Menachot 19a — the Talmud in English

“The sons of Aaron ![](pamud.bmp "

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the priests”

this

is expounded before it and after it

that is, both “and he shall pour,” which is written before it, and “and he shall take a handful,” which is written after it, shall be performed by priests.

And we raised it

and

if

does Rabbi Shimon hold: “A verse is expounded before it and after it”?

But it was taught:

It is written: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger and place it upon the horns of the altar,” and we expound: “

with his finger—

he shall take,”

meaning that the word “with his finger” applies to what is written at the beginning of the verse, “and he shall take,” and this

teaches that the receiving

of the blood [which is the meaning of “and he shall take”]

shall only be with the right hand,

that is, “with his finger,” for wherever “finger” is stated, it is only the right [hand].

We further expound: “

with his finger—

and he shall place,”

meaning that the word “with his finger” applies to what is written after it, “and he shall place,” and this

teaches that the placing

upon the horns of the altar

shall only be with the right [hand].

Rabbi Shimon said: But is “hand” stated

that is, “finger”

with regard to receiving?

For this “with his finger” applies to “and he shall place,” and not to “and he shall take.”

And since “hand” was not stated

with regard to receiving,

therefore

if he received with the left [hand], it is valid.

And

to explain the basis of their dispute,

Abaye said: They disagree concerning “a verse is expounded before it and after it,”

the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon: according to the Rabbis, they expound “with his finger” also before it, that is, with regard to “and he shall take”; whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that it is expounded after it, that is, with regard to “and he shall place,” but before it, with regard to “and he shall take,” it is not expounded.

And if so, since Rabbi Shimon did not hold that a verse is expounded before it, why does he hold that pouring by a non-priest is invalid?

And we answer:

Rather,

Rabbi Shimon does not hold that a verse is expounded before it; and regarding the pouring that is invalid when performed by a non-priest,

this is Rabbi Shimon’s reason:

because it is written, “

And he shall bring it

to the sons of Aaron, the priests,” and we expound: the

vav

in the word “and he shall bring it”

adds to the first matter,

which is “and he shall pour,” written above it, to say that the pouring, too, is performed by a priest. 25 .

And we challenge this:

And does Rabbi Shimon hold that a vav adds to the first matter? If so,

that which is written,

“And he shall slaughter the son of the cattle, and the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall bring the blood and they shall sprinkle the blood,”

and from the fact that the word “the priests” relates to what is written after it, “and they shall bring,” that is, receiving the blood, we learn that only

from receiving onward is there a mitzva of priesthood—

this teaches concerning

slaughtering, that it is valid when performed by a non-priest!

And

if

you say that

with regard to Rabbi Shimon

it is his view that

a vav adds to the first matter,

then let us say that the vav of “and they shall bring” adds to “and he shall slaughter,” and

slaughtering—

likewise, shall it be invalid when performed by a non-priest?!

But it is an established halakha that slaughtering is valid when performed by a non-priest.

And we answer:

The case there is different, for the verse says, “And he shall place his hand—

and he shall slaughter.”

The verse juxtaposed them to say:

Just as placing of the hands is by non-priests,

for the owners place their hands,

so, too, slaughtering is by non-priests.

And we challenge this:

If

so, since we expound “and he shall place his hand and he shall slaughter,” let us also expound for this law:

Just as placing of the hands is by the owners, so, too, slaughtering is by the owners

only?

And we answer:

That

which would require slaughtering by the owners specifically,

you cannot say,

for it is a

kal va-chomer:

it is one,

and if sprinkling, which is the principal element of atonement,

is

not requiring the owners,

for the priests perform the sprinkling,

then slaughtering, which is not the principal element of atonement, all the more so

does not need to be performed by the owners specifically. 26 .

And if you would say: We do not derive

slaughtering that

can

be performed by the owners

from

sprinkling,

which cannot

be performed by the owners, for the priests sprinkle the blood—and nevertheless let us derive slaughtering from placing of the hands, which must be by the owners?

And we answer: from the fact that

the Torah explicitly stated on Yom Kippur,

concerning the slaughtering of Aaron’s bull, that it requires the owner specifically, as it is written,

“And he shall slaughter the bull of the sin-offering that is his,”

we learn from this

by inference that ordinary slaughtering,

with regard to other offerings,

does not require the owners!

Rav said: Wherever “Torah” and “statute” are stated, it is only to make it an impediment!

It might enter your mind that two

of them, meaning that both should be written,

are required

by Rav so that we should derive from this that it is an impediment,

as it is written, “This is the statute of the Torah”;

but if only “Torah” or only “statute” is written, it is not an impediment.

And we raised it:

But concerning a nazirite, only “Torah” is written,

as it is written, “concerning the Torah of his naziriteship,”

and Rav said: The waving with regard to a nazirite is an impediment,

even though with regard to other offerings requiring waving, the waving is not an impediment. Necessarily, this is because “Torah” is written with regard to a nazirite, even though “statute” is not written?

And we answer:

The case there is different; since it is written, “So shall he do

concerning the Torah of his naziriteship,”

it is considered as though “statute” were written with regard to it!

And in truth, both “Torah” and “statute” are required to make it an impediment.

And we challenge this:

But concerning a thanksgiving-offering, only “Torah” is written,

as it is written, “And this is the law of … if he offers it for a thanksgiving-offering,”

and we learned: Four kinds

of loaves

that

come with a

thanksgiving-offering are an impediment to one another,

for if one kind is missing, he may not bring the others. Thus, from “Torah” alone we learn that it is an impediment, and this is difficult for Rav, who requires both?

And we answer:

The case of a thanksgiving-offering is different, for it was juxtaposed to a nazirite, as it is written, “Upon the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings,” and the Master said: “His peace-offerings”

is superfluous

to include the peace-offerings of a nazirite,

whose law is like that of a thanksgiving-offering. Thus, the thanksgiving-offering and the nazirite were juxtaposed in the verse; and just as an impediment is written with regard to a nazirite, as we said above, so too with regard to a thanksgiving-offering.

And furthermore we refute:

But concerning one afflicted with scale-disease, only “Torah” is written,

as it is written, “And this shall be the Torah of one afflicted with scale-disease,”

and we learned: The four kinds that are with one afflicted with scale-disease

—cedar wood, hyssop, crimson wool, and birds, which come for the purification of one afflicted with scale-disease—

are an impediment to one another?!

And we answer:

The case there is different; since it is written, “This shall be the Torah of one afflicted with scale-disease,” it is considered as though “statute” were written with regard to it!

For “shall be” indicates an impediment.

And furthermore we refute:

But concerning Yom Kippur, only “statute” is written,

as it is written, “And it shall be for you an eternal statute,”

and we learned: The two goats of Yom Kippur

for which lots are cast, one for the Lord and one for Azazel,

are an impediment to one another?

And we answer:

Rather,

this is what Rav meant to say: wherever

either “Torah” or “statute”

is stated, it is only to make it an impediment.

And we challenge this:

But the rest of

all the

offerings, with regard to which “Torah” is written,

as it is written, “This is the Torah for the burnt-offering and for the meal-offering,” and so on,

and

there are matters among them that

are not impediments?

And we answer: if

“Torah” is written, it requires

that

“statute”

also be written in order that we should derive an impediment,

and [

but ]

“statute” does not require “Torah”;

rather, from “statute” alone we derive an impediment.

And we challenge this:

But Rav said “Torah” and “statute,”

which implies that the two are equal?

And we answer:

This is what

Rav said:

Even though “Torah” is written, if “statute” is written, it is

an impediment,

but if it is not,

it is not

an impediment!

And we challenge this:

But concerning a meal-offering, “statute” is written,

as it is written, “Every male among the sons of Aaron shall eat it; an eternal statute,”

and Rav said: Every place

every law

that the verse repeated [

from the language of repetition ]

in the verse

in the portion of Tzav

in the Torah of the meal-offering,

what had already been stated in the portion of Vayikra,

is only to make it an impediment!

And it implies from this:

if it repeated, yes; if it did not

repeat, it is not

an impediment in a meal-offering, even though “statute” is written with regard to the meal-offering?

And we answer:

The case there is different, for when “statute” is written

with regard to a meal-offering,

it is written with regard to eating,

as it is stated, “Every male among the sons of Aaron shall eat it; an eternal statute.” And since eating is not an impediment, necessarily what is written “statute” with regard to a meal-offering does not indicate an impediment.

And we challenge this:

But concerning the showbread, when

there is written with

regard to it “statute,” it is written with regard to eating,

as it is written, “And they shall eat it in a holy place … an eternal statute,” and so on,

and

nevertheless

we learned: The two arrangements

of showbread, six loaves for each one,

are an impediment to one another. The two bowls

of frankincense placed upon the two arrangements

are an impediment to one another. The arrangements and the bowls are an impediment to one another?!

And we answer:

Rather, wherever “statute” is written,

even though it is written only

with regard to eating,

we say:

it is written with regard to the entire matter,

and we derive an impediment from it. Nevertheless, the difficulty from a meal-offering is not difficult, for

the case there is different,

with regard to a meal-offering,

for the verse says, “of its flour and of its oil,”

and from the superfluous hei, for it could have written “of flour and of oil,” we derive with regard to this that if any amount of its flour or its oil is lacking, it is invalid; and since it was necessary to write an impediment concerning this law,

The two goats of the Day of Atonement

that we learned in the Mishna

invalidate one another

is learned from the fact that it is written concerning them

“a statute,”

which implies invalidation. [As Rav said above, on page 19a: wherever “a statute” is written, it is only to invalidate].

The two sheep of Shavuot invalidate one another

is learned from the fact that the language

“shall be”

is written concerning them, for it is written: “They shall be holy to the Lord for the priest,” and “shall be” implies that this is an invalidating requirement.

The two loaves

invalidate one another; this is learned from the fact that the language

“shall be”

is written concerning them, for it is written: “They shall be fine flour.”

The two arrangements

invalidate one another; this is learned from the fact that it is written concerning them

“a statute.”

The two bowls

invalidate one another; this is learned from the fact that it is written concerning them

“a statute.”

The arrangements and the bowls

invalidate one another; this is learned from the fact that it is written concerning them

“a statute.”

The two kinds that are in the Nazirite

invalidate one another; this is learned from

for it is written

in the section of the Nazirite

“so shall he do,”

which implies invalidation.

Three

kinds

that are in the red cow

invalidate one another; this is learned from the fact that it is written concerning them

“a statute.”

Four

breads

that are in the thanksgiving-offering

invalidate one another; this is learned from the fact that

thanksgiving was juxtaposed

to the Nazirite-offering,

as it is written: “upon the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings,” and the master said: “his peace-offerings”

is superfluous

to include the peace-offerings of a Nazirite,

whose law is like that of the thanksgiving-offering with regard to the measure of the fine flour and oil in the bread that the Nazirite brings; and since the Nazirite-offering was juxtaposed to the thanksgiving-offering, its law is like that of the thanksgiving-offering also with regard to invalidation.

And four

kinds

that are in the leper

invalidate one another; this is learned from

that which is written: “This shall be the law of the leper,”

and “shall be” implies invalidation.

And four

kinds

that are in the lulav

invalidate one another; this is learned from the fact that it is written concerning them

“and you shall take,”

and we expound: that there shall be

a complete taking

[a whole one], that he should take all four of them together 164 .

so that he takes all four together. 164 .

Rav Hanan bar Rava said: They taught that

the four kinds that are in the lulav invalidate one another

only when he does not have

all four kinds, and then he does not fulfill his obligation, since he did not take all of them.

But if he has

the four kinds and took them together, only he did not bind them in one binding,

they do not invalidate

one another, and he has fulfilled his obligation 165 .

They raise an objection from a source:

It was taught in a beraita:

The four kinds that are in the lulav: two of them

the etrog and the lulav

produce fruit, and two of them

the myrtle and the willow

do not produce fruit. Those that produce fruit shall require those that do not produce fruit, and those that do not produce fruit shall require those that produce fruit; and a person does not fulfill his obligation with them until all of them are in one binding

[apart from the etrog] 166 .

And likewise Israel

even when they fast and pray, do not

have an acceptance,

for they are not answered

until they are all

in one binding,

the righteous and the wicked,

as it is stated: “He who builds His upper chambers in the heavens, and His band upon the earth He founded,”

which implies that He founded it in this manner, so that they should be in one binding.

And this is difficult for Rav Hanan, for it is explicitly stated in the beraita that with regard to the four kinds, it is an invalidating requirement that they be one binding?

And we answer: It is a dispute of

tannaim

whether the binding is an invalidating requirement.

For it was taught: A lulav, whether bound or whether it is not bound

with the two other kinds,

is valid. Rabbi Judah says: Bound is valid; not bound is invalid!

And Rav Hanan holds like the first tanna.

What is the reason of Rabbi Judah

that binding is an invalidating requirement?

He derives

this by a gzera shava:

“taking”—

“taking,”

the lulav

from the bundle of hyssop

of the Passover in Egypt, for in both of them it is said: “And you shall take”;

just as there

in the Passover in Egypt the stalks of the hyssop must be

in a bundle,

for it is said: “a bundle of hyssop,”

so here

with the lulav they must be

in a bundle.

And the Rabbis,

who hold that it is not necessary to bind the lulav with the other kinds,

do not derive

they did not receive from their teachers to derive the gzera shava of

“taking”—

“taking.”

And we raise a question concerning it:

According to whom does that which was taught [in a beraita] go: A lulav—it is a mitzva to bind it

together with the two other kinds,

and if he did not bind it, it is valid? According to whom? If according to Rabbi Judah, why is it valid if he did not bind it? If according to the Rabbis, what mitzva

is there in binding?

And we answer:

Actually, it is according to the Rabbis

it is,

and what mitzva?—

because of “This is my God and I shall glorify Him”

for this is the beauty of the mitzva when the lulav is bound.

That which we learned in the Mishna:

The seven sprinklings that are in the red cow invalidate one another

is learned from the fact that it is written in the section of the red cow

“a statute.”

The seven sprinklings upon between the staves, and upon the golden altar, and upon the curtain, invalidate one another,

from where do we derive this?

These sprinklings

of the Day of Atonement

invalidate one another; this is learned from that which

is written

concerning them

“a statute.”

And

those of the bull of the anointed priest, and of the bull for the unwitting matter of the community, and of the goats for idol worship,

from which he sprinkles upon the curtain and upon the golden altar, we learn concerning them that they invalidate,

as it was taught:

It is written concerning the bull for the unwitting matter of the community

“And he shall do to the bull as he did to the bull of the sin-offering,”

that is, as was done to the bull of the anointed priest, which is written above it.

What does

the verse

mean to teach?

To repeat the sprinklings

of the bull for the unwitting matter of the community, as though the verse repeated the order of its sprinklings, saying: