Meilah 7b (ז:) — the Talmud in English

The blood of one of them was sprinkled ,

do you not concede that just as its blood exempts its flesh from me'ila, so it should exempt

the flesh of its fellow from me'ila?! If the flesh of its fellow is exempt from me'ila, even though it is disqualified, it follows that it should exempt

its flesh

its own flesh, even though it left and became disqualified.

There is no dispute in the Gemara concerning the substance of Rabbi Akiva’s proof. Rather, the issue concerns his distinction between the case where they were slaughtered simultaneously and the case where they were slaughtered one after the other.

Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: “Rabbi Akiva gave that student a contrived answer,”

a concealed and covered answer,

to that student,

Rabbi Shimon, and it can be refuted:

When he slaughtered them

simultaneously, it is not so—

the second one did not leave the status of me'ila; whereas when he slaughtered them

one after the other, it is not so—

the second one did not leave the status of me'ila. But

since it is disqualified,

the second one is disqualified;

what difference is there whether they were slaughtered simultaneously or one after the other?

Just as, when they were slaughtered simultaneously, the sprinkling is effective for the second one, because they are considered one offering and one body, so too when they were slaughtered one after the other.

Reish Lakish understood that the reason the second one leaves the status of me'ila is that the two of them are considered one body.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: “And do you say

so?!”

Did it enter your mind to say that they are one body? The second one was designated only as a substitute for the first in the event of its loss; would they thereby become one body?!

And there is proof that they are not one body:

If he designated two

guilt-offerings as substitutes,

so that if one of them were lost he would bring the other,

and he slaughtered both of them, and proceeded

and preceded

and placed

on the altar

the sacrificial portions of one of them before the blood of its fellow was sprinkled,

and afterward he sprinkled the blood of its fellow, that guilt-offering whose sacrificial portions he had not placed,

do you not concede that if they were placed

the sacrificial portions—the very portions whose blood had not been sprinkled—

they must be removed ?!

And

now,

if it enters your mind

if you would say that

it is one body, why, if they were placed, must they be removed? Ulla said:

The sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity that he placed before the sprinkling of their blood need not be removed,

because

they become the altar’s bread,

and the altar retains them. All the more so, the sacrificial portions of offerings of most sacred sanctity that he placed before the sprinkling of their blood, being more sacred, are retained by the altar.

It follows that the mere fact that they were placed before the sprinkling of the blood does not cause them to be subject to removal. Why, then, according to your view that they are one body, must the sacrificial portions of the second one, whose blood was not sprinkled, actually be removed? Why did they not become the altar’s bread?

And if even guilt-offerings are not one body, all the more so sin-offerings, which possess greater sanctity.

Rather, they are certainly two bodies. The reason for distinguishing between the case of simultaneous slaughter and that of slaughter one after the other is as follows: when they were slaughtered simultaneously, and both are lying in bowls, and he may sprinkle from this one or he may sprinkle from that one, it emerges that this sprinkling now removes them from the status of me'ila. In the case of slaughter one after the other, however, he has already sprinkled the first one and is now receiving the blood of the second; this sprinkling is not effective for the second one.

Reish Lakish fell silent.

Reish Lakish was silent!

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “I have cut off the legs of the young one”;

I have cut off the legs of the young man—I refuted the words of Reish Lakish, who was younger than Rabbi Yoḥanan and did not know how to answer him.

Mishna:

The Mishna comes to detail, with regard to offerings of most sacred sanctity and offerings of lesser sanctity, when me'ila applies to them, and likewise when one is liable for them on account of piggul, notar, and tamei. The entire Mishna has already been explained in the preceding sugyot.

The act

of sprinkling

the blood, in offerings of most sacred sanctity,

contains

a leniency

and contains

a stringency, and

whereas the act involving the blood

in offerings of lesser sanctity is entirely a stringency.

How so?

Before the sprinkling of the blood, me'ila applies to the sacrificial portions and to the flesh of offerings of most sacred sanctity, and

one is not liable for them on account of piggul, notar, or tamei.

After the sprinkling of the blood, me'ila applies to the sacrificial portions, but me'ila does not apply to the flesh,

because through the sprinkling it became permitted for consumption by the priests and left the category of “the sacred property of the Lord.”

With regard to both this and that,

the flesh and the sacrificial portions,

one is liable on account of piggul, notar, and tamei.

One who eats them after the sprinkling is liable to karet.

It follows that the act involving the blood in offerings of most sacred sanctity is a leniency,

for through the sprinkling of the blood the flesh leaves the status of me'ila,

and a stringency,

for it renders one liable for it on account of piggul, notar, and tamei.

But with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, it is entirely a stringency,

How so?

Before the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity, me'ila does not apply either to the sacrificial portions or to the flesh, and one is not liable for them on account of piggul, notar, or tamei.

After the sprinkling of the blood, me'ila applies to the sacrificial portions, but me'ila does not apply to the flesh.

With regard to both this and that,

the flesh and the sacrificial portions,

one is liable for it on account of piggul, notar, and tamei.

It follows! The act involving the blood in offerings of lesser sanctity is entirely

a stringency,

because through the sprinkling of the blood the sacrificial portions become subject to me'ila, and one becomes liable for them on account of piggul, notar, and tamei.

Gemara:

It was taught:

We learned in the first clause, with regard to offerings of most sacred sanctity: after the sprinkling, “

me'ila does not apply to the flesh.”

And it may be inferred:

it is me'ila that does not apply,

so that one who eats or derives benefit from it does not violate the prohibition of me'ila;

but there is a prohibition,

meaning that there is nevertheless a prohibition against eating it!

And

this is difficult:

why,

why is it forbidden for a priest to eat it?

Is it not the priest’s property?

The Torah explicitly states [Leviticus 7] in several places that the priests are to eat it.

And we answer:

It is not difficult;

one cannot infer this from the wording

because

the

tanna

used

in the first clause,

before the sprinkling, the expression

“me'ila applies,”

and therefore

used

in the

final clause,

after the sprinkling, the expression

“me'ila does not apply.”

The wording is not exact; rather, it is permitted for the priests to eat it.

And we challenge this:

Come and hear the final clause

“With regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, it is entirely a stringency. How so? Before the sprinkling of the blood, me'ila does not apply to the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity or to their sacrificial portions, and one is not liable for them on account of piggul, notar, or tamei.

After the sprinkling of the blood, me'ila applies to their sacrificial portions, but ‘me'ila does not apply to the flesh.’”

And it may be inferred:

it is me'ila that does not apply,

so that one who eats or derives benefit from them after the sprinkling of the blood does not violate the prohibition of me'ila;

but there is a prohibition,

whereas if an Israelite eats them, he violates a prohibition!

And why? Is it not the owners’ property?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Ḥanina said:

Indeed, this should be inferred from the Mishna, and the meat is forbidden for consumption, because the Mishna is speaking of

that which went out—

in the case of kodshei kodashim and kodashim kalim whose meat went outside before the zerika, and he sprinkled their blood—

and

the Mishna of

Rabbi Akiva it is [on the previous page].

But when

Rabbi Akiva said, “The sprinkling is effective for that which went out,”

he said this only with regard to the laws taught in our Mishna: taking out and bringing in with regard to me'ila, and liability for piggul, notar, and tamei,

whereas

for

the law of

burning,

the sprinkling is not effective.