Ketubot 38a — the Talmud in English

For

it might enter your mind to say

these words —

that he does not give a ransom for a life and become exempt —

where he killed him “by way of ascent,”

when he raises his hand upward, since

his inadvertence was not given for atonement,

because one who kills “by way of ascent” goes into exile, as it is stated: “and it falls upon him [by way of falling], and he dies,” but not by way of ascent.

But

if

he killed him “by way of descent, for his inadvertence was given for atonement”

through exile,

say,

I might say that

we should take money from him and exempt him

from the punishment of death.

It teaches us

the verse: “Every devoted thing that is devoted from man shall not be redeemed.” The verse’s inclusion, “every devoted thing,” teaches that even those liable for death whose inadvertence was given for atonement, giving a ransom for a life is not effective for them to become exempt from liability to death.

Rava said to him:

But

this —

that in killing there is no distinction between way of descent and way of ascent, and in both he does not give money and become exempt —

is derived from the teaching of the school of Hezekiah;

we learned this matter from there!?

For the school of Hezekiah taught:

The Torah wrote: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it, but one who strikes a person shall not pay money but shall be put to death” —

The Torah compared

one who strikes a person

to exempt him from payments —

and

it compared

one who strikes an animal,

to obligate him in payments.

And Scripture compared them in order to teach:

Just as with one who strikes an animal, you made no distinction

with regard to payments:

a.

between

one who strikes an animal when he is

unintentional in

striking an animal and one who strikes an animal when he is

intentional,

for the Torah included “wound for wound” to obligate a person who causes damage unintentionally like one who causes damage intentionally, and one who causes damage under compulsion like one who causes damage willingly.

b. And

between one who intends

to strike the animal

and

one who

does not intend

to strike it.

c. And

between

one who strikes the animal

“by way of descent,”

in the manner of those who strike by bringing the hand down,

and

one who strikes it

by way of ascent,

striking by raising his hand, or cutting with his sword from below upward [for the law of one who causes damage is not like the law of one who kills unintentionally with regard to exile; only with one who kills unintentionally did the Torah distinguish between way of descent and way of ascent, and he does not go into exile until “it falls upon him and he dies” is fulfilled].

In all these you made no distinction

to exempt him from money

in any one of the ways,

but to obligate him in money

in all the ways mentioned.

So too, with one who strikes a person, you shall make no distinction

with regard to payments:

a.

between

one who kills

unintentionally,

who did not become liable for death,

and

one who kills

intentionally,

who became liable for death.

b.

between

the one who

intends

to kill and became liable for death,

and

one who

does not intend

to kill and did not become liable for death.

c. And

between

one who kills

by way of descent and

one who kills

by way of ascent.

For in all these you shall make no distinction

to obligate him in money

in any one of the ways,

but to exempt him from money

in all the ways mentioned.

And just as we learn that one must not distinguish between way of descent and way of ascent with regard to exemption from money, so you should learn with regard to ransom: one does not take ransom from him to exempt him, whether by way of descent or by way of ascent.

And by force of this question the Gemara brings another explanation: Rather, Rami bar Hama said:

In truth, only one of the two verses, “every devoted thing” and “you shall take no ransom,” comes to teach that we do not take money from him and exempt him from death, whereas the other verse is needed to teach the law that “he is subject to the greater penalty.” And that which was difficult for you above, at the beginning of the passage, that from “and there shall be no disaster” we derive the law that “he is subject to the greater penalty,” this is not difficult, because:

It was necessary — one of these two verses [either “every devoted thing that is devoted from man shall not be redeemed,” or “you shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer”], because

it might enter your mind to say: these words

that death exempts the money

where

in one act

he blinded his eye and killed him with it,

for only in such a case does Scripture teach that liability to death exempts him from paying the value of the eye to his heirs.

But where he blinded his eye

and became liable for money because of it,

and killed him with another thing,

with another blow, simultaneously,

say, we should take money from him,

and liability to death should not exempt the money, since he became liable for them through two acts.

I might say that we should take money from him,

Therefore one needs the other of these verses, which is superfluous, in order to teach that we say “he is subject to the greater penalty” even with two acts performed simultaneously.

Rava said to Rami bar Hama: Why do we need a superfluous verse to teach that the law “he is subject to the greater penalty” also applies to two separate acts?

For

this —

when he killed him and blinded his eye in one act —

is also derived, on the other hand, from the teaching of the school of Hezekiah!?

For the school of Hezekiah taught:

“An eye for an eye,” but not an eye and a life for an eye

,

Scripture teaches that he is exempt from the money for the eye, since he became liable for a life.

And since we learned from the teaching of the school of Hezekiah that if he blinded his eye and killed him with it, he does not pay for the eye, we should again learn from “and there shall be no disaster” that even with two acts he does not pay; and we do not need additional verses for the law that “he is subject to the greater penalty,” and it follows that this applies both when he died from the same blow and when he died not from the same blow.

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

It was necessary

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

It was necessary

one of the two verses, “you shall take no ransom” or “every devoted thing,” to teach about a fine that is exempted through liability to death: “if it does not concern” these verses, to teach about money together with death, assign it to concern a fine together with death.

And the Torah needed to teach this law because

it might enter your mind to say: Since it is a novelty that the Torah innovated concerning a fine

that it must be paid, and it is not a law but a royal decree, therefore the law should be that

even though he is executed

he

pays.

It teaches us one of the verses, “you shall take no ransom” or “every devoted thing,” that even a fine is not paid together with death.

And according to Rabba, who said

And we still ask:

But according to Rabba, who said

above: Indeed, since

it is a novelty that the Torah innovated concerning a fine,

therefore

even though he is executed, he pays —

what does this “every devoted thing” do for him!?

And we answer: Since we needed these answers only according to Rabbi Hanania ben Akavia, who holds that even one going out to be executed is assessed, and it is impossible to explain the verse “every devoted thing” as teaching concerning one who says regarding one going out to be executed, “My valuation is upon me,” that he is not liable,

if so, it is not difficult according to Rabba:

Rabba agrees with the first tanna of Rabbi Hanania ben Akavia,

and according to his view “every devoted thing” is not superfluous.

Mishna:

It is written in the Torah, in the passage concerning rape [Deuteronomy 22:28–29]: “If a man finds a virgin girl who is not betrothed, and he seizes her and lies with her, and they are discovered. Then the man who lay with her shall give the girl’s father fifty silver [shekels], and she shall be his wife in place of his having afflicted her; he may not send her away all his days.”

And it is written in the passage concerning seduction [Exodus 22:15–16]: “And if a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed, he shall surely pay her bride-price to be his wife. If her father absolutely refuses to give her to him, he shall weigh out money according to the bride-price of virgins.”

We have thus learned that Scripture spoke only of a girl who was not betrothed; but a girl who became betrothed, even if she has already been divorced, does not have the law stated in the Torah. And tannaim disagreed as to what her law is:

A girl who became betrothed and was divorced,

and once she was divorced there is no longer a death penalty in her case that would exempt him from the fine:

Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: She has no fine

at all.

Rabbi Akiva says: She has a fine, and

her fine is for herself,

and not like the other rape victim, whose fine belongs to her father.

Gemara:

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yose the Galilean,

who holds that a girl who became betrothed and was divorced has no fine?

The verse says

in the passage concerning rape and in the passage concerning seduction:

“Who was not betrothed,”

and we should infer:

if she was betrothed —

she has no fine

any longer.

And Rabbi Akiva,

who obligates a fine for a girl who had already become betrothed, his reason is that he interprets

“who was not betrothed”

as: the fine shall be

for her father; if she was betrothed,

the fine shall be

for herself.

And the Gemara is astonished at Rabbi Akiva’s view:

But from now on:

a. What the Torah said in the passage concerning rape and in the passage concerning seduction:

“girl,”

which implies

and not an adult woman, so too

you should interpret

that

the adult woman has a fine, and Scripture came only to say that her fine is

for herself!?

Yet we have never heard that it is written in any Mishna or beraita that an adult woman has a fine and that her fine is for herself, so that we could interpret it according to Rabbi Akiva.

b. And what the Torah said

“virgin,”

which implies

and not one who has had intercourse, so too

you should interpret

that

she has a fine and her fine is

for herself!?

Rather,

certainly the Torah excluded them

entirely

,

and here too, “who was not betrothed” — you should expound that

entirely

the Torah excluded one who had already become betrothed from the fine.

Rabbi Akiva can say to you:

That is why I do not exclude from “who was not betrothed” that she should have no fine at all, because

this “was not betrothed” is needed

by Rabbi Akiva

for that which is taught

[at the end of the following beraita]:

as it is taught

It is written in the Torah:

“Who was not betrothed”, the verse teaches:

excluding a girl who became betrothed and was divorced, who has no fine; these are the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean.

Rabbi Akiva says: She has a fine, and her fine belongs to her father.

This excludes a young woman who was betrothed and then divorced, who has no fine; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

And the law follows

that the fine should belong to her father:

Since her father

of a girl

is entitled to the money of her betrothal, and her father

of a girl

is entitled to the money of her fine —

Just as the money of her betrothal, even though she became betrothed and was divorced,

and afterward became betrothed again, nevertheless the money of her betrothal is

her father’s

—

so too the money of her fine, even though she became betrothed and was divorced, is her father’s

—

and the beraita continues:

If so, what does “who was not betrothed” teach?

It is available,

that is, it is superfluous in order

to compare to it and derive from it a gzera shava:

It is stated here,

in the case of rape,

“who was not betrothed” —

And it is stated below, in the case of seduction,

“Who was not betrothed”—

“shekels,” as the Torah says: “He shall weigh out silver,” so too here, in the case of seduction,

“who was not betrothed.”

Just as here —

in the case of rape —

fifty

silver is the fine, for thus the Torah said concerning rape: “Then the man who lay with her shall give the girl’s father fifty silver” —

so too below —

in the case of seduction —

fifty

silver is what he pays, although there the Torah did not specify the amount, but said: “He shall weigh out money.”

And what is below

in the case of seduction,

“shekels,”

for the Torah said: “He shall weigh out money,”

so too here

in the case of rape,

“shekels”

he pays, although the Torah said only “fifty silver.”

And just as according to Rabbi Akiva in the beraita the principal purpose of “who was not betrothed” is for a gzera shava, so too according to Rabbi Akiva of our Mishna; except that according to Rabbi Akiva of our Mishna, a verse does not leave its plain meaning, and it comes to say that the fine of a girl who was betrothed and divorced is for herself.

And we still wonder concerning Rabbi Akiva:

And Rabbi Akiva, what did you see that “who was not betrothed”

is available

for a gzera shava,

whereas

“virgin” is for excluding one who has had intercourse?

whereas

“virgin” is available to exclude one who has had intercourse?