Kiddushin 37a — the Talmud in English

except for orla,

that is, the prohibition against eating or deriving benefit from the fruits of orla,

and diverse kinds,

the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard: it is forbidden to sow together two kinds of seeds with a grape seed, and if he transgressed and sowed, and crops grew, they become forbidden for benefit.

These two halakhot, although they are mitzvot dependent on the Land, nevertheless apply even outside the Land.

Orla is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai that applies even outside the Land. And diverse kinds are forbidden outside the Land by “the words of the Scribes.”

Rabbi Eliezer says: Also the new produce,

the prohibition against eating from new grain before the offering of the omer, also applies outside the Land, although it is a mitzva dependent on the Land.

Gemara:

And we inquire concerning it:

what

what is the mitzva

dependent

on the Land,

and what is the mitzva

is the commandment

not dependent

on the Land,” mentioned in our Mishna?

If you say

that the mitzva

dependent

on the Land is a mitzva

in which it is written

“entry,”

as it is stated concerning it, “when you enter the Land,” or, “and it shall be when He brings you,” for Scripture made the obligation to fulfill this mitzva dependent upon entering the Land, and therefore it applies only in the Land of Israel.

And

the mitzva

not dependent

on the Land is a mitzva

in which it is not written

“entry,”

for the Torah did not make it dependent upon entering the Land, and therefore it applies even outside the Land.

It is impossible to say this, for:

but behold,

the mitzvot of

tefillin and

the mitzva of

the firstborn donkey, concerning which it is written

“entry,”

both are stated in the passage “and it shall be when He brings you,” concerning tefillin,

and they apply both in the Land and outside the Land.

Thus the matter does not depend upon this!

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said: This is what the

tanna in the Mishna

every mitzva

that is not dependent on the Land, that is not imposed in relation to the soil or its produce, but

that is an obligation of the body,

imposed upon the person’s body, such as Shabbat, tefillin, the firstborn donkey, and the like,

applies both in the Land and outside the Land.

And a mitzva dependent on the Land, which is

an obligation of the soil,

imposed in relation to the soil or its produce, such as the Sabbatical year, terumot and tithes, orla, and diverse kinds,

does not apply

by Torah law

except in the Land.

And we inquire concerning it:

from where are these matters

that an obligation of the body applies even outside the Land, whereas an obligation of the soil applies only in the Land?

And we answer:

For the Sages taught:

It is stated [Deuteronomy 12:1]: “These are the statutes and the judgments that you shall observe to perform, in the Land that the Lord, God of your fathers, has given you to possess, all the days that you live upon the soil.”

And we expound:

“These are the statutes”—

these are the expositions.

Laws that are not explicit in the Torah, but are derived from what the text lacks or contains in excess.

“And the judgments”—

these are the laws

explicit in the Torah.

“That you shall observe”—

this is Mishna.

The study of the statutes and the judgments.

“To perform”—

this is action,

the fulfillment of the statutes and the judgments.

“In the Land”—

could it be that all the mitzvot would apply only in the Land?

The verse says:

“all the days that you live upon the soil.”

And it implies both in the Land and outside the Land.

If

the verse

“all the days”

alone,

could

I have learned that all the mitzvot

would apply both in the Land and outside the Land.

The verse says

“in the Land,”

implying only in the Land.

After Scripture included

“all the days,” that the mitzvot apply even outside the Land,

and excluded

Scripture by “in the Land,” that the mitzvot apply only in the Land, from now we do not know which of the mitzvot will apply only in the Land and which will apply even outside the Land?

Go out and learn from what is stated in the context,

as it is stated later in the context,

“You shall utterly destroy all the places where they served”

the gentiles,” that is, idolatry. And concerning this prohibition it is stated, “all the days that you live upon the soil,” to say that it applies even outside the Land.

And one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded is the principle of “a matter learned from its context”; therefore we learn from the prohibition of idolatry stated in the context, for every case—

just as

like the transgression of

idolatry,

which is

distinctive

in that

it is an obligation of the body and applies both in the Land and outside the Land, so too every

mitzva

that is an obligation of the body applies both in the Land and outside the Land.

We learned in the Mishna:

except for orla and diverse kinds,

Rabbi Eliezer says: also the new produce.

It was asked of them

they were uncertain in the beit-midrash: does

Rabbi Eliezer disagree leniently,

meaning that he comes to disagree with the first tanna and say that new produce does not apply outside the Land,

or does he disagree stringently,

meaning that he comes to say that the prohibition of “new produce” applies even outside the Land?

And the Gemara explains the two sides of the uncertainty:

He disagrees stringently—

and this is what the first tanna says

in the Mishna:

except for orla and diverse kinds, for it is a received halakha,

a halakha given to Moses at Sinai that they apply even outside the Land, and

even though it could be said

that they should apply only in the Land, since

it is an obligation of the soil.

But

the prohibition of

“new produce,”

in the Land, yes,

it applies only in the Land, but

outside the Land,

it

does not

apply, like all mitzvot dependent on the Land.

What is the reason,

and the reason for the matter is that although concerning the prohibition of “new produce” it is stated, “an eternal statute throughout your generations in all your dwelling places,” seemingly implying that it also applies outside the Land [“in all your dwelling places”], this is not the meaning of the verse; rather, the verse

“dwelling place” [

that is, “in all your dwelling places” ]

implies after inheritance and settlement.

The verse comes to say that even in the Land of Israel the prohibition of “new produce” did not apply immediately upon their entering the Land, even during the fourteen years of conquering the Land and dividing it, but only afterward, when they had settled in it and each one recognized his portion. But outside the Land it does not apply.

And Rabbi Eliezer came

and came

Rabbi Eliezer

to disagree and

say

that

also

the prohibition of

“new produce”

applies both in the Land and outside the Land.

What is the reason?

Because

“dwelling place”

means

every place where you dwell,

even outside the Land.

Or perhaps

Rabbi Eliezer

disagrees leniently—

and this is what the first tanna says: except for orla and diverse kinds, for it is a received halakha

that they apply even outside the Land,

and all the more so

“new produce”

which applies even outside the Land, because

“

dwelling place”—

in

every place where you dwell, it implies.

And Rabbi Eliezer came to say:

“New produce”

applies only in the Land,

because of

“

dwelling place”—

it implies after inheritance and settlement,

and not outside the Land.

And what is

“also

the new produce” that Rabbi Eliezer said, for seemingly it implies that also “new produce” applies outside the Land?—

It refers to the first clause.

That is, “also the new produce” does not refer to the latter clause of the Mishna, “except for orla and diverse kinds,” to say that new produce too has the status of orla and diverse kinds and applies outside the Land; rather, it refers to the first clause, which says, “every mitzva that is dependent on the Land applies only in the Land,” and Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that “new produce” too is among the mitzvot dependent on the Land, and applies only in the Land.

Come and hear

to resolve the uncertainty concerning Rabbi Eliezer’s view, from that

which Abaye said: Who is the tanna

who is the first tanna of the Mishna,

who disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer?—

It is Rabbi Ishmael!

When Israel crossed the Jordan and entered the Land, they initially established the Tabernacle at Gilgal, where it stood during the fourteen years of conquering and dividing the Land. During that period there was permission for private altars: every individual was permitted to erect an altar [a private altar] anywhere and offer his sacrifices upon it, alongside the great altar [the public altar] that was in the Tabernacle at Gilgal.

Afterward they established the Tabernacle at Shiloh, and then private altars were prohibited.

When Shiloh was destroyed, they established the Tabernacle at Nob and afterward at Gibeon. During these periods the altars were again permitted, until the Temple was built in Jerusalem, and the altars were prohibited forever.

All burnt offerings and peace offerings must be offered together with a “meal-offering of libations.” And the tannaim disagreed concerning the status of a private altar with regard to libations: whether the sacrifices offered there were also required to have libations.

The dispute depends upon the interpretation of the verse stated at the beginning of the passage of libations [Numbers 15:2]: “When you enter the Land of your dwelling places that I am giving you.”

Rabbi Akiva interprets “your dwelling places” to mean that in every place where you dwell and offer sacrifices, even on a private altar, you are obligated to bring libations.

Whereas Rabbi Ishmael derives from “that I am giving you” that only on an altar applicable to everyone, that is, on a public altar, are they obligated in libations. And he interprets “your dwelling places” to mean that only after inheritance and settlement, when the Tabernacle was established at Shiloh, did they become obligated in libations; whereas during the first fourteen years, when they were at Gilgal, they did not offer libations, even on the public altar that was there.

For it was taught:

Since it is stated concerning libations, “that I am giving you,” from which we learned that the verse speaks only of a public altar, necessarily “dwelling place” stated there does not mean every place where you dwell, for the public altar existed in only one place. Rather, the meaning is after inheritance and settlement:

to teach you that wherever it is stated

“dwelling place,”

it means only after inheritance and settlement; these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: But Shabbat, concerning which it is stated

“dwelling places”

[Exodus 35:3] “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat,”

and

nevertheless it

applies both in the Land and outside the Land.

And it is proven from here that “dwelling places” means every place where you dwell; and if so, with regard to libations too we should interpret it thus, that everywhere, even on a private altar, they would be obligated in libations.

He said to him

Rabbi Ishmael: There is no proof from Shabbat, for

Shabbat comes by means of a kal va-chomer

that it applies also outside the Land—

Just as easy mitzvot

[which are not dependent on the Land]

apply both in the Land and outside the Land, Shabbat, which is stringent, all the more so

that it applies both

in the Land and outside the Land.

And the Gemara concludes in order to resolve the uncertainty, whether Rabbi Eliezer disagrees leniently or disagrees stringently:

From that Abaye said, “Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer?”—

“Rabbi Ishmael!”

for the first tanna in the Mishna is Rabbi Ishmael, who holds that “dwelling place” means after inheritance and settlement, and therefore holds that “new produce” applies only in the Land of Israel; consequently, Rabbi Eliezer comes to disagree with him and say that “new produce” applies also outside the Land.

Conclude from this: Rabbi Eliezer disagrees stringently.

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from this!

And we inquire concerning it:

since,

behold,

Rabbi Ishmael—upon what

does he stand?

From where did he learn that “dwelling place” means after inheritance and settlement?

From libations

he learned this from libations.