Makkot 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

And we reject this: It is not necessary to say that the disputes are interdependent.

For

according to Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees

that his view is that the priesthood was retroactively annulled, as he invalidated the offerings.

And certainly, the amora who said, “the priesthood died,” holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua.

However, it is not necessary to say that the amora who said, “the priesthood was annulled,” holds specifically in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather, it may be said:

they disagree,

meaning that the amoraim disagreed

according to Rabbi Yehoshua.

The one who says “

died

the priesthood” obviously holds only

in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua.

For according to Rabbi Eliezer, who retroactively invalidates the offerings, it necessarily follows that the priesthood was annulled.

However, even

the one who says “

the priesthood was annulled” with regard to the law governing the murderer’s departure from the city of refuge may hold in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua insofar as the offerings are not invalid. This is because there is another rationale here:

priesthood” with regard to the law concerning the killer’s departure from a city of refuge can follow Rabbi Yehoshua in this respect—that the offerings are not invalid. For there is another reasoning here:

For

Rabbi Yehoshua said this only

in

that case,

where the offerings are valid, because

it is written

in the blessing of the tribe of Levi, with regard to the service of the priests in the Temple: “

Bless, Lord, his resources, and favor the work of his hands.”

And we interpret it:

“Even his disqualified ones”—their service with the offerings is acceptable when they do not know that they are disqualified.

And in this matter he agrees with him.

And in this respect he agrees with him.

But here,

with regard to removing the murderer upon the death of the High Priest,

even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes

that once it became retroactively clear that he was not a priest, he does not remove the murderer; rather, the murderer remains in the city of refuge forever.

We learned in the Mishna:

“When his judgment has been concluded, etc.”

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Yoav made two errors at that moment

when he learned that King Solomon wished to execute him because he had rebelled against the monarchy, and he attempted to save himself by seizing hold of the altar.

For it is written [in

I Kings, chapter 2]: “

And Yoav fled to the Tent of the Lord and grasped the horns of the altar.”

1.

He erred

in thinking

that the altar itself does not provide refuge

but

rather

only

its roof.

For we interpret “From My altar you shall take him to die,” and not “from above My altar”—that is, its roof. If the murderer is found on the roof of the altar, he is not taken away.

And

if

he,

Yoav,

had grasped its horns

and thought that they were included in its roof, he would not have known that its horns are included in “From My altar you shall take him to die.”

2.

He erred

in thinking

that refuge is provided only by the altar of the eternal Sanctuary,

as implied by “My altar,” the one designated for Me,

and

if

he had grasped

the horns of

the altar of

the Tabernacle of

Shiloh.

Abaye says: In this matter as well, Yoav made an error

—

3.

He erred in thinking that refuge is provided only by a priest with the service in his hand,

and

if

he—

was a non-priest!

Reish Lakish said: The ministering angel of Rome—the Satan—will ultimately make three errors

when

he errs

when the end arrives.

For it is written [in

Isaiah 63]: “

Who is this coming from Edom, with crimson garments from Bozrah?”

The Gemara explains that this verse describes the killing of Samael by the Holy One, blessed be He. As it were, His garments will be spattered with his blood when He kills him in Bozrah.

The three errors of Samael are alluded to here, when he flees to Bozrah:

1.

He errs

in thinking

that only

the city of refuge

Bozer provides refuge, and

if

he, who was exiled to Bozrah,

which is in the land of Moab. 2.

He errs

in thinking

that it provides refuge only for one who acted unintentionally, and

if

he was acting intentionally.

3.

He errs

in thinking

that it provides refuge only for a person, and

if

he—

is an angel.

Rabbi Abbahu said: The cities of refuge were not given for burial

to the Levites who live in them.

For it is written: “

And their open spaces shall be for their animals, and for their property, and for all their life”—

they were given for the living, and not for burial.

And we raise an objection:

miytivi

from our Mishna, as we learned: “

There”—

there shall be his dwelling, there shall be his death, and there shall be his burial.

We see, then, that one is buried in a city of refuge! And we answer:

A murderer is different,

as he is indeed buried in the city of refuge, since

the Merciful One explicitly indicated this concerning him

by stating that his burial shall be there.

We learned in our Mishna:

“Just as the city provides refuge”,

so does its boundary provide refuge.

And we raise a contradiction

from what was taught in a beraita: “

And he shall dwell in it”—

and not within its boundary!

Abaye said: This is not difficult.

Here,

in our Mishna, the discussion concerns

providing refuge.

When he enters the area surrounding the city, he is granted refuge and is saved from the blood avenger.

Whereas

here,

where we derive that he may not dwell in the area surrounding the city, the meaning is that he is not permitted

to dwell

in the surrounding area, but only within the city itself.

And we raise a difficulty: Is a derivation really needed to establish that he may not

dwell

in the area surrounding the city of refuge?

But

why not derive it

from the fact

that one does not

make a field

surrounding a city of refuge into an

open space?

Nor

does one make the

open space

surrounding a city of refuge into a

field.

field.”

That is, the Israelites were commanded to give the Levites cities [which were also cities of refuge], and to leave an empty area of two thousand cubits around the city.

Of the two thousand cubits surrounding the city, one thousand cubits were to be designated as an empty open space, in which fields or vineyards could not be made; beyond them were another thousand cubits for fields and vineyards. It is prohibited to make a field within the area of the open space, and likewise conversely.

And likewise,

one does not

make part of an

open space of a city

into a building, for it is prohibited to build in the empty area; rather, it must remain empty as an unbuilt area around the city,

nor

does one make part of the

city

into an

open space.

If so, it is impossible to dwell in a house standing in the open space, since it is prohibited to build there, as construction in the open space transforms it into a “city.” Why, then, is a verse needed to exclude dwelling there?

And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said: It is necessary only

to exclude

underground chambers.

The murderer may not dwell in an underground chamber beneath the open space.

Indeed, there is no prohibition against dwelling there under the law governing the cities of the Levites, since dwelling in an underground chamber does not alter the designation of the open space [from an open space into a city], because there is no dwelling house on the open space. But the murderer may not live there, because his dwelling in an underground chamber beneath the open space within the city’s surrounding boundary is not considered dwelling in a city of refuge.

We learned in the Mishna:

“A murderer who went outside the boundary.”

The Sages taught:

The Torah states [Numbers 35]: “And if the murderer shall indeed go outside, and the blood avenger finds him outside the boundary of his city of refuge,

and the blood avenger kills the murderer;

he has no blood.”

We learn from here that there is

a mitzva incumbent upon the blood avenger

to kill the murderer.

This is because the meaning of the verse is phrased as a command, instructing the blood avenger to kill him!

And if

he has no

blood avenger,

for the slain person—there is

a

license granted to every person

to kill the murderer when he leaves his city of refuge—

the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

Rabbi Akiva says: The blood avenger has permission,

and the meaning of the verse is not a command, but merely permission granted to the blood avenger.

And if

the

entire person [according to

the version of Rambam, “there is no”]—

is not liable on his account.

And we explain:

What is the reason for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who understood the meaning of the verse as commanding the blood avenger to kill the murderer who left his city of refuge?—

He was precise:

Is it written

“if the blood redeemer murders

the murderer, he has no blood,” which indicates permission? But it is written, “and he shall murder,” which is an expression of command.

And Rabbi Akiva,

who said that permission was granted to the blood redeemer, was precise in the opposite manner:

Is it written, “he shall murder,”

which would indicate a command? “And he shall murder” is written, which indicates permission.

Mar Zutra bar Tuvia said that Rav said: If a murderer left beyond the boundary of

his city of refuge,

and the blood redeemer found him and killed him—

he is executed for killing him!

And we raise a difficulty:

In accordance with whom

did Rav hold?

But what he said is

not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who said that it is a mitzva for the blood redeemer to kill him,

and not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

who said that he has permission to kill him.

And we answer:

He,

Rav,

said this in accordance with this tanna—

as it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says:

The verse “the murderer shall not die

until he stands before the assembly for judgment”—

what does it teach?

Why was it necessary to teach us that it is prohibited to kill a murderer without a trial?

Rather,

since it is stated,

“and the blood redeemer shall murder the murderer,”

when he leaves the city of refuge,

one might have thought

that he may murder him

immediately

when he leaves.

The verse therefore states,

“until he stands before the assembly for judgment.”

This teaches us that he may not kill him without a trial. Thus, Rav, who said that the blood redeemer is executed for killing him, holds in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Accordingly, Rav, who said that the blood avenger is executed for killing him, holds in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

But

if it were

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Akiva, what do

they

expound from this verse,

“until he stands before the assembly for judgment”?

According to them,

that

verse

is needed for that which was taught:

Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived that if the Sanhedrin themselves

saw

someone kill a person, they may not execute him until he stands before another court? This is because a witness who sees an event may not become a judge in capital cases, even if he did not testify before a court [see Rosh Hashana 25b and Tosafot there].

This is because a witness who saw an event cannot serve as a judge in capital cases, even if he did not testify before a court. [See Rosh Hashana 25b and Tosafot there.]

The verse therefore states,

“until he stands before the assembly for judgment” —

until he stands before another court.

The Sages taught:

“If the murderer surely leaves

and the blood redeemer murders the murderer, he has no blood.”

I have derived

only that it is permitted to kill him

when

he leaves

intentionally.

If he left

inadvertently—

from where is it derived

that it is permitted to kill him?

The verse states,

“if he surely leaves.”

The verse doubled its wording to inform you that if he leaves

in any event,

whether inadvertently or intentionally, it is permitted to kill him.

And we raise a difficulty:

But was it not taught:

If the murderer left his city of refuge

intentionally —

he is killed

by the blood redeemer.

But if he leaves

inadvertently, he goes into exile.

That is, he returns to his city of refuge, and it is prohibited to kill him.

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

beraita, which teaches that if he leaves inadvertently he returns and goes into exile and it is prohibited to kill him, follows

the one who says, “the Torah speaks in the language of people.” According to him, no inference can be made from the doubled wording to include one who leaves inadvertently, whose blood would be permitted.

According to this view, one cannot infer from the repetition of the wording that it includes even one who leaves unintentionally, whose blood is permitted.

Whereas

this statement, that even when he leaves inadvertently it is permitted to kill him, based on the exposition of “surely leaves,” follows

teaching, which says that even when he leaves unintentionally it is permitted to kill him, because we interpret “he surely leaves”

the one who says, “the Torah does not speak in the language of people,”

and the doubled wording comes to teach an additional point.

Abaye said: It is reasonable

that in this matter the halakha is

in accordance with the one who says that the Torah speaks in the language of

people,

so that one who leaves inadvertently is not killed.

For it is logical

that the end of his

judgment, when he leaves the city of refuge, should not be

more severe than its beginning,

which is the murder, for which he is executed only when he killed intentionally.

It is not reasonable that his punishment for leaving the city of refuge should be more severe than the punishment for the murder itself, so that he would be liable to death even when he leaves inadvertently.

Rather,

just as at the beginning,

if he killed

intentionally, he is executed,

and if he killed

inadvertently, he goes into exile,

so too at the end,

when he leaves the city of refuge: if he leaves

intentionally, he is executed,

but if he leaves

inadvertently, he goes into exile,

that is, he returns to his refuge.

One teaching states: If a father killed

his son inadvertently,

his

second son

becomes his blood redeemer,

and kills his father.

And another teaching states:

If a father killed—

his son does not become his

blood redeemer.

And we inquire concerning this:

Shall we say

that

this

teaching, which says that he becomes a blood redeemer, is in accordance with

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who said that it is a mitzva for the blood redeemer to kill the murderer, and therefore he must also kill his father, who murdered?

And

if so,

this

teaching, which says that he does not become a blood redeemer for his father, is in accordance with

Rabbi Akiva,

who said that permission was granted to the blood redeemer, but killing his father was not permitted.

And we reject this:

Can you really understand it that way? Can this law be attributed to the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva?

Can this law really be dependent on the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva?

Since

according to the one who says it is a mitzva

for the blood redeemer to kill him,

and according to the one who says it is permission—

is it permitted

for a son to kill his father?

But Rabba bar Rav Huna said, and it was likewise taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: For all

the transgressions of the Torah that the father committed,

the son does not become an agent of the

court to punish

his father, whether

by

striking him

with the punishment of lashes

or

by

cursing him

with the punishment of excommunication and shammata that is due to him.

Except for an inciter,

if his father incited him to worship idolatry, with regard to this transgression the son may become an agent of the court to kill his father.

For the Torah said

concerning an inciter,

“You shall not spare him, and you shall not conceal him.”

If so, even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili it cannot be permitted for a son to become the blood redeemer and kill his father.

Rather,

there must necessarily be another distinction between the beraitot:

This

teaching, which states that the son does not become the blood redeemer, refers

to the son

of the murderer, who is the brother of the murdered person. It says that he does not redeem the blood of his brother, because it is prohibited for him to kill his father.

Whereas

this

teaching, which states that the son becomes the blood redeemer, refers

to the son’s son

of the murderer, who is the son of the murdered person. He becomes the blood redeemer for his father and kills his grandfather, for he is not warned regarding his grandfather’s honor.

Mishna:

A murderer who killed inadvertently, was exiled, and sat upon

a tree that is

planted on the boundary of the תחום of a city of refuge, with its trunk

standing within the תחום.

And

its

branches,

its branches,

are inclined

and extend

outside the תחום.

Or

conversely, if the tree’s trunk

stands

outside the תחום, and its branches

are inclined

and enter

within the תחום—

everything,

the tree, its trunk and its branches,

follows

the location of

the branches,

and the law concerning the murderer depends on the location of the tree’s branches.

If the branches extend outside the תחום, then even if the murderer sits on the trunk within the city, his status is that of one who has left the city of refuge.

And if the branches are within the city, then even if he sits outside the city, on the trunk, his status is that of one who is within the city, since the entire tree is considered to be within the city of refuge, and the blood redeemer may not kill him.

Gemara:

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the principle stated in the Mishna, that with regard to a city of refuge, the status of the entire tree depends on the location of the branches.

But this contradicts the principle stated concerning a tree planted on the boundary of Jerusalem, with regard to a person sitting upon it and eating second tithe—whether he is considered to be in Jerusalem and may eat second tithe, or whether he is considered to be outside it and may not eat second tithe there:

And they raise a contradiction

to the words of the Mishna from another Mishna, in Tractate Ma’aser Sheni [chapter 3, mishna 7]:

As we learned:

A tree that stands inside

the city of Jerusalem, within the wall,

with its branches,

its branches,

inclined outward.

Or

conversely, if the tree’s trunk

stands outside

Jerusalem,

and

its branches

are inclined inward—

Its laws are divided according to the division of the locations in which the tree is situated.

The part located

opposite the wall and inward—

its status is

like the inside

of the city, and one may eat second tithe while sitting upon it.

Whereas the part located

opposite the wall and outward—

its status is

like the outside!

The difference between the laws of second tithe, in which each part of the tree follows its own location separately, and the laws of cities of refuge, in which the status of all parts of the tree depends on the location of the branches, is puzzling.

And we answer: Is it possible that a contradiction between

second tithe

and

cities of refuge are you raising?

Their laws are different!

Since with regard to the laws of

second tithe, the Merciful One made it dependent on the wall.

As it is stated: “You shall eat it before the Lord your God.” Therefore, everything depends on the wall. Whatever is within the wall is considered to be inside Jerusalem, even though the tree’s branches are outside, and one may eat second tithe while on the part of the tree that is within the wall. But whatever is outside the wall is outside Jerusalem, and one may not eat upon it, even if the tree’s branches are within the wall.

That is not so with regard to being absorbed by

cities of refuge,

where one follows the branches, because there

the Merciful One made it dependent on residence.

As it is stated: “For in his city of refuge he shall dwell.” The branches are more suitable for residence than the trunk. Therefore, the law concerning a murderer sitting in a tree depends on the location of the branches, which is the primary place of his residence. Since

he can reside on its branches,

whereas

on its trunk—

he cannot reside there.

And they raise a contradiction

concerning the law of the tree’s location, from

second tithe against second tithe.

As we learned

in Tractate Ma’aserot [3:10]:

In Jerusalem—

one follows

with regard to eating second tithe

after

the location of

the branches.

And likewise,

with regard to cities of refuge—

one follows the branches.

Apparently, this Mishna contradicts that which was stated in Tractate Ma’aser Sheni, where each part of the tree is judged according to its own location.

And we answer:

Rav Kahana said: It is not difficult.

This

Mishna, which we learned in Tractate Ma’aserot, stating that in every case one follows the branches, is the opinion of

Rabbi Yehuda.

Whereas

this

Mishna, which we learned in Tractate Ma’aser Sheni, stating that each part is judged according to its own location, is the opinion of

the Rabbis.

And we find that this is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: The laws of a tree depend on its branches,

as it was taught: