Megillah 27a — the Talmud in English

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the view of Rav Pappi is more plausible,

for Rabbi Joshua ben Levi also said thus.

For

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: A synagogue—

it is permitted to make it into a beit-midrash .

And we conclude:

Conclude from it.

Bar Kappara expounded: What is

this

that is written

concerning Nebuzaradan:

“And he burned the House of the Lord and the king’s house and all the houses of Jerusalem, and every great house he burned with fire”?

“The House of the Lord”—

this is the Temple.

“The king’s house”—

these are the palaces of the king.

“And all the houses of Jerusalem”—

according to their plain meaning.

And what is: “And every great house he burned with fire”?

They disagree about it,

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Joshua ben Levi.

One said: A place where Torah is made great,

that is, a beit-midrash.

And one said: A place where prayer is made great,

that is, a synagogue.

The one who says

a house where

Torah

is made great—because it is written: “The Lord was pleased, for the sake of his righteousness, to make Torah great and glorious.”

We see that with Torah the language of greatness applies.

And the one who says

a house where

prayer

is made great—because it is written

that King Jehoram said to Gehazi:

“Please recount the great things that Elisha did.” And

this

Elisha,

what

did he do [

that he revived the son of the Shunamite woman]—

through mercy [

through prayer]

is what he did ,

we see that with prayer the language of greatness applies.

It will be concluded

from the following,

that it was Rabbi Joshua ben Levi who said: A place where Torah is made great.

For Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: A synagogue—

it is permitted to make it into a beit-midrash.

We see that he holds that the beit-midrash is the great house!

And we conclude:

Conclude from it.

We learned in our Mishna:

But if they sold Torah, they may not take books, and so on.

They raised a question before them: What is the ruling on selling an old Torah scroll

in order

to take with it [

with its proceeds] a Torah scroll

new?

And this is the question they raised:

Shall we say that

since he does not improve it—

it is forbidden; or perhaps, since there is no

other

possibility of improving it further—

it is properly permitted.

Come and hear

that it is permitted to sell it in order to purchase another:

But if they sold Torah, they may not take books.

It follows that

books

specifically

are what they may not

take with the proceeds of Torah;

but

to purchase a book

of Torah with

the proceeds of a book

of Torah—

it is properly permitted!

And we reject this: There is no proof from the Mishna, for

the Mishna

speaks

after the fact,

when they have already sold the Torah scroll, and therefore they should take another book with its proceeds; for otherwise, what should they take?

But we,

when we raise the question, [raise it] initially;

we raise the question whether it is permitted to sell a Torah scroll initially, with the intention of purchasing another Torah scroll with its proceeds.

Come and hear

that it is forbidden to sell it in order to purchase another book:

They wrap a Torah scroll in the wrappings of

the

Pentateuch scrolls [

that is, a Torah scroll containing only one of the Five Books],

and

they likewise wrap

Pentateuch scrolls in the wrappings of Prophets and Writings. But they may not

wrap

Prophets and Writings in wrappings

of

Pentateuch scrolls, nor Pentateuch scrolls

in wrappings

of

a Torah scroll.

Because this lowers the wrappings from their sanctity.

In any event, it teaches: “They wrap a Torah scroll in the wrappings of Pentateuch scrolls.”

It follows:

the wrappings of Pentateuch scrolls—

yes,

because they raise the wrappings in sanctity.

But

in

the wrappings of a Torah scroll

another—

no.

We see that one does not change it to that same sanctity, but only to a sanctity above it!

Say the latter clause: “Nor Pentateuch scrolls in the wrappings of a Torah scroll.”

It follows:

but Torah with

wrappings of

Torah

another—

it is properly permitted!

Rather, from this—

there is no way to infer anything.

For it can be understood this way, and it can also be understood the opposite way.

Come and hear

that it is permitted to sell a Torah scroll in order to purchase another:

They place a Torah scroll on top of

a

Torah scroll, and

a

Torah scroll on top of Pentateuch scrolls ,

and Pentateuch scrolls—

on top of Prophets and Writings .

But they do not

place

Prophets and Writings on top of Pentateuch scrolls, nor Pentateuch scrolls—

on top of Torah .

Therefore, since it is permitted to place one Torah scroll on top of another Torah scroll, it is proved that it is permitted to sell a Torah scroll with the intention of purchasing another Torah scroll! And we reject this:

Are you speaking of placing? Placing is different, for it is impossible

otherwise.

For if you do not say so, when one rolls [

to roll] a Torah scroll—

how do we roll it? But one page sits [

a page]

on its fellow,

that is, when one rolls the scroll, one page is rolled upon another ?!

Rather,

necessarily,

since it is impossible

otherwise—

it is permitted. Here too, since it is impossible—

it is permitted.

Come and hear,

that it was explicitly stated that it is forbidden:

For Rabbah bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: A person may not sell an old Torah scroll

with the intention

of taking a new one with it.

And we reject this: This that we say

there,

that he may not sell it, is

because of negligence,

for we are concerned that in the end they will not purchase another scroll, and as a result the money will be lost.

When we speak

we

speak, for example, when it is written and lying

—the second scroll is in the scribe’s house, and is held up only because payment must be given to him

to redeem it.

In such a case,

what is the ruling?

Come and hear, for Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: They sell a Torah scroll only in order to study Torah,

that is, in order to support oneself with it while studying Torah,

and to marry a woman .

And it might enter your mind that just as it is permitted to sell it in order to study Torah, so too it is permitted in order to purchase another Torah scroll. If so,

conclude from it,

that

Torah for Torah—

it is properly permitted!

And we reject this: Perhaps specifically for these needs it is permitted to sell a Torah scroll. For it is sold for the sake of Torah study because

the study

of Torah is different, because

study leads to action .

And likewise in order to

marry a woman too

it is permitted, because it is written:

“He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited.” But Torah for Torah,

perhaps

not .

The question was not resolved.

The Sages taught: A person may not sell a Torah scroll, even though he does not need it [

because he has another scroll].

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said further: Even if he has nothing

that he can

eat, and he sells

a Torah scroll, or

he sells his

daughter

for the sake of his livelihood—

he will not

see a sign of blessing forever

from that money.

We learned in our Mishna:

And likewise with their surplus.

Rava said: They taught this only when they sold

one of these sanctities and purchased a superior sanctity—

and there was a surplus

from the money.

But

if they

collected

money from the public for a Torah scroll and purchased it,

and there was a surplus

from the money they collected—

it is permitted

to lower it for the sake of a lesser sanctity, for the money had not yet entered into a more severe sanctity, and the intention of the townspeople regarding the money had already been fulfilled .

Abaye challenged him: When does this statement apply—

when they did not stipulate

that they could do whatever they wished with the money.

But

if they

stipulated—

even for the duksusia [

it will be explained below]—

it is permitted.

What are the circumstances?

If we say that they sold

sacred objects

and there was a surplus, when they stipulated—

what difference does it make,

for these are proceeds of sanctity, and their sanctity does not depart?

Rather,

necessarily, it speaks of

collecting and there being a surplus. And

And

the reason is

that they stipulated,

and therefore it is permitted to change their use.

If they did not stipulate—

no!

But how does Rava say that when they collected and there was a surplus, it is permitted to change its use even without a stipulation?!

And we reject this: No.

In fact,

this beraita, which requires a stipulation, speaks specifically of

selling and there being a surplus.

That is what it speaks of.

And thus the tan nay says:

Tanna, a sage of the Mishnaic period, said:

When does this statement apply

that it is forbidden to change their use? When

the seven leaders of the town did not stipulate—

in the presence of the townspeople. But

if they

stipulated

the seven leaders of the town in the presence of the townspeople—

even

for the duksusia too it is permitted.

Abaye said to one of the Sages who used to arrange the Mishna before Rav Sheshet: Did Rav Sheshet’s explanation of duksusia reach you?

He said to him: Thus Rav Sheshet said: The horseman of the town.

That is, the townspeople hire a horseman for themselves, who will be ready for them to send him to the governor of the town whenever they need.

Abaye said: Therefore, that young Torah scholar who hears a matter but does not know the explanation

of the matter,

should ask it before

whoever

has Sages frequently before him. For it is impossible that he did not hear it

this matter

from a great man.

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: The townspeople who went to another town, and the people of that town assessed charity upon them

the people of that town

charity—

they give,

so that they will not suspect them of failing to give what was assessed upon them.

And when they come

to return to their town—they take from the collectors the charity that they gave in the other town, and

bring it with them, and support with it

the

poor of their town.

It was likewise taught: The townspeople who went to another town, and charity was assessed upon them—

they give. And when they come—

they bring it with them.

And

if

an individual

who went to another town, and charity was assessed upon him—

it shall be given to the poor of that town.

Rav Huna decreed a fast. Rav Hana bar Hanilai and all the people of his town came before him [

his town].

They cast [

imposed]

charity upon them —

and they gave.

When they wished to come

back to their town,

they said to him

to Rav Huna:

Let our master give it to us

those monies that we gave for charity,

and let us go and support with it

the

poor of our town.