Kiddushin 77b — the Talmud in English

Behold

the three widows are

separate bodies

from one another, and it is established for us that if a person commits that same transgression with three different bodies, then even if all of them are forbidden to him on account of the same designation of prohibition, he is liable for lashes for each body separately.

And furthermore:

behold, the designations

of the prohibition of each one of them, they too are

separate

from one another. For this one is forbidden on account of the designation “Reuben’s widow,” and this one is forbidden on account of the designation “Simon’s widow.” And if so, he should be lashed for each designation of widow separately.

And we answer:

Rather

necessarily, this is referring to a case such as

one who had intercourse with one widow three times.

And we still wonder:

What are the circumstances?—

If they did not warn him,

if the witnesses did not warn him before each and every intercourse, then

it is obvious that he is liable for only one

for it is impossible for him to be lashed three times on account of one warning.

Rather,

necessarily, this is referring to a case such as

they warned him,

the witnesses gave separate warnings

for each one and one

of the acts of intercourse.

If so, the other side is difficult:

why is he liable for only

lashes

one?

Surely he should be lashed for each warning and warning.

For

did we not learn: A nazirite who was drinking wine all day long,

and they warned him only once,

is liable for only one.

But if

they said to him,

they warned him several times, “

Do not drink,” “

Do not drink,”

and he

transgressed their warnings and

drank,

then he is

liable for each one and one

of the warnings.

And we answer:

It is necessary;

this is referring only to a case such as

he had intercourse

once

with

one woman who had been widowed by three husbands, who was

Reuben’s widow,

and

who was Simon’s widow,

and

who was Levi’s widow.

And the novelty—that he is lashed only once for one act of intercourse involving one prohibition—is:

It might have entered your mind

that perhaps you would say:

behold,

three

designations

of prohibition

separate

exist in this woman, since she is Reuben’s widow, Simon’s widow, and Levi’s widow; and for that one act of intercourse he should be lashed on account of each designation separately.

Therefore

he teaches us

that

we require separate bodies

in order to make him liable for three sets of lashes,

and

here there

is not

three bodies, but only one body.

The tannaim disagreed as to whether any prohibition can take effect upon a person or an object when it has already previously been forbidden by another prohibition.

Some say: A prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition.

And some say: A prohibition does take effect upon a prohibition.

And there is one who holds that only if the second prohibition adds nothing to the first prohibition does it not take effect; but if it adds an additional detail that was not included within the first prohibition, then it takes effect even upon the details that were already forbidden by the first prohibition. Since it takes effect with regard to the additional matter, it takes effect completely.

We learned in a beraita: One who has intercourse with a woman who is

a widow, a divorcee, a woman rendered unfit, and a zona,

when these prohibitions took effect upon her in this order, is liable for each one and one.

And we inquire into it:

What does this tanna hold?

If he holds that a prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition, the reverse also

he should be liable for each one and one even if these prohibitions took effect in the reverse order.

And if he holds that a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition, even in this order, also not

should he be liable for lashes for all the prohibitions, but only for the prohibition that took effect upon her first.

Rava said: This tanna does not have the principle that a prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition.

But

the principle of an additive prohibition

he does have.

He holds that if the second prohibition adds to the first, the second one also takes effect.

And therefore, only because these four prohibitions took effect in this order is it found that each one adds to the preceding one, and therefore he is lashed for all of them—

For at first, when the prohibition of

widow took effect upon her,

she was

forbidden to the High Priest

only,

and

she was still

permitted

to

an ordinary priest,

for an ordinary priest was not forbidden to marry a widow.

And when the prohibition of a divorcee was added to her, she became forbidden on its account even to an ordinary priest. Therefore

it became for her

the prohibition of

a divorcee “an additive prohibition,” and therefore,

because it is an additional prohibition,

since it was added

because

a prohibition was added to her with regard to an ordinary priest, a prohibition was added to her

of a divorcee also

with regard to the High Priest.

And she was still permitted

she was permitted

to eat teruma,

if she was the daughter of a priest, since a divorced daughter of a priest is permitted to eat teruma.

And when the prohibition of a woman rendered unfit was added to her, she became forbidden even to eat teruma. Therefore

it became for her

the prohibition of

a woman rendered unfit “an additive prohibition,” and therefore,

because

since a prohibition was added to eat teruma, a prohibition was added

of a woman rendered unfit also

with regard to the High Priest,

and he is lashed for this.

And through this it has been explained why the first three prohibitions took effect one upon the other.

Rather,

it still has not been explained why the prohibition of a zona, which came last, also took effect upon them. For

what additive prohibition does a zona have

in addition to a woman rendered unfit?

Rav Hana bar Rav Ketina said:

The prohibition of a zona too is considered to add to the prohibition of a woman rendered unfit,

since the

designation of prostitution

disqualifies in Israel. For although the disqualification of a woman rendered unfit applies only to priests, the disqualification of a “zona” sometimes applies even in Israel, such as an Israelite woman who committed adultery while married to her husband, since she becomes forbidden to him.

Although this discussion does not concern the zenut of a married woman, but rather the zenut resulting from intercourse with one who is subject to a prohibition of a negative commandment, and this disqualification does not apply to Israelites, nevertheless, since the general designation of zenut applies also to Israelites, the general prohibition of a zonah is considered an additional prohibition to that of a woman rendered unfit, which applies only to priestly status.

And although this case does not involve the prostitution of a married woman, but rather prostitution through intercourse with one liable for prohibitions, and this disqualification does not apply in Israel, nevertheless, since the general designation of prostitution applies even in Israel, the general prohibition of a zona is considered an additive prohibition to that of a woman rendered unfit, which is a priestly prohibition בלבד.

A tanna taught before Rav Sheshet:

It is stated concerning the High Priest [Leviticus 21:13], “And he shall take a woman in her virginity,” and adjacent to this the verse says, “A widow, or a divorcee, or a woman rendered unfit, or a zona—these he shall not take.”

And the adjacency of these verses teaches that here too the principle exists that a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition, and this verse is expounded as follows:

Every

woman

whom he,

the High Priest, fulfills

by

taking her the mitzva of “And he shall take a woman in her virginity,”

shall take,

behold,

when she is a widow,

he

transgresses against her

with “

a widow

he shall not take.”

But

every

woman who was forbidden to him even when she was a virgin,

he does not

the High Priest fulfill

by

taking her the mitzva of “And he shall take a woman in her virginity,”

shall take,

also

does not

transgress against her when he takes her as a widow

with “

a widow

he shall not take.”

And it states this principle:

Except for a High Priest who has intercourse with his widowed sister,

for even if she is a virgin, she is forbidden to him on account of being his sister; therefore the prohibition of a widow does not take effect upon her, because a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition.

He said to him

Rav Sheshet to the one who taught this beraita before him:

The one who says to you [

the beraita that you teach],

who is it—according to whose view is it? It is surely according to

According to whose opinion is it? It is clearly in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Shimon, who says: A prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition.

And for this reason the prohibition of a widow does not take effect upon the prohibition of his sister.

For it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats an unslaughtered animal on the Day of Atonement is exempt

from the punishment of karet for the Day of Atonement, because the prohibition of an unslaughtered animal [or the prohibition of a limb from a living animal] preceded the prohibition of eating on the Day of Atonement, and a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition.

For if

it is like

the Rabbis, this

they disagree with Rabbi Shimon, and

say, “

A prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition,”

and he is liable also on account of the prohibition of eating on the Day of Atonement.

And according to their view, a High Priest who has intercourse with his widowed sister is liable also on account of a widow, and not as the beraita you brought taught.

But the Gemara rejects his words:

Even if you say

that the beraita stands according to the view of

the Rabbis,

it is also not difficult. Because

when the Rabbis said, “

A prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition,”

this applies

to

a stringent prohibition

that takes effect

upon a lenient prohibition,

such as the prohibition of eating on the Day of Atonement, which is a stringent prohibition because its punishment is karet, and it can take effect upon the lenient prohibition of an unslaughtered animal [or the prohibition of a limb from a living animal], which is a prohibition whose punishment is lashes, and the Day of Atonement is more stringent than it.

But

they too concede that

a lenient prohibition upon a stringent prohibition does not take effect.

Therefore the lenient prohibition of a widow [which is only a negative commandment and not karet] does not take effect upon the stringent prohibition of his sister, which involves karet.

There are those who say

that this is what Rav Sheshet said to him:

this

beraita,

who is it?—

According to the view of

the Rabbis, who say: A prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition.

And when the Rabbis say, “

A prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition,”

this applies to a stringent prohibition upon a lenient prohibition.

But a lenient prohibition upon a stringent prohibition does not take effect.

Therefore, even according to their view, the prohibition of a widow does not take effect upon the prohibition of his sister.

And it is specifically according to the view of the Sages.

For if

you will say that it is according to

Rabbi Shimon,

why was it necessary to teach it at all and derive this from the adjacency of the verses?

Behold,

now

Rabbi Shimon holds that even

a stringent prohibition upon a lenient prohibition does not take effect;

if so, that

a lenient prohibition upon a stringent prohibition

does not take effect

is it necessary

for him to say and derive this from the verse?!

And we reject this: Although Rabbi Shimon had already said that a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition, it was necessary in our matter to teach it again and derive this from the adjacency of the verses.

For

it might have entered your mind

that perhaps you would say

the priestly prohibition is different,

and properly takes effect even upon prohibitions more stringent than it, since Scripture increased additional commandments for priests.

He teaches us

the tanna in the beraita that even a priestly prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: An Israelite who has intercourse with his sister, he certainly makes her a zona

he certainly

makes her [

makes her] unfit for the priesthood, for she becomes a “zona” through any intercourse forbidden by a sexual transgression.

But the disqualification of

a woman rendered unfit—

does he

make her [

make her],

or does he not make her?

Do we say:

Is it not

a kal va-chomer: If we find that

intercourse with those subject to negative commandments

from

intercourse with

those liable for negative commandments she becomes a woman rendered unfit [

for a High Priest who has intercourse with a widow makes her a woman rendered unfit, as stated above], then from intercourse with

those liable for karet, all the more so

that she should become a woman rendered unfit?!

Or perhaps: No

the woman becomes

a woman rendered unfit only from

intercourse forbidden by

a priestly prohibition,

but not from intercourse whose prohibition is equally applicable to all.

He said to him

Abaye:

There is no [

prohibition]

of a halala

is created,

except from

intercourse with

a prohibition of the priesthood alone.

Rava said: From where is this matter that the Sages said: There is no halala except from a prohibition of the priesthood!?

For it was taught:

It is written concerning the High Priest: “A widow and a divorcee and a halala, a harlot, these he shall not take”!

And it is written concerning an ordinary kohen: “A woman who is a harlot or a halala they shall not take, and a divorced woman from her husband they shall not take.”

And from here one may reason:

The verse should not have said

the prohibition of

“a divorcee”

concerning the High Priest, and it should come

and be learned

by a kal va-chomer from

the divorcee mentioned concerning an

ordinary kohen.

And I say [

and I say and expound it myself, by a kal va-chomer]:

Now, if she is forbidden to an ordinary kohen,

the divorcee,

is it necessary for the High Priest

for the verse to write and say that she is forbidden to him, when she is already forbidden to him by virtue of his priesthood as an ordinary kohen?!

And if so,

why was

“a divorcee”

said concerning the High Priest?

To teach us: Just as a divorcee is distinct from a harlot and a halala in the case of an ordinary kohen,

in that she has a prohibition of her own,

so is she distinct

the divorcee from them

in the case of the High Priest.

For if she is also a harlot and a halala and also a divorcee, he is lashed for her also on account of being a divorcee. And although in the case of the High Priest all of them were stated in a single prohibition [“these he shall not take”], and they were not divided into two prohibitions as in the case of an ordinary kohen, we learn one from the other through the redundancy of “a divorcee,” which was written concerning him.

And we object: Is this not also

obvious?

For does the fact that the kohen was appointed High Priest mean that

his sanctity becomes deficient

and he is not liable for everything for which an ordinary kohen is liable? For he is indeed liable for two [prohibitions] by virtue of his sanctity as an ordinary kohen [which does not cease when the sanctity of a High Priest is added to him]!

Rather,

why was “a divorcee” said? To tell us:

Just as a divorcee is distinct from a harlot and a halala in the case of an ordinary kohen,

and one is lashed for her separately,

so a widow is distinct

from

a divorcee and a halala and a harlot in the case of the High Priest,

so that if he has intercourse with a woman who possesses all these designations, he is lashed also on account of being a widow. “

A halala”

why was it said

also concerning the High Priest? Is he not already forbidden to her by virtue of his status as an ordinary kohen—

Rather, from the fact that the verse repeated and wrote “a halala” concerning the High Priest, and specifically wrote this order, “a widow and a divorcee, and a halala, a harlot,” it follows that the verse placed “a halala” after a widow and a divorcee, which are prohibitions of the priesthood, and did not place a halala after the prohibition of “a harlot,” which applies also among Israelites [in the case of a married woman who committed adultery], in order to teach us:

There is no halala except from a prohibition of the priesthood.

And from here Rava brought the source of the law that there is no halala except from prohibitions of the priesthood.

And the beraita continues and says: “

A harlot,”

why was it said

concerning the High Priest? For a

gzera shava:

It is said here,

“a harlot,”

and it is said there,

concerning an ordinary kohen,

“a harlot.”

To teach us:

Just as here,

in the case of the High Priest,

his offspring,

who was born from intercourse with a widow, is

profane [

disqualified from the priesthood], as it is written, “He shall not profane his offspring,”

so also there,

in the case of an ordinary kohen who has intercourse with a woman forbidden to him on account of the priesthood,

his offspring

from her is

profane.