Ketubot 85b — the Talmud in English

And we infer precisely:

the reason

that he does not return and collect is because

his lien was relinquished, but to appear ![](pamud.bmp "

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like a falsehood, we are not concerned .

An incident involving

a certain man who deposited seven pearls, wrapped in a sheet, in the house of Rabbi Meyasha, son of the son of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi. [

He deposited seven pearls tied up in a sheet, in the house of Rabbi Meyasha, the grandson of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi.]

Rabbi Meyasha died [

he died]

and did not command.

He did not write a will.

And the owner of the pearls came to claim them from the orphans, and the orphans argued: “Perhaps these pearls belong to our father?”

They came before Rabbi Ami,

and

he said to them:

You are obligated to return them.

And the reason is:

first,

because

I know Rabbi Meyasha, son of the son of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi, that he was not

was

wealthy [

rich], and certainly the pearls were not his .

And furthermore ,

that

the depositor is giving

the

identifying sign.

He said: “The pearls were wrapped in a sheet, and there were seven” .

And

we say:

We said

that the depositor is believed to extract the pearls by means of an identifying sign

only

in a case

where he is not accustomed to enter and leave there,

that he is not accustomed to enter and leave Rabbi Meyasha’s house,

but

if he was

accustomed to enter and leave there,

we are concerned:

perhaps another person deposited [them], and he merely saw [them],

and saw the sign, that they were wrapped in a sheet .

And likewise there was an incident involving

a certain man who deposited a silver cup

with Hasa. [

He deposited a silver cup in the house of the amora named Hasa.]

Hasa died [

he died]

and did not command.

He did not write a will.

They came

the orphans

before Rav Nahman,

and asked him whether they had to return the cup.

He said to them:

You must return it!

And the reason: first, because

I know Hasa, that he was not wealthy. And furthermore—

the depositor is giving an identifying sign.

And we said this only where he is not accustomed to enter and leave there. But where he is accustomed to enter and leave there, perhaps another person deposited [it], and he merely saw [it].

As above.

And likewise there was an incident involving

a certain man who deposited a silk garment [

a garment made of silk]

with Rav Dimi, the brother of Rav Safra.

Rav Dimi died and did not command.

He did not write a will.

This case came

this incident

before Rabbi Abba, and he said to them:

You must return it.

And the reason:

first, because I know Rav Dimi, that he was not wealthy. And furthermore—

the depositor is giving an identifying sign.

And we said this only where he is not accustomed to enter and leave there. But where he is accustomed to enter and leave there, perhaps another person deposited [it], and he merely saw [it].

An incident involving

a certain man who said to them

before his death:

“My property is for Tuvia,”

but he did not specify which Tuvia.

He died, [

he died], and

there came

a person named

Tuvia,

and claimed his property.

Rav Yohanan said—

Here Tuvia has come!

And his words were fulfilled .

The Gemara says: This ruling stated by Rabbi Yohanan applies only when he

said

“My property is for

Tuvia,”

and a person named “Tuvia” came.

But if he said, “My property is for Tuvia,”

and there came

a person named

“Rav Tuvia,”

then

“Tuvia”

is specifically what he

said,

but

he did not say “Rav Tuvia.”

And

nevertheless,

if

that “Rav Tuvia” was

a person with whom he was familiar,

that is, a person who regularly associated with the deceased,

he was familiar with him!

And we say that he intended him; rather, because he was familiar with him, he did not call him “Rav.”

And if

two “Tuvias” came

to claim the property—if one of them was

a neighbor, and

the other

a Torah scholar,

then

the Torah scholar takes precedence,

since the Sages assessed the donor’s intention: that he would prefer to give his property to a Torah scholar.

And likewise, if one of them was

a relative, and

the other

a Torah scholar—

the Torah scholar takes precedence.

It was raised before them,

the Gemara was uncertain: if one of them was

a neighbor, and

the second

a relative, what is [the law]?

Who will acquire the property?

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear,

it is stated in Proverbs:

“Better

is a nearby neighbor than a distant brother,”

and if so, certainly the deceased’s intention was to give his property to his neighbor, and not to his relative.

And if

both of them were relatives, both of them were neighbors, and both of them were scholars,

the judges shall perform

“shuda de-dayyanei,”

that is, they shall assess to whom it appears that he wanted to give more .

Rava said to him, to the son of Rav Hiyya bar Avin: Come, I will tell you a fine matter that your father used to say. [

Come and I will tell you a good matter that your father used to say.]

And it is this:

That which Shmuel said

in several places—

“One who sells a debt document

that another person owed him

to his fellow, and then

the seller

relinquishes it,

that is, he relinquishes the debt to the debtor, his debt is

relinquished .

And the purchaser cannot collect with that document, since the creditor’s personal lien upon the debtor cannot be sold; only the lien upon the property can be sold. But after the debt itself has been relinquished and the personal lien has lapsed, it is no longer possible to collect the lien upon the property.

And even

the

heir

of the creditor

relinquishes it—

that is, he too can relinquish his father’s debt and cause the purchaser of the document to lose—",

until here are Shmuel’s words .

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin innovated:

Shmuel agrees, regarding

a woman who

brings a debt document

that she had against another

to her husband

in her dowry,

and then returns and relinquishes it, that it is not relinquished.

Because his hand

of the husband

is like her hand,

and now he himself is the claimant, and not only by virtue of the lien upon the property; rather, the husband becomes like the creditor himself and acquires even the personal lien. Therefore the woman’s relinquishment is ineffective.:

His female relative [

his relative]

of Rav Nahman sold her marriage contract [

she sold the lien of her marriage contract while she was still married]

for beneficial consideration,

that is, for a small amount.

And after some time

she was divorced and died [

she died].

They came

the purchasers and

were claiming it

her marriage contract

from her daughter. [

from her daughter.]

Rav Nahman said to them: Is there no one who can give her advice?!

Is there no one who will give her advice?!