Kiddushin 68b — the Talmud in English

But

its offspring

of the maidservant, which is

like her—

as explained in our Mishna—

from where do we know this?

Additional explanation of Tosafot’s words [based on Kehillot Yaakov, new edition, section 48, with an addition in brackets]: a. Tosafot’s question is difficult. At the time of the Gemara’s question, we still did not know that the child acquires slave status, since we had not yet learned this from “The woman and her children shall belong to her master.” Furthermore, if he is a slave, he is certainly unfit; the law that the child “follows the inferior one” certainly has nothing to do with the acquisition of slave status. If so, what does it mean to render him unfit on account of “following the inferior one”? It is not at all logical that the child should be unfit because of slave status without himself being a slave. This cannot be less than the case of a slave who is emancipated, whose disqualification is removed from him. Once the child is not a slave, what disqualification could apply to him? [Alternatively, the question can be phrased as follows: The law that the child “follows the inferior one” applies only to a disqualification that is intrinsically a “disqualification of the generations,” a disqualification transmitted by birth, such that if both parents were disqualified, the child would certainly be disqualified—as in the case of a mamzer, an Ammonite, and an Egyptian ; but we have not found that slave status is a disqualification transmitted by birth. Even if both the child’s father and mother were slaves, their children would not be disqualified unless the offspring itself were a slave ; see the words of the Mekhaneh that are cited in note 13, and see the work Mishnat Rabbi Aharon on Yevamot, page 214, which noted a formulation similar to this]. One can explain the intent of their question as follows: In truth, by logical reasoning—even without the verse “The woman and her children shall belong to her master”—slave status should apply to the child, because a maidservant is like the master’s field, and her children are like fruit growing in his field, which belong to him [see Kehillot Yaakov there for a fuller discussion]. The child would then automatically be disqualified as a slave; but without the law that he “follows the inferior one,” we would assign him the status of an Israelite on account of his father, and slave status cannot apply to an Israelite. However, since the established law is that he “follows the inferior one,” it emerges that he does not have the status of an Israelite through his father, since his mother is disqualified. Consequently, slave status applies to him because he is like the master’s produce, and he is disqualified like other slaves. [This can be explained in two ways: First, whether he is an Israelite or not is determined by the law that he “follows the inferior one,” as a number of later authorities have similarly explained. Second, only the “disqualification of slave status” is determined by the law that he “follows the inferior one”; it follows automatically that he is not an Israelite, because we relate him to his mother in order to disqualify him, and consequently he is not related to his father in order to make him an Israelite ; similar lines of reasoning are found among later authorities]. b. There is also room to examine the basic derivation from “The woman and her children shall belong to her master,” from which we learn that the son is not related to his father. This seems puzzling: Where is it hinted in the verse that he is not related to his father? This can be explained in two ways. The first, and simplest, is that once the Torah reveals that the child is a slave, we have an established principle that “a slave has no lineage”—that is, he is not related to his father—as explained in Yevamot 62a. This is derived from the verse, “Stay here with the donkey,” from which we learn that a slave is “like a donkey.” The second is that if the child were related to his father, how could the Torah say, “The woman and her children shall belong to her master”? This implies that the daughters, too, belong to their masters, whereas the father would also have a right to the proceeds of his daughters’ labor. It is therefore necessarily the case that the children are not related to their father. Now, according to what was explained in paragraph a regarding the intent of their question—that even without “The woman and her children shall belong to her master” we already knew that the child acquires slave status [at least in the case of a son]—the first explanation is impossible. Even though he is a slave, the Gemara still asks from where we know that he is not related to his father. The second explanation is therefore necessary. c. But one may ask: This itself is difficult. If “a slave has no lineage,” why are other teachings needed? [See also the Rashba, who writes in the course of his discussion: “For if not for the verse, I would have said that a maidservant has lineage like a gentile woman”; see there.] One can answer that from the verse “like a donkey” we know only that the children are not related to their father who is a slave [and this is the context in which this law is stated in Yevamot there], because “a donkey has no legal fatherhood with regard to those born from it.” But when the father is an Israelite and his child is a slave, one could still say that the child is considered his son, since an Israelite has legal fatherhood with regard to those born from him. Therefore, the verse “The woman and her children” is needed, to teach that even a son who is a slave has no lineage or connection whatsoever to his Israelite father”—the words of Kehillot Yaakov.

Because

the verse says concerning a Canaanite maidservant designated for a Hebrew slave [who is a complete Israelite]: “If his master gives him a woman, and she bears him sons or daughters

;

the woman [

the Canaanite maidservant]

and her children shall belong to her master

and he shall go out [from the master] by himself.” Thus, the son does not go out free with his father; rather, he is a slave like his mother.

The Gemara returned to explain our Mishna:

A gentile woman—

with whom kiddushin does not take effect, as explained in our Mishna—

from where do we know this?

Because

the verse says [Deuteronomy 7], concerning the seven nations in the Land of Israel: “When the Lord your God brings you to the land to which you are coming to possess it, and He casts out many nations before you, the Hittite and the Girgashite ... and the Lord your God gives them before you and you strike them

.

You shall not intermarry with them

; your daughter you shall not give to his son, and his daughter you shall not take for your son. For he will turn your son away from following Me, and they will serve other gods.” The language of the verse implies: “You shall have no marriage with them.” Thus, kiddushin does not take effect with a gentile woman. The Gemara further discusses:

We find

indeed, we find a derivation

that kiddushin does not take effect

[with a gentile woman]

with her [with a gentile woman],

but that

her offspring is like her—

as explained in our Mishna—

from where do we know this?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai:

Because

the verse says

concerning the seven nations: “You shall not intermarry with them; your daughter you shall not give to his son, and his daughter you shall not take for your son.

For he will turn away

[the son of the gentile to whom you give your daughter]

your son

[that is, the son of your daughter born to them]

from following Me, and they will serve other gods.” -

Thus, the verse was particular to be concerned about the turning away from following the Lord of the son born from them only when you give your daughter to his son. But when you take his daughter for your son, the verse was not particular to be concerned about the turning away from following the Lord of the son born from them, for the verse said only, “For he will turn away”—your gentile son-in-law will turn your Israelite grandson away—and it did not say, “For she will turn away”—your gentile daughter-in-law will turn your gentile grandson away. We have therefore learned: only

The verse was concerned about the possibility that the child born from them would be turned away from the Lord only when you give your daughter to his son. But when you take his daughter for your son, the verse was not concerned that the child born from them would be turned away from the Lord. The verse says only, “For he will turn away”—your gentile son-in-law will turn your Israelite grandson away—and it does not say, “For she will turn away”—your gentile daughter-in-law will turn your gentile grandson away. We therefore learn that only

your son

[that is, your grandson]

who comes from an Israelite woman—

that is, from your daughter, who is an Israelite woman married to a gentile— -

is called “

your son,”

for he is affiliated with you, and he is an Israelite; therefore the Torah was particular about his being turned away from following the Lord by your gentile son-in-law—

but your son

[your grandson]

who comes from the gentile woman—

that is, the son of your son married to a gentile woman—

is called “

your son”

only

he is called “

her son,” for he is not affiliated with you; rather, he is a gentile.

meaning that he is not related to you, but is a gentile.

Ravina said: Learn from this

from what the Torah said, “For he will turn your son away,” and Rabbi Yohanan explained it that the intention is the son of your daughter:

the son of your daughter who comes from a gentile is called “

your son,”

for he is affiliated with you, and he is an Israelite.

The Gemara discusses: Let us say that Ravina holds [is it indeed possible to say that Ravina holds] that

a gentile or a slave who has relations with an Israelite woman—

the offspring is a mamzer!

Since Ravina said that the offspring of a gentile who has relations with an Israelite woman is an Israelite, if so, the disqualification of mamzerut applies to him like to other Israelites; and since he was born through a transgression

from one with whom kiddushin does not take effect for him, he is a mamzer. As we learned in the third general rule in our Mishna: “And anyone with whom she has no kiddushin, the offspring is a mamzer.”

Since Ravina said that when a gentile has intercourse with an Israelite woman, the child is an Israelite, it would follow that the disqualification of mamzer applies to him, like other Israelites. Since he was born through a transgression from one with whom betrothal to her is not effective, he is a mamzer. This is like what we learned in the third general clause of our Mishna: “And anyone with whom she cannot have effective betrothal, the child is a mamzer.” Even a child born from intercourse with a person subject to a prohibition of uncertain severity, or with a person subject to a positive prohibition, who does not become a mamzer, is nevertheless “blemished” with regard to marriage into the priesthood. Thus, if the child is a daughter, she is forbidden to a priest because she is “tainted.” If the child is a son, the early authorities disagree whether he disqualifies a woman through intercourse with her, like a profaned priest, who disqualifies a woman through intercourse, or whether such a blemish applies to a son only in the case of a daughter. And we reject this:

is

completely

fit

the child born from intercourse between a gentile and an Israelite woman

is not—the offspring born from a gentile’s intercourse with an Israelite woman—nevertheless he also

is not a mamzer;

rather, he is only called a

“disqualified”

is called,

for he is defective with respect to the priesthood.

And this is so: even though you indeed have grounds to prove that he is not completely fit, since he is an Israelite, and because he was born from one whose relationship with him had no kiddushin validity, he is disqualified for the kehunah because he was born through a transgression, and necessarily he has at least some disqualification for the kehunah, like other Israelites born from those liable to lavin or those liable to positive commandments, who are disqualified for the kehunah; nevertheless, you cannot infer from the words of Ravina that he is a mamzer, even though he is an Israelite and the disqualification of mamzerut applies to him. For we did not learn in our Mishna the law of mamzerut regarding everyone born from a couple between whom there is no validity of kiddushin; rather, this is what we learned: “Anyone with whom she has no kiddushin with him, but with others she has kiddushin, the child is a mamzer.” But in the case of an Israelite woman who has intercourse with a gentile, kiddushin does not take effect for the gentile with any Israelite woman, and not only with this one; therefore, the child is not a mamzer.

And here the Gemara returns to what was learned in the Gemara above: that kiddushin has no validity with a gentile woman, from “You shall not intermarry with them,” and that the child of a gentile woman is like her, from the verse “for he will turn away”; and we ask:

But

that

verse—“You shall not intermarry with them; you shall not give your daughter to his son, for he will turn away”—is written only

with regard to the seven nations

in the Land of Israel, as it

is written,

and indeed we learned from this verse that kiddushin does not take effect for them and that the children of their daughters are like them.

But

the other

seventy

nations—

from where do we know

that kiddushin does not take effect with them and that the children of their daughters are like them? And we answer:

the verse says

in that passage: “

for he will turn away your son,”

and we learn

to include

also

all

the gentiles

who turn away

from following the Lord—that is, all the gentiles.

a. Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagreed [Bava Metzia 115a] regarding the law of what the Torah said [Deuteronomy 24:17]: “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral [you shall not take as security for your debt the garment of the widow who is your debtor],” whether this law applies also to a wealthy widow, or only to a poor one.

The issue is as follows: the reason for the Torah’s prohibition against taking a widow’s garment as collateral is that the Torah said [Deuteronomy 24:12]: “And if he is a poor man, you shall not lie down with his pledge.” Thus, if you take a widow’s garment as collateral, every morning you take it from her and in the evening you return it to her, and the neighbors see a strange man going in and out of a woman’s house morning and evening, and a bad name is given to the widow. This reason applies only to a poor widow, who has only one garment, so that you come to her house regularly, but not to a wealthy woman, who has other garments besides the garment that she pledges for the loan.

But the Sages hold: only where the Torah stated its reason explicitly do we indeed say that it came to teach us that where this reason does not exist, the Torah’s law does not apply; but where the Torah did not state its reason, even though we know its reason, nevertheless the law does not change, and even where this reason does not apply, the Torah’s law does not change.

b. Since the reason for the Torah’s prohibition against intermarriage with the seven nations is the concern that the gentile spouse or his family will turn away from the Lord the Israelite who entered their household and lead him astray to worship other gods [as the Torah stated the reason: “for he will turn away your son from following Me, and they will worship other gods”], if so, the prohibition “You shall not intermarry” stated in this passage applies only to the seven nations, and not to the other nations outside the Land of Israel, who are not so devoted to idolatry, whose ancestral practice is in their hands, and who are not eager to lead others after them.

Nevertheless, this exclusion of the other nations outside the Land of Israel depends for its source on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages.

According to Rabbi Shimon, we do not need a verse for this at all, for even if the Torah had not stated the reason explicitly, we would understand on our own that this is the reason. And since this reason does not apply to the nations outside the Land of Israel, they are not included in the prohibition of the passage.

But according to the Sages, who exclude nothing—even when the known reason does not apply—unless the Torah wrote the reason explicitly, we find that we need the Torah’s reason stated in “for he will turn away” in order to exclude the other nations outside the Land of Israel.

And we ask: “For he will turn away your son from following Me, and they will worship other gods” is not superfluous, since the verse was needed to teach us that the prohibition “You shall not intermarry” does not apply to the nations outside the Land of Israel, since there is no concern regarding them—that they are not devoted to idolatry—that they will turn away the heart of the Israelite who marries them from following the Lord to worship other gods.

This works well according to Rabbi Shimon, who expounds

everywhere

the reason of the verse,

and according to him, even if the verse had not said “for he will turn away your son from following Me, and they will worship other gods,” I would say on my own: since this is certainly the reason for the Torah, the Torah’s prohibition applies only to these nations and not to other nations outside the Land of Israel. And if, nevertheless, the Torah wrote “for he will turn away,” it is an inclusion, and it comes to include, with regard to the lack of validity of kiddushin and the law that “her child is like her,” all the gentiles.

But according to the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi Shimon and do not derive laws from reasons that were not written explicitly in the Torah, it follows that if the Torah had not explicitly stated the reason of “for he will turn away,” I would not have learned to exclude the prohibition “You shall not intermarry” from the other nations; therefore this verse is not superfluous, and it is impossible to learn from it that kiddushin does not take effect with a gentile woman and that the law “her child is like her” applies to other gentiles. If so,

what is the reason,

that is, from where are these laws learned with regard to the other nations?

And we answer:

the verse says [Deuteronomy 21:10]: “When you go out to war against your enemies, and the Lord your God delivers him into your hand and you take his captives. And you see among the captives a woman of beautiful form and you desire her ... and you bring her into the midst of your house, and she shall shave her head ... and she shall remove the garment of her captivity from upon her, and she shall sit in your house and weep for her father and her mother for a month of days,

Deuteronomy 21:10]: “When you go out to war against your enemies, and the Lord your God delivers him into your hand and you take his captives, and you see among the captives a beautiful woman and desire her … and you bring her into your house and she shaves her head … and removes the garment of her captivity from upon her, and she remains in your house and weeps for her father and mother for a month”;

and afterward you may come to her and possess her

and she shall be a wife to you”;

from this

you learn

that at first,

before she stayed in your house and before the Torah permitted her to you, we do not read with regard to her “and she shall be,” which is an expression of kiddushin, and

it does not take effect with her,

with the woman of beautiful form, and with the other gentile women who are not from the seven nations, like her —

kiddushin.

And we still ask: indeed,

we find that kiddushin does not take effect with her—

with a gentile woman who is not from the seven nations—

kiddushin.

But nevertheless,

her child,

which is

like her

among the other nations,

from where do we know it?

And we answer:

the verse says: “

When there will be [

an expression of being and kiddushin]

to a man

two wives, one beloved and one hated.

And they shall bear him [

to the man] sons”; and it comes to teach us:

Wherever “when there will be

to a man” applies,

“and they shall bear him”

applies.

Every intercourse of a man with a woman in whom there is the possibility of kiddushin [even if she can be betrothed by her intercourse partner only to others],

the children born from this intercourse belong to the man who had intercourse with her and are attributed to him—

And

if

wherever “when there will be

to a man” does not apply,

where the possibility of kiddushin cannot exist with regard to the man or the woman, because one of them is a gentile and is not capable of the validity of kiddushin,

“it does not apply

that they shall bear him”,

for the children are not attributed to their fathers at all.

And we ask:

if so,

as you expound this,

a slave-woman

who has intercourse with an Israelite, and the possibility of kiddushin cannot exist between them,

also

should we derive from this source that the children are not attributed to their fathers, and therefore slaves are like their mother? Why, then, did we need to learn this from “the woman and her children shall belong to her master”!?

And we answer:

indeed it is so, that we can learn it from this verse, and there is no need to learn the law of our Mishna from “the woman and her children”;

.

but

if so,

“the woman and her children shall belong to her master”

why do I need it,

that the Torah wrote it this way, when we already know that they are slaves like their mother from “and they shall bear him”!?

And we answer: the verse was needed only

for that which was taught: