Menachot 40b (מ:) — the Talmud in English

Now

with regard to the law

of leaven on Passover,

and with regard to eating on

Yom Kippur,

which are prohibitions

punishable by karet,

and nevertheless

we rely on the documents,

the letters issued by the court to inform people when Passover and when Yom Kippur will be,

here,

with regard to tekhelet,

which is merely a positive commandment

itself,

all the more so

should one rely on the documents?!

Rather, Rava said: I stated this matter

in Babylonia,

and it was stated

in the same manner

in the West

(in Eretz Yisrael)

because of Rabbi Zeira, in accordance with my opinion:

the reason that they prohibited tzitzit on a linen sheet is

lest his sheet tear within three

fingerbreadths of the edge of the sheet,

and he sew it up

with linen threads; and from the remainder of the threads that remain hanging from the edge of the sheet he will make tzitzit (together with threads of tekhelet). But these threads that remained hanging after the sewing are not fit for the mitzva of tzitzit, since

the Torah said: “

fringes

you shall make

for yourself”—their making must begin for the sake of the mitzva of tzitzit,

and

the mitzva will not be fulfilled

by means of something already made

previously in a garment not for the sake of the mitzva 49 .

And since he will not fulfill the mitzva of tzitzit, the threads of tekhelet that he adds to the linen threads render the sheet prohibited as shaatnez when not being used for a mitzva. Therefore, the Sages were concerned about such a situation and prohibited attaching tzitzit to a linen sheet, since it is preferable that one refrain from fulfilling the mitzva of tzitzit passively rather than violate the prohibition of shaatnez through an active deed.

Rabbi Zeira permitted his sheet!

Rabbi Zeira permitted the tzitzit that were on his sheet, which was made of linen, and accepted the decree out of concern lest it tear and be sewn, thereby causing one to stumble regarding shaatnez.

Rav Zeira said:

The reason that the Sages prohibited attaching tzitzit to a linen sheet is a different one:

They also issued a decree

because of night clothing!

Lest people come to cover themselves with it at night, when it is not a time for fulfilling the mitzva of tzitzit, and consequently violate the prohibition of shaatnez at a time when they are not fulfilling the mitzva of tzitzit 51 .

And Rava said: I stated this matter

in Babylonia,

and it was stated in the West in the name of Rabbi Zeira, in accordance with my opinion:

A ritual garment that

is made of fabric,

made of woven material,

while its corners

are

of leather,

it is

obligated

in tzitzit.

But if the garment itself

is made of leather,

then although

its corners

are made of

fabric

(woven material), it is

exempt

from tzitzit.

And “garment” refers only to woven material, and not to something made from a piece of leather 52 .

And the Gemara clarifies:

What is the reason

that the obligation is not determined according to the place where the tzitzit are attached? Because

we require the principal part of a garment

to determine the obligation of tzitzit. Therefore, it is obligated in tzitzit only if the principal part of the garment is made from a species subject to the obligation.

Rav Aḥai follows the corner,

and if it were made of fabric, he would attach tzitzit to it even though the principal part of the garment was made of leather 53 .

Rava said that Rav Seḥora said that Rav Huna said: If one attached

tzitzit threads

to a

garment that had

three

corners בלבד,

and

afterward

completed it to four

corners by sewing an additional corner onto it, then although he now attached tzitzit to the fourth corner, it is

invalid, because of “you shall make, and not from something already made”!

When the tzitzit threads were attached to the first three corners, the garment was not yet obligated in tzitzit. Consequently, at the time it became obligated, when he attached the fourth corner, the tzitzit threads were already on it. The Torah required that tzitzit be attached when the garment becomes obligated, and one does not fulfill his obligation with tzitzit that were already hanging on the garment before the time of obligation.

A challenge was raised:

The early pious ones,

who exerted themselves with all their strength to be meticulous in the mitzvot, would attach tzitzit to a garment at the earliest possible moment. Therefore, when they wove and prepared a four-cornered garment,

once they had woven three

fingerbreadths of fabric, which is the smallest measure of a garment,

they would attach to it

threads of

tekhelet

on the two corners that had already been woven. This proves that although a small, narrow garment three fingerbreadths wide is not obligated in tzitzit because it lacks the required measure, nevertheless this does not invalidate the tzitzit attached to it on account of “you shall make, and not from something already made.” This is a difficulty against Rava.

And we answer:

Say instead: once they had unravelled three!

That is, at the completion of the garment’s weaving, when they entered the final three fingerbreadths that still remained to be woven into the garment, and it was already possible to attach tzitzit to it because it already had four corners,

they would attach tekhelet to it.

At that point, the attachment of the tzitzit already had the status of “making.”

And we ask:

Do we really say

that tzitzit attached when the garment was still exempt from tzitzit can be invalid because of

“you shall make, and not from something already made”? But Rabbi Zeira said: If one attached

an additional set of tzitzit

to one already attached,

meaning that he had already attached tzitzit once to the garment and now came to add another set of tzitzit to each corner, it is

valid,

even if he subsequently cut off the first tzitzit. In such a case, the second tzitzit that now remain have no act of making associated with them, since the garment had already been exempted through the first tzitzit. Nevertheless, they are not invalidated as “something already made.” This is difficult!

And we answer:

Rava said: In the case of “you shall not add,” he stands

while making the second tzitzit; therefore,

“there was no act”

since, by making the second tzitzit, he violated the prohibition of “you shall not add,” there is no status of “making” at all in their attachment . Then, when he cuts off the first ones, that cutting is considered the “making” of the second tzitzit, and this is not called “something already made.” But in the case of a garment with three corners to which he attached tzitzit and which he afterward made into a garment with four corners, the attachment of the tzitzit is considered “making.” Therefore, when the garment subsequently becomes obligated, the tzitzit are considered “something already made,” and are invalid.

Rav Pappa objected to this: From where

do we know that the person intends to add? How do we know that the one attaching tzitzit a second time intends to add to what the Torah commanded, thereby violating “you shall not add,” and that consequently his act has no status of “making” at all?

Perhaps he intends to nullify

the first tzitzit: perhaps the person attaching them intends, through this act, to nullify the first tzitzit, with the intention of removing them afterward and now “making” other tzitzit in their place for the sake of the mitzva of tzitzit. In that case,

there is no “you shall not add,”

but

there is an act!

It is making while exempt, as in the case of a garment with three corners. If so, this proves that there is no invalidity of “you shall make, and not from something already made” when the garment is exempt from making those tzitzit!

Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Matana said that Shmuel said:

Threads of

tekhelet,

made of wool and attached to a garment together with white linen threads,

do not involve

the prohibition of

shaatnez ,

even

if he attached them

to a garment

that is

exempt

from the obligation of tzitzit. And we inquire:

What is meant by “an exempt garment”?

Which garment is being discussed?

If you say that it lacks the required measure,

and we say that there is no prohibition of shaatnez even if he inserts wool and linen into a garment smaller than the required measure, we learned the opposite: if it lacks the measure for the obligation, it is nevertheless subject to the prohibition of shaatnez. For we learned: