Ketubot 7a — the Talmud in English

Exempt!

And we hold that this is not merely an exemption, but permission from the outset [Shabbat 3a].

And Rabbi Ami assumed that releasing the pus from an abscess is similar to releasing virginal blood, which too is “stored and assigned,” and just as the release of the pus from an abscess is permitted, so too the release of the blood in intercourse with a virgin is permitted. And this would be difficult according to the one who holds that having intercourse for the first time on Shabbat is prohibited.

And we answer:

There,

the pus in an abscess —

stored,

all the pus is gathered together,

and separated,

it is entirely detached from the flesh and is not connected to it; rather, it is ready to emerge when there is an opening in the membrane of skin above the abscess.

But

here,

virginal blood — indeed

stored

it

and

yet

not separated

is it. Therefore, it is necessary to prohibit its release on account of “wounding” her by releasing the blood.

Rabbi Ami permitted

him

to have intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

The Rabbis said to him: “But her marriage document was not written!”

That is, since they were accustomed to write the marriage document at the time of the marriage, Rabbi Ami assumed that this woman’s husband too had written her marriage document when she entered the bridal canopy on Wednesday, and therefore he permitted him to have intercourse with her for the first time on Shabbat. The Sages said to him that in this woman’s case it happened that her husband had not written her marriage document [Ran, at the end of the first page of the Rif].

And since the marriage document was not written, he may not have intercourse with her, and on Shabbat it is impossible to write the marriage document.

He said to them,

Rabbi Ami: Even if the marriage document was not written, there is a solution to the matter —

Give her movable property as security.

Give her a pledge of movable property, so that she will hold it as security for the lien of her marriage document, until they write her marriage document, containing a lien upon land. This holding of the pledge is sufficient to permit her to her husband.

And the Gemara brings that other amoraim permitted having intercourse for the first time on Shabbat:

Rav Zevid permitted,

he permitted

having intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

And

some say: Rav Zevid himself

himself

had intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

Rav Judah permitted having intercourse for the first time on a Festival.

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: Do not say

that only

on a Festival

was it

permitted

by Rav Judah,

but on Shabbat it is prohibited.

For the same law applies, and it is permitted even on Shabbat as well; and the incident that occurred, occurred in this manner,

on a Festival.

Whereas

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava:

Only

on a Festival is it permitted

did Rav Judah permit it.

But

on Shabbat —

it is prohibited

according to Rav Judah to have intercourse for the first time.

Rav Pappi said to Rav Pappa: What is your reasoning,

why do you now think that Rav Judah distinguished between a Festival and Shabbat?

After all, only labor for the sake of food is permitted on a Festival, but the release of blood through intercourse for the sake of the mitzva does not have the permission of labor for the sake of food.

And every labor for which there is no permission on account of food is the same on a Festival as on Shabbat?

Rather, apparently you are saying that there is permission on a Festival even for certain labors that are not for the sake of food, because

since it was permitted

the making of

a wound

on a Festival

for the sake of

food [slaughtering] —

it was also permitted

the making of a wound

not for the sake of

food.

And I have an objection to this reasoning —

If so,

there will also be

permitted

kindling a fire for the sake of something that is not food, such as

making “mugmar”,

burning spices on a fire so that they give a pleasant fragrance to vessels and clothing,

on a Festival —

since kindling was permitted for the sake of

food —

it was also permitted

kindling

not for the sake of

food!

Rav Pappa said to him,

to Rav Pappi:

Upon you,

in response to your argument,

the verse says:

[Exodus 12]

“Only that which is eaten by every person” —

a matter that is common to every person.

Therefore, it is prohibited to perfume vessels and clothing on a Festival by burning spices on a fire, since the labor of perfuming is not common to every person, for only pampered people need a pleasant fragrance in their vessels and clothing. But intercourse for the sake of the mitzva is common to everyone.

And since the Gemara brought Rav Pappa’s words, that perfuming on a Festival is prohibited because it is a matter that is not common to every person, the Gemara brings Rav Aḥa bar Rava’s question to Rav Ashi, who holds [in tractate Beitza 22a] that it is permitted to burn frankincense on a fire on a Festival for the sake of a pleasant fragrance in the house, because it is a matter common to every person.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If Rav Pappa is correct in his argument, that burning spices for the purpose of perfuming vessels and clothing is called a matter that is not common to every person, and therefore it cannot be permitted on account of “since” —

If Rav Pappa is correct in his claim that burning spices for the purpose of perfuming utensils and clothing is called something that is not common to everyone, and therefore cannot be permitted on the basis of “since”—

If so,

if

it happens to him

a person that a

deer

comes before him to slaughter it in order to eat it

on a Festival,

shall it also be said here

since

eating the meat of a deer

is not

a matter that is

common to every person, so too it is prohibited to slaughter it

the deer on a Festival!?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

I am speaking of “a matter needed by every person”,

which is permitted, and eating

deer

is a matter

needed by every person.

Rather, not everyone has the ability to eat deer meat because of the high cost of its meat.

Therefore, burning spices for the purpose of making a pleasant fragrance in the house is permitted on a Festival, and likewise intercourse for the sake of the mitzva is permitted, since they are needed by everyone. But perfuming clothing and vessels with the fragrance of spices is only for pampered people, and it is not something needed by everyone.

Rabbi Jacob bar Idi said: Rabbi Yohanan ruled in Sidon: It is prohibited to have intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

And we raised an objection to it:

But is there a “ruling” concerning a prohibition?

That is, the expression “ruling” is appropriate to say where the one issuing the ruling states his words with certainty, because he relies either on a tradition in his possession or on the conclusion of his understanding. And when he says this to permit something, his ruling must be certain, for if he has a doubt, he must be stringent.

But when he states a matter of prohibition, the prohibition may also arise from doubt, and even a person who is not expert in halakha can be stringent and prohibit something to himself because of doubt. Therefore, stating the halakha as a prohibition is not called a “ruling.”

And we answer:

No, indeed we find that the expression “ruling” also exists with regard to a prohibition.

indeed we find that the term “ruling” is also used regarding a prohibition.

And did we not learn

as follows: It happened with Queen Helene that her son went out to war, and she vowed to observe nazirite abstinence for seven years, and she observed her nazirite abstinence outside the Land of Israel, which is a place impure with the impurity of the lands of the nations [by rabbinic decree].

And when she went up to the Land of Israel,

the House of Hillel ruled that she should be a nazirite for another seven years,

in order to fulfill her vow of nazirite abstinence in complete purity.

And it is demonstrated that the tanna uses the expression “ruling” with regard to a prohibition.

Alternatively,

another example in which we learned the expression “ruling” with regard to a prohibition is

as in that which was taught: The spinal cord

of an animal

that was severed through most of it,

it is a tereifa,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Jacob says: Even if

only

it was punctured,

the spinal cord, and most of it was not severed, it is a tereifa.

And

Rabbi ruled

as a practical halakha, to be stringent and prohibit even when it was punctured to any extent,

in accordance with

the words of

Rabbi Jacob,

who disagrees with him.

Rav Huna said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Jacob.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak taught it this way,

he transmitted this teaching in the following form:

Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Ishmael ben Jacob of Tyre asked Rabbi Yohanan in Sidon.

And I heard,

and I myself heard how he asked him this:

What is the law concerning having intercourse for the first time on Shabbat?

And he said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

It is prohibited.

And the conclusion of the Gemara as the halakha is:

And the halakha is: It is permitted to have intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

From here the Gemara begins explaining the marriage blessings:

Rabbi Ḥelbo said, Rabbi Huna said, Rabbi

Abba bar Zavda said, Rav said: Both a virgin

who is married,

and a widow

who is married —

require a blessing.

That is, the “marriage blessing” explained below.

And the Gemara wonders:

But did Rav Huna say this,

that even a widow requires a blessing!?

But Rav Huna said

himself:

A widow —

does not require a blessing.

It is not difficult:

Here,

Rav Huna, in the name of Rabbi Abba bar Zavda, who said in the name of Rav that the marriage blessing is recited even at the marriage of a widow — this refers to

a young man

[a bachelor]

who married a widow.

Since he is a bachelor, who has never before married a woman, he has a greater joy. Therefore, even though she is a widow, her marriage requires a blessing.

Here,

Rav Huna himself, who did not require a blessing for a widow — this refers to

a widower who married a widow.

Since he had already married a woman in the past, and even now he is not marrying a virgin but a widow, she does not require a blessing.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And

if

a widower married a widow —

do they not

recite the marriage blessings!?

But Rav Naḥman said, “Huna bar Natan told me”,

that the

tanna

in a beraita:

From where is it derived that the marriage blessing

is

with ten

men?

As it is stated

at the end of the Book of Ruth:

“And he took

[Boaz]

ten men from the elders of the city, and he said, ‘Sit here,’ and they sat.

And he said to the redeemer: If you will redeem, redeem. And he said: I will redeem. And Boaz said: On the day that you acquire the field from the hand of Naomi and from Ruth the Moabite, the wife of the dead, you have acquired [Ruth], to establish the name of the dead upon his inheritance.

And the redeemer said: I cannot redeem it for myself, lest I destroy my inheritance.”

because I would have sons from her who would be “Moabites,” unfit to enter the congregation

! And the redeemer erred and did not know the exposition: “A Moabite, and not a Moabitess.”

And the redeemer continued and said to Boaz: “Redeem for yourself. And the redeemer said to Boaz: Buy for yourself. And Boaz said to the elders: For I have bought, and also Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of Mahlon, I have bought.”

And therefore Boaz initially took ten men, so that they would be able to recite the blessing of bridegrooms.

And

now this is difficult: behold,

Boaz was a widower who married a widow,

for sixty sons and daughters had already been born to Boaz [who was Ibzan] before that episode involving Ruth.

And Ruth, too, had already been married to Mahlon.

Nevertheless, Boaz had to bring ten men in order to recite the blessing of bridegrooms. It follows that even a widow who marries a widower requires a blessing. And this is difficult against Rav Huna

The Tosafot wrote that the wording of the Gemara with regard to Ruth, that she was a “widow,” is not precise, for in her gentile status she had been married to Mahlon, and that was not a marriage by which she would be called a “widow”; rather, since she had been intimate, she is considered like a widow ; And we answer

what

“a widow”

does not require a blessing

is what Rav Huna said,

and we established his words as referring to a widower who married a widow—

this is what he is saying:

she does not require a blessing for all seven

days, as does a virgin.

But one day,

even a widow who marries a widower

does require a blessing.

And indeed, we do not find that Boaz recited a blessing for more than one day.

At first glance, it would have been possible to explain that, according to the Gemara’s answer concerning Rav Huna’s statement that “a widow does not require a blessing,” meaning that she does not require a blessing for all seven days, the contradiction between Rav Huna’s statements would no longer be difficult from what he said: “One a virgin and one a widow require a blessing.” For it is possible to explain that his intention is that even a widow requires a blessing for one day, and this is not a contradiction to what Rav Huna said, that a widow does not require a blessing for all seven days. And according to this, there would be no necessity to say that when a bachelor marries a widow she requires a blessing for all seven days; rather, it is possible to say that she too does not require a blessing for all seven days, but only for one day, as a widower who married a widow. However, from the continuation of the sugya it is explicit that the Gemara does not retract this, and even a widow who marries a bachelor requires a blessing for all seven days ; and in Rashi, below, in his commentary on “you have said seven,” the necessity for this is explained: for if “does not require a blessing” is interpreted as “does not require a blessing for all seven,” then the wording “requires a blessing” is likewise understood to mean that she requires a blessing for all seven. And for this reason the Gemara did not say rather “what does not require a blessing,” because the Gemara does not retract its earlier answer, but adds to it. The Gemara is still perplexed:

but as for that which was taught in a beraita:

“For what reason did they say that a widow marries on Thursday and is intimate on Friday, for if you say that she should be intimate on Thursday, on the following day he rises early for his work and goes away”—

therefore,

the Sages were diligent concerning the enactment for the daughters of Israel, that he should rejoice with her for three days.

And this is difficult:

with regard to what,

with regard to which man who marries a widow is the beraita speaking?

If it is a bachelor

who married the widow—it is difficult:

have you not said

that she requires a blessing

for seven

days, even though she is a widow? Whereas in the beraita it is explained that three days suffice.

The explanation is that it is necessarily the intention of Rav Huna that she requires a blessing for all seven, for he said: “A widow does not require a blessing,” and we interpreted this as meaning that she does not require a blessing for all seven, and as referring to a widower who married a widow. And necessarily, the wording “requires a blessing” that Rav Huna said concerning a widow who marries a bachelor is also interpreted to mean that she requires a blessing for all seven, Rashi. And in the wording of Rashi before us: “It follows that the ‘requires a blessing’ that Rabbi Abba said is for seven.” And the reference is to Rabbi Abba bar Zavda, concerning whom Rav Huna said in his name: “One a virgin and one a widow require a blessing”; but apparently it would have been more appropriate for Rashi to mention Rav Huna himself, for the explanation of Rabbi Abba’s wording cannot be learned from Rav Huna’s wording. If it is a widower who married the widow—it is likewise difficult:

have you not said: one day

only does she require a blessing. Whereas in the beraita it is explained that she requires a blessing for three days

!?

And the Gemara answers that there is a distinction between “rejoicing,” of which the beraita spoke, and “blessing,” which is the subject under discussion of Rav Huna. Therefore, the beraita is to be explained in two ways:

alternatively,

the beraita is dealing

with a widower

who married a widow.

The Ran explains that the law of blessing and the law of rejoicing are distinct in their essence: the blessing is for the joy of the bridegroom’s heart, but rejoicing—that is, cessation from work—is because of the enactment for the woman; see further in the notes below in the continuation of the sugya. And on

one day

only it suffices

for the blessing,

as Rav Huna said.

And

what we learned, that the Sages were diligent that he should rejoice with her

three days,

is

for rejoicing

alone, without a blessing.

Alternatively:

the words of the beraita may be explained as referring

to a bachelor

who married a widow.

And

seven

days

for the blessing,

as Rav Huna said.

And

for

three

days only it suffices

for rejoicing.

The earlier and later authorities discussed the explanation of the Gemara’s two answers, which are to be explained in two ways. The first: the two answers do not disagree, and both are true; in the case of a widower who married a widow, she requires a blessing for only one day, whereas the rejoicing exceeds it, and is for three days ; and in the case of a bachelor who married a widow, the days of blessing exceed the days of rejoicing: the rejoicing is for three days and the blessing for seven days. And they wrote that this is implied by the plain sense of the beraita, which did not distinguish between a widow who marries a bachelor and a widow who marries a widower, implying that in every case the rejoicing of the widow is for three days. And if you say: how is it possible that in the case of a widower who married a widow the rejoicing exceeds the blessing, whereas in the case of a bachelor who married a widow the rejoicing is less than the blessing? The Ran explained: everything is according to its matter. For the blessing is for the joy of the bridegroom’s heart; therefore, a bachelor who has not yet married, whose joy is greater, is always given blessings for seven days, even when he married a widow. But rejoicing—that is, cessation from work, which is because of the enactment for the woman—since she is a widow, she does not require so much persuasion, and three days of rejoicing suffice for her. But a widower who married a widow, since he has already married and also now is not marrying a virgin but a widow, does not rejoice as much; therefore, one day of blessing suffices for him. Nevertheless, for rejoicing he requires three days, since the days of rejoicing were instituted for the benefit of the woman, as they said: “The Sages were diligent concerning the enactment for the daughters of Israel.” And since this is so, if concerning a widow who marries a bachelor [who is already joyful in the very fact of marrying a bachelor] they said that she has three days of rejoicing, all the more so when she marries a widower, she requires three days of rejoicing. The second way: the two formulations disagree. According to the first formulation: only a widower who married a widow, who requires a blessing for only one day, has three days of rejoicing suffice for him; but a bachelor who married a widow, whose blessing is for seven days, also has rejoicing for seven days. According to the second formulation: the rejoicing never exceeds the blessing, and only in the case of a bachelor who married a widow are the days of rejoicing three days, but in the case of a widower who married a widow the days of rejoicing are only one day ; see all this in the earlier authorities here, in Maimonides, and in the Shulchan Arukh. And in the “Notes on Tractate Ketubot,” from the lessons of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, may he live long, he brought from Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, which wrote: “A bridegroom is like a king: just as a king does not go out alone to the marketplace, and so on; just as a king does not perform work, so too a bridegroom does not perform work.” Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, may he live long, noted that these laws mentioned in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer are among the laws of rejoicing [and that his not walking alone is not because of harmful beings, but by law and because of rejoicing], and the number of their days is like the days of rejoicing; see there. However, according to what the Ran wrote, according to the first approach, concerning the reason that the days of rejoicing are more numerous than the days of blessing in the case of a widower who married a widow—that the blessing is for the joy of the bridegroom, whereas the rejoicing is for the enactment for the bride—it follows that this applies only to performing work [and not because he is like a king, but in order to gladden his wife]; but concerning his not walking alone, because he is like a king, there is no reason to distinguish between it and the blessing.