Menachot 47b — the Talmud in English

And now the Gemara brings a source for their dispute:

as we learned in

Tractate Me'ila:

the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity

—the law of me'ila applies to them only after the sprinkling, through which they are designated for burning to the Most High, whereas all the meat belongs to the owners and me'ila does not apply to it. And they disputed the law of those sacrificial portions if it happened

that they went out before the sprinkling of the blood,

and it was found that the disqualification of “that which went out” had already taken effect in them.

Rabbi Eliezer says—

one does not commit me'ila with them.

For the sprinkling does not make them designated for the portion of the Most High, since they have already become disqualified; therefore, their law is like the law of meat to which me'ila does not apply.

And likewise

one is not liable on their account for piggul

if he sprinkled the blood with the intention of eating the meat outside its appointed time, for since they had already become disqualified through having gone out, the designation of piggul did not take effect upon them [for they are as though the blood had not been sprinkled and all its enabling rites had not been properly performed] [Rashi, Zevachim 90a].

And

likewise with regard to

notar and impure

there is no liability for them, because their law is not like that of consecrated meat fit for eating unless the sprinkling that permits them has taken effect upon them.

Rabbi Akiva says:

one commits me'ila with these sacrificial portions,

and one is liable on their account for piggul, notar, and impure,

for Rabbi Akiva holds that the effect of the sprinkling also takes effect with regard to a portion that had already become disqualified through having gone out, by virtue of the fact that it is effective for what did not go out. And the sprinkling is effective so that these liabilities apply to it as though everything had been fit at the time of the sprinkling.

And on the basis of this dispute they also disputed in the earlier beraita whether the thought of piggul takes effect with regard to the two loaves that went out between slaughter and sprinkling: Rabbi Akiva holds that there is sprinkling here also with regard to the loaf that went out, since “sprinkling is effective for that which went out.” For just as the sprinkling is effective for meat that remained inside, it is effective even for a loaf that is not actually part of the body of the offering.

And Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the sprinkling is not effective with regard to the portion outside, holds that piggul does not apply to it.

And the Gemara comes to explain the uncertainty of Rav Shmuel above, on page 47a: “The lambs of Shavuot that he slaughtered for their sake and sprinkled their blood not for their sake—what is the law of that loaf with regard to eating?” His uncertainty is—

what

is the law of that sprinkling to permit the loaf? Do we say

from

what we found,

that the sprinkling of piggul designated the loaf

of Shavuot

for piggul,

even when the loaf was disqualified

by

the disqualification of

“that which went out,”

and because the loaf is considered

like meat

of the offering, for the law of sprinkling to take effect upon it and to disqualify it through piggul, by virtue of the fact that the sprinkling is effective for the meat inside, since the loaf is considered like the body of the lambs; and likewise let us say

a sprinkling not for its sake also,

since it permits the meat of the lambs of Shavuot—for the lambs do not become disqualified for eating through the thought of not for their sake, but the sprinkling permits the meat for eating—likewise

it permits it

also

for the loaf,

for eating, since they are like the body of the lambs, even though it itself is a sprinkling that does not fulfill the obligation of the peace-offerings of Shavuot.

Or perhaps, we say this stringently

that the loaf is judged like meat with regard to the effect of sprinkling upon that which went out, in order to bring it to piggul, but

leniently,

to permit it for eating,

we do not say this,

but only a valid sprinkling permits it ?

Rav Pappa challenged him,

regarding the interpretation that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer disputed in the beraita of the two loaves that went out, whether sprinkling is effective for that which went out with regard to piggul.

And from where

do we have to interpret their dispute

as disputing when they are outside [when the loaf is still outside], and from this interpretation the conclusion emerges that sprinkling is effective for that which went out even with regard to the loaf, as though the loaf were like the body of the lambs, since it is effective for the meat found inside?

Perhaps, when they are outside,

everyone agrees that sprinkling is not effective for that which went out

because he did not bring them back in after they went out,

and the thought of piggul does not take effect in the loaf that went out, because Rabbi Akiva agrees that the loaf is not considered like the body of the offering. Rabbi Akiva said that sprinkling is effective for that which went out only with regard to the body of the sacrifice itself [and even if he did not bring it back in (Tosafot)].

And when he afterward brought them in,

when he brought the two loaves back inside, in this

they disputed.

And not as was explained above, but concerning the essential question: Was the loaf disqualified through going out before the sprinkling?

For Rabbi Eliezer holds like Rabbi, who says that slaughter sanctifies

the loaf, and therefore

they became disqualified

the loaves

through having gone out,

and piggul no longer takes effect in them.

And Rabbi Akiva

holds

like Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that slaughter does not sanctify

the two loaves

and they do not become disqualified through having gone out,

and therefore the thought of piggul took effect upon them. In this manner, when the loaf was not disqualified through having gone out [and is not piggul] and he sprinkled the blood for their sake, the loaf is permitted; but through a sprinkling not for their sake, it is not. If so, there is no place for the uncertainty of Rav Shmuel, since we have not found that sprinkling is effective even for a disqualified thing !?

Therefore, the thought of piggul takes effect upon them. In this case, where the loaf was not disqualified by leaving [and is not piggul], if the blood was sprinkled for its own sake, the loaf is permitted; but if the blood was sprinkled not for its own sake, it is not permitted. If so, there is no basis for Rav Shmuel’s doubt, since we have not found that sprinkling is effective even for something disqualified !

And we reject the words of Rav Pappa:

What is this?

How can their dispute be interpreted in this way? Is it not, on the contrary,

if you grant that Rabbi Akiva holds like Rabbi, who says that slaughter sanctifies them,

then they already possess the sanctity of an offering without this invalid sprinkling, and therefore

this is what Rabbi Akiva says,

that the disqualification of piggul took effect in them, since

they became sanctified through slaughter, and the sprinkling came

with the thought of outside its appointed time

and designated them for piggul,

for sprinkling is effective for that which went out with regard to the thought of piggul.

But if you say that he holds like Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that slaughter does not sanctify,

and the sprinkling is also needed for the sanctity to take effect,

does a

sprinkling of piggul sanctify? But Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav

that even if sprinkling is effective with the thought of piggul with regard to the effect of piggul, nevertheless—

a sprinkling of piggul does not bring about me'ila, and does not remove from me'ila !

And we explain it: What does “

does not bring about me'ila? In the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity!”

mean? Their law is that before sprinkling they belong to the owners, and me'ila does not apply to them; at the time of sprinkling they become designated for the Most High, and me'ila applies to them. In this case, where there was a sprinkling of piggul that is not a valid sprinkling, it is not effective to sanctify them, and the law of me'ila does not apply to them.

And “does not remove from me'ila”? In the meat of offerings of highest sanctity

which belongs to the Most High from the time they are alive, and me'ila applies to it; from the time of sprinkling, it leaves the status of me'ila, but such an invalid sprinkling does not remove it from the status of me'ila. If so, it is proven from the words of Rav Giddel that an invalid sprinkling of piggul is effective for an offering only with regard to the prohibition of piggul, but it is not effective to sanctify the offering for the law of me'ila or to remove it from the law of me'ila. If so, here, according to Rabbi Elazar, for whom the sanctity is not yet complete without the sprinkling, how can sprinkling with the thought of piggul be effective to sanctify the loaf!?

And we answer: Is it not the case that

Rav Giddel’s statement in the name of Rav was refuted?

His words were contradicted and disproved, and it was established that sprinkling with the thought of piggul is effective also to permit the meat of offerings of highest sanctity from me'ila and to prohibit the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity. Likewise, it will be effective to complete the sanctity of the loaf, and consequently the prohibition of piggul takes effect. Therefore, according to Rav Pappa, Rabbi Akiva holds like Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that slaughter does not sanctify the loaf until the blood of the lambs is sprinkled. If the loaf went out between slaughter and sprinkling, the loaf did not become disqualified. [Nevertheless, the thought of piggul is effective in them at the time of sprinkling, as above.] Therefore, if the blood was sprinkled for their sake, the loaf is permitted for eating. But if it was sprinkled not for their sake, they are forbidden, for there is no source that even with an invalid sprinkling a thought is effective, since the loaf was not disqualified at all

Rashi explained the words of the Gemara to mean that Rav Giddel’s statement that a sprinkling of piggul does not remove from me'ila was rejected, and Tosafot raised a difficulty concerning this: In the Gemara’s sugya in Me'ila (3b), which is the source of Rav Giddel’s statement, Rav Giddel’s words were not rejected. If so, what is the meaning of the Gemara’s statement, “Was Rav Giddel not refuted?” Therefore, Tosafot explained that the Gemara’s intention is conciliatory: this is not a difficulty, but an addition, since Rav Giddel’s words were not rejected. And the Shיטה Mekubetzet explained the words of the Gemara as follows: Although Rav Giddel’s statement that it does not remove from me'ila remains even according to the conclusion of the Gemara, the Gemara means that this is not a reason that the loaf should not become sanctified, for there the Gemara challenged Rav Giddel from the fact that a sprinkling of piggul sanctifies the loaf, and the Gemara concludes there that with regard to sanctification taking effect so that it becomes disqualified, this takes effect even according to Rav Giddel. If so, this is the meaning of the Gemara’s statement, “Was Rav Giddel not refuted?”—that although his words remain, namely, that it does not remove from me'ila, this sprinkling can nevertheless sanctify.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: The lambs of Shavuot that he slaughtered for their sake,

for they are no longer valid without the loaf, because they had already been bound to one another,

and the loaf was lost,

and if it is considered as an offering of Shavuot, the sacrifice will be disqualified because of the absence of the loaf—the Gemara is uncertain whether it is possible to remedy it by removing it from the status of the lambs of Shavuot:

What is the law: may he sprinkle their blood not for their sake

but rather for the sake of peace-offerings, and through this it will be considered a peace-offering, and a peace-offering is not disqualified when there is no loaf? And although it is forbidden to perform [the rites] not for their sake, should he do so in order

to permit the meat for eating ?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

Do you have anything that is not valid for its sake, yet is valid

specifically by being performed

not for its sake?

And we express astonishment:

And

is it so that

not

have we found such a thing?

But consider the Passover-offering before midday,

the day of the fourteenth of Nisan, which is before the time of slaughtering the Passover-offering,

which is not valid for its sake

until twilight,

yet is valid

if it is slaughtered

not for its sake

but rather for the sake of peace-offerings.

And Rabbi Zeira answers:

This is what I meant

in the question that I asked with the word “do you have”: Is it that

you have anything that appears [fit] for its sake, and

after it appears

is rejected from being for its sake and is not valid for its sake, yet is valid

specifically

not for its sake?

Therefore, with regard to these lambs of Shavuot, since before the loaf was lost they appeared [fit] for their sake, and they were rejected when the loaf was lost, we should not say that a sprinkling not for their sake will now be effective for them.

And we express astonishment:

And

have we not found a case such as this, which appeared [fit] for its sake, was rejected from being for its sake, and is valid not for its sake?

But consider the Passover-offering after midday.

It is fit to be slaughtered for its sake, and afterward,

during the rest of the days of the year,

it is rejected from being for its sake, yet it is valid when slaughtered not for its sake?

And Rabbi Zeira answers:

This is what I mean: Is it that

you have anything that appears fit for its sake and is slaughtered for its sake

and thereby designated for this offering,

and

after slaughter

is rejected from being for its sake and is not valid

if the rest of its service is performed

for its sake, yet is valid

only

not for its sake?

For in such a case, where it was rejected after it had been slaughtered for its sake, I said that we have not found that it becomes fit specifically through being performed not for its sake.

And again we express astonishment:

And

have you not

found it?

But consider a thanksgiving-offering,

as we said above (46a): If its bread became disqualified after slaughter, it is no longer valid as a thanksgiving-offering, since when the loaf was lost, the thanksgiving-offering was lost; nevertheless, he sprinkles its blood for the sake of peace-offerings, and it becomes fit for eating. If so, should we not say the same with regard to the lambs of Shavuot whose loaf was lost?

And Rabbi Zeira answers:

The thanksgiving-offering is different, for the Torah called it “peace-offerings,”

as it is written, “the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings.” Therefore, we say: Just as peace-offerings are offered without bread, so too a thanksgiving-offering is offered even without bread. Consequently, even when its bread was lost, it was not rejected from “for its sake”; rather, initially he may sprinkle the blood of the thanksgiving-offering for the sake of peace-offerings. But the lambs of Shavuot are not so: if he slaughters them for the sake of peace-offerings, this is not for their sake. Therefore, we have not found anything that is valid for its sake, is slaughtered for its sake, is rejected from being for its sake, and is valid not for its sake.

The Sages taught: If he slaughtered two lambs

of Shavuot

for four loaves

instead of for two loaves, and the sanctification took effect only upon two loaves, and before slaughter he had not clarified which two of them would be the bread of the sacrifice, then

he takes two of them,

and waves them,

and now clarifies them as the loaves of Shavuot, by the fact that these two loaves are the ones waved together with the slaughtered lambs, in accordance with the law of the loaf that requires waving together with the lambs, while alive and slaughtered.