Makkot 19a — the Talmud in English

From when

does the sanctity of first fruits take effect upon them,

from

the time

that one is liable for them,

a non-priest who eats them being liable to death at the hands of Heaven?

When they see the face of the House.

When they enter the Temple courtyard.

And we inquired concerning it: In accordance with whom

does Rabbi Yitzhak hold, like which tanna?

Like this tanna—

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: First fruits

that

some of them are outside

the wall of the courtyard,

and some of them are inside

the courtyard—this is their law: The fruits

that are outside are like non-sacred produce in every respect.

And whereas the fruits

that are inside are like consecrated property in every respect.

And it is explained in the words of Rabbi Eliezer that concerning first fruits that did not enter into the courtyard, the sanctity of first fruits does not take effect upon them. And Rabbi Yitzhak holds in accordance with his words, that the liability to death of a non-priest who eats first fruits depends upon seeing the face of the House.

Rav Sheshet said: With first fruits, placing them

before the Lord

is indispensable for them.

If the mitzva of placing them before the altar was not performed, the failure to fulfill the mitzva of placing them prevents permission to eat them.

But

reciting

the passage of the first fruits

is not indispensable for them.

And we inquired concerning it:

In accordance with whom

does Rav Sheshet hold, like which tanna?

Like this tanna—

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yose says: I heard three matters

from

three

from

three elders,

and this is one of them:

The beraita before us holds that the sanctity of the Land was not nullified after the destruction of the Temple, and all the commandments dependent on the Land still remain in force. According to it, the obligation to separate second tithe still remains in force even after the destruction of the Temple, and the place of its eating is Jerusalem.

And Rabbi Yishmael in the beraita before us discusses whether, nowadays, one may bring the fruits of second tithe to Jerusalem without redeeming them onto a coin and eat them there, or not.

Rabbi Yishmael says: Can a person bring up second tithe

nowadays to Jerusalem and eat it

there without redemption?!

And it is an inference,

that we must learn from the firstborn animal, which cannot be brought up and eaten in Jerusalem:

For

a firstborn requires bringing to the designated place

[one must bring it to Jerusalem, to the Temple],

and

also

second tithe requires bringing to the designated place.

And we have to learn second tithe from the firstborn:

Just as a firstborn is not

eaten

except in the presence of the House

[when the Temple is standing],

so second tithe is not

eaten without redemption

except in the presence of the House.

Perhaps you will refute it:

What is distinctive about a firstborn? For it requires the placing of blood and sacrificial portions beside the altar,

and since a firstborn has a stringency that second tithe does not have, it is impossible to learn from it concerning second tithe.

Your answer is:

First fruits prove it,

for they do not require the placing of blood and sacrificial portions on the altar, and nevertheless they may be eaten by priests only when the Temple is standing! And perhaps you will return and refute it: It is also impossible to learn from first fruits, because

what is distinctive about first fruits? For they require placing

before the altar, and as long as they have not been placed before the altar, there is no permission to eat them, and therefore they cannot be eaten at a time when the Temple is not standing. This is unlike second tithe, which does not require placing before the altar.

Your answer is: Indeed, it is impossible to learn this through the derivation of “what we find,” but it can still be learned through a juxtaposition, against which one does not refute on the basis of leniency and stringency—

The verse says: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God

in the place that He will choose to cause His Name to dwell there: tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and your flocks.”

Deuteronomy 14:23.

The verse juxtaposes

The verse juxtaposes

this verse

second tithe to the firstborn:

eaten

Just as a firstborn is not

eaten

except before the House.

is not

So also second tithe

except in the presence of the House

is not

eaten

except before the House 10 .

[And below the Gemara will explain why it is more obvious concerning a firstborn that it is not eaten except in the presence of the House, to the extent that it is learned from it concerning second tithe].

And it is proven from the words of Rabbi Yishmael that he holds that the recitation of the passage of first fruits is not indispensable. And Rav Sheshet holds in accordance with his words.

And the proof that Rabbi Yishmael holds this way is:

And if it is so,

that Rabbi Yishmael holds that recitation is indispensable concerning first fruits, why did he refute the derivation of second tithe from first fruits only on the grounds that first fruits involve placing, whereas second tithe does not involve placing?

For he should have

refuted

the derivation of second tithe from first fruits on the grounds that first fruits have two matters that second tithe does not have: besides the stringency that they contain the mitzva of placing, they also have the stringency of the mitzva of recitation.

And this is what Rabbi Yishmael should have said:

What is distinctive about first fruits, for they require

also

recitation and

also

placing;

can you say this concerning second tithe, in which there is neither recitation nor placing?!

Rav Ashi said,

to reject Rav Sheshet’s proof from the words of Rabbi Yishmael that he holds that recitation concerning first fruits is not indispensable:

For even if Rabbi Yishmael holds that recitation concerning first fruits does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of bringing them, but is merely a mitzva, it is still difficult: Why did he not refute the argument on the basis of the recitation of first fruits? For

even though there is no indispensability

in the recitation of first fruits,

is there no mitzva?!

And

if so, it is difficult: Even if he holds that it is only a mitzva and is not indispensable,

let him say: There is a mitzva

to recite concerning first fruits,

and let him refute

on this account the derivation from first fruits to second tithe.

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The reason Rabbi Yishmael did not refute the derivation from first fruits on the grounds that they require recitation is not because Rabbi Yishmael holds that recitation is not indispensable concerning first fruits. Rather, his reason is—

Since there is the first fruit-offering of a convert, concerning which he needs to say

[it is necessary to say] that everyone who brings first fruits at the time of recitation says

“which He swore

the Lord

to our fathers”

[Deuteronomy 26].

And

a convert

is unable to say

[he cannot say] this, and he does not recite the passage of first fruits.

And since

it is not definite for him

[that recitation is not a fixed mitzva for all those who bring first fruits], it is therefore not possible to refute the derivation from first fruits on the grounds that they involve recitation, since it is still possible to learn from the first fruits of a convert, which do not involve the mitzva of recitation.

And we raise an objection against Rabbi Yishmael:

Why did he accept the rejection of the derivation from first fruits, and have to learn second tithe from first fruits by juxtaposition?

And let the original inference return

[let the inference of “what we find” return], so that it may now be learned from the firstborn, after there is a refutation of the derivation from first fruits; and the firstborn will prove it, for it does not require placing before the altar, and nevertheless it is eaten only while the Temple is standing.

And let it come

second tithe

through the common side,

through a derivation from the common side of the firstborn and first fruits, both of which require being brought to Jerusalem and apply only while the Temple is standing.

And we answer: It is impossible to learn concerning second tithe from the common side of the firstborn and first fruits,

because it can be refuted:

What is distinctive about the common side shared by them? For they have a side of the altar!

The firstborn with regard to the placing of blood, and the first fruits with regard to placing; therefore they are eaten only while the Temple is standing.

Can you say this concerning second tithe, which requires nothing at the altar? And from where do we know that it is eaten only while the Temple is standing? Therefore Rabbi Yishmael had to learn through a juxtaposition, against which there is no refutation based on leniency and stringency, the law that second tithe is eaten in Jerusalem only while the Temple is standing.

And we raise an objection:

And what does he hold

—Rabbi Yishmael? Why was it obvious to him that a firstborn is not eaten except while the Temple is standing, more than second tithe?

If he holds that the first sanctification

of the Temple and Jerusalem

sanctified for its time,

when the Temple was standing,

and sanctified

also

for the future

after the destruction of the Temple, as he holds concerning the sanctity of the Land, that it was not nullified by the destruction of the Temple—and his doubt was whether eating second tithe in Jerusalem without a wall is considered eating “before the Lord your God” or not, and he resolved his question through a juxtaposition from the firstborn, which is not eaten nowadays—

If so, it is difficult: Why is the firstborn not eaten now?

For

even a firstborn too

should be offered and eaten, since the one who holds that the sanctity of the Temple continues after the destruction holds that offerings may be offered even though the Temple is not standing!

And

if he holds that the first sanctity

of the Temple

sanctified for its time but did not sanctify for the future

after the destruction of the Temple, and its sanctity was nullified. And Rabbi Yishmael’s doubt was whether, concerning second tithe, since it need not be brought to the Temple, its eating is considered eating “before the Lord” when he eats it in Jerusalem after the destruction, or not.

It is also difficult: For according to this,

even a firstborn too—let it be in doubt!

He should also have had a doubt concerning a firstborn in a case where it does not require the Temple, such as a firstborn whose blood was sprinkled before the destruction of the Temple, and afterward the Temple was destroyed while the sacrificial flesh still exists: may he eat it in Jerusalem, or not?

And we answer:

Ravina said: He always holds

—Rabbi Yishmael—that the sanctity of the Temple

sanctified for its time but did not sanctify for the future

after the destruction.

And here,

where he resolved from the juxtaposition of the firstborn to second tithe that it is not eaten in Jerusalem after the destruction, the case concerns

a firstborn

that does not require the Temple, which is similar in this respect to second tithe, which does not require the Temple; for example,

whose blood was sprinkled

of the firstborn

before the destruction of the Temple, and the Temple was destroyed while its flesh still exists.

And what was obvious to him, that the firstborn is not eaten in Jerusalem after the Temple was destroyed, is because

we juxtapose

[that it was juxtaposed]

its flesh

of the firstborn

to its blood,

as it is stated: “Only the firstborn—their blood you shall sprinkle on the altar, and their flesh shall be yours.”

And the juxtaposition of the flesh of the firstborn to its blood teaches:

What of its blood

requires sprinkling

on the altar, so too its flesh on the altar!

That is, only when it is fit for the sprinkling of the blood is the flesh permitted for eating, but not when the altar has been destroyed.

And

after we have learned by analogy that the flesh of a firstborn offering is forbidden for eating after the destruction of the Temple,

he analogizes

the

second tithe to the firstborn offering.

And this is the conclusion: the reason that nowadays it is forbidden to eat second tithe even in Jerusalem is that the altar does not exist.

And we challenge this:

Is it so

that it is possible to say that the flesh of the firstborn offering—which itself is not explicitly stated in the Torah to be forbidden for eating when the Temple does not exist, but is only

a matter learned by analogy

from the blood of the firstborn offering—shall

return and teach

about second tithe

by analogy

that it may be eaten only when the Temple is standing!?

But we have an established ruling in Zevahim [49b] that with regard to learning the laws of sacrificial offerings, it is impossible to learn by analogy from something that itself is not explicit in the Torah, but is a matter learned by analogy from elsewhere.

And we answer:

Produce tithe—

it is non-sacred!

And with regard to non-sacred matters, one learns by analogy even from something that itself is a matter learned by analogy .