Kiddushin 80a (פ.) — the Talmud in English

They taught this only

that one relies on the fact that they cling to her in order to presume that they are her sons

but

with regard to permitting them

to

eat

teruma from the border

, that is, teruma, which may be eaten only by fit kohanim. Since this fit woman is presumed to be their mother, they too are presumed fit.

But

to presume them

with regard to lineage, no

: They are not presumed with certainty to be the sons of this woman. And if there are daughters among them, they are forbidden to marry a kohen. For we are still concerned that perhaps they are the daughters of another woman who is disqualified from marrying a kohen, in which case they are ḥalalot.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

One relies on the fact that she is their mother

even

with regard to presuming them

to have valid lineage.

And

this follows the view of

Rabbi Yoḥanan in accordance with his own reasoning.

As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

a.

One is flogged on the basis of presumptions.

It is sufficient that something is presumed by us to be forbidden, even if we do not have clear testimony that the act was in fact a transgression, in order to punish for it with lashes.

b. And they said this not only with regard to the punishment of lashes, but also

one is stoned or burned on the basis of

the

presumptions.

c.

And

, however,

one does not burn teruma on the basis of presumptions

. If the teruma did not certainly become impure, but according to what is presumed by us we must assume that it became impure—for example, a child touched it, and we did not see that he became impure, but he is presumed impure because he is accustomed to rummaging through refuse in which there are always creeping animals and carcasses—we do not burn it as impure teruma. Rather, we suspend it [we neither eat nor burn it], as in a case of uncertain impurity.

And we explain Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

a. “

One is flogged on the basis of presumptions

” —

as

we find in the statement of

Rav Yehuda.

As Rav Yehuda said:

A woman who was

presumed

to be

a menstruating woman among her neighbors

, because they saw that she was dressed that day in the clothing she customarily wears during her menstruation, if

her husband

had relations with her, he is

flogged because of her

for violating the prohibition of

menstruation.

Although it was not established by witnesses that she was impure, it is sufficient that she is presumed to be so on the basis of her clothing.

b. And this statement

: “

One is stoned or burned on the basis of presumptions ” -

This is

as

the case

that

we find in the statement of

Rabba bar Rav Huna.

As Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A man and a woman

with

a male child and a female child, who grew up within

that

house

, are presumed by us to be husband and wife, and the children are presumed to be their offspring.

And if the son had relations with the woman, they are

stoned, each because of the other

, because she is presumed to be his mother, and when one has relations with his mother, both are executed by stoning.

And

if the man had relations with the daughter, they are

burned, each

because of the other

. Since she is presumed to be his daughter, and when one has relations with his daughter, both are executed by burning.

Learn from this that even when there is no testimony that they are relatives, it is sufficient that they are presumed to be so in order to execute them with the death penalty.

Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: There was an incident involving a woman who came to Jerusalem with a child riding on her shoulder, and she raised him

, and when he grew up, he

had relations with her

. They brought them to the court, and they stoned them.

And they

did not

stone them

because he was certainly her son

, for there were no witnesses to this fact.

Rather, because he

was

clinging to her

, he was presumed to be her son. They stoned them solely on the basis of the presumption.

c.

And

with regard to what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, “

One does not burn teruma on the basis of presumptions

,” he already disputed this matter with Reish Lakish.

As Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One burns on the basis of presumptions

. Teruma that is impure on the basis of a presumption is considered certainly impure, and its law is that it must be burned.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One does not burn

the teruma because it is presumed impure; rather, one suspends it.

And

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish followed this matter

in accordance with their own reasoning.

As we learned: A child found beside dough

, and it is unknown whether he is impure or not, and it is known that he touched the dough, for a bit of

dough is in his hand —

Rabbi Meir deems

the dough

pure. And the Sages deem it impure: Because it is the child’s way to smear his hands

[to touch] creeping animals and carcasses in refuse; therefore, he is presumed impure, and he rendered the dough impure through his contact.

And we raise a question concerning it: What is the rationale of Rabbi Meir

who deems it pure?! Surely there is certainly reason to be concerned that it is the child’s way to smear his hands.

And we answer:

He holds

that Rabbi Meir, although

most children smear their hands

, nevertheless, there is a

minority

of children who

do not

smear their hands

in this manner.

And

since the

dough

is

presumed pure

, for before the uncertainty before us arose it was pure, we say: Leave the matter in its presumptive status.

And although elsewhere we follow the majority, here it is different, because a presumption stands against it.

And

we say:

Add the minority

of “those who do not smear their hands”

to the presumption; the majority has been weakened

for it

[it has been undermined]

by

the minority. That is, the dough’s presumption of purity prevails over it.

And Rabbi Meir follows his own reasoning: He is concerned for a minority and holds that it is not entirely nullified; and wherever some additional clarification joins it, it undermines the majority.

And the Rabbis

hold: Since we follow the majority, the

minority is considered as though it does not exist

[as though it were entirely absent]. And since the presumption stands alone against the majority, we have an established principle:

When a majority and a presumption conflict, the majority prevails

. The consideration that “most children smear their hands” prevails over the dough’s presumption of purity.

Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya:

This presumptive majority,

this

“most children smear their hands,”

is

a presumption

on the basis of which teruma is burned.

This is not literally the law of a “presumption,” but rather the law of a “majority.” Nevertheless, it resembles a presumption, because it is a majority that is not present before us [the majority of the world’s children are not present before us], but is known to us on the basis of the nature of the world’s majority.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is not a presumption on the basis of which teruma is burned

. This is consistent with his view that teruma is not burned on the basis of presumptions; rather, it is suspended.

Rather, which

is the

presumption according to Rabbi Yoḥanan

, which he too acknowledges

as one on the basis of which teruma is burned?! —

He acknowledges the case cited below.

As we learned: Dough

found

inside the house, and creeping animals

that are impure

and frogs

[which do not impart impurity through contact]

are moving about there

[and pieces of their bodies fall in that house].

And pieces were found in the dough

, and it is unknown whether the pieces are from the creeping animals and rendered it impure, or from the frogs, in which case it is pure —

If the majority

of the creatures in the house are

creeping animals

, the dough is

impure.

If

the

majority

are

frogs

, it is

pure.

This is a “majority present before us” [one that is present before us], and it is unlike the majority of “children who smear their hands,” which is not present before us but is known to us only as general knowledge.

In the case of this majority, even Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees that its status is like certainty. And if the teruma is presumed impure on the basis of this majority, it is burned as the law of definite impurity.

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan: There are two things that have no capacity to be asked about, and the Sages made them like things that do have the capacity to be asked about.

A sota is a woman whose husband warned her not to seclude herself with a particular man, and she went and secluded herself with him. The Torah forbade her to her husband and treated her as though she were certainly impure until she drinks the sota water. This is so even though it was not established with certainty that she had relations with him.

And from here we learned that every uncertainty concerning impurity in a private domain is impure. For this purpose, every place in which there are no more than two people is considered a private domain. For in the case of a sota as well, there were only two people; if another man besides the woman and the man with whom she secluded herself had been there, this would no longer be considered seclusion.

But a place in which three people are present is like a public domain. And an uncertainty concerning impurity in a public domain is pure.

We also learned from there that it is specifically when the uncertainty arose through a person with awareness, who has the capacity to be asked about the uncertainty, that we say that his uncertainty in a private domain is impure. This is like the uncertainty concerning a sota, where the uncertainty arose with regard to a woman who has awareness.

But if the uncertainty arose with regard to something that has no capacity to be asked about—for example, when the impurity came about without the agency of a person—even in a private domain its uncertainty is pure, because we leave it in its presumption of purity.

And the Sages said in a beraita that there are two things which, although they involve an uncertainty concerning “something that has no capacity to be asked about,” and the law should therefore be to deem them pure, the Sages nevertheless treated stringently with them as though they were things that have the capacity to be asked about, and deemed them impure.

And these are:

a child, and another “

different one.”

And we explain:

A child —

this is what we said

above: If the child touched the dough, it is impure, even though it is not certainly impure. Since a child has no capacity to be asked about the uncertainty, we should have deemed this uncertainty pure and left the dough or the child in its presumption of purity. Nevertheless, the Sages treated this case stringently and deemed it impure. “

And another different one

what is it?” —

As we learned:

Dough

found

inside the house, and

also

chickens and impure liquids

are found

there,