Kiddushin 56b (נו:) — the Talmud in English

Indeed, on the basis of the fundamental law, we should have said that the sale is void. However, here, in the Mishna concerning ma'aser sheni, with what case are we dealing

? When the seller fled,

with the money in his possession.

And we raise an objection:

And the reason is because he fled; but if he did not flee, do we penalize the seller

by requiring that the money be returned to its place? But why

!? Should we penalize the buyer

by requiring him to eat produce corresponding to that money

!? It is not the mouse that steals, but the hole that steals;

this is a parable: When a mouse steals grain and places it in its hole, it is not the mouse that is the thief, but the hole, for had there been no hole, the mouse would not have stolen. Here, too, the thief is not the buyer but the seller, for had it not been for him, the buyer would not have purchased.

And we raise an objection to this:

And

but

if not for the mouse, what would the hole have done

—that is, if not for the buyer, the seller would not have done anything

!? And we answer:

It stands to reason: Wherever the prohibition is located, there we impose the penalty

[we penalize the place where the prohibition is found], and the money of the ma'aser is in the seller’s possession.

Mishna:

One who betroths

a woman

with orla [the fruit of a tree during its first three years], which is prohibited for benefit, or

fruit from a tree during its first three years], which is prohibited to benefit from, or

with produce of diverse kinds in a vineyard

[produce that grows from a mixture of two types of grain or vegetables sown in a vineyard], which is prohibited for benefit—or

with a stoned ox

[an ox that killed a person, or that had intercourse with a woman, or with which a person had intercourse, and whose sentence of stoning was finalized]—

and with a calf whose neck is broken

[or with the calf whose neck is broken that is brought by the nearest city when it is not known who struck the slain person], even before its neck is broken

— with the birds of a leper

[which he brings when he is purified from his leprosy: he slaughters one and sprinkles its blood on the leper, and sends the other away]—

And with the hair of a nazirite—

and with the hair of a nazirite— and

with

the firstborn donkey

[the firstborn of a donkey, which is not redeemed but is killed by breaking its neck]—

and with meat cooked with milk

that was cooked together—

and

with

non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard:

One who betroths with any of these, which are prohibited for benefit,

is not betrothed.

a. The Tosafot asked: Why is she not betrothed? After all, it is permitted to benefit from things prohibited for benefit when used in an unusual manner!? They answered in two ways. The first: Here we are dealing with a case in which the benefit obtained from them in an unusual manner is not worth a peruta ; and:

However, if he

sold these items

that are prohibited for benefit,

and betrothed a woman with the money received for them,

she

is betrothed,

because the money received for them does not itself become subject to the prohibition against benefit. A.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who betroths

with orla ...

is not betrothed:

And we explain:

From where

do we know that orla is prohibited for benefit?

As it is taught:

It is written: “When you come into the land and plant every food-bearing tree, you shall regard its fruit as forbidden; for three years it shall be for you

forbidden; it shall not be eaten.”

I have

derived from this concerning orla

only the prohibition against eating,

as it is stated, “it shall not be eaten.” But from where do we derive the prohibition against

benefit

from orla

?

That is,

that one may not benefit from it, nor

dye with it

nor kindle with it

[for example, when it is oil]

a lamp?

The verse states:

“when you come into the land and plant every food-bearing tree,

you shall regard its fruit as forbidden

”—

to include all of them.

Rashi explained: “From where do we know that one may not benefit from it —for example, not dye with it, etc.? But the Tosafot wrote: Although we have already learned ‘one may not benefit from it,’ it is nevertheless necessary to teach that one may not dye with it, because one might have said, ‘Appearance is not considered a matter of significance.’ It is also necessary to teach that one may not kindle with it, although by doing so one consumes it. For example, with the shells of nuts that are orla. Although they are merely “protection for the fruit,” protection for the fruit is considered like the fruit itself, Rashi.

We learned in the Mishna: One who betroths ...

with produce of diverse kinds in a vineyard ...

is not betrothed:

And we explain:

From where

do we know that produce of diverse kinds in a vineyard is prohibited for benefit?

Hezekiah said:

Because

the verse states: “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds, lest the fullness of the seed that you have sown and the produce of the vineyard” be destroyed. And we expound what the verse says:

“

Lest it be sanctified

”—

“lest it be consumed by fire”; that is, lest the diverse kinds become prohibited for benefit and require burning.

Rav Ashi said:

This is how we expound it:

“Lest it become sacred”,

that is, lest the diverse kinds become prohibited for benefit like consecrated property.

And we challenge Rav Ashi: But if so, we should say:

Just as sacred property seizes its proceeds,

so that they too become sacred,

and

the original sacred property

emerges to non-sacred status, so too produce of diverse kinds in a vineyard

should be said to

seize its proceeds

with the prohibition,

and

the produce of diverse kinds in a vineyard

emerges to non-sacred status!?

Rather, it is clear

[the clear explanation is] that we expound it

as Hezekiah did.

We learned in the Mishna: One who betroths ... with a

stoned ox ...

is not betrothed:

And we explain:

From where

do we know that a stoned ox is prohibited for benefit?

As it is taught:

From the implication of what is stated: “If an ox gores a man or a woman and he dies,

“If an ox gores a man or a woman and he dies,

the ox shall surely be stoned,”

is it so that

I do not know

from this

that it is an animal carcass, and an animal carcass is prohibited for eating!?

“was slaughtered” “after its judgment was completed,” [and see the wording of the Tosafot in Zevahim 71a: “However, once they are slaughtered or die, they become prohibited for benefit ” ;

And if so,

what purpose does the verse serve: “

and

he shall not eat its flesh, and the owner of the ox is clean”?

he shall not eat its flesh, and the owner of the ox is free,”

The verse tells you, by stating “

and he shall not eat its flesh”:

that if one slaughtered it after its sentence had been concluded

for stoning, it is

forbidden to eat.

That is to say: from the time its sentence to be stoned has been concluded, it is forbidden.

Until this point, we have heard that after it was stoned—or even from the time its sentence was concluded—it is forbidden only to eat it.

From where do we know

that it is forbidden to derive benefit from it from the time its sentence was concluded?

The verse states: “

and he shall not eat its flesh

and the owner of the ox is clean,”

as will be explained below.

And we explain:

What is the implication—how does this verse imply a prohibition against deriving benefit?

what is the indication? How does this verse indicate a prohibition against deriving benefit?

Shimon ben Zoma says: Like a person who says to his fellow: “

So-and-so has emerged clean of his possessions, and he has no benefit whatsoever from them.”

So too, the owner of the ox is clean of this ox, and he has no benefit whatsoever from it.

And we raise an objection to what we said, that an ox that is stoned is forbidden to eat and to derive benefit from it from the time its sentence has been concluded:

From where do we know that this “

he shall not eat its flesh” [and “

and the owner of the ox is clean”]

comes to address a case in which it is slaughtered after its sentence has been concluded,

and to teach us that it is forbidden to eat it and to derive benefit from it from the time its sentence has been concluded?

But

perhaps

in truth,

in a case in which it is slaughtered after

its sentence has been concluded, it is permitted

to eat and to derive benefit from it.

And

if so, perhaps “

he shall not eat”

should be understood as coming

to address a case in which it was stoned!? [That is: From where do we know that the verse “he shall not eat its flesh” comes to teach a prohibition after its sentence has been concluded? Perhaps, in truth, it is not prohibited after its sentence has been concluded, and the verse “he shall not eat its flesh” comes to teach a prohibition after it has been stoned!?]

it is specifically where he stoned it that it is forbidden! [That is, from where do we know that the phrase “he shall not eat its flesh” comes to teach a prohibition after its verdict was completed? Perhaps, in fact, after its verdict was completed it is not forbidden, and the phrase “he shall not eat its flesh” comes to teach that it is forbidden after stoning.]

And if you would say: It has already been stated, “The ox shall surely be stoned,” and I know that an animal carcass is forbidden to eat; why then do I need “he shall not eat”? I would say to you that this verse comes to add a prohibition against deriving benefit [which is permitted in the case of an ordinary animal carcass] from an ox that is stoned.

And

this can be derived from the wording “he shall not eat,”

as Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Elazar; for Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

Everywhere that it is stated “

he shall not eat,”

or “

you shall not eat,”

and “

you shall not eat,”

both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit

are implied,

until the verse specifies for you

that deriving benefit is permitted,

as it specified for you in the case of an animal carcass: The verse states, “You shall not eat any animal carcass; [but] you shall give it to the stranger who is within your gates, that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a gentile.” Thus, in the case of an animal carcass, the verse specified that it is permitted to benefit from it by giving it as a gift or selling it; but had the verse not permitted it, we would have forbidden deriving benefit from an animal carcass because it is stated with regard to it, “he shall not eat.”

as it specifies in the case of an unslaughtered carcass: the verse says, “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass; [but] you shall give it to the stranger who is within your gates, and he may eat it, or you may sell it to a gentile.” Thus, the verse specifies in the case of an unslaughtered carcass that it is permitted to benefit from it by giving it as a gift or selling it. But if the verse had not permitted this, we would have forbidden deriving benefit from an unslaughtered carcass because it says about it, “he shall not eat.”

And if so, also with regard to an ox that is stoned, we should say that the verse, in stating “he shall not eat,” comes to prohibit deriving benefit from it once it has been stoned; but from where do we know that eating and deriving benefit from it are forbidden from the time its sentence has been concluded?

And we answer: It is impossible for the verse “he shall not eat” to teach a prohibition against deriving benefit once it has been stoned, because

this principle applies—that “he shall not eat” teaches a prohibition against deriving benefit—

when “he shall not eat” also teaches the prohibition against eating,

in a case where we derive

the

prohibition against

eating

from “

he shall not eat.”

But

here, if you say that the verse comes to teach a prohibition against deriving benefit once the ox has been stoned, then the

here, if you were to say that the verse comes to teach a prohibition against deriving benefit after the ox is stoned, then

prohibition against

eating is derived

from “

the ox shall surely be stoned”;

it is derived from there. In that case, since the verse would come to introduce only a prohibition against deriving benefit, it should have said, “He shall not derive benefit.” Necessarily, then, it comes to teach a prohibition against eating before it is stoned.

it is derived. Since in this case the verse would be coming only to add a prohibition against deriving benefit, it should have said, “One may not derive benefit.” It necessarily follows that it comes to teach about the prohibition against eating before it is stoned.

The reason it is impossible to say that the verse prohibits deriving benefit when the verse does not also teach a prohibition against eating is that:

if it enters your mind that it is only a prohibition against deriving benefit

alone

that is written in “he shall not eat,”

then

the verse should have written: “

He shall not derive benefit.”

Alternatively, one may offer another reason why the verse “he shall not eat” cannot be interpreted as referring to after stoning: If so,

Alternatively, another reason can be given why the phrase “he shall not eat” cannot be interpreted as referring to after stoning: If so,

let it write “

he shall not eat”

alone. But why do I need

“its flesh”

as well? Rather, it certainly serves to teach that

Rather, certainly they come to teach:

even though one slaughtered it in the manner of flesh,

having slaughtered it rather than stoning it, it is

forbidden.

Mar Zutra raised another objection

to the derivation of the prohibition against eating and deriving benefit from the time its sentence has been concluded:

But say that this principle applies—that the verse forbade it

after its sentence had been concluded—

in a case where one tested a flint [a

stone]

and slaughtered it with it, for it appears like stoning [it appears like stoning with stones] and not like slaughtering—

slaughtered it with it, so that it appears like stoning [that is, it appears like stoning with stones] and not like slaughtering—

but if he slaughtered it with a knife, it is not

forbidden to eat or to derive benefit from it!?

And we answer:

Is a knife

in slaughter

written in the Torah [is a knife mentioned in the section of slaughtering]!? After all, even when he slaughtered it with a flint, it is slaughtering, and necessarily it is forbidden even when he slaughtered it. If so, what difference is there whether he slaughtered it with a flint or whether he slaughtered it with a knife?

written in the Torah [that is, was a knife mentioned in the passage concerning slaughter]? Even when he slaughtered it with a stone, it is slaughtering, and necessarily it is forbidden when slaughtered in that manner as well. If so, what difference is there whether he slaughtered it with a stone or whether he slaughtered it with a knife?

Furthermore,

there is

a beraita explicitly taught

that slaughtering with a stone is slaughtering:

One may slaughter with anything: whether with a flint, whether with glass, or whether with a sharp reed.

And we ask:

And now that we derive

everywhere

both the prohibition against eating and the prohibition against deriving benefit from “

he shall not eat,”

it follows that we can derive the prohibition against deriving benefit from the time its sentence has been concluded from “he shall not eat” [for the prohibition against eating is also derived from it]. If so,

this “

and the owner of the ox is clean”—

which was mentioned above as coming to teach a prohibition against deriving benefit after its sentence has been concluded—

what does it come for [why does it come]!? We already know the prohibition against deriving benefit from “he shall not eat.”

what does it come to teach? [Why is it needed? We already know the prohibition against deriving benefit from “he shall not eat.”]

And we answer: “And the owner of the ox is clean” does not come to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from the ox from the time its sentence has been concluded; rather, it comes

with regard to deriving benefit from its hide, both while its sentence has been concluded and once it has already been stoned. For had the verse not included the hide,

to teach about benefiting from its hide, whether its verdict has been completed or whether it has already been stoned. This is because, had the verse not included the hide as well,

it might enter your mind to say: “

He shall not eat its flesh”

is written: its flesh is forbidden, and

perhaps

its hide is permitted.”

And we ask:

And according to those tanna’im who derive this “

and the owner of the ox is clean” [who derive other teachings from this verse]

for other purposes:

a.

To

exempt the owner of an innocuous ox that killed a person from

half a ransom—that is, to exempt an innocuous ox from the ransom paid by the owner of a proven ox that killed a person [had the verse not exempted it, it would have been liable for only half a ransom, just as an innocuous ox pays half the damage when it causes damage]; and this is how Rabbi Eliezer derived it in Bava Kamma 41b from this verse.

half a ransom—that is, to exempt an unconditioned ox from the ransom paid by the owner of an ox with established liability that killed a person. Had the verse not exempted it, it would have been liable for only half a ransom, just as an unconditioned ox pays half the damage when it causes damage; this is how Rabbi Eliezer derived it from this verse in Bava Kamma 41b.

b.

And to

exempt an ox from

the value of miscarried offspring if it gored a pregnant woman and her children emerged, teaching that the ox is not liable for the value of miscarried offspring, as a person is liable; and this is how Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derived it from this verse in Bava Kamma 42a—

compensation for miscarried fetuses if it gored a pregnant woman and her children emerged, teaching that the ox is not liable for compensation for miscarried fetuses, as a person is liable; this is how Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derived it from this verse in Bava Kamma 42a.

Then these tanna’im face the question:

From where do they derive that deriving benefit from its hide

is forbidden?

And we explain:

From “

and he shall not eat

its flesh,”

and “et” comes to include

the

hide,

which is ancillary to its flesh,

so that it too is forbidden to derive benefit from.