Ketubot 85b (פה:) — the Talmud in English

And we infer:

The reason

that he cannot return and collect is because

his lien was waived; but as for merely appearing

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to be false, we are not concerned.

There was an incident involving

a certain man who deposited seven pearls, wrapped in a sheet, in the house of Rabbi Meyasha, the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. [He deposited seven pearls wrapped in a sheet, in the house of Rabbi Meyasha, the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi].

He deposited seven pearls tied up in a sheet, in the house of Rabbi Meyasha, the grandson of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi.]

Rabbi Meyasha died [he died],

and did not issue instructions. He did not write a will.

He did not leave a written record.

He did not write a will.

?

The owner of the pearls came to claim them from the orphans, and the orphans argued: “Perhaps these pearls belong to our father?” They came before Rabbi Ami,

and

he said to them: You are obligated to return them.

You are obligated to return them.

The reason is:

First,

because

I know Rabbi Meyasha, the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and he was not

a

wealthy man [rich], and certainly the pearls were not his.

rich], and certainly the pearls were not his .

And furthermore ,

that

the depositor is providing

the

identifying sign. He said: “The pearls were wrapped in a sheet, and there were seven of them.”

saying: “The pearls were bundled in a cloth, and there were seven of them.”

And

we say:

We said that the depositor is believed to extract the pearls by means of an identifying sign

only

in a case

where

he is not accustomed to coming and going there,

that is, he is not accustomed to entering and leaving Rabbi Meyasha’s house.

But

if he was

accustomed to coming and going there,

we are concerned:

perhaps another person deposited the item, and he merely saw it,

and saw the identifying sign, that they were wrapped in a sheet.

And there was likewise an incident involving

a certain man who deposited a silver cup

in the house of Hasa. [He deposited a silver cup in the house of the amora named Hasa].

He deposited a silver cup in the house of the amora named Hasa.]

Hasa died [he died]

he died]

and did not issue instructions. He did not write a will.

He did not write a will.

The orphans came

the

before Rav Naḥman,

and asked him whether they were required to return the cup.

He said to them: You must return it!

You must return it!

The reason: First, because

I know Hasa, and he was not wealthy. And furthermore—

he is providing an identifying sign.

And we said this only where he was not accustomed to coming and going there. But if he was accustomed to coming and going there, say: Perhaps another person deposited the item, and he merely saw it.

As above.

And there was likewise an incident involving

a certain man who deposited a silk garment [a garment of silk]

a garment made of silk

in the house of Rav Dimi, the brother of Rav Safra.

Rav Dimi died and did not issue instructions. He did not write a will.

He did not write a will.

This case came

this case

before Rabbi Abba, who said to them: You are obligated to return it.

You are obligated to return it.

The reason:

First, I know Rav Dimi, and he was not wealthy. And furthermore—

he is providing an identifying sign.

And we said this only where he was not accustomed to coming and going there. But if he was accustomed to coming and going there, say: Perhaps another person deposited the item, and he merely saw it.

There was an incident involving

a certain man who said to them

before his death:

“My property is for Tovya,”

but he did not specify which Tovya.

He died, [he died], and

he died], and

there came

a man named

Tovya,

and he claimed his property.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Here Tovya has come!

And his words have been fulfilled.

The Gemara says: This ruling stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan applies only if

he said,

“My property is for

Tovya,”

and a man named “Tovya” came.

But if he said, “My property is for Tovya,”

and

a man named

“Rav Tovya,” came, then

it is the case that

“for Tovya”

specifically is what he

said,

but

he did not say “for Rav Tovya.”

And

nevertheless,

if

that “Rav Tovya” was

a person who was close to him, that is, a person who regularly associated with the deceased,

meaning someone who regularly associated with the deceased,

he was close to him! We say that he intended him; rather, because he was close to him, he did not call him “Rav.”

We say that the deceased intended him; because he was familiar with him, he did not call him “Rav.”

And if

two “Tovya”s came

to claim the property, and one of them was

a neighbor, and

the other was

a Torah scholar, then

it is the case that

the Torah scholar takes precedence,

since the Sages assessed the donor’s intention as favoring the giving of his property to a Torah scholar.

And likewise, if one of them was

a relative, and

the other was

a Torah scholar—

the Torah scholar takes precedence.

They raised a dilemma:

The Gemara considered the case in which one of them was

a neighbor, and

the other was

a relative. What is the ruling?

Who receives the property?

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear:

It is stated in Proverbs:

“Better

is a nearby neighbor than a distant brother,”

and therefore, certainly the deceased intended to give his property to his neighbor, and not to his relative.

And if there were

two relatives, two neighbors, and two Torah scholars,

the judges should perform

“shudda de-dayyanei,”

that is, they should assess to whom it appears that he wished to give more.

Rava said to the son of Rav Hiyya bar Avin: Come, I will tell you a fine teaching that your father used to say. [Come, and I will tell you a good teaching that your father used to say].

Come and I will tell you a good matter that your father used to say.]

And it is this:

That which Shmuel said

in several places:

“One who sells a promissory note

that another person owed him

to his fellow, and

then the seller

waived it,

that is, he waived the debt for the debtor; his debt is

waived .

The purchaser cannot collect by means of that document, since the personal obligation that the creditor has against the debtor cannot be sold; only the lien on the debtor’s property can be sold. But once the debt itself has been waived and the personal obligation has lapsed, it is no longer possible to collect through the lien on the property.

And even if

the

heir

of the creditor

waives it—

that is, he too can waive his father’s debt and cause the purchaser of the document to lose—,”

this concludes Shmuel’s statement.

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin innovated:

Shmuel concedes, in the case of

a woman who

brings into her marriage a promissory note

that she held against another person,

to her husband

as part of her dowry,

and then waived it, that it is not waived.

Because his hand

the husband’s

is like her hand,

and now he himself is the claimant—not merely by virtue of the lien on the property, but the husband has become like the creditor himself and acquires even the personal obligation. Therefore, the woman’s waiver is ineffective.:

The female relative [his relative]

his relative

of Rav Naḥman sold her ketובה [she sold the lien of her ketuba while she was still married]

while she was still married

for a benefit

that is, for a small amount.

After some time

she was divorced and died [she died].

she died.

The purchasers came

the purchasers and

were claiming

her ketuba

from her daughter. [from her daughter].

from her daughter.

Rav Naḥman said to them: Is there no one who can give her advice?!

Is there no one who can give her advice?!