Kiddushin 9b (ט:) — the Talmud in English

What—

as with

the case of departure,

we require that the bill of divorce be written for the sake of the woman being divorced, as it is stated: “And he shall write for her,” and the Sages expounded: “for her”—for her sake!

So too, the act of betrothal

kiddushin],

must be performed for her sake.

Or perhaps

we should say that

we compare the acts of betrothal to one another.

We compare and equate all the methods of effecting betrothal with one another (27a')—

Just as the act of betrothal by

kiddushei

money

does not require

us to imprint the form of the coin with which the woman is betrothed

for her sake,

for the sake of the woman being betrothed—

so too, the act of betrothal by a document

does not require

that the document be written

for her sake!

After he raised the question,

he then resolved it.

After Reish Lakish raised this uncertainty, he himself returned and resolved it:

We compare betrothal to departure.

For from where did we learn the institution of betrothal by document in the first place?—

As the verse states

Deuteronomy 24]: “

And she shall depart and become.”

From the fact that betrothal was compared to departure, we learn that just as a woman is divorced by means of a document, so too she is betrothed by means of a document.

Therefore, with regard to writing the document for her sake as well, betrothal must be compared to departure. The document of betrothal must also be written for her sake, just like a bill of divorce.

The Gemara continues to discuss another matter connected with the comparison of betrothal to departure:

It was stated:

A document of betrothal that

was written for her sake,

for the sake of betrothing a particular woman,

but without her knowledge,

without asking the woman before writing the document whether she agreed to be betrothed to him by means of it; and after he had already written the document, he informed her, and she agreed and accepted the document from him — the amoraim disputed what the law is in this case:

Rava and Ravina said—

she is betrothed.

Rav Pappa and Rav Shervaya said—

she is not betrothed.

And Rav Pappa explains what their dispute depends on:

Rav Pappa said: I will state their reason,

I will explain the reason of Rava and Ravina, who hold that she is betrothed,

and I will state my reason,

and I will also explain my own position, that the woman is not betrothed:

I will state their reason,

I will explain the reason of Rava and Ravina, who hold that the woman is betrothed.

Because

it is written: “

And she shall depart and become”—

the verse compares

the act of

betrothal to departure—

Just as departure,

which is effected by means of a bill of divorce, requires that the bill of divorce be written

for her sake,

so

even if the bill of divorce was written

without her knowledge

without her consent], it is valid.

So too, betrothal,

which is effected by means of a document of betrothal,

also—

requires that the document of betrothal be written

for her sake.

But

even if it was written

without her knowledge,

it is valid.

Therefore, Rava and Ravina said that a document of betrothal written for her sake but without her knowledge is valid.

And I will state my reason,

and I will explain my position, that a document of betrothal written for her sake but without her knowledge is invalid.

Because it is stated: “

And she shall depart and become”—

the verse compares

the act of

betrothal to departure:

Just as

in the matter of

departure

by means of a bill of divorce,

we require

that the document be written with the

knowledge of the

one who

transfers the property.

That is, the bill of divorce must be written with the husband’s knowledge, as it is stated: “And he shall write for her”—it is not sufficient for the scribe to write the bill of divorce for her sake—because the husband is the one who transfers to the woman the right to remarry whomever she wishes—

so too, betrothal,

including a document of betrothal,

requires

that the document be written with the

knowledge of the

one who

transfers the property.

In betrothal, the woman is the one who transfers herself to the husband. Therefore, the document of betrothal must be written with the woman’s knowledge, and if it was written without her knowledge, it is invalid.

Meytivi

an objection to the words of Rava and Ravina, who hold that a document of betrothal written without the woman’s knowledge is valid:

For we learned in tractate Bava Batra (167b): One may not

write documents of betrothal and marriage except with the knowledge of both of them,

the husband and the woman.

What

is meant there?

Is it not

referring to

actual documents of betrothal and marriage?!

We learned that a document of betrothal [kiddushin] and marriage may be written only with the knowledge of both of them, and it is evident from there that the woman’s knowledge is required for writing a document of betrothal!

This is an objection to the words of Rava and Ravina!

And we reject this:

No.

That passage is not referring to actual documents of betrothal. Rather, it is referring to

documents of stipulations,

documents in which the commitments between the two parties—the father of the groom and the father of the bride—and the sums of money that they stipulated for one another are recorded.

And this is in accordance with what Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav:

As Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav:

Before the betrothal, when the father of the bride asks the father of the groom:

How much will you give your son?

And the father of the groom says to him:

Such and such.

And the father of the groom then asks the father of the bride: How much will you give

your daughter?

And he says to him:

Such and such.

If

the fathers stood

the father of the groom and the father of the bride, on the basis of this agreement,

and betrothed

their children [the groom betrothed the bride], without the father of the groom and the father of the bride performing any act of acquisition between them with regard to the commitments they had undertaken toward one another,

then, even though they performed no act of acquisition, nevertheless

they acquire!

Each one acquires the commitment from the other, and neither of them can retract.

There is no need for an act of acquisition for this commitment, since

these are—

the matters acquired through a declaration

without an act of acquisition.

The betrothal completes the matter, because they derive benefit from becoming bound to one another through the bond of betrothal, and that benefit causes them to resolve to transfer their commitments to one another; an act of acquisition is unnecessary.

With regard to those stipulations, the Mishna [in Bava Batra] stated that the witnesses are not permitted to write a document concerning them except with the knowledge of both parties. But if the witnesses did not ask both of them, they are not permitted to write a document, because it is possible that the parties prefer that the commitment be only an oral loan, and not a loan documented in writing.

We learned in the Mishna: A woman is acquired

through intercourse.

And we raise a question concerning this:

From where do we know this,

from where do we know that a woman is acquired through intercourse?

Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: As the verse states

Deuteronomy 22]: “When a man finds a woman lying with

a married man”—

the verse teaches

that

her

husband became her

husband through

acquiring her by means of

intercourse.

Therefore it says “a married man.”

He said to him,

he challenged

Rabbi Zeira Rabbi Abbahu,

who cited this statement of Rabbi Yohanan—

And some say

that

Reish Lakish

was the one who challenged

Rabbi Yohanan:

Why are you exerting yourself and seeking to derive betrothal through intercourse from this verse?

Is

this

ugly] a beraita

that Rabbi

taught

ugly,

as the source for betrothal through intercourse?!

For it was taught: “When a man takes a woman

and has intercourse with her”—

the verse teaches

that a

woman

is acquired through intercourse.

And is this beraita not acceptable to you?!

Rabbi Abbahu, or Rabbi Yohanan, replied:

If it were derived from there,

if we were to learn from the verse “and has intercourse with her” that a woman is betrothed through intercourse,

I would have thought

that the woman is not acquired by her husband except

until he betroths her and then has intercourse with her.

That is, one might have said that a woman is not betrothed by intercourse alone, but must first be betrothed with money,

and then have intercourse with her, because the meaning of this verse is: “When a man takes a woman”—he first acquires her through betrothal with money [as explained above, 2a]—and afterward, “and has intercourse with her.”

This teaches us

that it was necessary to derive the matter from the verse “a married man,” to teach us that intercourse effects acquisition on its own.

Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection

with a difficulty:

Could one really have said that betrothal takes effect only if he betroths the woman with money and then has intercourse with her, so that Rabbi Yohanan had to derive from the verse “a married man” that a woman is acquired through intercourse alone?!

For

if

you

say so—

a maiden,

a virgin,

betrothed

who committed adultery during her betrothal,

as the Merciful One stated

that she is to be punished

by stoning—

how can you find such a case?!

How can there be such a possibility, that she be punished by stoning for committing adultery while she was a betrothed virgin maiden?

For the punishment of stoning for adultery by a married woman is stated only with regard to a betrothed virgin maiden, whereas any other married woman [a betrothed woman who is not a maiden, a maiden who is not a virgin, or a married woman] who commits adultery while married is punished by strangulation.

For the Torah states [Deuteronomy 22:22]: “If a man is found lying with a married woman, then both of them shall die,” meaning death by strangulation.

And it is stated [in the following verse]: “If there is a virgin maiden betrothed to a man, and a man finds her in the city and lies with her. You shall stone them with stones.” And the Sages expounded: “If there is a virgin maiden”—a virgin, and not one who has had intercourse. The verse teaches that a betrothed maiden who has had intercourse is punished by strangulation, like a married woman [Ketubot 48b].

And if it were as you say—that one might have thought that a woman becomes betrothed only through money and intercourse together—how could there be adultery by a betrothed virgin maiden, whose punishment is stoning? Once she had intercourse at the time of her betrothal, she would no longer be a virgin but one who had had intercourse; if she then committed adultery, her punishment would be strangulation, like that of a married woman who had had intercourse, and not stoning, like that of a virgin maiden!

And Rabbi Abba bar Memel explains his objection:

If he betrothed her and then had intercourse with her,

if he betrothed the woman with money and afterward had intercourse with her, then

she is a woman who has had intercourse,

and her punishment is strangulation!

And

if he betrothed her but did not have intercourse with her—

it is nothing!

If he betrothed her with money but did not have intercourse with her, then according to your statement one might have said that this is not a betrothal, that she is considered unmarried, and that if she has intercourse with another man she incurs no punishment at all!

Rather, it would necessarily have been understood that the verse, “When a man takes a woman and has intercourse with her,” refers to two independent acts of acquisition: “When a man takes” refers to acquisition with money, and “and has intercourse with her” refers to an independent acquisition through intercourse. There would have been no basis for entertaining the possibility that from this verse we would say that a woman is acquired by her husband only if he betroths her and has intercourse with her!

The Gemara now brings a response to Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s objection:

The Sages said,

the students seated

before Abaye:

Even if we were to interpret the verse, “When a man takes a woman and has intercourse with her,” as meaning that a woman is acquired only through money and intercourse together, nevertheless

you can find

an betrothed virgin girl who is liable to execution by stoning if she commits adultery while betrothed—

For example, if

he betrothed her with money, and afterward

had intercourse with her,

the

betrothed man

through intercourse

in an unusual manner,

not in the place of virginity, but in the place from which excrement is expelled.

Through such intercourse she becomes betrothed to him, but she nevertheless remains a virgin. Therefore, if she commits adultery with another man while betrothed to him, her punishment is stoning, since she is a betrothed virgin girl.

He said to them,

Abaye said to his students: It would not have been possible to establish the law of stoning for a betrothed virgin girl as you have said—that is, in the case of one who was betrothed with money and with whom her husband had intercourse in an unusual manner.

For we find below that Rabbi and the Sages disagree concerning a woman with whom a man other than her husband had intercourse in an unusual manner: whether she thereby becomes a woman who has had intercourse, as the Gemara will explain below.

According to Rabbi, she is considered a woman who has had intercourse, whereas according to the Sages she is still considered a virgin.

According to Rabbi, it is obvious that if the betrothed man had intercourse with her in an unusual manner, she becomes a woman who has had intercourse. Consequently, if she commits adultery, her punishment is strangulation rather than stoning.

But even the Sages agree that intercourse by the betrothed man in an unusual manner causes her to be considered a woman who has had intercourse; she is no longer considered a virgin.

For

Rabbi and the Sages disagree only up to this point

as to whether she becomes a woman who has had intercourse through intercourse in an unusual manner,

but only

with

a

man

other

than her husband who had intercourse with her in an unusual manner.

But if the husband had intercourse [

the betrothed man]—

everyone agrees that if he had intercourse with her,

even

in an unusual manner, he made her

thereby

a woman who has had intercourse.” [

And this matter is derived below from the verse, “A woman who has had intercourse with a husband.”]

The Gemara now explains which beraita Abaye learned from concerning the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages:

What is it

—the beraita on which Abaye relied?

As it was taught: If ten men had intercourse with her,

with the betrothed virgin girl,

in an unusual manner,

through intercourse in an unusual manner,

and she still was

left

a virgin—

all of them

are judged

by stoning.

These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi

disagrees and

says: I say that the first

is judged

by stoning,

because he had intercourse with her while she was still a virgin,

whereas all

all those who had intercourse with her after him, are judged

by strangulation,

because she became a woman who has had intercourse through the first man, despite the fact that he had intercourse with her in an unusual manner.

Abaye said concerning this that even the Sages agree that if the betrothed man had intercourse with her first, she becomes a woman who has had intercourse.

Abaye challenged them: According to this, the objection returns: How could we say that a woman is acquired by her husband only through money and intercourse? If you say so, you will not find a betrothed virgin girl whose punishment is stoning!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: You can find this,

you can find such a case,

for example, if he betrothed her

the betrothed man

with a document.

A document certainly effects acquisition independently, even without intercourse.

The reason is:

since

a document

completes the acquisition and removes

the woman from her husband without anything additional, therefore, also with regard to betrothal, the document

completes the acquisition and brings her in

without intercourse.

Therefore, had the Torah stated only, “When a man takes a woman and has intercourse with her,” and had it not stated, “A woman who has had intercourse with a husband,” I would have said that money and intercourse effect acquisition only when both are performed together, whereas a document effects acquisition independently. And the betrothed virgin girl who is stoned would be one who was betrothed with a document, had not yet had intercourse with her husband, remained a virgin, and then committed adultery with another man while betrothed to him.

Consequently, Rabbi Yoḥanan needed to derive from the verse “A woman who has had intercourse with a husband” that intercourse effects acquisition independently.

It follows that the verse, “When a man takes a woman, and has intercourse with her,” must be interpreted as follows: “When he takes” refers to an independent acquisition with money, and “and has intercourse with her” refers to an independent acquisition through intercourse.

This proves that money effects acquisition without intercourse, and intercourse effects acquisition without money.

Thus far, it has been explained why Rabbi Yoḥanan needed to learn that intercourse effects acquisition of a woman from the verse “A woman who has had intercourse with a husband,” and did not learn it from the verse “and has intercourse with her.”

But the question arises:

And Rabbi Yoḥanan, this

“

and has intercourse with her”—

what does he do with it? What is the purpose of its being written?

And we answer: That verse

is needed

to teach him

that specifically

this [

woman]

is acquired

by her husband

through intercourse.

But

however,

the

Hebrew

maidservant is not acquired

by her master

through intercourse.

For had the verse not stated, “When a man takes a woman, and has intercourse with her,”

it might enter your mind

that

it could be derived through a kal va-chomer from a yevama,

that the Hebrew maidservant is acquired through intercourse, by means of a kal va-chomer from a yevama—

And if a yevama, who is not acquired with money,

nevertheless

is acquired

by the yavam

through intercourse,

this one,

the Hebrew maidservant,

who

is easier to acquire, since she

is acquired with money—

is it not logically inferred

to say

that she is acquired

also

through intercourse?!

Therefore, with regard to a woman the verse states, “When a man takes a woman, and has intercourse with her,” to teach that only a woman is acquired by her husband through intercourse, whereas the Hebrew maidservant is not acquired by her master through intercourse.

And we challenge this: How could one have entertained the possibility that the maidservant is acquired by her master through intercourse, by means of a kal va-chomer from the acquisition of a yevama by the yavam?

After all, the kal va-chomer can be refuted, as follows:

What is there about a yevama

that she is acquired through intercourse? This is because

she is already obligated and designated

for intercourse in fulfillment of levirate marriage on account of her deceased husband’s betrothal to her brother-in-law, and it follows that the yavam’s intercourse with her serves only to complete the acquisition.

But as for a Hebrew maidservant, who is not already obligated and designated for her master, from where could we entertain the possibility that her master’s intercourse with her is effective to effect a complete acquisition in her from beginning to end?

In response to this challenge, the Gemara says that for another reason we would have entertained the possibility that the maidservant is acquired through intercourse:

It might enter your mind,

you might have said,

since the Torah wrote

in the matter of a Hebrew maidservant, whom the master designates as a wife for himself or for his son—

[Exodus 21]: “

If

a woman

he takes for himself

the master—her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights [of the Hebrew maidservant whom he designated as a wife for himself] he shall not diminish.”

The verse equated

the Hebrew maidservant [whom he designated as a wife]

with

a

different

woman.

And since the verse equated the Hebrew maidservant with a woman, I would say, on the basis of this equation:

Just as a different [

woman]

is acquired

by her husband

through intercourse,

so too the Hebrew maidservant is acquired

by her master

through intercourse.

Therefore,

it teaches us

that the verse, “When a man takes a woman, and has intercourse with her,” teaches that only a woman is acquired by her husband through intercourse, and the Hebrew maidservant is not acquired by her master through intercourse.

Thus far, the Gemara has explained Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view, that he learned the betrothal effected through intercourse from the verse “A woman who has had intercourse with a husband.”

The Gemara now explains Rabbi’s view, that he learned the betrothal effected through intercourse from the verse “and has intercourse with her.”

And

we ask:

Rabbi—

from where does he derive this principle?

From where does Rabbi learn that a Hebrew maidservant is not acquired through intercourse? After all, according to him, the word “and has intercourse with her” is needed to teach the very institution of betrothal through intercourse, and not to exclude the acquisition of a Hebrew maidservant through intercourse!

And we answer: Rabbi holds that

if so,

if the verse was indeed written only to teach the very institution of betrothal through intercourse, and nothing more—

the Merciful One should have written

“and has intercourse”

without the additional letter heh.

What is the meaning of

“and has intercourse with her”?

Why did the verse say “and has intercourse with her,” with the additional letter heh?

Conclude from it that there are two

things learned from this verse:

a. The very institution of betrothal through intercourse is learned from “and has intercourse.”

b. The additional letter heh excludes the Hebrew maidservant from being acquired by her master through intercourse.

But the Gemara challenges this answer:

Below, [51a], Abaye and Rava disagree concerning the law of “betrothals that are not fit for intercourse,” meaning betrothals performed in a manner in which it is forbidden for the husband to have intercourse with the woman,

for example, one who says to the father of two girls or minors, “One of your two daughters is betrothed to me,” without specifying which of them is betrothed to him.

If his betrothal takes effect with one of them without it being established which of them is betrothed to him, intercourse with both of them becomes forbidden to him. For with regard to each of them there is concern that the betrothal took effect with her sister, in which case she is his wife’s sister, and it is forbidden for a man to have intercourse with his wife’s sister.

According to Abaye, the betrothals take effect, and both women become forbidden to him.

According to Rava, betrothals that are not available for intercourse are not betrothals, and he is permitted to both of them; likewise, they are permitted to marry another man without a bill of divorce from the one who betrothed them.

Bar Ahina brought a source for Rava’s opinion from the verse, which states: “When a man takes a woman, and has intercourse with her.”

“When he takes” refers to betrothal with money [which is learned through the gzera shava “taking” and “taking” from the field of Ephron]. This verse teaches that only a taking with money that is fit for intercourse has the power to effect betrothal.

Accordingly, with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who expounded “and has intercourse with her” only once [to exclude the Hebrew maidservant from being acquired through intercourse], it is understandable that one can derive an additional exposition—that betrothals not available for intercourse are not betrothals—for the additional letter heh in the word “and has intercourse with her” is superfluous for the purpose of another exposition.

But

according

to

Rava, who said: Bar Ahina [

the name of an amora]

explained it to me,

he explained to me that I can bring a source for my view that betrothals not available for intercourse are not betrothals from the exposition of the verse [Deuteronomy 24]: “

When a man takes a woman—

and has intercourse with her,”

from here it follows that only

betrothals available for intercourse are betrothals,

but

betrothals not available for intercourse [

in which it is impossible to read, “When a man takes a woman, and has intercourse with her”]—

are not betrothals.

And if Rabbi indeed derived two expositions from the word “and has intercourse with her,” as we said above [that a woman is acquired through intercourse, and that a Hebrew maidservant is not acquired through intercourse], this is difficult:

what can be said?

How did Rava learn from this verse that betrothals not available for intercourse are not betrothals? He has no superfluous element in this verse by virtue of which he could derive a third exposition!

And we answer: According to Rava, there is an additional superfluous element in this verse:

If so,

if the verse had indeed been written only to teach us these two expositions,

the verse should have written

“When a man takes a woman

or has intercourse with her”!

After all, intercourse is an independent act of acquisition.

What is the meaning of

“and has intercourse with her”?—

Why was “and has intercourse with her” written with the conjunction “and”?

Therefore,

conclude from it all of them,

that all three expositions are to be learned from here—

a. “Had intercourse”—teaches that she is acquired through intercourse.

b. The letter heh excludes the Hebrew maidservant from being acquired by her master through intercourse.

c. The conjunction “and” teaches that there must be betrothal with money, by virtue of which the woman is fit for intercourse.

But another question must still be asked concerning Rabbi— —

Rabbi Yoḥanan learned from the verse “a woman who has had intercourse with a husband” that she acquires the status of a wife through intercourse, whereas Rabbi learned this from “and has intercourse with her.”

If so,

Rabbi, this

“a woman who has had intercourse with a husband”—

what does he do with it?

What does Rabbi derive from the verse “a woman who has had intercourse with a husband”?

And we answer:

This is needed to teach him,

the verse is needed to teach that only

the husband makes her a woman who has had intercourse

through

intercourse in an unusual manner, and another does not make her a woman who has had intercourse through intercourse in an unusual manner,

as long as she is still a virgin [and in accordance with Abaye’s reasoning above].

And we challenge this:

Does Rabbi really hold this view?!

Does Rabbi indeed hold that there is a distinction between the husband and another man with regard to intercourse in an unusual manner?

But it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

If they had intercourse with her,

with the betrothed girl,

ten men

through intercourse in an unusual manner,

and she was still a virgin—

all

of them are judged

by stoning,

according to the law of one who has intercourse with a betrothed virgin girl. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi says: I say that

only

the first

is judged

by stoning,

because he had intercourse with her while she was still a virgin.

And

if

all,

all those who had intercourse with her after him, are judged

by strangulation,

according to the law of one who has intercourse with a married woman who has had intercourse.

From here it follows that according to Rabbi, even another man, who is not the husband, makes the girl a “woman who has had intercourse” through intercourse in an unusual manner!