Meilah 7b — the Talmud in English

The blood of one of them was cast ,

do you not concede that just as its blood exempts its flesh from meila, so it should exempt

the flesh of its fellow from meila?! If it exempts the flesh of its fellow from meila, even though it is disqualified, it follows that it should exempt

its flesh

its own flesh, even though it went out and became disqualified.

There is no dispute in the Gemara concerning the substance of Rabbi Akiva’s proof. Rather, it concerns what he distinguishes between [the animals slaughtered] simultaneously and [those slaughtered] one after the other.

Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: [It was] a stolen response

hidden and concealed,

that Rabbi Akiva gave to that student,

Rabbi Shimon, and it can be refuted.

When he slaughtered them

simultaneously, no,

the second did not leave the status of meila, whereas when he slaughtered them

one after the other, not

did the second leave the status of meila? But

since it is disqualified,

the second is also disqualified;

what difference is there whether simultaneously, what difference whether one after the other,

just as when simultaneously the casting exempts the second, because they are considered one offering and like one body, so too when one after the other?

Reish Lakish held that the reason the second left the status of meila is that the two of them are like one body.

Rabbi Yohanan said to Reish Lakish: And you say

so?!

Did it enter your mind to say that they are like one body? But he designated the second only as a responsibility for the first; would they thereby become like one body?!

And here is proof that they are not like one body:

If he designated two

guilt-offerings as a responsibility,

so that if one of them were lost he would bring the other,

and slaughtered both of them, and preceded [ and brought first ]

and brought first

and placed

on the altar

the sacrificial portions of one of them before casting the blood of its fellow

and afterward cast the blood of its fellow—that guilt-offering whose sacrificial portions he had not placed—

do you not concede that if they went up

the sacrificial portions, those sacrificial portions whose blood had not been cast,

they should come down ?!

And

now,

if it enters your mind,

if it entered your mind to say that

it is one body, why, if they went up, should they come down? For Ulla said

The sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity that he placed before casting the blood do not come down ,

because

they became the food of the altar,

and the altar takes hold of them. And all the more so the sacrificial portions of most holy offerings that he placed before casting the blood: since they are more holy, the altar takes hold of them.

It follows that the very placing of them before the casting of the blood does not cause an obligation to bring them down. Why, then, must the sacrificial portions of the second, whose blood was not cast, actually be brought down, and why did they not become the food of the altar, according to your words that they are like one body?

And if even in the case of guilt-offerings they are not like one body, all the more so sin-offerings, which are more holy.

Rather, certainly they are two bodies, and the reason for distinguishing between simultaneously and one after the other is this: when simultaneously, and both are placed in cups, and he wishes, he casts from this one, and he wishes, he casts from that one, it follows that now, by this casting, he removes them from the status of meila. This is not so when one after the other: he has already cast the one and now receives the blood of the second; this casting does not benefit the second.

He fell silent

Reish Lakish was silent!

Rabbi Yohanan said: I have cut off the legs of the youngster

I have cut off the legs of the youngster; I refuted the words of Reish Lakish, who was younger than Rabbi Yohanan and did not know how to answer him.

MISHNA:

The Mishna comes to specify, with regard to most holy offerings and lesser holy offerings, when one commits meila with them, and likewise when one is liable for them on account of piggul, notar, and impure. The entire Mishna has already been explained in the preceding discussions.

The act

the casting

of the blood, with regard to most holy offerings,

has

a leniency

and has

a stringency, and

whereas this act of the blood performed

with regard to lesser holy offerings is entirely a stringency.

How so?

With regard to most holy offerings, before the casting of the blood, one commits meila with their sacrificial portions and with the flesh, and one is not

liable for them on account of piggul, notar, and impure.

After the casting of the blood, one commits meila with their sacrificial portions, but one does not commit meila with the flesh,

because by the casting it became permitted for the eating of the priests, and it left the category of “most holy.”

And with regard to both this and that,

the flesh and the sacrificial portions,

one is liable on account of piggul, notar, and impure.

One who eats them after the casting is liable to excision.

It follows that the act of the blood with regard to most holy offerings is a leniency,

for through the casting of the blood the flesh leaves the status of meila,

and a stringency,

to make one liable for it on account of piggul, notar, and impure.

But with regard to lesser holy offerings, all of it is a stringency,

How so?

With regard to lesser holy offerings, before the casting of the blood, one does not commit meila either with the sacrificial portions or with the flesh, and one is not liable for them on account of piggul, notar, and impure.

After the casting of the blood, one commits meila with the sacrificial portions, but one does not commit meila with the flesh.

With regard to both this and that,

the flesh and the sacrificial portions,

one is liable for it on account of piggul, notar, and impure.

It follows! The act of the blood with regard to lesser holy offerings is entirely

a stringency,

for through the casting of the blood the sacrificial portions come to the status of meila, and one becomes liable for it on account of piggul, notar, and impure.

GEMARA:

It was taught,

we learned in the first clause concerning most holy offerings: after the casting,

“one does not commit meila with the flesh.”

And it should be inferred:

it is meila that is absent,

one who eats or benefits from them does not transgress the prohibition of meila;

but the prohibition is present,

there is nevertheless a prohibition against eating it!

And

this is difficult:

why,

why is it forbidden for a priest to eat it,

for it is the property of a priest ?

For it is explicitly stated in the Torah [Leviticus 7] in several places that the priests shall eat it.

And we answer:

It is not difficult;

there is no inference to be made from this wording,

because

the tan[n]ay

used

the wording

in the first clause,

before the casting,

“one commits meila”;

therefore he

used

the wording

in the final clause,

after the casting, the wording

“one does not commit meila.”

The wording is not precise, however; rather, it is permitted for the priests to eat it.

And we challenge:

Say the final clause

“With regard to lesser holy offerings, all of it is a stringency. How so? The flesh of lesser holy offerings before the casting of the blood: one does not commit meila with them or with their sacrificial portions, and one is not liable for them on account of piggul, notar, and impure.”

“After the casting of the blood, one commits meila with their sacrificial portions, but one does not commit meila with the flesh.”

And it should be inferred:

it is meila that is absent,

one who eats or benefits from them after the casting of the blood does not transgress the prohibition of meila;

but the prohibition is present,

whereas if an Israelite eats them, he transgresses a prohibition!

And why? Is it not the property of the owners!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Hanina said:

Indeed, it is necessary to infer this from the Mishna, and the meat is forbidden for consumption, because the Mishna is speaking

of what went outside,

with regard to most sacred offerings and offerings of lesser sanctity whose meat went outside before the sprinkling, and he sprinkled their blood,

and

the Mishna of

Rabbi Akiva is .

And when

Rabbi Akiva said, “The sprinkling is effective for what went outside,”

he said this only with regard to the laws taught in our Mishna: removal and bringing in with regard to meila, and liability for piggul, notar, and impurity,

whereas

for

the law of

burning,

the sprinkling is not effective.