Ketubot 55a (נה.) — the Talmud in English

g.

To enhancement

of a widow’s property, for she does not collect the addition from the enhancement that the properties underwent after her husband’s death, just as she does not collect the principal of the ketubah from it.

h.

To an oath,

if she is collecting in his absence, or if one witness testifies that she has already been paid, or if she comes to collect from the property of orphans or from encumbered property; in all these cases she may not collect even the addition except by taking an oath, just as she must take an oath concerning the principal.

And

the remission of debts in

the Sabbatical year,

for it does not release the addition, just as it does not release the principal.

j.

And to one who writes all his property to his sons

and writes for his wife any amount of land, who thereby forfeits the addition just as she forfeits the principal. k. And her law is not

to collect

the addition except

from land,

just as she collects the principal of the ketubah.

l.

And she collects it only

from

the

inferior-quality

land [poor-quality land], just as she collects the principal of the ketubah.

m.

And as long as she is

the widow

in her father’s house,

meaning that the orphans did not attend to her needs and did not support her, she may collect her ketubah for up to twenty-five years. If she remained silent longer than that, she has waived it; and in all this, the law of the addition is like that of the principal.

And to the ketubah of male children,

the male sons that she has from her husband take the addition from their father’s inheritance after their father’s death, and sons from another wife have no share in it; and in all this its law is like that of the one maneh and two hundred zuz of the principal ketubah, and like the law of the dowry that she brought to her husband.

It was stated: The ketubah of male children,

the residents of Pumbedita and the residents of Mata Meḥasya disputed its law:

The residents of

Pumbedita said: They do not collect

the ketubah, the male sons,

from encumbered property

[they collect it only from property that was in their father’s possession at the time of his death, and not from property that he sold to others], because [the wording is] “The male children that you will have from me

will inherit

[“will inherit”] the money of your ketubah beyond their share with their brothers”—

we learned

[it]—and an inheritance is not collected from encumbered property.

The residents of Mata Meḥasya

[a place name]

said: They do collect

even

from encumbered property

[from land that the father sold after marrying their mother], because “they

will take

” [they will take]

we learned,

in the language of a creditor, who collects even from encumbered property.

And the halakha is: They do not collect from encumbered property,

because

“they will inherit” is what we learned.

The Gemara cites two additional disputes between the residents of Pumbedita and the residents of Mata Meḥasya concerning ketubah:

If the husband designated

movable property

for the collection of her ketubah,

and

it

is present as it was

[it exists and remains], she collects it from the orphans

without an oath—

For although the Sages said that a woman who comes to collect from orphans’ property may collect only by taking an oath, the reason is solely that we are concerned lest the husband gave her bundles of money from which she could collect her ketubah [“he handed her bundles of money”]. Here, these are the very bundles of money that he handed over to her.

But if

they are not present as they were,

and the movable property that he designated for her ketubah is not found, the residents of Pumbedita and the residents of Mata Meḥasya disputed the matter:

The residents of

Pumbedita said:

The woman collects her ketubah from land

without an oath,

because once this movable property was lost, presumably the husband did not hand her other bundles of money, and she collects her ketubah from land like any other ketubah and without an oath.

And

the residents of Mata Meḥasya said:

She may not collect except

by taking an oath.

And the halakha:

She may not collect

without an oath.

And if

he designated for her

the husband for his wife

land

and made it an apotiki for her ketubah:

If he defined it

by its four boundaries

[by its four borders], she may collect

without an oath,

because he certainly did not hand her other bundles of money.

But if he did not define it, except

by one boundary:

Pumbedita said:

Even this woman may collect

without an oath.

The residents of Mata Meḥasya said:

This woman may collect only

by taking an oath,

because since he did not define it clearly, she does not rely on it, and there is concern that the husband handed her other bundles of money.

And the halakha is: without an oath.

Alongside the dispute between the people of Pumbedita and the people of Mata Meḥasya concerning a ketuba, the Gemara cites another dispute between them regarding a different matter:

He said

a man

to the witnesses: Write and sign

a deed of a gift of land for so-and-so

and give it to him

give it to him]:

If

the witnesses acquired

the property from

from him

[from the donor, through a kinyan sudar, the land for the recipient], then

there is no need to consult him

[to go back and consult the donor] as to whether he stands by his statement to write a deed, since an unspecified kinyan is presumed to be intended for writing.

And if

they did not acquire from him:

The people of

Pumbedita said: There is no need to consult him

[there is no need to consult the donor before the writing].

And

the people of Mata Meḥasya said: It is necessary to consult him.

And the halakha is: It is necessary to consult him.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya

says: From the marriage

she collects the entire amount;

from betrothal, a betrothed virgin collects two hundred dinars, and a widow one hundred dinars, for he wrote it for her only on the condition that he would marry her:

It was stated:

They disagreed concerning the halakhic ruling,

Rav and Rabbi Natan:

One said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

And one said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

The Gemara initially assumed that the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Natan concerned whether one follows an “assessment”

that he wrote it for her only on the condition that he would marry her. Therefore, the Gemara says:

It can be established that it was Rabbi Natan who said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

Since

we have heard Rabbi Natan

elsewhere

follow the assessment!

For

this

is how Rabbi Natan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri:

a.

In the case of a dangerously ill person

who said, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” although he did not say, “Give it,” they shall nevertheless write it and give it, because we follow the assessment of intent: surely the dangerously ill person did not intend to jest with his wife; his intention was to have it written and given.