Ketubot 66a — the Talmud in English

which is from her handiwork,

and there was room to say that even her handiwork exceeding her obligation belongs to the husband [similar to the handiwork that she is obligated to perform for her husband, which belongs to the husband in exchange for his sustenance], nevertheless

Rabbi Akiva said

that she takes her surplus handiwork

for herself.

Her found object,

which is not included in “her handiwork,” is it

not all the more so

that she takes it for herself!?

And we find that Rabbi Akiva said that the surplus of the woman's handiwork belongs to herself —

for we learned

in tractate Nedarim [85a]: a woman who said to her husband

“Konam: what I make is forbidden to your mouth” [

that she made her husband forbidden from benefiting from her handiwork],

he does not need

the husband

to annul

her vow, since the vow does not take effect at all, as the woman has no power to prohibit something that is not hers.

Rabbi Akiva says: He should annul it!

For

perhaps she will produce for him more than is fitting for him [

there is concern that perhaps she will perform more handiwork than she is obligated to perform for her husband, and that surplus belongs to her, and the vow takes effect upon it. Therefore he should annul it, so that he will be able to benefit from the surplus if she wishes to give him benefit from it].

And it is explained that Rabbi Akiva holds that the surplus belongs to her. And if so, all the more so her found object belongs to her, and it is impossible to teach in the beraita that according to Rabbi Akiva the husband acquires the woman's found object.

And because of this difficulty, the beraita must be taught in another form.

Rather, reverse it [

let us reverse the positions of the tannaim in the beraita], and let us teach it as follows:

The wife's found object belongs to her husband. Rabbi Akiva says: It is hers.

And the Gemara asks:

But when Ravin came [

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia, he brought from there an utterance, that thus]

Rabbi Yohanan said: With surplus not produced through exertion [

where she did not need to force herself in order to produce a surplus] —

everyone does not dispute,

but Rabbi Akiva also agrees

that it belongs to the husband,

that it belongs to the husband.

They dispute with regard to surplus produced through exertion [

where she forced herself in order to produce a surplus].

The first tanna holds —

it is

her husband's.

And Rabbi Akiva holds —

it is

hers.

And the Gemara understood that her found object is considered surplus not produced through exertion. And if so, it is difficult: why does Rabbi Akiva hold that it is hers!?

Rav Pappa said: Her found object —

is comparable to surplus produced through exertion.

Since most found objects require effort to find them, such as fish that remained on dry land, or a broken deer . Therefore, even a found object depends upon the

dispute of Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis.

Rav Pappa inquired:

If

she did for him,

the woman for her husband,

two

tasks

at once [

for example, she was guarding squashes, and at that same time she was also spinning flax, and she produced more than the measure of her obligation to do for her husband],

what is

the law? Is this considered “surplus produced through exertion,” concerning which the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva disputed, or not?

Ravina inquired:

If the woman did for her husband

three or four

tasks

at once [

for example, she was guarding squashes, and at the same time was also spinning flax, teaching a song to women for payment, and warming eggs in her lap],

what is

the law? Is this considered surplus through exertion, or surplus not through exertion?

And we conclude:

teyku

We learned in the Mishna:

her humiliation and her damage

belong to her. Rabbi Judah ben Beteira says: when it is in private, she receives two portions and he one; and when it is in public, he receives two portions and she one.

And it is explained in the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Beteira that since there is humiliation also to the husband, he shares with her in the payments of humiliation, even though the act of humiliating was not done to the husband's body, but to his wife.

Rava bar Rav Hanan challenged

the law of Rabbi Judah ben Beteira:

But from now,

if

one humiliated

a person

his fellow's mare,

would

so too

we say

that he must give him,

pay him the money of

humiliation?!

That is to say: since we learned according to Rabbi Judah ben Beteira that a person is obligated to pay humiliation payments to anyone who was humiliated as a result of his act, if so, even when a person humiliates his fellow's mare, and as a result her owner is humiliated, he must pay him humiliation money. Would it enter one's mind that he should become liable to pay him humiliation payments, even though with the humiliation of an animal no obligation of payment for humiliation was stated!? And we reject this:

And

for

a horse —

is it capable of humiliation!?

That is, no humiliation at all is caused to the owner of the horse when they injure his horse, and therefore he does not take humiliation. [Shitah Mekubetzet].

But the Gemara still asks:

Rather,

this is how one should challenge the law of Rabbi Judah ben Beteira:

If

a person spat

on

his fellow's garment,

and humiliated him [but the spittle did not strike his fellow], would

so too

we say

that he must give him humiliation?!

And the Gemara held that in such an act there is no obligation to pay humiliation, even though certainly humiliation was caused to the person on whose garment they spat, even if the spittle did not strike him.

And the reason for the matter is that the payment of humiliation was stated in the Torah only in the manner of a person injuring his fellow, when the injury is done to the body of the injured party.

Rather, we should learn from here an obligation to pay for humiliation done to a person's body even if he was not injured, as when the humiliator spat on the body of the humiliated person, since it is similar to humiliation caused through an injury, which is done to a person's body.

But if he spat on his garments, which is mere humiliation, since it is not done to the body of the one humiliated, we do not find that the Torah obligated payment for it.

And if you should say,

perhaps you would wish to answer that indeed

so

too! [Indeed, he is obligated to pay payments for humiliation even if he spat on his fellow’s garments.]

Indeed, he is obligated to pay compensation for humiliation even if he spat on his fellow’s garments.]

It is impossible to say so, for

and we learned

in tractate Bava Kamma, in the chapter “One Who Injures His Fellow” [90a], what is the humiliation for which one is obligated:

One who

spat

toward his fellow,

and it reached him,

his fellow,

the spittle.

And likewise

if he uncovered

the

head of a woman,

and thereby humiliated her by exposing the hair of her head.

And

likewise if

he removed his fellow’s cloak

from

him—

he is obligated to give him four hundred zuz

as payment for his humiliation.

And Rav Pappa said

about this:

They taught

that the spitter who humiliates is obligated to pay his fellow payments for humiliation,

only if

the spittle struck

him,

the body of his fellow.

But

if the spittle struck only

his garment

of his fellow,

he is exempt

the spitter from payment for humiliation, because the Torah obligated payment for humiliation only when he performed the act of humiliation upon the body of his fellow.

And this is difficult for Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra, who holds that even when the act of humiliation was not performed upon the body of the husband, but upon his wife, nevertheless the one who humiliates is obligated to pay the husband for his humiliation—for what reason, when he spat upon his garment and thereby caused him humiliation, is he not obligated to pay him for his humiliation? And we answer: Actually, payment for humiliation does not depend on whether the humiliation was done to the body of the person, or whether humiliation was caused to him even without performing an act of humiliation upon his body.

Rather, if there was an act of humiliation, the husband takes the payment for humiliation. And if not, he does not take it.

And therefore, when he spat

upon his garment—

he has no degradation.

But when he humiliated

his wife—

she has degradation.

That is to say, since the garment itself is not humiliated, the act is not considered an act of humiliation, and he is not obligated to pay payments for humiliation. But when he struck his wife, the act is considered an act of humiliation, and he is obligated to pay even her husband .

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Rather, from now on,

according to your words, that one must pay for every humiliation caused to a person, even if the act of humiliation was performed upon the body of another person, since he has “degradation” from the act of humiliation performed upon a person close to him, such as his wife—

If so, if he

humiliated

a person

who is poor,

who is

“of good family,”

for all the members of the family have degradation, shall

here too

we say

that he must give payment for humiliation to all the members of the family?!

He said to him: There,

with the members of the poor man’s family,

not

upon

their bodies

was the humiliation performed, and for every humiliation that is not upon a person’s body, one is not obligated for it by Torah law.

Here,

with humiliation performed upon a woman, the matter is considered as though the humiliation were performed upon him himself, because

his wife—

she is his very body.

That is to say, it is not enough that humiliation was caused to him in order to obligate the one who humiliates in payments for humiliation. Rather, the act of humiliation must be performed upon the body of the one humiliated. And therefore, only when they humiliated his wife, whose legal status is like his body, does he too take payment for her humiliation, which is also his humiliation. But in the other cases, not .

Mishna:

It was customary for the father of the groom and the father of the bride, before the marriages of their children, to establish by an undertaking what they were prepared to give the marrying couple.

This undertaking does not require an act of acquisition; rather, it is acquired merely through a statement, provided that it is made close to the kiddushin, when, as a result, they arose and betrothed; and their statement at such a time contains complete firmness of mind, like an act of acquisition.

Likewise, the mutual benefit of the marriage of their children is also considered in place of an act of acquisition [and the Hazon Ish wrote that only where our Sages revealed to us that the benefit has the force of an act of acquisition does this help without an act of acquisition, and this does not help with every benefit].

In the language of the Sages, this undertaking is called “pesika,” and in the Mishna before us several laws concerning the pesika will be explained: toward whom it applies and what it obligates.

The first matter that the Mishna discusses is the “pesika” of the father-in-law to the groom:

One who stipulates money

as a dowry

for his son-in-law, and his son-in-law dies

before the marriage. And the woman falls before his brother, the levir. And this one demands from the woman’s father that he give him what he stipulated to give his deceased brother.

The Sages said: He is able to say,

“Only

to your brother did I wish to give,”

but to you,

“I do not wish to give,”

and therefore, either perform halitza for her, or perform levirate marriage with her. But to his son-in-law, he is obligated to give as he promised. And if he does not give, and the groom has not yet married her, she shall sit until her head turns white [Rashi].

And now the Mishna proceeds to discuss the laws of the ketuba: The ketuba is composed of three parts: 1\.

The obligation of a ketuba in the amount of two hundred zuz for a virgin, or one hundred zuz for a widow. 2\.

An addition to the ketuba, which the husband adds for the wife beyond two hundred zuz for a virgin or beyond one hundred zuz for a widow. 3\.

The husband’s undertaking to return the value of the dowry that his wife brought to him in the event that he dies during her lifetime, or if he divorces her.

The “dowry” is money or assets [land, slaves, or movable property] that the woman brings to her husband as “iron-sheep assets,” for which the husband undertakes to return their value [on the wedding day], whether their value decreases or they are lost or damaged.

On the other hand, the husband may make use of these assets, even if using them causes wear to the assets.

And it was customary for grooms to write in the ketuba the value of the dowry that they undertook to return to the woman [if she were widowed or divorced], according to their use of it. For they would write an amount much higher than the value of the dowry that she had brought to him when they could make profits from the dowry and thereby increase their wealth; whereas, when it was expected that the dowry assets would lose value, they would write an amount lower than the value of the dowry that she had brought them.

And the Mishna specifies how their practice was: A woman who

stipulated

to her husband

to bring him one thousand dinars

as her dowry—therefore

he stipulates against them,

writes in her ketuba and undertakes to return to her, if he dies during her lifetime or if he divorces her, as though she had brought him

fifteen maneh [one thousand five hundred dinars; that is, an addition of one-third milbar], since he can profit from them.

one thousand five hundred dinars—that is, an addition of one-third beyond the principal], since he can profit from it.

And

by contrast, against

the “appraisal” [if she brought him garments and other objects that are customarily used, and they decrease because of their use, and they appraised these objects at the time when people gathered in the house of the groom and bride; for this is not a true appraisal of the value of the objects, but an inflated appraisal, as people customarily value the objects of a bride entering the wedding canopy at more than their true value], therefore

if she brought him clothing and other objects ordinarily used in a way that causes them to decrease through use, and these objects were assessed when the people gathered in the home of the groom and bride—this is not a true assessment of the objects’ value, but an inflated assessment, as people customarily value the belongings of a bride entering the marriage canopy above their actual value],

he stipulates,

writing in the ketuba the value of her dowry,

less one-fifth.

That is to say: It is not enough that he does not add, since he cannot profit from them; rather, he deducts one-fifth from their value.

There are two reasons for this: First, since their value decreases with time. And second, since it is the way of people gathering in the house of the groom and bride to exaggerate the value of the objects that the bride brought with her. Therefore the groom writes in the ketuba that he received an amount one-fifth less than what she brought him .

And if the bride brought him

an “appraisal,”

whose objects were appraised at one hundred zuz [“maneh”], and the woman demanded that the husband undertake

one maneh

to return them according to their true value, and not deduct one-fifth for her from the appraisal,

and

in truth this

was worth

this “appraisal”

one maneh,

for such is the appraisal of these objects in the market for everyone—

he has no

right to write in her ketuba

anything but one maneh,

and he cannot deduct one-fifth from the appraisal.

But neither may he add to it as he adds to money, since he cannot profit from the garments immediately . And only with money must he add one-third, since he can profit from it.

And the Mishna returns and summarizes:

An appraisal worth one maneh—

she gives thirty-one sela and a dinar.

If the woman wants the husband to write in the ketuba that she brought him an appraisal worth one maneh, she must bring him an appraisal that they would value in the house of the grooms at thirty-one sela and a dinar—that is, an addition of one-fifth.

And

when she wants him to write in her ketuba that she brought him an appraisal

worth four hundred—

she gives five hundred.

That is, an addition of one-fifth.