Ketubot 66a (סו.) — the Talmud in English

which are the product of her labor,

and there would be reason to say that even the product of her labor beyond her obligation belongs to the husband [similar to the product of her labor that she is obligated to perform for her husband, which belongs to him in exchange for his providing her sustenance], nevertheless

Rabbi Akiva said

that she takes the extra product of her labor

for herself.

Her found object,

which is not included in “the product of her labor”—would

it not all the more so

belong to her, so that she takes it for herself?!

And we find that Rabbi Akiva said that the extra product of the woman’s labor belongs to her herself —

as we learned

in tractate Nedarim [85a]: A woman who said to her husband,

“Konam: What I make is forbidden to you” [

she prohibited her husband from benefiting from the product of her labor],

does not need

the husband

to annul

her vow, since the vow does not take effect at all, as a woman cannot prohibit something that does not belong to her.

Rabbi Akiva says: He must annul it!

For

perhaps she will produce more than what is fitting for him [

there is concern that she may perform more labor than she is obligated to perform for her husband, and that extra product belongs to her, so the vow takes effect upon it. Therefore, he must annul it, so that he will be able to benefit from the extra product if she wishes to provide it to him].

It is clear that Rabbi Akiva holds that the extra product belongs to her. If so, certainly her found object belongs to her, and it is impossible to teach in the beraita that according to Rabbi Akiva the husband acquires the woman’s found object.

On the basis of this difficulty, the beraita must be taught in a different form.

Rather, reverse [

reverse the positions of the tannaim in the beraita], and teach it as follows:

The woman’s found object belongs to her husband. Rabbi Akiva says: It belongs to her.

The Gemara asks:

But when Ravin came [

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he brought from there a statement, which said as follows],

Rabbi Yohanan said: With regard to extra earnings that do not result from exertion [

where she did not have to strain herself in order to produce the extra earnings],

everyone agrees

that Rabbi Akiva too concedes

that they belong to the husband,

that they belong to the husband.

They disagree with regard to extra earnings that result from exertion [

where she strained herself in order to produce the extra earnings].

The first tanna holds —

it is

his, the husband’s.

And Rabbi Akiva holds —

it is

hers, the woman’s.

The Gemara understood that her found object is considered extra earnings that do not result from exertion. If so, this is difficult: Why does Rabbi Akiva hold that it belongs to her?!

Rav Pappa said: Her found object

is comparable to extra earnings that result from exertion.

Since most found objects require effort to find them, such as fish left on dry land or a crippled deer . Therefore, even a found object depends on the

dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis.

Rav Pappa raised a dilemma:

If

she performed for him

the woman for her husband

two

types of labor

at once [

for example, she was guarding squash and at the same time was also spinning flax, and she produced more than the amount of labor she was obligated to perform for her husband],

what is the law?

Is this considered “extra earnings resulting from exertion,” about which the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva disagree, or not?

Ravina raised a dilemma:

If the woman performed for her husband

three or four

types of labor

at once [

for example, she was guarding squash, and simultaneously was also spinning flax, teaching songs to women for payment, and warming eggs in her lap],

what is the law?

Is this considered extra earnings resulting from exertion, or extra earnings not resulting from exertion?

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved

We learned in the Mishna:

Her humiliation and injury

belong to her. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: When it is in private, she receives two parts and he one; and when it is in public, he receives two parts and she one.

It is apparent from Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira’s opinion that since the husband too experiences humiliation, he shares with her in the humiliation payments, even though the humiliating act was not performed against the husband’s body but against his wife.

Rava bar Rav Hanan challenged

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira’s ruling:

But if that is so,

if

a person humiliated

the

horse of another person,

would

this also

mean

that he must give him

to pay him the money for

humiliation?!

In other words: Since we learned according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira that a person must pay humiliation payments to anyone who became humiliated as a result of his act, so too, when a person humiliates another’s horse, and as a result its owner becomes humiliated, he should have to pay him humiliation money. Would it occur to anyone that he should become liable for humiliation payments, even though with regard to humiliating an animal there is no liability to pay for humiliation?! And we reject this:

And

is a

horse

capable of humiliation?!

That is, the horse’s owner experiences no humiliation when his horse is harmed, and therefore he does not receive a humiliation payment. [Shitah Mekubbetzet].

But the Gemara still asks:

Rather,

this is how Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira’s ruling should be challenged:

If

a person spat

on

another’s garment,

and humiliated him [but the spittle did not touch the other person], would

this also

mean

that he must give him a humiliation payment?!

The Gemara’s reasoning was that in such a case there is no liability to pay humiliation, even though certainly the person whose garment was spat upon suffered humiliation, despite the fact that the spittle did not touch him.

The reason is that the payment for humiliation is stated in the Torah only in the case of a person who injures another, when the injury is inflicted upon the injured person’s body.

Rather, we can learn from here an obligation to pay for humiliation caused to a person’s body even when he was not injured, as when the humiliator spat upon the body of the humiliated person, since this resembles humiliation caused through an injury, which is inflicted upon a person’s body.

But if he spat on his garments—which is merely humiliation, and is not inflicted upon the body of the one humiliated—we do not find that the Torah obligated him to pay for it.

And if you would say,

perhaps you would want to answer that indeed

so

too! [

Indeed, he is liable to pay compensation for humiliation even if he spat on his fellow’s garments.]

It is impossible to say this, because:

And we learned

in tractate Bava Kamma, in the chapter Haḥovel ba-ḥavero [90a], what constitutes humiliation for which one is liable:

One who

spat

in the direction of his fellow,

and it reached him,

his fellow,

the spittle.

And likewise,

if he uncovered

the

head of a woman,

and thereby humiliated her by exposing the hair of her head.

And

likewise, if he

removed his cloak

from his fellow

himself—

he must give him four hundred zuz

as payment for his humiliation.

And

concerning this,

Rav Pappa said: They taught

that the one who spat and humiliated his fellow is liable to pay him compensation for humiliation

only if

the spittle struck

him,

the body of his fellow.

But

if the spittle struck only

his garment

of his fellow,

he is exempt,

the one who spat, from paying compensation for humiliation, since the Torah obligated payment for humiliation only when he performed the humiliating act upon the body of his fellow.

This presents a difficulty for Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who maintains that even when the humiliating act was not performed upon the husband’s body but upon his wife, the one who humiliated her is nevertheless liable to pay the husband for his humiliation. Why, then, when he spat on his garment and thereby caused him humiliation, is he not liable to pay him for his humiliation? And we answer: In fact, payment for humiliation does not depend on whether the humiliation was inflicted upon a person’s body or whether he became humiliated even without a humiliating act being performed upon his body.

Rather, if there was a humiliating act, the husband receives compensation for humiliation; and if there was no such act, he does not receive it.

Therefore, when he spat

on his garment—

he has no humiliation.

But when he humiliated

his wife—

she has humiliation.

That is, since the garment itself cannot be humiliated, the act is not considered a humiliating act, and he is not liable to pay compensation for humiliation. But when he struck his wife, the act is considered a humiliating act, and he is liable to pay even her husband.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If that is so,

according to your statement, that one must pay for any humiliation caused to a person, even if the humiliating act was performed upon the body of another person, since he suffers humiliation from an act performed upon someone close to him, such as his wife—

if so, if he

humiliated

a person who was

poor

but was

“of distinguished family,”

so that all the members of his family suffer humiliation, would

here too

we say

that he must give compensation for humiliation to every member of the family?!

He said to him: There,

with regard to the members of the poor man’s family,

not

upon

their bodies

was the humiliation inflicted, and for any humiliation that is not inflicted upon a person’s body, one is not liable by Torah law.

Here,

with regard to humiliation inflicted upon a woman, the matter is considered as though the humiliation were inflicted upon him himself, because

his wife—

is his very body.

That is, it is not sufficient that a person became humiliated in order to obligate the one who humiliated him to pay compensation for humiliation. Rather, the humiliating act must be performed upon the body of the one humiliated. Therefore, only when his wife was humiliated, since her status is like his own body, does he too receive compensation for her humiliation, which is also his humiliation. But in other cases, he does not.

Mishna:

Before the marriages of their children, it was customary for the father of the groom and the father of the bride to establish, by undertaking an obligation, what they were prepared to give the marrying couple.

This undertaking does not require an act of acquisition; rather, it is acquired merely through speech, provided that it is made close to the time of the kiddushin, when they then proceeded to perform the kiddushin. Their statement at such a time reflects complete resolve, like an act of acquisition.

Likewise, the mutual benefit derived from the marriage of their children is also considered in place of an act of acquisition [and the Ḥazon Ish wrote that this is effective without an act of acquisition only where the Sages revealed to us that the benefit has the force of an act of acquisition; such an arrangement is not effective with regard to every benefit].

In the language of the Sages, this undertaking is called “pesika,” and the Mishna before us will explain several laws concerning pesika: to whom it applies and what it obligates.

The first matter discussed by the Mishna is the father-in-law’s “pesika” to the groom:

One who stipulates a sum of money

for a dowry

for his son-in-law, and his son-in-law dies

before the marriage. The woman then becomes subject to levirate marriage with his brother, the yavam. The latter demands that the woman’s father give him what he had stipulated to give his deceased brother.

The Sages said: He may say,

“I wanted

to give it to your brother,

but to you

I do not wish to give it,

and therefore either perform ḥalitza with her or perform yibbum with her. But with regard to his son-in-law, he is obligated to give what he promised.” If he does not give it, and the groom has not yet married her, she must remain unmarried until her hair turns white [Rashi].

The Mishna now proceeds to discuss the laws of the ketubba. The ketubba consists of three components: 1\.

The ketubba obligation of two hundred zuz for a virgin, or one hundred zuz for a widow. 2\.

An addition to the ketubba, which the husband adds for the wife beyond the two hundred zuz for a virgin or the one hundred zuz for a widow. 3\.

The husband’s undertaking to return the value of the dowry that his wife brought him if he dies during her lifetime or if he divorces her.

The dowry consists of money or property [land, slaves, or movable property] that the woman brings to her husband as nakhsei tzon barzel, property for which the husband undertakes to return the value [on the day of the wedding], whether its value decreases or it is lost or damaged.

On the other hand, the husband may make use of this property, even if using it causes the property to deteriorate.

It was customary for grooms to write in the ketubba the value of the dowry that they undertook to return to the wife [if she were widowed or divorced] according to their use of it. They would write a sum far higher than the value of the dowry she had brought him when they could profit from the dowry and thereby increase their wealth. Conversely, when it was expected that the dowry property would lose value, they would write a sum lower than the value of the dowry she had brought them.

The Mishna details their practice: A woman who

stipulated

for her husband

to bring him one thousand dinars

as her dowry—

he stipulates against it,

writing in her ketubba and undertaking to return to her, if he dies during her lifetime or divorces her, as though she had brought him

fifteen maneh [

one thousand five hundred dinars; that is, an increase of one-third beyond the principal], since he can profit from them.

And

in contrast, against

the “assessment” [

if she brought him garments and other objects that are customarily used, and whose value decreases through use, and these objects were assessed at the time when people gathered at the home of the bride and groom; this is not a true assessment of the objects’ value, but an inflated assessment, as people customarily value the belongings of a bride entering the wedding canopy at more than their actual worth],

he stipulates,

writing the value of her dowry in the ketubba

less one-fifth.

That is: it is not enough that he does not add to their value, since he cannot profit from them; rather, he deducts one-fifth from their value.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that their value decreases over time. The second is that it is customary for people gathered at the home of the bride and groom to exaggerate the value of the objects the bride brought with her. Therefore, the groom writes in the ketubba that he received a sum one-fifth less than what she brought him.

And if the bride brought him

“assessed property,”

whose objects were assessed at one hundred zuz [“a maneh,”] and the woman demanded that the husband undertake to return them

at a maneh,

according to their true value, without deducting one-fifth from the assessment,

and

in fact this “assessed property” was

worth

this

maneh,

as these objects are assessed in the market for everyone—

he may not

write in her ketubba

anything but a maneh,

and he may not deduct one-fifth from the assessment.

But he may not add to it as he does with money either, since he cannot immediately earn a profit from the garments. It is only with money that he must add one-third, since he can profit from it.

The Mishna then summarizes:

Assessed property worth a maneh—

she gives thirty-one sela and one dinar.

If the woman wants the husband to write in the ketubba that she brought him assessed property worth a maneh, she must bring him property that would be assessed at the home of the bride and groom at thirty-one sela and one dinar—that is, with an addition of one-fifth.

And

when she wants him to write in her ketubba that she brought him assessed property

worth four hundred—

she gives five hundred.

That is, an addition of one-fifth.