Menachot 49a (מט.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

The tanna teaches: The verse “This is the law of the burnt offering” includes [all offerings],

for there shall be one law for all offerings that ascend [upon the altar]: If they ascended, they shall not descend;

it is juxtaposed to it.

Therefore, the ruling that emerges is that if they ascended, they shall not descend, and he cited what is valid on a bama only as an asmachta—a support for his words. But it is impossible to derive the fundamental law by learning something that is not valid [outside the Temple] from something that is valid [on a bama].

The following sugya deals primarily with the law of “mistaken uprooting.”

The basis of this issue is what is explained at the beginning of tractate Zevahim: Every offering, “by default, is for its designated purpose.” That is, by its very nature, it possesses the status of the offering to which it was consecrated. Consequently, as long as this status remains in force, a thought that differs from that status cannot cause the acts of sacrificial service performed with it to be considered as having been performed not for their designated purpose. However, the laws of invalidating thoughts introduced the novel possibility that one can uproot that “default” status, which designates the offering for its intended purpose. This is the issue in our sugya: What is the law when this uprooting is done mistakenly?

Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught before Rav: The festival sheep,

which are shelamim, and it happened

that they slaughtered them

mistakenly

for the sake of the rams

of the festival, which are burnt offerings, they are

valid, but they did not count for the owners,

who are the public,

as their obligation!

Rav said to him:

That is not so. Rather,

they counted, and they counted

also toward the obligation, since mistaken uprooting is not considered uprooting. Here, after all, he confused the rams with the sheep.

Rav Ḥisda said: Rav’s statement stands to reason

that there is no law of offering performed not for its designated purpose

when he thought that he was slaughtering

sheep

[but in fact was slaughtering] rams,

whereas in reality these were sheep,

and he slaughtered them for the sake of sheep,

but he intended to slaughter rams for the sake of sheep, which is a thought of performing the offering not for its designated purpose; nevertheless, it turned out that he slaughtered it properly,

for sheep were slaughtered for the sake of sheep,

and therefore they count as the required offering, in accordance with Rav.

But when he thought

that the sheep were

rams, and he slaughtered them for the sake of rams,

and it turns out that there is here an offering performed not for its designated purpose—

no,

they do not count as the required offering! For also

mistaken uprooting is considered uprooting. Rav himself holds that mistaken uprooting is not considered uprooting, and therefore sheep slaughtered for the sake of rams counted toward the obligation when his thought was mistaken.

Rav himself holds that a mistaken removal of designation is not considered a removal of designation. Therefore, lambs slaughtered for the sake of rams fulfill the obligation when his thought resulted from a mistake.

And Rabba said: Mistaken uprooting is not considered uprooting.

Rabba said

[to challenge his position],

and we raise an objection against our teaching

from the Mishna:

“The priests who caused pigul in the Temple,

who, while performing the service, intended to eat some of the meat beyond the time allotted for its eating and thereby invalidated the offering—if they were

deliberate,

they are liable

to pay the owners the value of the offering.”

And it follows that

if

the priests were

unintentional,

they are

exempt

from paying.

And it was taught concerning it

in a beraita:

“Their pigul is pigul”

even when done unintentionally. And why are those who acted unintentionally exempt? Because it is considered damage that is not perceptible, and it was only in the case of deliberate action that the Sages imposed a monetary penalty.

We consider this:

What are the circumstances

in which he is exempt because he acted unintentionally, while his pigul remains pigul?

If we say that he knew that it was a sin offering,

whose eating time is one day and one night,

and he was thinking about it

deliberately

for the sake of a peace offering,

to eat it for two days and one night, so that he now intended to eat a sin offering beyond its allotted time and it is therefore pigul—would such a person be called

unintentional

? Yet

he was deliberate!

Rather, is it not

necessarily referring to a case

in which he thought

that this offering

was a peace offering, and he was thinking about it for the sake of a peace offering,

and therefore he intended to eat it for two days because of his error,

and it teaches: “Their pigul is pigul”; evidently, mistaken uprooting is considered uprooting.

For if you say that it is not considered uprooting, why does the law of pigul take effect here? All his thought of eating it for two days was because he believed that he was offering a peace offering, and this thought was mistaken. If uprooting done mistakenly is not considered uprooting, one should likewise not regard his thought of eating it for two days as a thought of pigul, since he did not think of eating a sin offering for two days; rather, he thought of eating a peace offering for two days.

And we reject this:

Abaye said to him: Actually,

it is speaking

of one who knew that it was a sin offering, and he was thinking about it for the sake of a peace offering,

and therefore intended to eat it for two days. His error was

in saying, “It is permitted,”

as he entertained the notion that it was permitted to change the offering and transform it into a peace offering through this thought. Therefore he is considered unintentional, but nevertheless the uprooting was deliberate!

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection

against those who hold that mistaken uprooting is not considered uprooting, from the beraita cited at the beginning of the tractate:

“Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings whose handfuls were removed not for their designated purpose are valid

completely, since the law of an offering performed not for its designated purpose does not apply to them,

and they count for the owners as their obligation,

because

meal offerings are not comparable to animal offerings

with regard to which the disqualification of an offering performed not for its designated purpose is stated.

For if one removes the handful of

a meal offering

prepared in a pan,

which is made in a flat vessel and becomes firm,

for the sake of

a meal offering

prepared in a deep vessel,

which is deep and in which the meal offering becomes soft,

its actions

—the fact that it was made in a pan—

demonstrate concerning it

that he is false in his declaration, because

it

is a meal offering

prepared in a pan,

and not as he said, that he was making it for the sake of one prepared in a deep vessel. Similarly, when he makes a sinner’s meal offering, which is

dry

without oil,

for the sake of

a voluntary meal offering, which is

mixed

with oil,

its actions demonstrate concerning it that it is dry,

and remove it from the status of an offering performed not for its designated purpose. Therefore, the meal offering retains its validity, and his thought and declaration that he is making it for the sake of another offering have no force.

But with animal offerings it is not so,

for reality does not contradict his words. After all,

there is one slaughtering for all of them,

whether a burnt offering, a sin offering, or a peace offering; and likewise,

there is one receiving for all of them and one sprinkling for all of them.

When he says that he is slaughtering, receiving, or sprinkling for the sake of another offering, the acts do not demonstrate that his words are false. Therefore, the thought of performing the offering not for its designated purpose takes effect, and it does not count toward the obligation. These are the words of Rabbi Shimon.

We consider this:

What are the circumstances

of a thought of performing a meal offering not for its designated purpose, about which Rabbi Shimon stated his words?

If we say that he knew that it was a meal offering prepared in a pan, and he was removing its handful

intentionally

for the sake of one prepared in a deep vessel,

why is there no disqualification for performing it not for its designated purpose?

What difference does it make that its actions demonstrate [its identity]?

Why does his thought not invalidate it? This is precisely the Torah’s novel teaching: that a thought of performing an offering not for its designated purpose blemishes it at least to the extent that it does not count as the required offering, by uprooting the offering’s “default” status. Here too,

he is indeed uprooting it;

what, then, is Rabbi Shimon’s reason for declaring it valid?

Rather, is it not

necessarily referring to a case

in which he thought

that this meal offering prepared in a pan

was one prepared in a deep vessel, and he removed its handful for the sake of one prepared in a deep vessel,

as he did not intend to remove the offering from its actual designation,

but he erred

in his thought, since in reality it was a meal offering prepared in a pan; therefore Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. And we learn from his words

that here

it is valid and the thought of performing it not for its designated purpose does not take effect, because

its actions demonstrate concerning it

that it is not as his mistaken thought held.

But elsewhere,

when the actions do not demonstrate this,

mistaken uprooting is considered uprooting,

contrary to [Rav] and Rabba, who hold that it is not considered uprooting!?

Abaye said to him:

This is not a proof.

Actually,

according to Rabba, Rabbi Shimon’s statement concerns one

who knew that it was a meal offering prepared in a pan, and he removed its handful for the sake of one prepared in a deep vessel,

without being mistaken.

And when you said

that if he intends to uproot the offering from its designation,

“What difference does it make that its actions demonstrate concerning it?”

your answer is as follows:

Rabba,

who holds that mistaken uprooting is not considered uprooting, interprets Rabbi Shimon’s words

according to his own reasoning,

as he interpreted them at the beginning of the tractate.

For Rabba said

that Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, “its actions demonstrate concerning it,” is to be understood as follows:

A thought that is not recognizable as

incorrect

the Merciful One invalidated,

but

a thought that is recognizable

as false

the Merciful One did not invalidate,

even if he formed it deliberately and knowingly, since it has no force to invalidate because it is patently recognizable as a false thought; therefore the offering counts for the owners. But elsewhere we still do not know whether mistaken uprooting is considered uprooting or not. [Rabbenu Gershom] 41.

Mishna:

The Torah commands that a daily offering be brought every day: one sheep in the morning and a second sheep between the evenings [Numbers 28]. Similarly, with regard to the incense, its mitzva is to burn a measure each day, half in the morning and the second half between the evenings [Exodus 30].

The daily offerings do not prevent the additional offerings [from being brought].

If an additional offering was brought without the daily offering having been brought, it is valid.

Nor do the additional offerings prevent the daily offerings [from being brought].

The bringing of the additional offerings does not prevent the bringing of the afternoon daily offering.

Nor do the additional offerings prevent one another.

As we have already learned [42b], an additional offering may be brought even if all the animals included in it are not available.

If they did not bring a sheep

of the daily offering

in the morning,

this does not prevent the afternoon daily offering; rather,

they shall bring

the daily offering of

between the evenings.

Rabbi Shimon said: When

does the morning daily offering not prevent the one between the evenings?

When they were compelled or acted unintentionally

in failing to bring the morning daily offering.

But if they acted deliberately and did not bring a sheep in the morning, they shall not bring one between the evenings.

And it is explained in the Gemara that this means that those priests may not bring it; rather, other priests may bring it.

And if

they did not burn incense in the morning, they shall burn it

[even those priests who forgot to burn it in the morning]

between the evenings

[even according to the first tanna], for burning the morning half does not prevent burning the half between the evenings. [According to the first tanna, they may burn only the half between the evenings].

Rabbi Shimon said: And the entire measure

of incense

was offered between the evenings,

including the half that was supposed to be offered in the morning.

For they do not inaugurate the

golden altar

on the first occasion, when its initial service is prepared, a process called its “inauguration,”

except with the incense.

Accordingly, on the day on which they inaugurated the altar, they did not burn incense in the morning, and they inaugurated it in the evening with a full measure. Therefore, every day as well, if it happened that they did not burn the incense in the morning, they complete the burning of the morning half between the evenings and burn a full measure.

And they do not inaugurate

the altar of the burnt offering except with the morning daily offering.

Nor

do they inaugurate

the table except with the showbread on Shabbat,

for by arranging the showbread on the table on Shabbat, the table is inaugurated.

Nor

do they inaugurate

the menorah except with

the lighting of

its seven lamps between the evenings.

Gemara:

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin asked Rav Ḥisda: If the public does not have

sufficient funds for the sacrifices required to offer

the daily and additional offerings, which of them takes precedence?

We consider this:

What are the circumstances? If we say that they have the daily offerings of that day and the additional offerings of that day,

for example, on Shabbat or a Festival, and the question is whether they should bring the daily offering without the additional offering or the additional offering without the daily offering [as we have already learned in the Mishna that they do not prevent one another],

it is obvious that

in this case

the daily offerings are preferable

to bring, and they should not bring the additional offerings, because

they are

the daily offerings of Shabbat or a Festival,

“more frequent,”

as their mitzva is every day,

and

also

“more sacred,”

since the sanctity of the day applies to the daily offering as well, whereas the additional offerings possess only the quality of being more sacred; certainly the daily offering is preferable. 4.

Rather,

necessarily, it is speaking of a case in which they have enough for the day’s daily offering and additional offering, but if they offer the additional offering of that day, they will not have enough for the daily offering of the following day, which is an ordinary weekday.

Therefore, the question is:

The daily offerings of tomorrow and the additional offerings of today—which takes precedence?

The sides of the question are as follows: Perhaps

the daily offerings

of tomorrow

are preferable,

and although tomorrow is a weekday and they do not possess the status of being more sacred,

since

they possess the quality of

being more frequent,

as they are brought every day.

Or perhaps the additional offerings are preferable, since they are more sacred,

and they should bring today’s additional offerings, even though this will result in the daily offering of tomorrow being canceled.

He said to him: You have learned it

in our Mishna, as we learned:

“The daily offerings do not prevent the additional offerings, nor do the additional offerings prevent the daily offerings, nor do the additional offerings prevent one another.”

We consider this:

What are the circumstances

in which it is stated that they do not prevent one another?

If we say that he has enough for both,

and to precede

one with the other, this is what the Mishna is discussing: If he brought the additional offering before the daily offering, it does not prevent it. Likewise, if he brought the additional offering before the afternoon daily offering, it does not prevent it.

And it was taught

in a beraita:

From where is it derived that no matter

else

may precede the morning daily offering? The verse states: “And he shall arrange upon it the burnt offering.” And Rava said:

What is the significance of

“the burnt offering”

with the definite article?

A burnt offering

shall be

first

of all the offerings, and this is the daily burnt offering, [as it is the important one, mentioned first among all the burnt offerings in the passage of Pinchas]. And if so, how can you say that the daily offerings do not prevent the additional offerings with regard to precedence?