Menachot 45b (מה:) — the Talmud in English

And likewise,

if they had

funds for

more rams

than required,

but did not have

funds for their libations in the amount of

“their ephah,”

which is the measure appropriate for them,

they shall bring one ram and its ephah, but shall not offer

all the other rams

without the ephahs

appropriate for their libations.

Mishna:

In the portion of Emor, two sets of offerings associated with bringing the two loaves on Shavuot are written.

A. Lambs, a bull, and rams

as burnt offerings,

and a goat

as a sin offering.

B.

Two peace-offering lambs,

with which the two loaves are waved, and the slaughter of which sanctifies the two loaves and permits them to be eaten.

The offerings that come with the two loaves [those mentioned in the portion of Emor], namely:

the bull, the rams, and the lambs,

which are brought as burnt offerings,

and the goat

brought as a sin offering—

do not invalidate the loaves,

and the loaves are offered even without them.

Nor do the loaves invalidate them,

and they are offered even without the loaves.

All this applies with regard to the burnt offerings and the sin offering. But with regard to the two lambs, which are communal peace offerings, which are waved together with the loaves, and which also sanctify them and permit them to be eaten through their slaughter, the tannaim disagree whether the lambs invalidate the two loaves, or whether the two loaves invalidate the lambs.

The loaves invalidate the lambs,

and without the loaves the peace-offering lambs may not be offered.

But the lambs do not invalidate the loaves,

and when there are no lambs, the loaves are brought without them;

the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Shimon ben Nannos said: It is not so,

but rather, the lambs are the ones

that invalidate the loaves,

as the loaves may not be offered without the lambs.

But the loaves do not invalidate the lambs,

rather, they are offered even without the loaves. And the proof is:

For we find that, when the Jewish people were in the wilderness for forty years,

and it was impossible to bring the loaves, since they can be brought only from the produce of Eretz Yisrael, nevertheless

the lambs were offered without the loaves.

And from here there is proof that

also here,

when there are no loaves,

the lambs shall be offered without the loaves.

Rabbi Shimon said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of ben Nannos,

that only the lambs invalidate the loaves 2 .

But the reason

and proof for this ruling

is not

as stated by ben Nannos, because he says that the peace-offering lambs were offered in the wilderness, and that is not so!

For everything stated in the Book of Numbers,

the additional offerings of Shavuot stated in the Book of Numbers, in the portion of Pinchas,

was offered in the wilderness. But everything stated in the Torat Kohanim,

which is the Book of Leviticus—for example, these seven lambs, a bull, and rams as burnt offerings, and the peace-offering lambs brought with the two loaves—

was not offered in the wilderness.

And if so, since the peace-offering lambs brought with the loaves, which are written in the portion of Emor in Leviticus, were not offered before they entered Eretz Yisrael, there is no proof that they were offered even without the two loaves, because in the wilderness neither the loaves nor the lambs were offered;

and once they entered Eretz Yisrael, both these and those were offered.

And why do I say in accordance with his opinion,

of ben Nannos, that

the lambs shall be offered without the loaves,

even though I disagree with his proof?

Because

the lambs permit themselves,

and also the two loaves, to be eaten. The permissibility of eating the two lambs is not dependent on the performance of any act of permitting with regard to the two loaves. Therefore, the lambs can be brought even when the two loaves are not brought.

But the loaves

are brought

without the lambs

because

there is no one to permit them,

as the two loaves are not permitted to be eaten until the lambs have been offered.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is written: “And you shall offer with the bread seven yearling lambs without blemish, and one young bull and two rams. And you shall make one goat for a sin offering and two yearling lambs for a peace offering.”

And we interpret this verse:

“And you shall offer with the bread”—

an obligation with regard to the bread.

For it indicates that the two lambs of Shavuot may not be offered without the loaves, and that the two loaves may not be offered without the two lambs.

And at the end of the verse it is written:

“Seven yearling lambs without blemish”—

even if there is no bread!

For it is obvious that the seven lambs, which are burnt offerings and are written in this verse, do not invalidate the loaves.

If so, what does the Torah teach

at the beginning of the verse by stating

“with the bread”?

It teaches that they were not obligated to bring the two lambs until they became obligated to bring the bread; the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: Could it be that the lambs stated here,

in the Book of Leviticus, in the portion of Emor,

are themselves

those

lambs stated

in the portion of Pinchas

in the Book of Numbers,

and that there are not two separate sets of offerings?

You have said: When you reach the bulls and rams,

you see that

they are not themselves.

For in the portion of Emor one bull and two rams are written, whereas in the portion of Pinchas two bulls and one ram are written.

Rather,

you have learned that

these

in the Book of Numbers

come on account of themselves for

an additional offering,

whereas these

in the Book of Leviticus

come on account of the bread.

It follows that what is stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness,

as it has no connection to the bread,

whereas what is stated in the Torat Kohanim,

which comes on account of the bread,

was not offered in the wilderness,

because they were not yet obligated to bring the bread.

And we raise an objection:

Perhaps

only the

bulls and rams,

with regard to which there is a difference between the portions,

are not themselves.

But the lambs,

with regard to which seven are written in both portions,

are themselves,

meaning that the lambs mentioned in the portion of Emor are the same as those in the portion of Pinchas, and fourteen lambs are not offered; only seven are offered?

And we answer:

Since these

bulls and rams

were changed, these too

the lambs mentioned in the two portions are not the same lambs; rather,

they are others,

because the two portions concern separate matters.

And we challenge this:

As for the bulls and rams,

with regard to which the Torah changed their numbers in the two portions,

from where do you know that they were changed? Perhaps this is what the Torah said:

that the matter depends on one’s choice:

if he wishes

to offer

one bull and two rams, let him offer them; if he wishes

to offer

two bulls and one ram, let him offer them?!

And we answer:

Since their order was changed,

for in the portion of Emor they are stated in this order: lambs, a bull, and rams, whereas in the portion of Pinchas their order is: bulls, a ram, and lambs,

infer

from the change in order that

they are others,

and there are two separate types of offerings here: offerings brought on account of the bread, and additional offerings brought for the obligation of the day.

We learned in our Mishna:

“The loaves invalidate the lambs, but the lambs do not invalidate the loaves; the statement of Rabbi Akiva.” 5 .

And we inquire:

What is the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s opinion?

And we explain: From what is stated in the portion of Emor—“And the priest shall wave them with the bread of the first fruits as a wave offering before the Lord, with the two lambs; they shall be holy to the Lord for the priest”—the expression “they shall be” is interpreted as indicating that the law is indispensable. However, it is still unclear whether “they shall be” refers to the lambs or to the bread. Rabbi Akiva derives it by means of a gzera shava:

He derives “they shall be”

stated in this verse

from “they shall be”

stated earlier concerning the loaves, or the two loaves: “They shall be fine flour.”

Just as there

the expression “they shall be” is stated with regard to

bread, so here

the expression “they shall be” is stated with regard to

bread.

We explain the reasoning of ben Nannos:

And ben Nannos

who disagrees and holds that specifically the lambs invalidate the loaves, but the loaves do not invalidate the lambs,

derives

by means of another gzera shava:

“They shall be” from “they shall be.” Just as there are lambs,

as is stated concerning the seven lambs,

“they shall be

a burnt offering to the Lord,”

so here,

where it is stated, “They shall be holy to the Lord for the priest,” the meaning of “they shall be” as indicating indispensability refers

to the lambs,

and not to the two loaves.

And we challenge this:

And ben Nannos too,

who derives “they shall be” from the burnt-offering lambs to the peace-offering lambs,

should derive it from “they shall be”

stated with regard to bread, to the bread similar to it:

just as there it is bread, so here it is bread,

and he should not derive it from the burnt-offering lambs to the peace-offering lambs, which are different offerings.

And we answer:

One derives “they shall be” from “they shall be,”

which are similar in wording,

but one does not derive “they shall be” from “they shall be,”

whose wording is different, even though the subject matter is more similar.

And we challenge this:

What difference does it make

that the wording differs with regard to a gzera shava?

But the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught

with regard to the afflictions of houses that one may derive by means of a gzera shava from

“And the priest shall return” and “And the priest shall come,”

because the meanings of the two words are identical, for

“this is returning; this is coming”?

And we answer:

That statement

that precision of wording is not determinative applies

where there is nothing similar to it,

in which case one may derive a gzera shava according to the meaning.

But where there is something similar to it

in the similarity of wording,

we derive from what is similar to it,

and even though it is possible to derive it in another manner—through a greater similarity between the subjects being derived—one derives only from what is similar in wording.

And we return to challenge Rabbi Akiva:

And Rabbi Akiva too should derive “they shall be” from “they shall be,”

since the similarity of wording should be preferred over similarity of subject matter!?

And we explain: He holds that

one derives

the two loaves, which are

something given to a priest, from something given to a priest,

namely, the bread and the peace-offering lambs. Therefore, he derives it from “They shall be fine flour,” stated concerning the loaves.

To exclude

the possibility of deriving it by means of a gzera shava from

these

seven lambs,

which are burnt offerings,

and from which the priest receives nothing, since they are entirely burned. Therefore, it is not appropriate to derive a law concerning the bread from them; similarity of subject matter takes precedence over similarity of wording.

We explain their dispute—whether the lambs invalidate the loaves or the loaves invalidate the lambs—in another manner:

And if you wish, say: They disagree with regard to the verse itself,

and not with regard to a gzera shava, but concerning what is stated:

“They shall be holy to the Lord for the priest,”

where the expression “they shall be” teaches that the law is indispensable.

Rabbi Akiva holds

that the verse is speaking of the bread, and his reasoning is:

What is something that is entirely for the priest

and has no portion for the altar?

You must say that this is the bread,

and not the lambs, since even with peace offerings there is a portion for the altar, namely, their sacrificial portions.

And ben Nannos

holds:

Is it written, “They shall be holy to the priest”?

For had it been written that way, it would indeed indicate something that is entirely for the priest. But

“They shall be holy to the Lord for the priest” is written,

and therefore the verse is interpreted as follows:

What is something of which part is for the Lord and part is for the priest?

You must say that these are the lambs,

which are offered as peace offerings! For the priest takes from them the portion eaten according to the law of communal peace offerings, and concerning them the verse states the expression indicating indispensability: “They shall be holy to the Lord for the priest.”

And we are astonished:

And Rabbi Akiva,

why did he not hold that it should be interpreted in this manner, and why did he infer from the expression “for the Lord for the priest” that it refers to something entirely for the priest?

And we answer:

Is it written, “They shall be holy to the Lord and to the priest,”

with the conjunction “and”? For then it would indicate something given to both of them. Rather,

“For the Lord for the priest” is written,

without the conjunction “and,” and therefore it cannot be interpreted as ben Nannos interprets it. And the mention of “for the Lord” with regard to bread, which is entirely for the priest, is

in accordance with Rav Huna. For Rav Huna said: The Lord acquired it and gave it to the priest!

That is, the priests receive it from the table of the Most High. If so, the verse is speaking of the bread, concerning which the verse used the expression indicating indispensability—“they shall be” !

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Although we learned in our Mishna that according to Rabbi Akiva the lambs do not invalidate the loaves, and according to Rabbi Shimon and ben Nannos the loaves do not invalidate the lambs, all this applies before a bond has been formed between them,