Ketubot 30a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

There is a difference between them: ![](pamud.bmp "

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those subject to positive commandments concerning Egyptians and Edomites—

an Egyptian or an Edomite [of the first or second generation] who raped or seduced a daughter of Israel, or an Israelite who raped or seduced an Egyptian or an Edomite—whether there is a fine for them.

For according to the exposition, “a woman in whom there is havaya,” there is a fine for these young women, since even according to Rabbi Akiva, kiddushin takes effect with those subject to a positive commandment. Whereas according to the exposition, “a woman fit to be maintained by him,” even for these there is no fine, since she is a woman whom the rapist is not fit to maintain.

And the Gemara still raises a difficulty according to Rabbi Yishbav:

This works out well according to Rabbi Yishbav—

if he came to exclude [

to dispute and exclude ]

and he comes from the position of Rabbi Simai!

If we say that although Rabbi Yishbav said, “Anyone with whom intercourse is not permitted in Israel—the offspring is a mamzer,” he did not intend to say that the offspring of all those with whom intercourse is forbidden—even those subject to a positive commandment—is a mamzer, for Rabbi Yishbav came only to dispute Rabbi Simai, who excluded those subject to prohibitions of “do not” concerning the priesthood from the general rule; therefore Rabbi Yishbav came to say that even these subject to prohibitions of “do not” are included in the rule, but from those subject to a positive commandment the offspring is not a mamzer—

Well,

there is no difficulty for Rabbi Yishbav: “What is the difference between them?” since concerning those subject to a positive commandment Rabbi Yishbav agrees that the offspring is not a mamzer, even according to Rabbi Akiva.

Rather, if

Rabbi Yishbav did not come to dispute Rabbi Simai, but

his own reason

is what he

said [

he stated his own teaching, without reference to Rabbi Simai ]:

And according to Rabbi Yishbav, Rabbi Akiva holds indeed that

anyone with whom intercourse is not permitted in Israel—

the offspring is a mamzer, even those subject to a positive commandment.

If so,

what difference is there between them

the two reasons, since in either case kiddushin does not take effect with her!?

In addition to the fact that a High Priest is forbidden by a prohibition of “do not” to have intercourse with a widow, a divorcee, a woman rendered unfit, or a zona, he is also forbidden by a positive commandment to have intercourse with a woman who has already had intercourse. For it is stated concerning a High Priest: “For he shall take a wife from among his people only a virgin.” And the verse comes to teach that he shall take a virgin and not one who has already had intercourse. And the Torah further said: “And he shall take a woman in her virginity.”

And a High Priest who transgressed and had intercourse with one who had already had intercourse thereby transgresses a positive commandment.

There is a difference between them

those subject to positive commandments concerning prohibitions of the priesthood, namely,

one who has already had intercourse, with a High Priest.

For if a High Priest raped or seduced a virgin girl after she had already had intercourse with another man [but remained a virgin after his intercourse with her],

she is a woman “whom he is not fit to maintain,” and he transgresses a positive commandment with her.

But she is “a woman in whom there is havaya,” since kiddushin takes effect with her for him even according to Rabbi Yishbav, as the Gemara goes on to explain the reason.

And the Gemara discusses:

And what is different

about one who has already had intercourse, with a High Priest, so that although she is forbidden to him by a positive commandment, kiddushin takes effect with her for him, from the other cases subject to positive commandments, with whom, according to Rabbi Yishbav, kiddushin does not take effect for him?

Because

it is the prohibition of one who has already had intercourse with a High Priest—

a prohibition of

a positive commandment that is not equal for all.

For this prohibition applies only to a High Priest. Therefore, according to everyone, kiddushin takes effect with her for him.

Rav Hisda said: Everyone—

Shimon the Timnite and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya—

agrees, when one has intercourse with a

girl who is

menstruating, that he pays a fine,

even though intercourse with her is forbidden by karet.

For

according to the one who says that one is liable for a fine only for a woman in whom there

is havaya,

behold,

this

also,

a menstruating woman,

has havaya in her,

since kiddushin takes effect with a menstruating woman even though intercourse with her is forbidden with liability for karet.

And

according to the one who says that one is liable for a fine only for a woman who is

fit to be maintained by him,

this, a menstruating woman,

also

even though intercourse with her is forbidden,

is

fit

to be

maintained

under him.

And now the Gemara comes to explain that our Mishna, which obligates a fine for one who has intercourse with those subject to karet, also comes to exclude:

And to exclude from

the method

of Rabbi Nehunia ben HaKana,

who exempted, by the principle “he is confronted with the greater [penalty],” one who becomes liable for a monetary payment together with liability for karet at one and the same time.

And according to his method it will be found that one who has intercourse with those subject to karet is not liable for a fine!

For it was taught:

One who became liable for two penalties at one and the same time, one karet and the other monetary, such as one who burned his fellow’s stack on Yom Kippur, who is liable for karet for lighting the fire and liable to pay his fellow money because he damaged him by burning the stack—

Rabbi Nehunia ben HaKana treated Yom Kippur

for which he is liable for karet if he lit the stack

like Shabbat,

for which he is liable to a court-imposed death for lighting the stack—

with regard to the exemption from liability

for payment

of payments

for the damage to his fellow through burning the stack —

Just as

in the case of

Shabbat,

when he lit the stack on it, he thereby

became liable with his life

for a court-imposed death for kindling the fire,

and

therefore he is

exempt

from

the payments

for the damage to the stack that he caused his fellow—

for it is an established principle that one who becomes liable at one and the same time for the severe penalty of death and for the lesser monetary payment is punished only with the severe penalty [“he is confronted with the greater”], and it is learned from what the verse said: “And when men fight, and they strike a pregnant woman, and her children emerge, and there is no catastrophe [to the woman, that she did not die from the blow with which they struck her, but only miscarried her fetus], he shall surely be punished [the one who struck her, by payment of the value of the fetuses to her husband] as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give through the judges.”

The verse teaches by saying “and there is no catastrophe” that if indeed there is a catastrophe to the woman, so that she dies as a result of the blow with which he struck her, and the one who struck her then becomes liable to death as a murderer, then the one who struck her is not punished by payment for the fetuses.

So too Yom Kippur,

when he lit his fellow’s stack on it,

he becomes liable with his life

for karet from Heaven,

and is exempt from the payments

for the stack, as in the case of Shabbat.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Nehunia ben HaKana,

who holds that even karet exempts from monetary payment like death? Because

“catastrophe” is stated concerning death at the hands of man, “and there is no catastrophe, he shall surely be punished,”

and from there we learn to exempt those liable to court-imposed deaths from payment.

And “catastrophe” is stated concerning death at the hands of Heaven,

by Jacob, who said to his sons [Genesis 42:38]: “And he said, My son shall not go down with you, for his brother is dead and he alone remains, and a catastrophe may befall him [such as cold or heat, so it would seem to us] on the way on which you will go” —

This teaches by a derivation based on the identical expression:

Just as “catastrophe” stated concerning death at the hands of man,

namely, a court-imposed death,

exempts from payment.

So too “catastrophe” stated concerning death at the hands of Heaven—

karet and death at the hands of Heaven—

exempts from payment.

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection

against the gzera shava:

From where do we know that when Jacob warned his sons,

that Jacob’s intention in saying, “My son shall not go down with you, and a catastrophe may befall him,” was to warn them

about

a catastrophe of

cold and heat [

cold and heat ],

which are at the hands of Heaven,

so that you learn from this verse concerning a catastrophe at the hands of Heaven!?

But

Perhaps

Jacob intended to warn

about

a catastrophe of

a lion and thieves [

being torn by a lion and kidnappers ],

which are at the hands of man.

That is: both are not in the hands of Heaven [and thieves, they are in the hands of man],

and you will not learn to include a misfortune in the hands of Heaven in order to exempt him from the payments!? And we answer: in any event, you have from this verse to learn even about a misfortune in the hands of Heaven.

For

is it so

: did

Jacob

our father only

with regard to—

with regard to the lion and thieves, which are not in the hands of Heaven—was he

cautious,

whereas

with regard to—

with regard to chills and traps, which are in the hands of Heaven—

he was not cautious,

Jacob!?

But surely

Jacob was cautious regarding every matter,

for Jacob was concerned about all the misfortunes, including misfortunes in the hands of Heaven. And therefore even misfortunes in the hands of Heaven were included through “misfortune, misfortune.”

The Gemara wonders about the words of Rav Adda bar Ahava:

And

for

chills and traps,

when they come upon a person,

are they “in the hands of Heaven”?

That is: are they a decree of the King, so that you call them a “misfortune in the hands of Heaven”!?

But it was taught: Everything is in the hands of Heaven,

every punishment that comes upon a person is a decree of the King,

except for chills and traps,

which sometimes come upon a person through his negligence, and the Holy One, blessed is He, did not decree punishment upon him.

As it is stated: “Chills and traps are on a crooked way; he who guards his soul will keep far from them”!

And if so, “chills and traps” should not be considered a misfortune in the hands of Heaven, but rather a misfortune in the hands of man, and this is a difficulty against Rav Adda!?

Furthermore,

a difficulty may be raised against Rav Adda: are

the lion and thieves in the hands of man,

and do they not come from a decree of the King!?

For Rav Yosef said, and likewise Rabbi Hiyya taught

in a beraita:

From the day the Temple was destroyed, even though the Sanhedrin ceased, the four death penalties did not cease

The Gemara wonders before continuing to cite the words of the beraita:

But

did not cease

the four death penalties of the court!?

They did cease

when the Sanhedrin stopped judging them!?

And the Gemara explains:

Rather,

this is how the beraita should be taught: