Meilah 15a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

Every

sacrificial offering combines with another for meila.

A person who derives benefit from two types of sacrificial offerings, for example, from a sin-offering and from a guilt-offering, in a manner that he derived benefit from this one in the amount of half a peruta, and from that one in the amount of half a peruta, combine together to the measure of a peruta, which is the measure of meila, and he is liable for the principal, a fifth, and a guilt-offering. And they likewise combine to make one liable for them on account of piggul, if he ate half an olive-bulk of piggul from one offering and half an olive-bulk of piggul from another offering . And they likewise combine for

remaining and impure.

And below [17b] it will be explained that piggul, remaining, and impure combine with one another.

to make one liable on account of piggul,

if he ate half an olive-bulk of piggul from one offering and half an olive-bulk of piggul from another offering

Consecrated property for Temple maintenance combines with itself for meila,

to the measure of a peruta. Sacrificial offerings and consecrated property for Temple maintenance combine with one another for meila. If he derived benefit in the measure of half a peruta from sacrificial offerings and half a peruta from consecrated property for Temple maintenance, he has committed meila. Since everything is one designation, “consecrated property.” Gemara: The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the repetition of the wording of the Mishna. Now one might say, since the Mishna says in the latter clause: “Sacrificial offerings and consecrated property for Temple maintenance,” they combine, even though this is bodily sanctity and that is sanctity of monetary value, and they are not truly one sanctity, and even so, they combine with one another, since both are called “consecrated property.” If so, sacrificial offerings with sacrificial offerings—is it necessary to state it?! Did the Mishna need to inform us that they combine !? And we answer: Indeed, the Mishna did not need to inform us that sacrificial offerings combine with sacrificial offerings for the measure of meila. Rather,

remaining sacrificial meat and ritually impure meat.

The Gemara below [17b] will explain that piggul, remaining sacrificial meat, and ritually impure meat combine with one another.

Property consecrated for Temple maintenance combines with itself with regard to misuse of consecrated property,

to reach the value of one peruta.

Sacrificial offerings and property consecrated for Temple maintenance

combine with one another with regard to misuse of consecrated property.

If one derived benefit worth half a peruta from sacrificial offerings and half a peruta from property consecrated for Temple maintenance, he has misused consecrated property, because everything has one designation: “consecrated property.”[ ^6]

because it teaches concerning it,

concerning sacrificial offerings, that they combine

to make one liable for them on account of piggul, remaining, and impure,

and this law the Mishna did need to inform us, since

consecrated property for Temple maintenance

does not

have piggul, remaining, or impurity apply to it,

for that reason it divided them,

placing them in the first clause and the latter clause. In the first clause the Mishna teaches the law of combination with regard to piggul, remaining, and impurity, and incidentally the Mishna also teaches the law of combination with regard to meila. And since it taught the law of sacrificial offerings separately, it taught the law of consecrated property for Temple maintenance separately.

And finally the Mishna innovated that even sacrificial offerings with consecrated property for Temple maintenance combine.

We learned in the Mishna: Sacrificial offerings combine with one another for meila. Rabbi Yannai said: It is clear, it is a clear matter that one is liable on account of meila only for consecrated property for Temple maintenance . What is the reason? For the verse says [Leviticus 5], “ When a person commits a trespass and sins inadvertently from the consecrated property of the Lord.” And we expound: consecrated property distinguished for the Lord, which is consecrated property for Temple maintenance, because it is all His, there is meila with them.

Did the Mishna have to teach us that they combine!? And we answer: indeed, the Mishna did not need to teach that sacrificial offerings combine with sacrificial offerings to reach the amount for misuse. Rather,

because it teaches in addition,

concerning sacrificial offerings, that they combine

to make one liable on account of piggul, remaining sacrificial meat, and ritually impure meat,

the Mishna needed to teach this law. Since

property consecrated for Temple maintenance

does not

have the laws of piggul, remaining sacrificial meat, and ritual impurity,

that is why it separated them

into a first clause and a latter clause. In the first clause, the Mishna teaches the law of combining with regard to piggul, remaining sacrificial meat, and ritual impurity, and incidentally it also teaches the law of combining with regard to misuse. Since it taught the law of sacrificial offerings separately, it taught the law of property consecrated for Temple maintenance separately. Finally, the Mishna innovates that even sacrificial offerings and property consecrated for Temple maintenance combine.

But sacrificial offerings,

such as a sin-offering and a guilt-offering,

there is in them

a portion

for the priests, and the other offerings, there is in them a portion for the owners, and they are not entirely “for the Lord”; therefore there is no meila with them. The Gemara understood Rabbi Yannai’s words literally, that there is no meila at all with sacrificial offerings. Therefore the Gemara brings several Mishnayot, a beraita, and statements of amoraim to refute his words. We learned in our Mishna: Sacrificial offerings combine with one another for meila. And it is proven that one commits meila with sacrificial offerings. And this is difficult for Rabbi Yannai’s words? And we answer: Indeed, there is no meila with them by Torah law, and what the Mishna said, that there is meila with them, means:

rabbinic meila.

And we raise an objection from what we learned [at the beginning of the tractate]:

With most holy offerings that one slaughtered in the south, one commits meila with them.

It is proven that one commits meila with sacrificial offerings. And this is difficult for Rabbi Yannai’s words?

And we answer:

Here too,

one commits meila

rabbinically.

And we raise an objection:

We learned,

we learned [in the next chapter]:

One who derives benefit from a sin-offering, while it is alive, has not committed meila until he blemishes it; while it is dead, once he derives any benefit, he has committed meila [and it will be explained there]. And it is proven that one commits meila with a sin-offering, and it is a sacrificial offering. And this is difficult for Rabbi Yannai’s words? And we answer:

rabbinically.

and the other offerings

have

And we raise an objection:

And by Torah law, not?

Is it the case that one does not commit meila with sacrificial offerings by Torah law?!

But it was taught, did we not learn in a beraita: Rabbi says:

The Torah said [Leviticus 3], “

Every fat portion is for the Lord,” and we expound:

to include the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity for meila. Here it is shown that one commits meila by Torah law even with the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity. And this is difficult for Rabbi Yannai’s words?

This proves that there is liability for misuse of sacrificial offerings. This is a difficulty against Rabbi Yannai’s words.

And we answer: indeed, there is no liability for them by Torah law. What the Mishna said, that there is liability for misuse, means liability

And we answer:

rabbinically.

And we raise an objection:

But he bases it on a verse!

For Rabbi derives this from the exposition of the verse, and how is it possible to say that it is rabbinic?

And we answer: Indeed, the meila is rabbinic, and the exposition of the verse is

merely an asmachta; the Sages supported their words with expositions of the verse, but nevertheless one does not commit meila by Torah law.

And we raise an objection:

But Ulla said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Offerings that died have exited from the law of meila by Torah law .

And it implies that while they are alive they have meila by Torah law?

And the questioner explains Rabbi Yohanan’s words:

With what,

with which consecrated offerings did Rabbi Yohanan say that when they died they exited from the law of meila?

If you say,

if you say:

with consecrated property for Temple maintenance, it is impossible to say this, for even when they died, also,

why should they have exited from the law of meila?

It is no more than one who consecrated a refuse heap,

in what way is its law different from one who consecrates a refuse heap?

If he consecrated a refuse heap for Temple maintenance

would it

not—does it not have meila?!

And why should they have exited from the law of meila upon their death?

“All fat is for the Lord,”

and we derive:

to include the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity with regard to misuse of consecrated property. This proves that there is liability by Torah law even for the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity. This is a difficulty against Rabbi Yannai’s words.

And we answer:

by rabbinic law.

We challenge this:

But he uses the verse as the basis for it!

Rabbi derives this from an interpretation of the verse; how can it be said that the liability is only rabbinic?

And we answer: indeed, the liability for misuse is rabbinic, and the interpretation of the verse is

merely a supporting reference. The Sages based their words on interpretations of verses, but nevertheless there is no liability by Torah law.

We challenge this:

But Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “Offerings that died are no longer subject to misuse by Torah law” .

This implies that while they were alive, there was liability for their misuse by Torah law.

The questioner explains Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

With regard to what,

which offerings did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that upon their death they cease to be subject to misuse?

If you say,

if you propose:

property consecrated for Temple maintenance,

that cannot be said, because

even when they died as well,

why should they cease to be subject to misuse?

It is no different from one who consecrated a refuse heap;

how is its law different from that of one who consecrates a refuse heap?

If one consecrated a refuse heap for Temple maintenance,

would it

not surely have liability for misuse?

Why, then, should these offerings cease to be subject to misuse when they die?

Rather, in fact,

the words of Rabbi Yohanan concern

altar offerings,

and concerning them he said that when they died they left the realm of meila, and it is proven that as long as they had not died,

there is also a Torah-law meila liability in them .

And this is difficult: is it not proven contrary to Rabbi Yannai's words?

And we reconcile:

Rather,

certainly, Rabbi Yannai too agrees that there is a Torah-law meila liability for altar offerings. And it is expounded from what is stated, “All fat is for the Lord” ,

And this is what Rabbi Yannai's scholars say,

and thus they explained his words:

From this verse,

from this verse, “the consecrated things of the Lord,”

we learn about consecrated property for Temple maintenance,

whereas

we do not learn about altar offerings from it,

the law of meila for altar offerings is not learned from “this verse,” because they are not entirely “the consecrated things of the Lord,” since they contain a portion for the priests and a portion for the owners.

But from another verse, “All fat is for the Lord,” we expound the law of meila for altar offerings.