Meilah 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

The beraita brings an additional derivation that “betrayal” means “alteration”:

And it says ,

with regard to idolatry [I Chronicles 5]: “

They betrayed the God of

their

ancestors and went astray after the gods of the peoples of the land.”

That is, from the sota we learn the prohibition against deriving “benefit” from sacred property, just as the sota derives benefit from the transgression. “

Benefit” of this kind, which is prohibited from sacred property, applies even without damage. Just as the transgression of the sota is without damage, so deriving “benefit” from sacred property is prohibited.

This meila applies even when the consecrated object was not removed from the domain of sacred property—for example, when a Temple treasurer derives benefit from sacred property.

From idolatry we learn meila through alteration of the “domain” of sacred property, even without deriving benefit. For example, one takes consecrated money and converts it to ordinary use, without deriving benefit from the money itself, but from the object purchased with the money. Or, for example, he gives an object of sacred property to another person. Just as one who worships idols changes himself from the domain of the Holy One, blessed be He, and from His service to the domain of the idols, even without benefit,

the beraita continues:

I might

say that if he

derived benefit but did not damage ,

he should be liable.

That is, although we learned from the sota to impose liability for benefit without damage, as explained, nevertheless one might say that the Torah’s principal concern in the case of a sota is the benefit itself, whether accompanied by damage or not. And we learn meila from the sota, imposing liability for benefit even without damage. Yet in our Mishna we learned that with regard to an object that is damaged, one is not liable for the benefit until he damages it. And the beraita asks: From where do we learn to “exempt” one who derives benefit without causing damage, in the case of an object that is damaged? Likewise, I might say that if he

That is, although we learned from the sota that one is liable for benefit without damage, as explained, nevertheless one might say that the Torah’s principal concern in the case of the sota is the benefit itself, whether or not it involves damage.

damaged it but did not derive benefit,

he should be liable.

That is, if we derive the law from idolatry, one might reason and say that just as one who worships idols damages the One who hates him—the Holy One, blessed be He—and abandons His service to follow vanity,

and that wicked person derives no benefit at all from abandoning the blessed Creator,

so one who damages sacred property without deriving benefit should likewise be liable—for example, one who damages sacred property and casts it away to be lost, such as one who takes consecrated objects and throws them into fire or water, or breaks them.

That is, if we derive the law from the worship of idols, one might reason that just as one who worships idols causes damage to the One he hates, the Holy One, blessed be He, and abandons His service to follow vanity, and that wicked person derives no benefit at all from abandoning the Creator, blessed is He,

And from where do we learn to exempt one who damages sacred property?

And from where do we learn to exempt one who damages consecrated property?

And

so, I could have said that if one committed me'ila with something

attached to the ground,

he would be liable. And from where do we know that he is exempt?

And

so ,

in the case of an agent who carried out his agency

For example: If a homeowner said to his agent, “Give meat to the guests” [meaning consecrated meat], I could have said that the agent committed me'ila, as we establish with regard to all the laws of the Torah: “There is no agency for a transgression,” because the one who appointed him can say: “The words of the Master and the words of the student—which words does one heed?”

But with regard to me'ila, we learned [in the next chapter] that the homeowner committed me'ila and not the agent. And from where do we derive that me'ila is excluded from the entire Torah, so that the homeowner committed me'ila?

The beraita replies:

The verse states:

“Any person who commits a misuse of sacred property

and sins,”

and we derive it by means of a gzera shava:

“Sin” is stated with regard to teruma,

concerning a non-priest who eats teruma and profanes it [Numbers 18]: “And you shall not bear sin because of it” ,

and “sin” is stated with regard to me'ila,

to teach us:

Just as the “sin” stated with regard to teruma involves causing a defect and deriving benefit,

as it is stated [Leviticus 22] with regard to teruma: “For when he eats.” Eating is impossible without causing a defect. This teaches us that just as for eating teruma one is liable only for benefit that causes a defect, so too with regard to me'ila, one is liable only for benefit that causes a defect [in an object susceptible to being blemished].

And just as with teruma, the defect is bound up with benefit, and one who damages teruma is exempt , so too with me'ila one is liable only for a defect caused by benefit, excluding one who causes damage [when he has not removed the object from the domain of the consecrated property].

And

just as with teruma,

the one who causes the defect derives benefit,

so too with me'ila. This comes to exclude a case in which one person causes the defect and another derives the benefit .

And

just as with teruma,

the benefit is derived from the very object in which the defect is caused,

so too with me'ila. This comes to exclude a case in which one causes a defect without deriving benefit.

And

just as with teruma,

the causing of the defect and the deriving of benefit occur simultaneously,

so too with me'ila. This comes to exclude a case in which one causes the defect now and derives benefit tomorrow, because the defect and the benefit do not combine, even when they are experienced by the same person and involve the same object .

And

just as teruma applies specifically

to something detached from the ground,

since teruma applies only to something detached, from the time it is called “grain,” as it is stated [Deuteronomy 18]: “The first of your grain,” so too me'ila applies only to something detached .

And

just as the law of teruma applies

in the case of an agent who carried out his agency,

when the homeowner instructed him to separate teruma, he is considered as though the homeowner himself separated it, and his teruma is valid, as we derive from what is stated [Numbers 18]: “So shall you also raise it.” So too with me'ila, when the agent carried out his agency, the homeowner committed me'ila .

The “sin” stated with regard to me'ila likewise involves causing a defect and deriving benefit; the one who causes the defect derives benefit; the benefit is derived from the object in which the defect is caused; the causing of the defect and the deriving of benefit occur simultaneously; it applies to something detached from the ground; and it applies in the case of an agent who carried out his agency,

as explained.

The beraita continues [according to one reading ]:

If me'ila is derived from teruma,

I have a derivation

that establishes liability

only for one who eats and derives benefit,

when the eater himself derives benefit. But

when he eats part and another eats part, from where

do we have a derivation establishing liability when he took food worth a peruta, ate half of it himself, and fed the other half to his fellow, whereas we learned in the next Mishna that he, and not his fellow, committed me'ila. [The continuation of the beraita will be explained]. [

Another reading ]:

If me'ila is derived from teruma,

I have a derivation

that establishes liability

only for one who eats,

just as with teruma it is stated: “And any person who eats”;

one who derives benefit

but does not eat,

from where do we know

that he is liable? And likewise,

his eating and his fellow's eating ,

as stated above, or

his deriving benefit

[his benefit]

and his fellow's deriving benefit ,

or

his deriving benefit and his fellow's eating,

or

his eating and his fellow's deriving benefit.

That

all these

combine with one another even over a very long period of time,

such as: one on the morning and the other in the evening,

from where?

And the beraita responds:

The verse states: “

He shall commit a trespass,”

and we expound: “trespass”

in every case, even by means of combining. [And according to the second reading, we also include deriving benefit from an item in which there is no deterioration].

And the beraita continues:

If,

if me'ila is derived from teruma, then it would be possible to say:

Just as the sin stated with regard to teruma does not combine two acts of eating as one,

if one ate half the measure for which one is liable to pay the principal and an additional fifth for eating teruma ,

and the other half on the following day, he is not liable,

And we would derive from teruma that

even the sin stated with regard to me'ila does not combine two acts of eating as one,

from where

to include

one who ate

half the measure of me'ila

today, and ate

the other half

on

not specifically the following day, but

even over a very long period of time ?

And the beraita responds:

The verse states: “

He shall commit a trespass,”

to include a trespass

in every case.

And the beraita continues:

If,

if me'ila is derived from teruma, then it would be possible to say:

Just as the sin stated with regard to teruma,

when one ate the teruma,

its deterioration and his benefit occur simultaneously,

when he eats and benefits, the teruma is diminished, and he is both the beneficiary and the one who causes the deterioration,

so too, the sin stated with regard to me'ila entails deterioration and benefit occurring simultaneously ,

from where

to include

his eating and his fellow's eating,

which combine, and combine even over a very long period of time,

even from now until three years [hence]?

The verse states: “

He shall commit a trespass,”

and we expound: to include a trespass

in every case.