Kiddushin 74a (עד.) — the Talmud in English

And we raised this objection:

Then let us see from whom he took the money

that is, let us ask the seller from whom he received the money]. For he certainly remembers from whom he received the money—even after the sale has left his possession. On that basis, we will know to whom he sold it, since he certainly sold it to the one who gave him the money. And why is the seller not deemed credible after the sale has left his possession?

And we answer:

It is not necessary;

the case is one in which

he took [

the seller received]

money from both of them, and said: One

gave me the money

willingly [

of my own accord],

and the other

gave it to me

against my will.

And

since the sold item is no longer in his possession, he

no longer knows [

the seller does not remember]

which [

of them] gave it to him

willingly, and which

gave it to him

unwillingly.

The Gemara brings the continuation of that same beraita: Two litigants, each of whom says, “I won the case!”—

The

judge

is believed to say: I acquitted

this litigant,

and

convicted

that litigant!

In what case

is the judge believed? When the

litigants

are still

standing before him. For as long as they have not left him, he still remembers whom he acquitted and whom he convicted.

But if the litigants are no longer standing before him,

but

if they have already

left, the judge is not believed, since once they have left him, he is no longer charged with remembering the verdict.

And we raised this objection:

Then let us see

who is holding the document of acquittal!?

Let us check who is holding the writ recording the favorable judgment; why should there be any uncertainty?

And we answer:

It is not necessary; the

[the document]

of their acquittal has been torn up.

And we again ask: Why is it necessary to believe him regarding whom he acquitted?

Let him go back and judge them!

For the judge can judge them again, and thereby it will become clear who is liable and who is entitled.

And we answer: What are we dealing with here?

With a discretionary judgment by the judge.

This is a case in which there was no way to determine the law according to the laws of monetary claims. In such a case, the judgment is issued according to the judge’s assessment, and he has the authority to acquit whichever litigant his heart inclines him to regard as the rightful owner of the money.

Once he has ruled in favor of one of them, he may no longer retract his decision. Therefore, the litigants do not agree to litigate the case anew, lest the judge’s inclination now turn toward the other side.

Rav Naḥman said: Three are deemed credible

to testify

about the

child who is a

firstborn [

to receive a double portion of his father’s inheritance].

And these are: the midwife [

the woman who delivered the child],

his father, and his mother.

The

midwife

is deemed credible only

immediately,

close to the time of birth. This law was already explained above.

His mother

is deemed credible to testify about him

for seven days

after the birth, since his father still does not recognize him. For he has not yet emerged from his mother’s care to enter the covenant. But from the time that his father recognizes him, his mother is no longer deemed credible.

And his father

is deemed credible concerning him

forever. This credibility is derived through an interpretation of the Torah.

As it was taught:

It is written [Deuteronomy 21:17]: “For he must acknowledge the firstborn, the son of the hated one, to give him a double portion.” And we interpret: “

napisano [Deyanim 21:17]: «A pervoro­dnogo, syna nenavistnitsy, on dolzhen priznat', chtoby dat' emu dve doli». I tolkuem:

He must acknowledge”

he must identify him to others!

That is, the father testifies to others that he is the firstborn, and from here we learn that the Torah granted the father a special power of credibility concerning his son.

From here Rabbi Yehuda said: A person is deemed credible to say: This

is

my son,

the

firstborn!

And just as he is deemed credible to say, “

This is my firstborn son,”

so

too he is

deemed credible

to disqualify him, and the father,

may say,

the priest-father, “

This

is my son,

the son of a divorced woman, and this is the son of a ḥalutza,”

and thereby he is deemed credible to disqualify him from the priesthood.

And the Sages say:

Although the father is deemed credible concerning his son, to say that he is a firstborn,

he is not deemed credible

to say that he is the son of a divorced woman and to disqualify him from the priesthood.

We learned in the Mishna:

Abba Shaul would call a shetuki —“

one requiring examination.”

And we raise the question:

What does “

one requiring examination” mean?

If you say that they examine his mother,

asking her by whom she became pregnant,

and she says, “

I had relations with a fit man,”

so that she is deemed credible to establish the child’s fitness—

then

according to whom

does Abba Shaul hold?

According to Rabban Gamliel,

who said in Tractate Ketubot: She is deemed credible! This cannot be said.

For we have already

learned

this law

once before. Why did Rabbi repeat it here? He should have cited Abba Shaul immediately alongside Rabban Gamliel’s statement and said that Abba Shaul holds likewise.

As we learned

in Tractate Ketubot: A single woman who

was pregnant, and they said to her, “

What is the status of this fetus?”

And she said to them: I became pregnant from a certain man,

and

he is a priest [

that is, of proper lineage and fit]—

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is

deemed credible.

The Gemara assumes that she is deemed credible concerning her own fitness, and that the child is likewise deemed fit on the basis of her statement.

And Rabbi Yehoshua says: We do not live by her word.

She is not deemed credible to establish the child’s fitness; rather, he is disqualified due to uncertainty, like a shetuki.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

who deems her credible.

I skazal Rav Yehuda ot imeni Shmu'ela: «Galahicheskoe reshenie sootvetstvuet mneniyu Rabana Gamli'ela»,

And we answer: Rabbi had to teach this law twice

—once to establish her fitness, and once to establish her daughter’s fitness. For in the Mishna there, Rabban Gamliel deemed her credible only with regard to herself. If she had relations with a ḥalal or with someone forbidden to her, she would be forbidden to marry a priest; and likewise, if she were a priest’s daughter, she would be forbidden to eat teruma. Concerning this Rabban Gamliel said: She is deemed credible when she says, “I had relations with a fit man,” and she does not become disqualified from the priesthood, since her unequivocal claim combines with her presumption of fitness.

But she is not deemed credible to say that she became pregnant from a fit man for purposes of establishing the fetus’s fitness [if it is a girl] to marry a priest, since the fetus has no presumption of fitness.

V Mishna tam Raban Gamli'el schitaet ee nadezhnoy tol'ko v otnoshenii nee samoy. Esli ona byla s muzhchino y, lishennym statusa koena, ili s tem, za kogo ey zapreshcheno byt' zamuzhem, ona zapreshchena vstupat' v brak s koenom; a esli ona sama koen, ey zapreshcheno est' terumu. O tom Raban Gamli'el skazal: ona nadezhna skazat', chto byla s podkhodyashchim muzhchinoy, i ne lishaetsya statusa koena, poskol'ku ee uverennoe utverzhdenie soedinyaetsya s prezump­tsiey ee godnosti.

She is deemed credible specifically with regard to herself, because she has a presumption of fitness. For before she had relations with him, she was certainly fit. But the fetus never had a presumption of fitness.

And concerning this, Abba Shaul added in our Mishna that the mother is deemed credible to say even concerning the child that he is fit. And we ask again:

This works out well according to the one who says

there in Tractate Ketubot that even

according to the words of

Rabban Gamliel, who

declares her

fit

and

believes her that she had relations with a fit man, he

disqualifies her daughter,

because the daughter has no presumption of fitness, and we are concerned that her father was disqualified, as explained. Thus, the tanna properly added Abba Shaul’s position in our Mishna, which disagrees with Rabban Gamliel and establishes her daughter’s fitness as well.

But according to the one who says

there, “

according to the words of

Rabban Gamliel, who

declares her fit,

even

declares her daughter fit,”

if so,

what has Abba Shaul

come to teach us?

We have already learned this from Rabban Gamliel’s words.

And we answer:

Abba Shaul’s position is superior to Rabban Gamliel’s.

We learn a greater innovation from Abba Shaul’s statement than from Rabban Gamliel’s.

For had we derived it from there,

from Rabban Gamliel,

I would have thought

that only

there

Rabban Gamliel declared her and the fetus fit, because the case concerns a place where

the majority of the people there

are fit for her.

For example, she is single, and most of the city’s inhabitants are fit to marry into the priesthood and are not ḥalalim.

But where the majority

of the people of the place

are disqualified for her,

for example, she is betrothed, and apart from her betrothed, the entire world is forbidden to her as a married woman; or even if she is single, where most of the city’s inhabitants are disqualified from the priesthood,

I might say, no:

she would not be deemed credible to testify against the majority, which establishes that she had relations with a disqualified man.

Therefore,

it is necessary for Abba Shaul to teach us that even against a majority of disqualified men, she is deemed credible when she says that she had relations with a fit man.

Poetomu

Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with Abba Shaul!

Mishna:

All who are forbidden to enter the congregation, such as mamzerim, netinim, shetukim, and foundlings,

are permitted to enter into marriage with one another.

Even a definite mamzer, who is certainly disqualified, may marry shetukim and foundlings, whose disqualification is uncertain. For the Torah prohibited a mamzer only from marrying into a congregation of definite status, not one of uncertain status.

Rabbi Yehuda prohibits.

His position will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Eliezer

says: Definite ones

V Gemare budet obyasneno ego mnenie.

definite cases of those disqualified]

with definite ones

[nesomnenno neprigodnye iz nikh]

disqualified cases]

are permitted.

For example, a mamzer and a natin, both of whom are certainly disqualified from the congregation, are permitted to marry one another.

But

definite ones

of those disqualified

with uncertain ones

of those disqualified, such as a mamzer or natin with a shetukit or foundling—

iz neprigodnykh, naprimer mamzer i netin s «molchunom» i podkid­y­shom —

and

likewise,

uncertain ones with definite ones,

such as a shetuki or foundling with a mamzeret or netina—

i

and likewise,

uncertain ones with uncertain ones

such as a shetuki with a shetuki, a foundling with a foundling, a shetuki with a foundling, or a foundling with a shetuki—

For all these, it is

forbidden to enter into marriage with one another, lest one of them be disqualified and the other fit. Rabbi Eliezer holds that a mamzer is forbidden even to marry into a congregation of uncertain status.

And these are the uncertain cases: a shetuki—

whose father is unknown, and perhaps he is disqualified;

a foundling—

whose father and mother are unknown, and perhaps they are disqualified;

and a Cuthite—

members of the people whom Sennacherib brought from Cuthah and settled in the cities of Samaria, and who converted out of fear of the lions that God sent against them. The Gemara will explain the nature of their uncertainty.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: All who are forbidden to enter the congregation are permitted to enter into marriage with one another.

And we raise the question:

What does “all who are forbidden to enter the congregation” mean?

If you say: Mamzerim, netinim, shetukim, and foundlings—

Esli skazat': mamzery, netini, «molchuny» i podkid­yshi,

this

has already

been taught at the beginning

of the previous Mishna: “

Mamzerim, netinim, shetukim, and foundlings are permitted to enter into marriage with one another.”

Why was it necessary to teach this law again?

Furthermore, there is a difficulty: If so, what is the meaning of the statement, “

Rabbi Yehuda prohibits”?

With regard to what

S chem

did Rabbi Yehuda disagree and prohibit?—

If you say that he disagreed concerning definite ones with uncertain ones,

prohibiting a mamzer from marrying a shetuki or foundling, this cannot be said.

For

since he teaches

in the

conclusion: “Rabbi Eliezer says: Definite ones with definite ones are permitted; definite ones with uncertain ones and uncertain ones with uncertain ones are forbidden,”

by inference, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold this way;

rather, he permits even a definite mamzer to marry an uncertain mamzer.

And if you would say that the statement

“

Rabbi Yehuda prohibits”

refers

to a convert with a mamzeret, and Rabbi Yehuda follows his own position [72b] that “the congregation of converts” is also called a congregation, and they too are forbidden to marry a mamzeret—this cannot be the explanation.

For

is it

at all

the case that the statement, “A

convert is permitted

to marry a mamzeret,”

is taught

in the words of the first tanna, so that it could be said that Rabbi Yehuda disagreed concerning this?

For

the Mishna teaches: “

All who are forbidden to enter the congregation

are permitted to marry one another,”

it teaches!

And a convert is not included, since he is permitted to enter the congregation.