Menachot 49a — the Talmud in English

And we explain it:

The tanna taught: “This”—“This is the law of the burnt offering”—includes [it],

for there shall be one law for all that ascend [upon the altar]: if they ascended, they shall not descend,

it is adjacent to it.

And therefore the ruling that emerges is that if they ascended, they shall not descend, and he brought what is valid on a bama only as a support for his words. But to learn the essential law, it is impossible to learn a matter that is not in its validity from a matter that is in its validity.

The following sugya deals primarily with the law of “removal in error.”

The basis of this discussion is what is explained at the beginning of tractate Zevahim: every offering, “by default, is for its designated purpose.” That is to say, in its very essence there is an effective status of the offering for which it was dedicated. Consequently, as long as this effective status exists, a thought differing from that effective status does not suffice to render the acts of service performed with it as having been performed not for their designated purpose. Rather, it was newly established in the laws of invalid thought that [such thoughts] can remove that “default,” which is the effective status designating the offering for its designated purpose. This is the issue in our sugya: what is the law when this removal is done in error?

Rabbah bar bar Ḥana taught before Rav: The two communal sheep of Shavuot,

which are peace offerings, that it happened

that he slaughtered them

in error

for the sake of the rams

of Shavuot, which are burnt offerings, they are

valid, but they did not count for the owners

which is the community,

as their obligation!

Rav said to him:

It is not so; rather,

they counted, and they counted

also for the obligation, since removal in error is not called removal, and here he merely erred between the rams and the sheep.

Rav Ḥisda said: Rav’s statement is reasonable

for there is no law of [an offering] not for its designated purpose

when he thought that he was

slaughtering

rams,

but in truth they were sheep,

and he slaughtered them for the sake of sheep,

rather, he intended to slaughter rams for the sake of sheep, which is a thought not for the designated purpose, but it turns out that he slaughtered properly,

for sheep were slaughtered for the sake of sheep,

and therefore they will count as the obligation, in accordance with Rav’s words.

But when he thought

that the sheep were

rams, and he slaughtered them for the sake of rams,

and it turns out that there is here [an offering] not for its designated purpose—

they will not

count as the obligation! For also

removal in error is removal.

And Rav himself holds that removal in error is not called removal, and therefore sheep slaughtered for the sake of rams counted as the obligation when his thought was in error.

And Rabbah said: Removal in error is not removal.

Rabbah said

to raise a difficulty against his position:

And we raise an objection against our teaching

from the Mishna:

The priests who rendered [an offering] pigul in the Temple,

who thought at the time of the service to eat from the flesh beyond its time of eating and thereby invalidated the offering, if they were

deliberate—they are

liable

to pay the owners the value of the offering.

And it follows:

but

if the priests were

unwitting

they are

exempt

from paying.

And it was taught concerning it

in a beraita:

Their pigul is pigul

even when unwitting; and for what reason are the unwitting exempt? Because it is considered unrecognizable damage, and only in the case of deliberate action did they impose a penalty making them liable.

And we inquire about it:

What are the circumstances

in which he is exempt because he was unwitting, while his pigul is pigul?

If you say that he knew it was a sin offering,

whose eating time is one day and one night,

and he was thinking about it

deliberately

for the sake of a peace offering,

to eat it for two days and one night, for now he thought to eat a sin offering beyond its time and therefore it is pigul—and is

such a person unwitting

? But

he was deliberate!

Rather, is it not

necessarily that it is speaking

of one who thought

that this offering

was a peace offering, and he was thinking about it for the sake of a peace offering,

and therefore he thought to eat it for two days because of his error,

and it teaches: Their pigul is pigul—it follows that removal in error is removal.

For if you say that it is not called removal, why does the law of pigul take effect here? All his thought to eat it for two days was because he thought that he was offering a peace offering, and this thought was an error. And if removal thought done in error is not called removal, there should likewise be no attribution to the thought of eating for two days as a thought of pigul, since he did not think to eat a sin offering for two days; rather, he thought to eat a peace offering for two days.

And we reject this:

Abaye said to him: In fact,

it is speaking

of one who knew it was a sin offering, and he was thinking about it for the sake of a peace offering,

and therefore he thought to eat it for two days. And his error was

in saying, “It is permitted,”

for he brought to mind that it was permitted to change the offering and turn it into a peace offering through this thought. Therefore he is considered unwitting, but nevertheless the removal was deliberate!

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection

against those who hold that removal in error is not called removal, from the beraita brought at the beginning of the tractate:

Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings whose handful was taken not for their designated purpose are valid

completely, for the law of [an offering] not for its designated purpose does not apply to them,

and they count for the owners as their obligation,

because

meal offerings are not comparable to animal offerings

in which the invalidity of [an offering] not for its designated purpose was stated.

For if one takes the handful

of a meal offering

made on a griddle

which is made on a flat utensil and becomes firm,

for the sake of

a meal offering

made in a deep pan,

which is deep and the meal offering made in it is soft,

its actions

which are performed in a griddle

demonstrate concerning it

that he is false in his statement, since

it

is a meal offering

made on a griddle,

and not as his words state, that he makes it for the sake of a meal offering made in a deep pan. And likewise, when he makes a sinner’s meal offering, which is

dry

without oil,

for the sake of

a voluntary meal offering, which is

mixed

with oil, then

its actions demonstrate concerning it that it is dry,

and they remove it from the thought of [doing it] not for its designated purpose. Therefore the meal offering remains valid, and his thought and speech that he makes it for the sake of another matter have no force.

But with animal offerings it is not so,

for reality does not contradict his words, since

there is one slaughtering for all of them,

whether a burnt offering, a sin offering, or a peace offering, and likewise

one receiving for all of them, and one sprinkling for all of them.

And when he says that he slaughters, receives, or sprinkles for the sake of another offering, the actions do not demonstrate that his words are untrue. Therefore the thought not for its designated purpose takes effect, and they do not count as the obligation. These are Rabbi Shimon’s words.

And we inquire about it:

What are the circumstances

of the thought not for its designated purpose in a meal offering, concerning which Rabbi Shimon stated his words?

If you say that he knew it was a meal offering made on a griddle, and he took its handful

intentionally

for the sake of a meal offering made in a deep pan,

why is there no invalidity of [doing it] not for its designated purpose here?

What difference does it make that its actions demonstrate [otherwise]?

And why does his thought not invalidate it? This is, after all, the Torah’s innovation that a thought not for its designated purpose damages [the offering], at least with regard to its not counting as the obligation, by removing the “default” of the offering; and here too

he is removing it!

What, then, is Rabbi Shimon’s reason for declaring it valid?

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking

of one who thought

that this meal offering made on a griddle

was a meal offering made in a deep pan, and he took its handful for the sake of a meal offering made in a deep pan,

for he did not intend to remove the offering from its true designation,

but he erred

in his thought, since in truth it was a meal offering made on a griddle, and therefore Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. And we learn from his words

that here

it is valid and the thought not for its designated purpose does not take effect in it, because

its actions demonstrate concerning it

contrary to his mistaken thought.

But elsewhere,

when the actions do not demonstrate [otherwise],

removal in error is removal,

and not [in accordance with Rav] and Rabbah, who hold that it is not removal!?

Abaye said to him:

This is no proof.

In fact,

according to Rabbah, Rabbi Shimon’s words concern one who

knew it was a meal offering made on a griddle, and he took its handful for the sake of a meal offering made in a deep pan,

not as a result of error.

And as for what you said:

If he intends to remove the offering from its designation,

what difference does it make that its actions demonstrate concerning it?

Your answer is:

Rabbah,

who holds that removal in error is not called removal, interprets Rabbi Shimon’s words

according to his reasoning,

as he interpreted them at the beginning of the tractate.

For Rabbah said

in explaining Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, “its actions demonstrate concerning it,” that this is the interpretation:

a thought that is not recognizable as

incorrect,

the Merciful One invalidated,

but

a thought that is recognizable

as false,

the Merciful One did not invalidate,

even if he did it deliberately and knowingly, for it has no force to invalidate because it is plainly recognizable as a false thought, and therefore they count for the owners. But everywhere else, we still do not know whether removal in error is removal or not. [Rabbeinu Gershom]

Mishna:

The Torah commandment is to offer every day the daily offering: one sheep in the morning and a second sheep between the evenings [Numbers 28]. And likewise, concerning the incense, its commandment is to burn a measure every day, half of it in the morning and the second half between the evenings [Exodus 30].

The daily offerings do not prevent the additional offerings.

If they offered an additional offering without offering the daily offering, it is valid.

And the additional offerings do not prevent the daily offerings.

The offering of the additional offerings does not prevent the offering of the afternoon daily offering.

And the additional offerings do not prevent one another.

As we have already learned [49b], that an additional offering is offered even if all the animals included in it are not available.

If they did not offer a sheep

of the daily offering

in the morning,

this does not prevent the afternoon daily offering; rather,

they shall offer

the daily offering of

between the evenings.

Rabbi Shimon said: When

does the morning daily offering not prevent the one between the evenings?

When they were compelled or unwitting

in that they did not offer the morning daily offering.

But if they were deliberate and did not offer a sheep in the morning, they shall not offer it between the evenings.

And it is explained in the Gemara that this means that those priests may not offer it, but other priests may.

And if

they did not burn incense in the morning, they shall burn it

even those priests who forgot to burn it in the morning

between the evenings

even according to the first tanna, for the burning of the morning half does not prevent the burning of the half between the evenings. [And according to the first tanna, they shall burn only the half between the evenings.]

Rabbi Shimon said: And all of it

all the burning

was offered between the evenings,

even the half that was supposed to be offered in the morning.

For one does not inaugurate the

golden altar

the first time, which is the preparation for the beginning of its service, called its “inauguration,”

except with the incense of spices.

And if so, on the day on which they inaugurated the altar they did not burn incense in the morning, and they inaugurated it in the evening with a full measure. Therefore, every day as well, if it happened that they did not burn it in the morning, they complete the burning of the morning half between the evenings and burn a full measure.

And they do not inaugurate

the altar of the burnt offering except with the morning daily offering.

And they do not

inaugurate

the table except with the showbread on Shabbat,

for by arranging the showbread on the table on Shabbat, the table is inaugurated.

And they do not

inaugurate

the menorah except with the

lighting of

its seven lamps between the evenings.

Gemara:

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin asked Rav Ḥisda: [If] the community does not have

sufficient funds for the offerings necessary for offering

the daily offerings and the additional offerings, which of them comes first?

And we inquire about it:

What are the circumstances? If you say [it concerns] the daily offerings of today and the additional offerings of today,

for example, on Shabbat or a Festival, and the question is whether they should offer the daily offering without the additional offering or the additional offering without the daily offering [as we have already learned in the Mishna that they do not prevent one another],

it is obvious that

in this situation

the daily offerings are preferable

to offer, and they should not offer the additional offerings, because

they are

the daily offerings of Shabbat or a Festival,

“more frequent,”

for their commandment is every day,

and

also

“more sacred,”

for the sanctity of the day takes effect upon the daily offering, whereas the additional offerings are only more sacred, and certainly the daily offering is preferable.

Rather,

necessarily, it is speaking of a situation in which they have enough for the day’s daily offering and additional offering, but if they offer today’s additional offering, they will not have enough for tomorrow’s daily offering, which is an ordinary weekday.

Therefore the uncertainty is:

The daily offerings of tomorrow and the additional offerings of today—what is [the ruling]?

The sides of the uncertainty are: whether

the daily offerings

of tomorrow

are preferable,

and although tomorrow is an ordinary weekday and they are not in the category of “more sacred,”

since

they have the advantage of

“more frequent,”

for they come every day,

or perhaps the additional offerings are preferable, since they are more sacred,

and they should offer today’s additional offerings, even though by doing so tomorrow’s daily offering will be nullified.

He said to him: You have learned it

in our Mishna, for we learned:

“The daily offerings do not prevent the additional offerings, and the additional offerings do not prevent the daily offerings, and the additional offerings do not prevent one another.”

And we inquire about it:

What are the circumstances

in which it is stated that they do not prevent one another?

If he has enough for both,

and to bring one before

the other, this is what the Mishna is speaking about: if he brought the additional offering before the daily offering, it does not prevent [the offering]. And likewise, if he brought the additional offering before the afternoon daily offering, it does not prevent [the offering].

And it was taught

in a beraita:

From where [is it derived] that there shall be no matter

else

before the morning daily offering? Scripture says: “And he shall arrange upon it the burnt offering.” And Rava said:

What is

“the burnt offering”

with the definite article?

A burnt offering

shall be

first

of all the offerings, and it is the daily burnt offering, [which is the important one, stated first of all the burnt offerings in the portion of Pinchas]. And if so, how will you say that the daily offerings do not prevent the additional offerings with regard to precedence?