Makkot 12a — the Talmud in English

And we reject this: There is no necessity that the disputes depend upon one another.

For

according to Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees

that his view is that the priesthood was annulled retroactively, since he invalidated the sacrifices.

And certainly, the amora who said, “the priesthood died,” holds like Rabbi Yehoshua.

However, the amora who said, “the priesthood was annulled,” need not hold specifically like Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather, one can say,

that they disputed,

that the amoraim disputed—

according to Rabbi Yehoshua.

The one who says “

died

priesthood,” obviously holds only

like Rabbi Yehoshua.

For according to Rabbi Eliezer, who invalidates the sacrifices retroactively, it is necessarily the case that the priesthood was annulled.

But also

the one who says “

the priesthood was annulled” with regard to the law of the murderer leaving the city of refuge can hold like Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to this: that the sacrifices are not invalid. For there is another reasoning here—

priesthood” with regard to the law concerning the killer’s departure from a city of refuge can follow Rabbi Yehoshua in this respect—that the offerings are not invalid. For there is another reasoning here:

For

Rabbi Yehoshua did not say this

except

there,

that the sacrifices are valid, because

it is written in the blessing of the tribe of Levi [Deuteronomy 33], with regard to the service of the priests in the Temple: “

Bless, Hashem, his army, and favor the work of his hands.”

And we expound:

Even the disqualified ones among them—

He favors their service in the sacrifices when they do not know that they are disqualified.

And in this he held like him.

And in this respect he agrees with him.

But here,

with regard to bringing out the murderer upon the death of the High Priest,

even Rabbi Yehoshua agrees

that it was clarified retroactively that he is not a priest, and he does not bring out the murderer; rather, he will remain in the city of refuge forever.

We learned in the Mishna:

“When his judgment has been concluded, etc.”

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Joab made two mistakes at that time,

when it became known to him that King Solomon wanted to kill him because he had rebelled against the kingship, and he attempted to save himself by grasping the altar.

For it is written [I Kings, chapter 2]: “

I Kings, chapter 2]: “

And Joab fled to the Tent of Hashem, and grasped the horns of the altar.”

1.

He erred

in this:

the altar itself does not shelter,

the altar itself,

but

only

its roof.

For we expound, “From My altar you shall take him to die,” and not “from above My altar”—that is, the roof of the altar: if the murderer is found on the roof of the altar, they do not take him.

And

if

he,

Joab,

had grasped its horns

and thought that they were included in its roof, and did not know that its horns are included in “From My altar you shall take him to die.”

2.

He erred

in this:

that only the altar of the permanent Temple shelters,

as is implied by “My altars,” the one special to Me,

and

if

he had grasped

the horns of

the altar of

the Tabernacle of

Shiloh.

Abaye says: In this also Joab made a mistake,

Joab—

3.

He erred in that only a priest with the service in his hand shelters,

and

if

he—

was an Israelite!

Reish Lakish said: The ministering angel of Rome is destined to make three mistakes,

the Satan,

to err

when the end arrives.

For it is written [Isaiah 63]: “

Isaiah 63]: “

Who is this coming from Edom, with soiled garments from Bozrah?”

And the Gemara explains that this verse describes the killing of Samael by the Holy One, blessed be He. And, as it were, His blood will be spattered upon the garments of Hashem, when He kills him in Bozrah.

And hinted in this are Samael’s three mistakes, when he flees to Bozrah:

1.

He errs

in this:

that only

the city of refuge

Bozer shelters, and

if

he were to exile himself to Bozrah,

which is in the land of Moab. 2.

He errs

in this:

that it shelters only one who acted unintentionally, and

if

he was intentional.

3.

He errs

in this:

that it shelters only a human being, and

if

he—

is an angel.

Rabbi Abbahu said: Cities of refuge were not given for burial

for the Levites who dwell in them.

For it is written: “

And their open spaces shall be for their animals, and for their property, and for all their life”—

They were given for the living, and not for burial.

And we object:

We cite an objection from our Mishna, for we learned: “

as we learned: “

There”—

There shall be his dwelling, there shall be his death, there shall be his burial.

Behold, we find that they bury in a city of refuge! And we answer:

A murderer is different,

for him they indeed bury in the city of refuge, since

the Merciful One explicitly indicated concerning him

that there shall be his burial.

We learned in our Mishna:

Just as the city shelters,

so its boundary shelters.

And we raise a contradiction to this from that which was taught: “

to this from what was taught in a beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna: “

And he shall dwell in it”—

and not in its boundary!

Abaye said: It is not difficult.

Here,

in our Mishna, it is speaking with regard to

sheltering.

When he enters the boundary around the city, he is sheltered and saved from the blood-avenger.

But

here,

where we expound “he shall not dwell in its boundary,” meaning the boundary around the city, this is to say that he is not permitted

to dwell

in its surrounding boundary, but only inside it.

And we object: Does the fact that he is not

to dwell

in the area surrounding the city of refuge require an exclusion?

But

let it follow,

you can learn this law because

one does not

make a field around a city of refuge into an

“

open space.”

And one does not make the

make the

open space

around a city of refuge into a

“

field.”

That is, the Israelites were commanded to give the Levites cities [which are also cities of refuge], and around the city to leave an empty area of two thousand cubits.

From the two thousand cubits surrounding the city, one thousand cubits are to be designated as an empty open space, in which they should not make fields or vineyards, and after them one thousand cubits for fields and vineyards; and it is forbidden to make a field in the area of the open space, and likewise conversely.

And likewise

one does not make

a part of an

open space of a city,

for it is forbidden to build in the empty area; rather, it must remain empty as an airy place for the city,

and one does not make part of the

make part of the

city

into an

open space.

If so, it is impossible to dwell in a house standing in the open space, since it is forbidden to build there, as the construction in the open space turns it into a “city”; so why do I need a verse to exclude it?

And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said: It is necessary only

to exclude

underground chambers.

The murderer should not dwell in an underground chamber beneath the open space.

For indeed there is no prohibition against dwelling there from the perspective of the law of the cities of the Levites, since dwelling in an underground chamber does not alter the designation of the open space [from open space into city], since there is no dwelling house upon the open space. But the murderer cannot dwell there, because his dwelling in an underground chamber beneath the open space within the boundary surrounding the city is not considered dwelling in a city of refuge.

We learned in the Mishna:

A murderer who went outside the boundary.

The Sages taught:

The Torah said [Numbers 35], “And if the murderer surely goes out, and the blood-avenger finds him outside the boundary of his city of refuge,

and the blood-avenger kills the murderer

he has no blood.”

We learn from here that there is

a mitzva incumbent upon the blood-avenger

to kill the murderer.

Since the meaning of the verse is an expression of command, in that the blood-avenger is commanded to kill him!

And if

he does not have

the blood-avenger of the one killed,

a blood-avenger—there is

a

permission in the hands of every person

to kill the murderer when he leaves his city of refuge,

the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean.

Rabbi Akiva says: Permission is in the hands of the blood-avenger,

and the meaning of the verse is not an expression of command, but only permission and authorization for the blood-avenger.

And

if

every person [the Rambam’s version: “there is not”]—

Maimonides’ version is “not”]—

they are not liable on his account.

And we explain:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yose the Galilean,

who understood the meaning of the verse as commanding the blood-avenger to kill the murderer who left his city of refuge?—

He is precise:

Is it written “

if he murders

the blood-avenger the murderer, he has no blood,” whose meaning is permission? But it is written “and he shall murder,” which is an expression of command.

And Rabbi Akiva,

who said that permission was given to the blood-avenger, is precise in the opposite manner:

Is “he shall murder” written,

whose meaning is command? “And he shall murder” is written, whose meaning is permission.

Mar Zutra bar Tovya said in the name of Rav: A murderer who went outside the boundary

of his city of refuge,

and the blood-avenger found him and killed him—

he is executed on his account!

And we wonder:

In accordance with whom

does Rav hold?

But what he said is

not in accordance with Rabbi Yose the Galilean,

who said that it is a mitzva upon the blood-avenger to kill him,

and not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

who said that he has permission to kill him.

And we answer:

He,

Rav,

said [his ruling] in accordance with this tan—

as it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says,

one must be precise about the verse, “And the murderer shall not die

until he stands before the assembly for judgment”:

What does it come to teach?

And why was it necessary to teach us that it is forbidden to kill a murderer without a trial?

Rather,

since it was stated, “

and the blood-avenger shall murder the murderer,”

when he leaves the city of refuge.

One might have thought

that he may kill him

immediately

when he leaves.

The verse therefore states, “

until he stands before the assembly for judgment.”

To teach us that he may not kill him without a trial. And if so, Rav, who said that the blood-avenger is executed on his account, holds in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Accordingly, Rav, who said that the blood avenger is executed for killing him, holds in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

And

if

Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Akiva—

this “

until he stands before the assembly for judgment,”

what do they expound from it?

According to their position,

that

verse

is needed for that which was taught—

Rabbi Akiva says: From where [do we know] concerning a Sanhedrin that saw

with their own eyes

one who killed a person, that they may not execute him until he stands before another court?

Because a witness who sees cannot become a judge in capital cases, even if he did not testify before a court [see Rosh Hashana 25b and Tosafot there].

The verse therefore states, “

until he stands before the assembly for judgment” —

until he stands before another court.

The Sages taught: “

If the murderer surely goes out.

And the blood-avenger shall murder the murderer; he has no blood.”

I have only

that it is permitted to kill him

but

when he went out

deliberately.

If he went out

inadvertently—

from where

is it permitted to kill him?

The verse therefore states, “

if he surely goes out.”

The verse doubled its expression in order to inform you that if he went out

in any event,

whether inadvertently or deliberately, it is permitted to kill him.

And we object:

But it was taught:

If the murderer went out from his city of refuge

deliberately —

he is executed

by the blood-avenger.

But if he went out

inadvertently, he goes into exile.

That is, he returns to his city of refuge, and it is forbidden to kill him.

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

This

that it was taught that if he goes out inadvertently, he returns and goes into exile, and it is forbidden to kill him—

is in accordance with the one who says, “The Torah spoke in the language of human beings.” According to him, it is impossible to derive from the doubled expression that it also includes one who goes out inadvertently, whose blood is permitted.

According to this view, one cannot infer from the repetition of the wording that it includes even one who leaves unintentionally, whose blood is permitted.

Whereas

this

that we say that even when he goes out inadvertently it is permitted to kill him, for we expound, “he surely goes out”—

is in accordance with the one who says, “The Torah did not speak in the language of human beings,”

and the doubled expression comes to teach us an additional matter.

Abaye said: It is reasonable

that in this matter the halakha is

in accordance with the one who says, “The Torah spoke in the language of human

beings,”

so that one who goes out inadvertently is not killed.

For it is logical

that the end

of his law, when he leaves the city of refuge, should not be

more severe than its beginning,

which is the killing, for which he is killed only when he killed deliberately.

And it is not reasonable that his punishment for leaving the city of refuge should be more severe than it, and that he should become liable to death even when he goes out inadvertently.

Rather,

just as at the beginning,

if he killed

deliberately, he is executed,

and if he killed

inadvertently, he goes into exile,

so too at the end,

when he leaves the city of refuge: if he goes out

deliberately, he is executed,

but if he goes out

inadvertently, he goes into exile.

That is, he returns to his refuge.

One [teaching] taught: A father who killed

his son inadvertently—

his son

the other

becomes his blood-avenger,

and kills his father.

And another [teaching] was taught:

A father who killed—

his son does not become his

blood-avenger.

And we examine this:

Let us say,

shall we say that

this

which was taught, that he becomes the blood-avenger, is in accordance with

Rabbi Yose the Galilean,

who said that it is a mitzva for the blood-avenger to kill the murderer, and therefore he must also kill his father who murdered?

And

if

this

which was taught, that he does not become the blood-avenger for his father, is in accordance with

Rabbi Akiva,

who said that permission was given to the blood-avenger, but he was not permitted to kill his father.

And we reject this:

But can you really understand [it so]?

Could you really say this!? For it is impossible to attribute this law to the dispute between Rabbi Yose the Galilean and Rabbi Akiva!

Since

both according to the one who says it is a mitzva

for the blood-avenger to kill,

and according to the one who says it is permission—

is it permitted,

for a son to kill his father?

But Rabba bar Rav Huna said, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For all

the transgressions in the Torah that the father committed,

the son does not become an agent

of the court to punish

his father,

whether

to strike him

with the punishment of lashes

or

whether

to curse him

with the punishment of excommunication and shammata that is due to him.

Except for an inciter,

for if his father was an inciter to worship idolatry, concerning this transgression the son may be an agent of the court to kill his father.

For the Torah said

concerning an inciter, “

You shall not spare, and you shall not cover for him.”

And if so, even according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean it is impossible to permit a son to become the blood-avenger and kill his father.

Rather,

necessarily, there is another distinction between the beraitot, and it is as follows:

This

which was taught, that the son does not become the blood-avenger, is referring

to the son

of the murderer, who is the brother of the murdered person. Concerning this it was said that he does not avenge the blood of his brother, because it is forbidden for him to kill his father.

Whereas

this

which was taught, that the son becomes the blood-avenger, is referring

to the son’s son

of the murderer, who is the son of the murdered person. He becomes the blood-avenger for his father and kills his grandfather, for he is not warned concerning his grandfather’s honor.

Mishna:

A manslayer through inadvertence who was exiled and sat upon

a tree, which is

planted at the boundary of the area of the city of refuge, and its trunk

stands within the area.

And

its

branches,

its branches,

incline

and extend

outside the area.

Or

conversely, that the trunk of the tree

stands

outside

the area, and its branches incline

and enter

within the area—

everything,

the tree, its trunk and its branches,

follows

the place of

the branches,

and the law of the manslayer depends upon the location of the branches of the tree.

If the branches extend outside the area, then even if the manslayer sat on the trunk within the city, his law is as one who went outside the city of refuge.

And if the branches are within the city, then even if he sat outside the city upon the trunk, his law is as one who is found within the city. Since the entire tree is considered to be within the city of refuge, it is forbidden for the blood-avenger to kill him.

Gemara:

The Gemara raises a difficulty against the principle stated in the Mishna, that concerning a city of refuge, the law of the entire tree depends upon the place where the branches are located.

For this matter contradicts the principle stated concerning a tree planted at the boundary of Jerusalem, regarding the eating of second tithe by a person sitting upon it—whether he is found in Jerusalem and may eat second tithe, or whether he is found outside it and is not permitted to eat second tithe there:

And we raise a contradiction

to the words of the Mishna from another Mishna in Tractate Maaser Sheni [chapter 3, mishna 7]:

For we learned:

A tree that stands inside

the city of Jerusalem, within the wall,

and its branches,

its branches,

incline outward.

Or

conversely, that the trunk of the tree

stands outside

Jerusalem,

and

its branches

incline inward—

Its laws are divided according to the division of the place where the tree is located.

The part that is located

opposite the wall and inward—

its law is

like the interior

of the city, and one may eat second tithe while sitting upon it.

But the part that is located

opposite the wall and outward—

its law is

like the exterior!

And the difference between the laws of second tithe, in which each part of the tree follows its place separately, and the laws of cities of refuge, in which the law of all parts of the tree depends upon the place where the branches are located, is perplexing.

And we answer: Is it a contradiction between

second tithe

and

cities of refuge that you raise?

But their laws are different!

Since concerning the laws of

tithe, the Merciful One made it dependent upon the wall.

As it is stated: “Before the Lord your God you shall eat it.” Therefore everything depends upon the wall. What is within the wall is inside Jerusalem, even though the branches of the tree are outside, and one may eat second tithe on the part of the tree that is within the wall. And what is outside the wall is outside Jerusalem, and one may not eat upon it even if the branches of the tree are within the wall.

But this is not so concerning the absorption of

cities of refuge,

where one follows the branches, because there

the Merciful One made it dependent upon dwelling.

As it is stated: “For in his city of refuge he shall dwell.” And the branches are more fit for dwelling than the trunk. Therefore the law of the manslayer sitting in the tree depends upon the place of the branches, for that is where his principal dwelling is. Since

in its branches he can dwell,

whereas

in its trunk—

he cannot dwell.

And he raises a contradiction,

one must raise a contradiction between Mishnayot concerning the law of the place of the tree, from

second tithe against second tithe.

For we learned

in Tractate Maaserot [3:10]:

In Jerusalem—

one follows

with regard to eating second tithe

after

the place of

the branches.

And likewise

in cities of refuge—

one follows the branches.

And apparently this Mishna contradicts what is stated in Tractate Maaser Sheni, that each part of the tree is judged according to its place.

And we answer:

Rav Kahana said: It is not difficult.

This

that we learned in Tractate Maaserot, that in every matter one follows the branches, is the opinion of

Rabbi Judah.

Whereas

this

that we learned in Tractate Maaser Sheni, that each part is judged according to its place, is the opinion of

the Rabbis.

And we find that this is the opinion of Rabbi Judah, that the laws of the tree depend upon its branches,

for it was taught: