go after his actions

, which were for saving the child; and according to his method, so too in our case we go after his actions, for he needed and was permitted to bring the choicest one.

And Rava said: He is liable

, because he holds

go after his thought

, which was for a forbidden act, in order to trap fish. Likewise, in our case we go after his thought, which was for a forbidden act, to add a communal offering to the first one that had already been offered.

Rava said:

A sick person whom they assessed

the physicians

to

be healed with

one dried fig,

for if he eats that dried fig his spirit will return to him,

and ten people wanted

to bring that dried fig,

and brought ten dried figs

detached from the tree

at one time,

they are all

exempt,

for they all intended for a mitzva, since the one who is zealous to save the sick person is praiseworthy.

And even if

they cut the dried figs

one after another,

and

even if

the sick person

recovered from the first one

before the others cut their dried figs.

He inquired

—

Rava was uncertain: A sick person whom they assessed to

be healed with

two dried figs

of figs,

and there are

on the fig tree standing before him

two dried figs

[and a dried fig contains the measure of the labor of reaping on Shabbat], and the two dried figs were hanging

on two stalks

[like tails, from which the dried figs hang], and if he cuts the two dried figs, it follows that he performs two acts of reaping, but he needs everything that is reaped by him for the healing of the sick person—

and

there are furthermore on the tree

three

dried figs

on one stalk,

and if he cuts the one stalk, then on the one hand he performs only one act of reaping, but on the other hand, in this one act of reaping he reaps an additional dried fig that is not needed by the sick person—

which of them do we bring,

from which of them should they bring? The sides of the uncertainty are:

Whether

we bring two,

even though there are two acts of reaping here, since

they

are all

fit for him

[suitable for him], and he does not add something that is not needed by him.

Or perhaps three

we bring,

even though a quantity greater than what he needs is reaped by him, because

it minimizes reaping,

for when he cuts the one stalk that has three dried figs on it, he performs only one act of reaping.

And the Gemara resolves the doubt:

Obviously, three we bring;

he cuts off the single stem, in which there are three dried figs.