Kiddushin 42a (מב.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it derived that all of Israel can fulfill their obligation

with one

Paschal offering alone, even though there is not an olive-bulk for each and every one? — Because

it is stated: “

And they shall slaughter it—the entire congregation of the assembly of Israel—in the afternoon.”

But does the entire congregation all slaughter it? Surely only one person slaughters it!

Rather, from here it is derived that all of Israel can fulfill their obligation with one Paschal offering.

And if so, this is difficult:

From where does he derive that an agent can act with regard to consecrated offerings?

And we answer:

From it!

From this very verse, “And they shall slaughter it,” one can learn that agency applies to the slaughter of consecrated offerings. For this Paschal offering, which all of Israel brought, is not slaughtered by everyone; rather, one person slaughters it as the agent of them all. Thus, agency applies to the slaughter of consecrated offerings. The Gemara rejects this derivation:

Perhaps

there —

with regard to the Paschal offering of all Israel —

it is different, since

the agent

has a partnership in it [the agent is a partner with those who sent him in that Paschal offering], and therefore he acts as the agent of them all. But as for an agent who is not a partner, from where do we know that he can act as an agent for the slaughter of consecrated offerings?!

he is a partner with those who appointed him in that same Paschal offering. Therefore, he becomes their agent. But with regard to an agent who is not a partner, from where is it derived that he can act as an agent for the slaughter of sacrificial offerings?

Rather,

according to Rabbi Yonatan,

from here agency with regard to consecrated offerings is derived: As it is stated concerning the Paschal offering: “

agency in sacred matters is learned: It is stated regarding the Passover offering: “

And they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb for the ancestral house, a lamb for each household.”

Thus you have learned from the wording of the verse, “And they shall take for themselves, each man,” that one person takes the offering for the entire family; therefore, agency applies to consecrated offerings. The Gemara asks:

But perhaps there too

he becomes an agent because

he has a partnership in it,

as he takes it for himself and for those who sent him as partners?!

The Gemara explains:

If so —

that he becomes an agent only because he has a partnership —

why do I need two verses? [“And they shall slaughter it” and “And they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb for the ancestral house”]

“and they shall slaughter it” and “and they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb for the fathers’ household”

Why do I need them?!

That is, if the verse “And they shall take for themselves” came only to teach agency when the agent has a partnership, we have already learned this from “And they shall slaughter it.” Necessarily,

if it is not —

the verse “And they shall take for themselves” —

relevant to a case where

the agent is involved in the matter, meaning that he has a partnership,

apply it —

the verse “And they shall take for themselves” — to teach agency

to a case where

the agent is not involved in the matter, meaning that he has no partnership.

The Gemara nevertheless asks: But

this

verse, “And they shall take for themselves,” is not superfluous, so that we could say, “If it is not relevant”; for

it is needed

for this verse

for the teaching of Rabbi Yitzhak!

As Rabbi Yitzhak said:

The verse said “And they shall take for themselves, each man” in order to teach:

An adult

[a mature person]

can acquire

the Paschal offering on behalf of everyone,

but a minor cannot acquire

the Paschal offering on behalf of everyone. The difficulty nevertheless remains: From where do we derive agency with regard to consecrated offerings? If it is from this very verse, the agent has a partnership in it, and the verse is not superfluous so that we could apply to it the principle, “If it is not relevant...”

And we answer: “And they shall take for themselves, each man” is indeed superfluous, for

that —

the teaching of Rabbi Yitzhak —

is derived from “

Each man according to his eating

you shall designate yourselves for the lamb,”

as it emerges from the verse stating “man” and not a minor. Thus, the verse “And they shall take for themselves, each man” remains superfluous, to teach that agency applies to consecrated offerings even when the agent has no partnership in it.

from the verse stating “man,” but not a minor. The verse “and they shall take for themselves, each man” is still superfluous, and therefore it teaches that agency applies to sacrificial offerings even when the agent has no partnership in the offering.

The difficulty nevertheless remains:

But

it is needed

for the verse “Each man according to his eating you shall designate yourselves,” to teach

that one may slaughter the Paschal offering on behalf of an individual

who has no group with him. If so, the verse “And they shall take for themselves, each man” is not superfluous, since it teaches that a minor cannot acquire. The difficulty regarding Rabbi Yonatan therefore remains—for he does not derive agency from “And they shall slaughter it”: From where does he derive that agency applies to consecrated offerings?!

And we answer:

He holds

—Rabbi Yonatan—

in accordance with the one who says

[Rabbi Yehuda]:

One may not slaughter the Paschal offering on behalf of an individual.

If so, “Each man according to his eating you shall designate yourselves” is available to teach that a minor cannot acquire, and “And they shall take for themselves, each man” is available to teach that agency applies to consecrated offerings. For if it is not relevant to an agent who is a partner, apply it to an agent who is not a partner.

The Gemara asks:

But then, with regard to what Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: From where is it derived that a person’s agent is like him, as it is stated

in the apportionment of the Land: “

And one prince, one prince from each tribe

you shall take to inherit the Land”—

why does he need to derive the law of agency from that verse?

Let him derive agency from here,

from everything brought in this sugya!?

And we answer rhetorically:

Can you really think so?

Do you think

that this

— the apportionment of the Land by the princes —

is agency? After all, there were minors among those who inherited the Land,

But there were minors among those who inherited the Land, and

and minors are not capable of agency,

so how can you say that the princes acquired it for them by means of agency?!

Rather,

it is certain that the verse “And one prince” does not come to teach the law of agency, but to teach

the principle stated by Rava bar Rav Huna

in the name of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav

! As Rava bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav:

From where is it derived that one may acquire something for a person even not in his presence

[without his knowledge]?

As it is stated: “

And one prince, one prince

from each tribe you shall take to inherit the Land.” Minors were present there, and minors are considered as not present.

The Gemara nevertheless asks:

Can you really think so?

Do you think that the inheritance of the Land

is a benefit,

that you derive from it that “one may acquire something for a person even not in his presence”?

But

there is also a disadvantage

in the inheritance of the Land through the princes,

for

there

are

among those who inherited the Land some

who prefer

a portion

in the mountain region, but do not prefer

a portion

in the valley, and there are

[others]

who prefer the valley but do not prefer the mountain region. Thus, the princes’ apportionment was a disadvantage for them.

And

therefore we explain:

Rather,

the verse “And one prince” does not come only to teach that “one may acquire something for a person even not in his presence,” but to teach that one may acquire something for minors even when there is a disadvantage arising from the benefit—for example, the apportionment of the Land, whose underlying nature is beneficial to them but which also entails a disadvantage, since some prefer the mountain region and others prefer the valley—

in accordance with

the words of

Rava bar Rav Huna

in the name of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav

! As

Rava bar Rav Huna said further in the name of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav

:

From where is it derived that with regard to orphans who came to divide their father’s estate, the court appoints for them

for the minors among them

a guardian for disadvantage and for benefit—

The Gemara asks: Why

indeed

should we appoint a guardian to act to the disadvantage of the orphans?!

Rather,

this is what Rav said: From where is it derived that guardians are appointed for orphans

to act to their disadvantage in order to secure a benefit—

that is, if the orphans have a legal case, we appoint a guardian to litigate on their behalf, and even if he ultimately loses the case, nevertheless, whatever he did is valid?

The verse states: “

And one prince, one prince from each tribe you shall take

to inherit the Land.” There too, this entails both a disadvantage and a benefit, since some prefer the mountain region and others prefer the valley.

The Gemara’s discussion of the laws of agency moves from one matter to another by association with the laws mentioned in it. It returns to the laws of agency on the following amud, where it discusses the law of an agent who performs a transgression.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel:

Orphans who came

to divide their father’s estate, the court appoints for them—

for each of the minor orphans—

a guardian, and they select for them

the guardians, each for the orphan under his guardianship,

a choice portion.

And when they come of age,

the orphans

can

they

protest

and annul the division.

But Rav Naḥman himself—

not in the name of his teacher Shmuel—

said: When they come of age, they cannot protest, for if so—

if they could protest—

what force would the court’s authority have?!

The Gemara asks:

But does Rav Naḥman hold

[does he really maintain]

“What force would the court’s authority have?!”

But we learned:

The valuation [the collection of a borrower’s property by a lender is called a valuation]

of the judges, who

when they appraised the property that they collected for the lender,

reduced

its value by

one-sixth [or more], and the borrower suffered a loss,

or more, thereby causing a loss to the borrower,

or increased the valuation by one-sixth [or more] above the value of the property, and the lender suffered a loss; in such a case,

or more above the property’s value, thereby causing a loss to the creditor; in that case,

their sale is void.

But if they erred by less than one-sixth in either direction, their valuation stands.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Even if they erred by one-sixth or more in either direction,

their sale stands,

for

if so—

according to the opinion that their sale is void—

what force would the court’s authority have?!

And

yet

Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Sages,

who do not maintain, “If so, what force would the court’s authority have?” This is difficult from Rav Naḥman’s own statement, in which he said: “If so, what force would the court’s authority have?!”

And we answer:

It is not difficult.