Makkot 19a (יט.) — the Talmud in English

From when

does the sanctity of the first fruits (bikkurim) take effect for them,

from

when

one is liable for them,

so that a non-kohein who eats them incurs death at the hand of Heaven?

Once they see the face of the House.

Once they enter the azarah of the Temple.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it: In accordance with whom

meaning, in accordance with which tanna, does Rabbi Yitzḥak hold?

It is in accordance with this tanna—

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to first fruits

that

some of them are outside

the wall of the azarah,

and some of them are inside

the azarah, this is their law: The fruits

that are outside are considered non-sacred produce in every respect.

But the fruits

that are inside are considered consecrated property in every respect.

It is evident from Rabbi Eliezer’s words that the sanctity of first fruits that did not enter the azarah does not take effect. Rabbi Yitzḥak agrees with him that the liability to death for a non-kohein who eats first fruits depends on their seeing the face of the House.

Rav Sheshet said: With regard to first fruits, placing them

before the Lord

is indispensable for them.

If the mitzva of placing them before the altar was not performed, the failure to fulfill the mitzva of placing them prevents the fruits from being permitted for eating.

However,

the recitation

of the passage concerning first fruits

is not indispensable for them.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

In accordance with whom

meaning, in accordance with which tanna, does Rav Sheshet hold?

It is in accordance with this tanna—

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei says: I heard three matters

from

three elders,

[from]

and this is one of them:

The beraita before us holds that the sanctity of the Land was not nullified after the destruction of the Temple, and all the mitzvot dependent on the Land still apply. According to it, the obligation to separate second tithe still applies even after the destruction of the Temple, and its place of consumption is Jerusalem.

And Rabbi Yishmael in the beraita before us discusses whether, nowadays, one may bring the produce of second tithe to Jerusalem without redeeming it onto a coin and eat it there, or not.

Rabbi Yishmael says: Can a person bring second tithe

to Jerusalem nowadays and eat it

there without redemption

?!

And it is a logical inference,

for we can derive the matter from an animal firstborn, which cannot be brought up and eaten in Jerusalem:

For

a firstborn requires being brought to the designated place

[it must be brought to Jerusalem, to the Temple],

and

also

second tithe requires being brought to the designated place.

And we can derive the law of second tithe from that of a firstborn:

Just as a firstborn is not

eaten

except in the presence of the House

[when the Temple is standing],

so, second tithe is not

eaten without redemption

except in the presence of the House.

Perhaps you can refute this:

What is true of a firstborn? It requires the presentation of its blood and sacrificial portions on the altar,

and since a firstborn has a stringency that second tithe does not, it is impossible to derive the law of second tithe from it.

Your answer is:

First fruits prove

the point, since they do not require the presentation of blood and sacrificial portions on the altar, and nevertheless they may be eaten by kohanim only while the Temple is standing! Perhaps you can return and refute this as well: First fruits also cannot serve as a source, because

what is true of first fruits? They require placing

them before the altar, and as long as they have not been placed before the altar, there is no permission to eat them; therefore, they cannot be eaten when the Temple is not standing. Second tithe, by contrast, does not require placement before the altar.

Your answer is: It is indeed impossible to derive this through a mah matzinu inference, but it can still be derived through a juxtaposition, which cannot be refuted on the basis of a leniency or stringency— The verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God

in the place that He will choose to establish His Name there: the tithe

of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and your flocks.”

Deuteronomy 14:23]

The verse juxtaposes

this verse

second tithe with a firstborn:

Just as a firstborn is not

eaten

except in the presence of the House.

So, second tithe

also,

is not

eaten

except in the presence of the House

10 .

eaten

(The Gemara will explain below why it is more obvious with regard to a firstborn that it may not be eaten except in the presence of the House, to the extent that this can serve as the source for the law of second tithe.)

It is evident from Rabbi Yishmael’s words that he holds that recitation of the passage concerning first fruits is not indispensable. Rav Sheshet agrees with him.

The proof that Rabbi Yishmael holds this way is as follows: And if it is so

that Rabbi Yishmael holds that recitation is indispensable with regard to first fruits, why did he refute the derivation of second tithe from first fruits only on the grounds that first fruits require placement, whereas second tithe does not?

But he should have

refuted

the derivation of second tithe from first fruits on the grounds that first fruits possess two elements absent from second tithe: in addition to the stringency that they require the mitzva of placement, they also have the stringency of the mitzva of recitation.

And this is what Rabbi Yishmael should have said:

What is true of first fruits? They require

both

recitation and

also

placement;

you cannot say the same of second tithe, which requires neither recitation nor placement!

Rav Ashi said,

to reject Rav Sheshet’s proof from Rabbi Yishmael’s words that he holds that recitation of first fruits is not indispensable:

Even if Rabbi Yishmael holds that recitation of first fruits does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of bringing them, but is merely a mitzva in its own right, it is still difficult: Why did he not refute the derivation on the basis of recitation of first fruits? For

although there is no indispensability

with regard to the recitation of first fruits,

is there not a mitzva?!

And

if so, even if he holds that it is merely a mitzva and is not indispensable,

let him say: There is a mitzva

to recite concerning first fruits,

and refute

the derivation from first fruits to second tithe on this basis.

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The reason Rabbi Yishmael did not refute the derivation from first fruits on the grounds that they require recitation is not that Rabbi Yishmael holds that recitation is not indispensable with regard to first fruits. Rather, his reason is this—

Since there are “the first fruits of a convert,” who must say

at the time of recitation:

“Which the Lord swore

[he would have to say] that anyone who brings first fruits, when reading the passage, says:

to our forefathers”

(Deuteronomy 26),

and

a convert

cannot say

a convert

this, and he does not recite the passage concerning first fruits.

And since it was not certain to him

And since

(that recitation is a fixed mitzva for every person who brings first fruits), it is not possible to refute the derivation from first fruits on the grounds that they require recitation, since one can still derive the matter from the first fruits of a convert, with regard to which there is no mitzva of recitation.

And we raise an objection to Rabbi Yishmael:

Why did he accept the rejection of the derivation from first fruits and have to derive the law of second tithe from first fruits through a juxtaposition?

And let the original inference return

Let him return to the original derivation

(let the mah matzinu inference return), and let us now derive the matter from a firstborn, after there is a refutation of the derivation from first fruits; a firstborn can prove the point, since it does not require placement before the altar and nevertheless may be eaten only while the Temple is standing.

And let second tithe come

through

the common denominator,

through a derivation from the common feature of a firstborn and first fruits: both require being brought to Jerusalem and apply only while the Temple is standing.

And we answer: It is impossible to derive the law of second tithe from the common denominator of a firstborn and first fruits

because it can be refuted:

What is true of the common feature shared by them? They each have an aspect involving the altar!

A firstborn with regard to the presentation of its blood, and first fruits with regard to their placement; therefore, they may be eaten only while the Temple is standing.

You cannot say the same of second tithe, which requires nothing involving the altar. And from where would you know that it may be eaten only while the Temple is standing? Therefore, Rabbi Yishmael had to derive through a juxtaposition—which cannot be refuted on the basis of a leniency or stringency—that second tithe may be eaten in Jerusalem only while the Temple is standing.

And we raise an objection:

And what does Rabbi Yishmael hold?

Why was it obvious to him that a firstborn may be eaten only while the Temple is standing, more so than second tithe?

If he holds that the initial sanctification

of the Temple and Jerusalem

sanctified them for its time,

when the Temple was standing,

and sanctified them

also

for the future

after the destruction of the Temple, as he holds regarding the sanctity of the Land, that it was not nullified by the destruction of the Temple—and his question was whether eating second tithe in Jerusalem without a wall is considered eating “before the Lord your God” or not—and he resolved his question through a juxtaposition to a firstborn, which may not be eaten nowadays—

If so, it is difficult: Why may a firstborn not be eaten now?

For

even a firstborn as well

could be offered and eaten, since one who holds that the sanctity of the Temple continues after the destruction holds that sacrifices may be offered even though the Temple is not standing!

And

if he holds that the initial sanctification

of the Temple

sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it for the future

after the destruction of the Temple, and its sanctity was nullified, then Rabbi Yishmael’s question was whether, with regard to second tithe, since it does not need to be brought to the Temple, eating it in Jerusalem after the destruction is considered eating “before the Lord,” or not. There is still a difficulty: According to this,

even a firstborn as well—one should be uncertain about it!

He should also have been uncertain in the case of a firstborn that does not need the Temple, such as a firstborn whose blood was sprinkled before the destruction of the Temple, after which the Temple was destroyed while the sacrificial flesh still remained: May one eat it in Jerusalem, or not?

And we answer:

Ravina said: Actually, he holds

that Rabbi Yishmael holds that the sanctity of the Temple

sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it for the future

after the destruction.

And here,

where he resolved through the juxtaposition of a firstborn to second tithe that it may not be eaten in Jerusalem after the destruction, the case is

a firstborn

that does not need the Temple, and is therefore similar in this respect to second tithe, which does not need the Temple, such as when

its blood was sprinkled

before the destruction of the Temple, and the Temple was destroyed while its flesh still remained.

And the reason it was obvious to him that a firstborn may not be eaten in Jerusalem after the Temple was destroyed is that

its flesh was juxtaposed

to

its blood,

as it is stated: “Only the blood of a firstborn you shall sprinkle on the altar, and its flesh shall be yours.”

And the juxtaposition of the firstborn’s flesh to its blood teaches:

of the firstborn

to its blood,

as it is stated: “Only the blood of the firstborn you shall sprinkle on the altar, and its meat shall be yours.”

The comparison of the firstborn’s meat to its blood teaches:

What is the case with its blood?

It requires sprinkling

on the altar; all the more so, its flesh is dependent on the altar!

That is, only when it is fit for the sprinkling of the blood is the flesh permitted for consumption, but not once the altar has been destroyed.

And

after we have learned by means of a hekesh that the flesh of a bekhor is forbidden for consumption after the destruction of the Temple,

he derives

it

—the maaser from the bekhor.

And this is indeed the conclusion: The reason that, nowadays, it is forbidden to eat maaser sheni even in Jerusalem is that the altar is not standing.

And we challenge this:

Can

it be said that the flesh of the bekhor, which itself is not explicitly stated in the Torah to be forbidden for consumption when the Temple is not standing, but is merely

a matter learned by means of a hekesh

from the blood of the bekhor, will

return and teach

about maaser sheni

by means of a hekesh

that it may be eaten only when the Temple is standing?!

But we have established in Zevahim (49b) that with regard to deriving the laws of sacrificial matters, it is impossible to derive by means of a hekesh from a matter that itself is not explicit in the Torah, but is a matter learned by means of a hekesh from another source.

And we answer:

The grain tithe—

it is non-sacred produce!

And with regard to non-sacred produce, one may derive by means of a hekesh even from a matter that itself is a matter learned by means of a hekesh.