Menachot 47b (מז:) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara now brings a source for their dispute:

as we learned in

tractate Me’ila:

the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity,

for the law of misuse applies to them only after the blood has been sprinkled, through which they become designated for burning on the altar; whereas all the meat belongs to the owners and is not subject to the law of misuse. They disputed the law of these sacrificial portions if it happened

that they exited before the blood was sprinkled,

so that they had already become subject to the disqualification of “that which has exited.”

Rabbi Eliezer says:

One does not misuse them.

For the sprinkling does not serve to designate them for the Most High, since they have already been disqualified; therefore, their status is like that of meat, which is not subject to the law of misuse.

Likewise,

one is not liable for them on account of piggul

if he sprinkled the blood with the intention of eating the meat outside its designated time, for since they had already been disqualified by exiting, the status of piggul does not take effect upon them [since it is as though the blood had not been sprinkled and all of its requisite procedures had not been properly performed] [Rashi, Zevahim 90a].

And

likewise with regard to

notar and something impure,

there is no liability for them, because they are not considered consecrated meat fit to be eaten unless the sprinkling that permits them has taken effect upon them.

Rabbi Akiva says:

There is liability for misuse of these sacrificial portions,

and one is liable for them on account of piggul, notar, and something impure,

for Rabbi Akiva maintains that the sprinkling takes effect even with regard to the portion that had already been disqualified by exiting, by virtue of the fact that it is effective for what did not exit. The sprinkling is effective with regard to these liabilities as though everything had been fit at the time of the sprinkling.

On the basis of this dispute, they likewise disputed in the aforementioned beraita whether a thought of piggul takes effect with regard to the two loaves that exited between slaughter and sprinkling. Rabbi Akiva maintains that the sprinkling takes effect here even with regard to the loaf that exited, since “sprinkling is effective for that which has exited.” For by virtue of the fact that the sprinkling is effective for meat that remained inside, it is also effective for the loaf, even though it is not actually part of the body of the sacrifice.

And Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that the sprinkling is not effective with regard to the portion outside, maintains that there is no liability for piggul in its case.

The Gemara comes to explain Rav Shmuel’s uncertainty mentioned above on the first side of the page: “With regard to the rams of Shavuot, which one slaughtered for their sake and sprinkled their blood not for their sake, what is the status of those loaves with regard to eating?” His uncertainty is:

What

is the status of that sprinkling with regard to permitting the loaves? Do we say

that

we find

that a sprinkling performed with a thought of piggul establishes the loaves

of Shavuot

as piggul,

even when the loaf was disqualified

by

the disqualification of

“that which has exited,”

because the loaf is considered

like the meat

of the sacrifice, so that the law of sprinkling takes effect upon it and disqualifies it as piggul, by virtue of the fact that sprinkling is effective for the meat inside? For the loaf is considered part of the body of the rams. And likewise, may it be said that

a sprinkling not for its sake, as well,

since it permits the meat of the rams of Shavuot—for the rams are not disqualified from being eaten by a thought of not for their sake, but the sprinkling permits the meat to be eaten—likewise

permits it

also

for the loaf,

for eating, since they are considered part of the body of the rams, even though this sprinkling itself does not fulfill the obligation of the peace-offerings of Shavuot?

Or perhaps, we say this stringently

and regard the loaf as meat with regard to the sprinkling taking effect upon that which has exited, so as to make it piggul, but

leniently,

to permit it to be eaten,

we do not say this;

rather, only a valid sprinkling permits it ?

Rav Pappa raised an objection to this,

to the interpretation that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer disputed in the beraita concerning the two loaves that exited, whether sprinkling is effective for that which has exited with regard to piggul.

And from where

do we have grounds to interpret their dispute

as a dispute when they are outside [when the loaves are still outside],

and on the basis of this interpretation to arrive at the conclusion that sprinkling is effective for the loaf that has exited as well, as though the loaf were part of the body of the rams, since it is effective for the meat that remained inside?

Perhaps, when they are outside,

meaning that they were not brought back in after they exited,

everyone agrees that sprinkling is not effective for that which has exited

and a thought of piggul does not take effect with regard to the loaf that exited, because Rabbi Akiva agrees that the loaf is not considered part of the body of the sacrifice. Rabbi Akiva said only that sprinkling is effective for that which has exited with regard to the body of the offering itself [even if it was not brought back in (Tosafot)].

And when they were brought back in,

when the two loaves were brought back inside,

they disputed.

And their dispute was not as explained above; rather, it concerned the fundamental question: Was the loaf disqualified by its exit before the sprinkling?

For Rabbi Eliezer maintains the view of Rabbi, who says that slaughter sanctifies

the loaves, and therefore

they became disqualified

the loaves

by exiting,

and the status of piggul could no longer take effect upon them.

And Rabbi Akiva

maintains

the view of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that slaughter does not sanctify

the two loaves

and they are not disqualified by exiting,

and therefore the thought of piggul took effect upon them. In this manner, when the loaf was not disqualified by exiting [and is not piggul] and he sprinkled the blood for their sake, the loaf is permitted; but with sprinkling not for their sake, it is not permitted. If so, Rav Shmuel’s uncertainty has no basis, since we have not found that sprinkling is effective even for a disqualified item !?

We reject Rav Pappa’s statement:

What is this?

How can their dispute be interpreted in this manner? On the contrary,

Granted, if you say that Rabbi Akiva maintains the view of Rabbi, who says that slaughter sanctifies them,

then they already possess the sanctity of an offering without this invalid sprinkling, and therefore

this is what Rabbi Akiva says

—that the disqualification of piggul took effect upon them—since

they were sanctified through slaughter, and the sprinkling came

with the intention of performing it outside its designated time

and established them as piggul,

for sprinkling is effective for that which has exited with regard to a thought of piggul.

But if you say that he maintains the view of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that slaughter does not sanctify,

and the sprinkling is also required for the sanctity to take effect,

does

a sprinkling of piggul sanctify? But Rav Giddel said that Rav said

that even if sprinkling with a thought of piggul is effective with regard to the status of piggul, nevertheless—

a sprinkling of piggul does not bring about liability for misuse, nor does it remove an item from liability for misuse !

And we explain it as follows: What does the statement

“does not bring about liability for misuse” mean? With regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity!

Before the sprinkling, they belong to the owners and there is no liability for misuse; at the time of the sprinkling, they become designated for the Most High and there is liability for misuse. In this case, since the sprinkling was a sprinkling of piggul and was not valid, it does not sanctify them, and there is no law of misuse concerning them.

And what does “nor does it remove an item from liability for misuse” mean? With regard to the meat of offerings of the most sacred sanctity,

which belongs to the Most High from the time they are alive and is subject to misuse; from the time of the sprinkling, it leaves the status of liability for misuse, whereas an invalid sprinkling of this kind does not remove it from that status. If so, Rav Giddel’s statement proves that an invalid sprinkling of piggul is effective for the offering only with regard to the prohibition of piggul, but is not effective to sanctify the offering for purposes of misuse or to remove it from the law of misuse. If so, here, according to Rabbi Elazar, when the sanctity is not yet complete without the sprinkling, how can sprinkling with a thought of piggul sanctify the loaf!?

And we answer:

Was not Rav Giddel’s statement in the name of Rav refuted?

His words were contradicted and disproved, and the conclusion was established that sprinkling with a thought of piggul is effective also to release the meat of offerings of the most sacred sanctity from liability for misuse and to impose liability for misuse upon the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity. Likewise, it is effective to complete the sanctity of the loaf, and consequently the prohibition of piggul takes effect. Therefore, according to Rav Pappa, Rabbi Akiva maintains the view of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, that slaughter does not sanctify the loaf until the blood of the rams is sprinkled. If the loaf exited between slaughter and sprinkling, it was not disqualified. [Nevertheless, a thought of piggul takes effect upon it at the time of sprinkling, as above.] Therefore, if the blood was sprinkled for their sake, the loaf is permitted to be eaten. But if it was sprinkled not for their sake, they are prohibited, for there is no source indicating that even an invalid sprinkling renders the thought effective, since the loaf was not disqualified at all

Rashi explained the Gemara’s statement to mean that Rav Giddel’s statement—that a sprinkling of piggul does not remove an item from liability for misuse—was rejected. And Tosafot raised a difficulty with this, for in the Gemara’s passage in Me’ila (3b), which is the source of Rav Giddel’s statement, Rav Giddel’s words were not rejected. If so, what is the meaning of the Gemara’s statement, “Was not Rav Giddel refuted?” Therefore, Tosafot explained that the Gemara’s wording is affirmative: It is not a difficulty; rather, it is an addition, for Rav Giddel’s words were not rejected. And the Shitta Mekubbetzet explained the Gemara’s statement as follows: Although Rav Giddel’s statement—that it does not remove an item from liability for misuse—remains even according to the conclusion of the Gemara, the Gemara means that this is not a reason that the loaf should not become sanctified. For in the passage there, the Gemara raised a difficulty against Rav Giddel from the fact that a sprinkling of piggul sanctifies the loaf, and the Gemara concludes there that with regard to sanctification taking effect so that it can become disqualified, this does take effect even according to Rav Giddel. This, then, is the meaning of the Gemara’s statement, “Was not Rav Giddel refuted?” Although his statement remains valid insofar as the sprinkling does not remove an item from liability for misuse, this sprinkling can nevertheless sanctify it.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: The rams of Shavuot, which one slaughtered for their sake,

for they are no longer valid without the loaves, since they have already become mutually dependent,

and the loaves were lost,

and if they are considered offerings of Shavuot, the sacrifice is disqualified because the loaves are absent—the Gemara raises the question whether it is possible to rectify them by removing them from the category of the rams of Shavuot:

What is the law as to sprinkling their blood not for their sake

but rather for the sake of peace-offerings, so that they will be considered peace-offerings, and a peace-offering is not disqualified when there is no loaf? Although it is prohibited to perform the service not for its sake, might one do so in order

to permit the meat to be eaten ?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

Do you have any item that is not valid when performed for its sake, but is valid

specifically when it is performed

not for its sake?

And we are astonished:

And

is it true that

we have not

found such a case?

But what of the Paschal-offering before noon

on the fourteenth of Nisan, which is before the time for slaughtering the Paschal-offering,

which is not valid when performed for its sake

until the afternoon,

but is valid

if it is slaughtered

not for its sake

but rather for the sake of a peace-offering?

Rabbi Zeira answered:

This is what I meant

in the question I raised—“Do you have”—namely:

Do you have any item that appears to be fit for its sake, and

after it appears to be fit, is

rejected from being performed for its sake and is not valid when performed for its sake, but is valid

specifically

not for its sake?

Therefore, with regard to these rams of Shavuot, since before the loaves were lost they appeared to be fit for their sake, and they were rejected when the loaves were lost, we do not say that sprinkling not for their sake will now be effective for them.

And we are astonished:

And have we not

found a case in which an offering appeared to be fit for its sake, was rejected from being performed for its sake, and is valid when performed not for its sake?

But what of the Paschal-offering after noon

which is fit to be slaughtered for its sake, and afterward,

during the rest of the year,

it is rejected from being performed for its sake, yet is valid when slaughtered not for its sake?

Rabbi Zeira answered:

This is what I mean:

Do you have any item that

appeared to be fit for its sake and was slaughtered for its sake

and thereby designated for this offering,

and

after slaughter

was rejected from being performed for its sake and is not valid

if the subsequent service is performed

for its sake, but is valid

only

not for its sake?

I meant that in a case such as this, where it was rejected after being slaughtered for its sake, we have not found that it becomes valid specifically when performed not for its sake.

And once again we ask:

And have you not

found such a case?

But what of the thanksgiving-offering,

for we said above (46a) that if its loaves became disqualified after slaughter, it is no longer valid as a thanksgiving-offering, since once the loaves were lost, the thanksgiving-offering was lost; nevertheless, one should sprinkle its blood for the sake of a peace-offering, and it becomes valid for eating. If so, should we not say the same with regard to the rams of Shavuot whose loaves were lost?

Rabbi Zeira answered:

The thanksgiving-offering is different, for the Torah calls it “peace-offerings,”

as it is written, “the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings.” Therefore, we say: Just as peace-offerings may be offered without a loaf, so too a thanksgiving-offering may be offered even without a loaf. Consequently, even when its loaf was lost, it was not rejected from being performed “for its sake”; rather, one may initially sprinkle the blood of the thanksgiving-offering for the sake of a peace-offering. But this is not so with regard to the rams of Shavuot: If one slaughters them for the sake of peace-offerings, it is not for their sake. Thus, we have not found an item that is valid when performed for its sake, was slaughtered for its sake, was rejected from being performed for its sake, and is valid when performed not for its sake.

The Sages taught: If one slaughtered two rams

of Shavuot

for four loaves

instead of for two loaves, and the sanctification took effect only upon two of the loaves, but before slaughter he had not designated which two loaves would be the loaves of the sacrifice, then

he takes two of them,

and waves them,

thereby designating them now as the loaves of Shavuot, since these two loaves are the ones waved together with the slaughtered rams, in accordance with the law of the loaves, which require waving together with the rams, both while alive and after slaughter.