Ketubot 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

He is exempt! The Gemara, in tractate Shabbat 107b, presents the law of opening an abscess as a labor that one does not require for its own purpose: he makes an opening, but does not need it as an opening. It need not be made for air to enter, but only to release pus. An opening that is not made for air to enter and pus to exit is not considered an opening, and therefore this is a labor that one does not require for its own purpose. The Mishna le-Melekh raised a difficulty from this Gemara, which maintains that opening an abscess is a labor that one does not require for its own purpose, against the ruling of Rambam [in Chapter 10 of the Laws of Shabbat, halakha 17]. Rambam ruled that one who opens a boil on Shabbat in order to enlarge the mouth of the wound, as doctors do, intending as a medical treatment to enlarge the mouth of the wound, is liable for striking the final hammer blow, since this is the physician’s labor. But if he opened it to release the pus in it, it is permitted. Yet Rambam ruled that one is liable for a labor that he does not require for its own purpose. Why, then, did he rule that releasing the pus from an abscess is permitted when his sole intention is to release the pus? Rabbi Chaim explained in his work on Rambam that opening an abscess is an unintentional act with regard to making the opening; nevertheless, it is an inevitable consequence, since he does in fact make an opening. Rambam followed the view of the Arukh that an inevitable consequence that one does not desire does not involve a prohibition. The Gemara’s statement that opening an abscess is “a labor that one does not require for its own purpose” applies only according to Rav, who maintains that an unintentional act is prohibited. According to him, when an undesired inevitable consequence occurs in a labor of Shabbat, one is liable on account of a labor that one does not require for its own purpose. Rambam, however, ruled in accordance with Shmuel, that an unintentional act is permitted; and with regard to the inevitable consequence, this is an undesired inevitable consequence. It follows that our masters, Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Rabbi Chaim, disagree concerning one who makes an opening in an abscess solely to release its pus, whether he can be defined as one who “does not intend.” It was explained above that there are two explanations of the definition of “an unintentional act”: either it is a deficiency in intention, or a deficiency in the attribution of the second act to the person performing it. Here, it appears that Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Rabbi Chaim disagree in a third explanation: Does the category of an unintentional act define the act as though it were not a labor at all? That is, one who opens an abscess but does not intend to make an opening designed for air to enter and pus to exit, intending only to release the pus, is not considered to have performed the labor of making an opening. Therefore, Tosafot maintain—and Rabbi Chaim likewise maintains—that if he does not intend the labor, it is not a labor at all [according to Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that an unintentional act is permitted]. Rabbi Akiva Eiger, however, who challenged Tosafot and was unwilling to accept that making the opening falls within the category of an unintentional act, maintains that there is no such definition of an unintentional act whereby this act would not be considered a labor. See Kehillot Yaakov here for an explanation of the matter.

And we hold that this is not merely an exemption, but permission from the outset [Shabbat 3a].

Rabbi Ami assumed that releasing the pus from an abscess is analogous to releasing the blood of virginity, since that blood, too, is stored in place. And just as releasing the pus of an abscess is permitted, so too releasing the blood during intercourse with a virgin should be permitted. This presents a difficulty according to the one who maintains that it is prohibited to have intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

And we answer:

There,

the pus in an abscess—

is stored,

all the pus is gathered together,

and detached,

it is entirely separated from the flesh and is not attached to it; it is merely ready to emerge once there is an opening in the layer of skin above the abscess.

But

here,

the blood of virginity—indeed,

it is stored,

it is,

but

nevertheless,

it is not detached,

and therefore releasing it must be prohibited, because in releasing the blood he causes an injury.

Rabbi Ami permitted

him

to have intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

The Sages said to him: But her marriage contract was not written!

That is, since they were accustomed to write the marriage contract at the time of the marriage, Rabbi Ami assumed that the husband had also written this woman’s marriage contract when she entered the wedding canopy on Wednesday, and therefore permitted him to have intercourse with her for the first time on Shabbat. The Sages told him that in this case it had happened that her husband had not written her marriage contract [Ran, at the end of the first page of the pages of the Rif].

Since the marriage contract had not been written, he may not have intercourse with her, and on Shabbat it is impossible to write the marriage contract.

Rabbi Ami said to them:

Even if the marriage contract was not written, there is a solution:

Have movable property seized for her.

Give her movable property as collateral, so that she will hold it in lien for her marriage contract until they write her a marriage-contract document containing a lien on real estate. This seizure of collateral is sufficient to permit her to her husband.

The Gemara relates that other amoraim also permitted intercourse for the first time on Shabbat:

Rav Zevid permitted,

he permitted

intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

And

some say: Rav Zevid himself

himself

had intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

Rav Yehuda permitted intercourse for the first time on a Festival.

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: Do not say

that only

on a Festival

did

Rav Yehuda permit,

Rav Yehuda,

whereas on Shabbat it is prohibited.

The same law applies: even on Shabbat it is permitted; and the incident that occurred happened to take place

on a Festival.

But

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava:

only

on a Festival is it permitted,

Rav Yehuda permitted it.

But

on Shabbat—

it is prohibited,

according to Rav Yehuda, to have intercourse for the first time.

Rav Pappi said to Rav Pappa: What is your reasoning,

why do you now think that Rav Yehuda distinguished between a Festival and Shabbat?

After all, only labor necessary for food preparation is permitted on a Festival, whereas the release of blood during intercourse that fulfills a mitzva does not have the permission granted to labor necessary for food preparation.

And with regard to every labor that does not have the permission of food preparation, a Festival and Shabbat are the same.

Rather, evidently you intend to say that on a Festival there is permission even for certain labors that are not necessary for food preparation, because

since the performance of

the

injury

on a Festival

for the sake of

food preparation [slaughtering]—

the making of an injury is likewise permitted

the making of an injury

not for the sake of

food preparation.

I can raise an objection to this reasoning:

If so,

then it should also be

permitted

to kindle a fire for a purpose unrelated to food preparation, such as

making mugmar,

burning spices over a fire so that they impart a pleasant fragrance to utensils and clothing,

on a Festival—

For since kindling a fire is permitted for the sake of

food preparation—

kindling a fire is likewise permitted

kindling a fire

not for the sake of

food preparation!

Rav Pappa said to him,

Rav Pappa to Rav Pappi:

Your argument,

in response to your claim,

the verse says: [Exodus 12]

[Exodus 12]

“However, whatever is eaten by every person”—

something that is common to everyone.

Therefore it is prohibited to perfume utensils and clothing on a Festival by burning spices over a fire, since this finishing process is not common to everyone: only pampered people require a pleasant fragrance in their utensils and clothing. Intercourse that fulfills a mitzva, however, is common to everyone.

And since the Gemara has cited Rav Pappa’s statement that it is prohibited to perfume objects on a Festival because this is not something common to everyone, the Gemara cites the question of Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, to Rav Ashi, who maintains [in tractate Beitza 22a] that it is permitted to burn frankincense over a fire on a Festival for the sake of a pleasant fragrance in the house, since this is something common to everyone.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi:

If Rav Pappa is correct in his claim that burning spices for the purpose of perfuming utensils and clothing is called something that is not common to everyone, and therefore cannot be permitted on the basis of “since”—

If so,

if

a person happened

to

come upon a deer

to slaughter it in order to eat it

on a Festival,

shall we also say here:

since

eating venison

is not

a matter that is

common to everyone, so too it is prohibited to slaughter the deer

on a Festival?!

Rav Ashi said to him,

Rav Ashi:

I am speaking of “something needed by everyone”,

which is permitted; and eating

venison—

it is something

needed by everyone.

It is merely that not everyone can eat venison because of the cost of its meat.

Therefore, burning spices to create a pleasant fragrance in the house is permitted on a Festival, and intercourse that fulfills a mitzva is likewise permitted, since these are needs common to everyone. But perfuming clothing and utensils with the fragrance of spices is only for pampered people, and is not something needed by everyone.

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said: Rabbi Yoḥanan issued a ruling in Sidon: It is prohibited to have intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

Is there such a thing as a “ruling” concerning a prohibition?

That is, the term “ruling” is appropriate when the one issuing the ruling states his position with certainty, relying either on a tradition in his possession or on the conclusion reached through his wisdom. When he says this in order to permit something, his ruling must be certain, since if he is uncertain, he must rule stringently.

But when he states that something is prohibited, the prohibition may also be based on uncertainty; and anyone who is not expert in halakha can likewise act stringently and prohibit something for himself out of uncertainty. Therefore, stating the halakha as a prohibition is not called a “ruling.”

And we answer:

No,

indeed, we find that the term “ruling” is also used with regard to a prohibition.

And we learned in the Mishna as follows:

There was an incident involving Queen Helena, whose son went to war. She vowed to observe naziriteship for seven years, and observed her naziriteship outside Eretz Yisrael, which is a place rendered impure with the impurity of the lands of the nations [by rabbinic decree].

And when she ascended to Eretz Yisrael,

Beit Hillel instructed her that she should be a nazirite for another seven years,

in order to fulfill her vow of naziriteship in complete purity.

It is evident that the tanna uses the term “ruling” with regard to a prohibition.

Alternatively,

there is another example in which we learned the term “ruling” with regard to a prohibition:

As it is taught in a beraita: The spinal cord

of an animal

that was severed through most of its thickness

is thereby a tereifa,

the statement of Rabbi.

Rabbi Yaakov says: Even

if only

the spinal cord was perforated,

and most of it was not severed, the animal is a tereifa.

And

Rabbi issued a ruling

in practice to rule stringently and prohibit the animal even when it was perforated to any degree,

in accordance with

the view of

Rabbi Yaakov,

who disagrees with him.

Rav Huna said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yaakov.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak taught the matter as follows,

he would transmit this tradition in the following form:

Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Yishmael ben Yaakov of Tyre asked Rabbi Yoḥanan in Sidon.

And I myself heard

how he asked him:

What is the ruling concerning having intercourse for the first time on Shabbat?

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

It is prohibited.

And the Gemara’s halakhic conclusion is:

And the halakha is: It is permitted to have intercourse for the first time on Shabbat.

From this point the Gemara begins its explanation of the wedding blessings: In Hidushei Rabbi Shmuel, section 2, he cites the words of Meiri at the beginning of the chapter: A bachelor who married a widow must rejoice with her for three days and recite the blessings for seven days. Nevertheless, if mourning befell him before he brought her beneath the wedding canopy, the mourning is postponed throughout the seven days of blessing, and he is prohibited from performing labor for all seven days. It is thus evident that the seven “Festival days” apply even to a bachelor who married a widow, despite the fact that he is obligated to rejoice with her for only three days, and he is likewise prohibited from performing labor throughout all “seven Festival days.” Similarly, Rabbi Shlomo Rozovsky explained the words of the Rama in Even HaEzer, section 64, subsection 1, in accordance with Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik’s explanation. The Shulḥan Arukh wrote: One who marries a virgin must rejoice with her for seven days; he may not perform labor or engage in commerce in the marketplace, but must eat and rejoice with her, whether he is a bachelor or a widower. The Rama adds that a groom is prohibited from performing labor and is prohibited from going out alone into the marketplace. At first glance, one must wonder: What does the Rama add to the words of the Shulḥan Arukh? The Ḥelkat Meḥokek answered that he means to say that the woman’s waiver is ineffective in this regard. Even if she agrees that he should go out to perform labor, he is nevertheless prohibited from doing so by his own law, since he is comparable to a king, and a king is prohibited from performing labor. It may be said that the Rama added that the seven days of celebration are not merely a period during which the groom is obligated to make his wife happy. Rather, these days are Festival days with regard to him, and he must therefore conduct himself like a king. Accordingly, he is also prohibited from performing ordinary “labor” in the house, even if his bride agrees, and even if performing this labor makes her happy!

Rabbi Ḥelbo said that Rav Huna said that Rabbi

Abba bar Zavda said that Rav said: Both a virgin

who marries,

and a widow

who marries—

require a blessing.

That is, the “wedding blessing” explained below.

The Gemara asks:

And did Rav Huna say this,

that even a widow requires a blessing?

But Rav Huna said

himself:

A widow—

does not require a blessing.

This is not difficult:

Here,

the statement of Rav Huna in the name of Rabbi Abba bar Zavda, who said in the name of Rav that the wedding blessing is recited even at the marriage of a widow, is referring to

a bachelor [an unmarried man]

who had never married

who married a widow.

Since he is a bachelor who has never before married a woman, he experiences an increased degree of joy. Therefore, even though she is a widow, her marriage requires a blessing.

Here,

Rav Huna himself, who did not require a blessing for a widow, is referring to

a widower who married a widow.

Since he has already married a woman in the past, and now too he is not marrying a virgin but a widow, she does not require a blessing.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

And

if

a widower who married a widow—

do they not

recite the wedding blessing?

But Rav Naḥman said: Huna bar Natan told me

that

the tanna

in a beraita:

From where is it derived that the wedding blessing

is

recited with ten

people? Regarding the betrothal blessing, Rav Aḥai Gaon maintains that it, too, must be recited with ten, while Rabbeinu Shmuel HaNagid maintains that it does not require ten [their disagreement is cited in the words of the Rosh here]. One must examine whether the betrothal blessing is a blessing over mitzvot or a blessing of praise. The Rosh proved that it is a blessing of praise from the wording of the blessing: It does not say, “Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to betroth a woman,” but rather uses language of prohibition: “Who commanded us concerning forbidden relations and prohibited to us those who are betrothed.” Rambam, by contrast, ruled [Chapter 3 of the Laws of Marriage, halakha 23] that the betrothal blessing must be recited before betrothing the woman, in accordance with the rule governing all mitzvot over which blessings are recited before their performance. Therefore, according to Rambam, it is reasonable that it does not require ten, and that only the wedding blessings, which are blessings of praise, were derived from Boaz as requiring ten. Meiri, however, wrote that the primary subject of the blessing is the marriage as a whole, which is a positive commandment; nevertheless, the blessing was expanded to include an account of praise and thanksgiving to God. It follows from his words that this blessing is primarily a blessing over a mitzva, although its wording includes a blessing of praise.

As it is stated

at the end of the book of Ruth:

“And Boaz took [בּוֹעַז]

[Boaz]

ten men from the elders of the city, and he said: Sit here; and they sat.

And he said to the redeemer: If you will redeem, redeem. And he said: I will redeem. And Boaz said: On the day that you acquire the field from Naomi and from Ruth the Moabite, the wife of the deceased, you acquire Ruth, in order to establish the name of the deceased upon his inheritance.

And the redeemer said: I cannot redeem it for myself, lest I impair my inheritance.”

because I would have sons from her who were “Moabites,” unfit to enter the congregation

! And the redeemer erred and did not know the exposition: “A Moabite, and not a Moabitess”

”. And the redeemer continued and said to Boaz: “Redeem it yourself.” And the redeemer said to Boaz: “Acquire it for yourself.” And Boaz said to the elders: “I have acquired it, and also Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of Mahlon, I have acquired

”. Therefore, Boaz initially took ten men, so that they would be able to recite the blessing of the bridegrooms.

And

now the difficulty arises: after all,

Boaz was a widower who married a widow,

as Boaz—who was Ivtzan—had already had sixty sons and daughters before that incident involving Ruth.

And Ruth, too, had already been married to Mahlon.

Nevertheless, Boaz had to bring ten men in order to recite the blessing of the bridegrooms. This proves that even a widow who marries a widower requires a blessing. This presents a difficulty for Rav Huna!?

And we answer:

What

does “a widow”

does not require a blessing

that Rav Huna said

mean? We established his statement as referring to a widower who married a widow—

This is what it means:

she does not require a blessing for all seven

days, as does a virgin.

But for one day,

even a widow who marries a widower

requires a blessing.

Indeed, we do not find that Boaz recited a blessing for more than one day.

The Gemara is still perplexed:

But with regard to that which was taught in a beraita:

For what reason did they say that “a widow” is married on Thursday and has intercourse on Friday? For if you say that she should have intercourse on Thursday, the next morning he will rise early for his work and leave—

Therefore,

the Sages devoted attention to the enactment for the benefit of the daughters of Israel, so that he would rejoice with her for three days.

And this presents a difficulty:

With regard to what,

that is, what sort of man marrying a widow is the beraita speaking?

If it is referring to a bachelor

who married a widow, there is a difficulty:

Did you not say

that she requires a blessing

for seven

days, even though she is a widow? Yet the beraita indicates that three days suffice.

If it is referring to a widower

who married a widow, there is likewise a difficulty:

Did you not say: One day

alone is sufficient for her to require a blessing? Yet the beraita indicates that she needs a blessing for three days!?

The Gemara answers that there is a distinction between “rejoicing,” of which the beraita spoke, and “blessing,” which is the subject under discussion in Rav Huna’s statement. Accordingly, the beraita may be explained in two ways:

Alternatively,

the beraita is discussing

a widower

who married a widow.

And

one day

alone suffices

for the blessing,

as Rav Huna said.

And

what we learned—that the Sages devoted attention so that he would rejoice with her for

three days—

refers

only to rejoicing,

without a blessing.

Alternatively:

the words of the beraita may be explained as referring to

a bachelor

who married a widow.

And

seven

days

for the blessing,

as Rav Huna said.

And

for

three

days alone,

rejoicing suffices.

The earlier and later authorities discussed the explanation of the Gemara’s two answers, which are to be explained in two ways. The first: the two answers do not disagree, and both are true; in the case of a widower who married a widow, she requires a blessing for only one day, whereas the rejoicing exceeds it, and is for three days ; and in the case of a bachelor who married a widow, the days of blessing exceed the days of rejoicing: the rejoicing is for three days and the blessing for seven days. And they wrote that this is implied by the plain sense of the beraita, which did not distinguish between a widow who marries a bachelor and a widow who marries a widower, implying that in every case the rejoicing of the widow is for three days. And if you say: how is it possible that in the case of a widower who married a widow the rejoicing exceeds the blessing, whereas in the case of a bachelor who married a widow the rejoicing is less than the blessing? The Ran explained: everything is according to its matter. For the blessing is for the joy of the bridegroom’s heart; therefore, a bachelor who has not yet married, whose joy is greater, is always given blessings for seven days, even when he married a widow. But rejoicing—that is, cessation from work, which is because of the enactment for the woman—since she is a widow, she does not require so much persuasion, and three days of rejoicing suffice for her. But a widower who married a widow, since he has already married and also now is not marrying a virgin but a widow, does not rejoice as much; therefore, one day of blessing suffices for him. Nevertheless, for rejoicing he requires three days, since the days of rejoicing were instituted for the benefit of the woman, as they said: “The Sages were diligent concerning the enactment for the daughters of Israel.” And since this is so, if concerning a widow who marries a bachelor [who is already joyful in the very fact of marrying a bachelor] they said that she has three days of rejoicing, all the more so when she marries a widower, she requires three days of rejoicing. The second way: the two formulations disagree. According to the first formulation: only a widower who married a widow, who requires a blessing for only one day, has three days of rejoicing suffice for him; but a bachelor who married a widow, whose blessing is for seven days, also has rejoicing for seven days. According to the second formulation: the rejoicing never exceeds the blessing, and only in the case of a bachelor who married a widow are the days of rejoicing three days, but in the case of a widower who married a widow the days of rejoicing are only one day ; see all this in the earlier authorities here, in Maimonides, and in the Shulchan Arukh. And in the “Notes on Tractate Ketubot,” from the lessons of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, may he live long, he brought from Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, which wrote: “A bridegroom is like a king: just as a king does not go out alone to the marketplace, and so on; just as a king does not perform work, so too a bridegroom does not perform work.” Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, may he live long, noted that these laws mentioned in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer are among the laws of rejoicing [and that his not walking alone is not because of harmful beings, but by law and because of rejoicing], and the number of their days is like the days of rejoicing; see there. However, according to what the Ran wrote, according to the first approach, concerning the reason that the days of rejoicing are more numerous than the days of blessing in the case of a widower who married a widow—that the blessing is for the joy of the bridegroom, whereas the rejoicing is for the enactment for the bride—it follows that this applies only to performing work [and not because he is like a king, but in order to gladden his wife]; but concerning his not walking alone, because he is like a king, there is no reason to distinguish between it and the blessing.