Ketubot 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

It was stated:

We learned to clarify the husband’s reliability when he claims, “I found an open passage,” thereby depriving his wife of her ketuba -

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar:

If the obligation of the ketuba were from the Torah, the husband would not be deemed reliable to claim that he found no signs of virginity and thereby deprive her of her ketuba unless he substantiated his claim with “recognized testimony,” and not merely by claiming, “I found an open passage.”

His entire reliability to make this claim and deprive her of her ketuba is because

the Sages

are the ones who

instituted for the daughters of Israel

that

a virgin

should have a ketuba of

two hundred

zuz, and

a widow

should have a ketuba of

one maneh

[one hundred zuz].

And they

also

deemed him reliable, so that

even

if

he merely

said, “I found an open passage,”

and did not bring proof for his words, he would be

deemed reliable

to deprive her of her ketuba.

We raised an objection concerning this:

If so,

if the Sages deemed him reliable to claim, “I found an open passage,” and thereby deprive her of her ketuba—

what benefit did the Sages provide through their institution

of instituting a ketuba for her?

After all, if he wishes to divorce her because she does not find favor in his eyes, he can do so merely by claiming, “I found an open passage,” without having to bring proof for his words, and thereby deprive her of her ketuba!

Rava said:

We need not fear that he might divorce her immediately after marrying her, since we have a

presumption

that

“a person does not trouble himself with a feast and then ruin it.”

If he hated her when he brought her beneath the wedding canopy, he would not trouble himself to prepare the wedding feast and then divorce her immediately after the marriage. Rather, he would divorce her while she was still betrothed, and would not marry her.

Likewise, we need not fear that he might come to hate her afterward and deprive her of her ketuba with the claim, “I found an open passage,” since he can make this claim only immediately after the marriage.

The Gemara now cites a beraita clarifying the obligation of the ketuba:

The tanna taught

in a beraita:

Since

the obligation of the ketuba

is a “fine imposed by the Sages,”

she may not collect

her ketuba [which is collected from the husband’s land and not from his movable property]

except from

the

inferior-quality

[lowest-grade] land of the husband.

But if the ketuba were from the Torah, she would collect it from the highest-quality land among his properties.

Before the Gemara finishes citing all the words of the beraita, it interrupts and expresses astonishment:

How can the tanna call the obligation of the ketuba

“a fine”?

Is it really

a fine

? On what grounds should we penalize him?

Rather, say

that the wording of the beraita should be corrected, and read as follows:

Since

the obligation of the ketuba

is an institution of the Sages,

she may not collect

it

except from

the

inferior-quality

land of her husband.

The Gemara continues to cite the conclusion of the beraita:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

The obligation of a

woman’s ketuba

is from the Torah

.

We challenge this:

Did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel really say this,

that a woman’s ketuba is from the Torah?

But it was taught

the opposite:

A. One who rapes a virgin girl or seduces her must pay the girl’s father a payment of fifty silver shekels.

This payment is derived from two verses:

Regarding one who rapes a virgin girl, it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:29]: “He shall give the girl’s father fifty silver.”

However, it is not stated in which coins he must pay the fifty silver pieces, whether in ordinary coins or in shekels.

But regarding the seducer it is stated [Exodus 22:16]:

“He shall weigh out silver

[the seducer shall pay the girl’s father silver, in shekels, in an amount]

like the bride-price of virgins,”

which is the sum of fifty silver pieces that the rapist must pay for having caused her to lose her virginity.

The verse juxtaposed the payments imposed upon the seducer and the rapist, in order to derive one payment from the other. On the one hand, the juxtaposition teaches

that

the sum of shekels paid by

this one,

the seducer, of whom it is stated, “He shall weigh out silver,”

should be like the “bride-price of virgins,”

the amount stated regarding the rapist, whom the Torah fined fifty silver pieces.

And

on the other hand, the juxtaposition teaches that

the “bride-price of virgins”

of fifty silver pieces stated regarding the rapist

should be like this,

that is, like the type of coin paid by the seducer. In other words, the fifty silver pieces must be in coins of shekels, and not in ordinary coins.

B.

From this,

from the wording of the verse that called the payment of fifty shekels [which equal two hundred zuz] for the loss of virginity “the bride-price of virgins,” -

the Sages supported the ketuba of a woman

in the amount of two hundred zuz, which

is from the Torah.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A woman’s ketuba—

is not from the words of the Torah, but from the words of the Sages!

Thus, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a woman’s ketuba is not from the Torah, contrary to what we learned above, that according to him a woman’s ketuba is from the Torah.

And we answer:

Reverse

the positions in the second beraita, and place Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the position of the first tanna; he is the one who holds [in accordance with his position stated above] that a woman’s ketuba is from the Torah.

We challenge this:

What did you see that led you to reverse

the positions in the

later

beraita, the positions of the disputants in the last beraita, in order to reconcile them with the positions in the earlier beraita cited above?

Reverse the earlier one!

Reverse the positions in the beraita cited above and reconcile them with the last beraita!?

And we answer:

For we have heard Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

elsewhere

say that a woman’s ketuba

is

from the Torah.

As we learned [below, 110b], regarding the manner of payment of a ketuba when there is a difference in the value of the currency between the place where the ketuba was written and the place where she is divorced:

In all obligations that are from the Torah, if one writes a promissory note for another in one place and comes to repay the debt in another place, and there is a difference in the value of the currencies in the two places, he must give him payment according to the rate of the place where he incurred the obligation.

But regarding the obligation of a ketuba, we find a dispute among the tannaim:

For example, if one marries a woman in a place called Cappadocia, whose coins are larger than the coins in Eretz Yisrael and are worth more than the coins in Eretz Yisrael, and he divorces her in Eretz Yisrael—

According to the first tanna, he may give her the sum of coins he obligated himself to pay her in coins of Eretz Yisrael. Since he holds that the obligation of the ketuba is rabbinic, the Sages therefore leniently allowed him to repay her with coins of Eretz Yisrael, which are worth less.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

He gives her

the payment of her ketuba

in Cappadocian coins

which are worth more, and he may not give her the equivalent sum in coins of Eretz Yisrael, because he holds that the obligation of the ketuba is from the Torah.

And if you wish, say

that the contradiction in Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statements can be resolved by correcting the last beraita, as follows:

The entire

last beraita

was taught according to the position of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

.

And there is an omission

in the wording of the beraita,

and this is what it teaches

in it:

From this, the Sages supported the ketuba of a woman

who is a virgin, which

is from the Torah.

But

the ketuba of a widow

or of a non-virgin woman who marries another husband

is not from the words of the Torah, but from the words of the Sages—

as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The ketuba of a widow

is not from the words of the Torah, but from the words of the Sages.

The Gemara now brings two cases in which the husband claimed, “I found an open passage,” and what ruling was issued in each case:

A. An incident involving

a certain

man who married a virgin

who came before Rav Naḥman

and

said to him: “I found an open passage.”

Rav Naḥman said to them,

the agents of the court appointed to flog those liable for lashes:

“Give him palm branches,”

flog him with palm branches!

For how could he know and recognize what an “open passage” is?

Apparently, the prostitutes of this city, called

Mevarkhta—

“had intercourse with him,”

lying before him, until he became expert in recognizing an open passage.

Therefore, he should be flogged for having the audacity to make in court a claim based on experience acquired through promiscuity.

We challenge this:

But it was Rav Naḥman who said

above in the name of Shmuel, in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar [at the beginning of the page], that he is

deemed reliable

to claim, “I found an open passage.” This implies that his claim is accepted and that he is not flogged!?

And we answer: Indeed, he is

deemed reliable

in his statement that he found an open passage,

but

nevertheless,

“we give him palm branches,”

flogging him with palm branches because he made this claim on the basis of his experience with promiscuity.

But

Rav Aḥai explains

the contradiction in Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statements as follows:

Here, it is referring to a young unmarried man,

and he is flogged, because a young unmarried man is not expert in this matter; he is flogged for having had the audacity to appear in court and make a claim based on the experience he acquired through his promiscuity.

Here, it is referring to a married man,

who is expert in this matter by virtue of his married life; he is therefore deemed reliable and is not flogged.

B.

There was a certain man who came before Rabban Gamliel and said

to him: “I found an open passage.”

He said to him: “Perhaps you tilted it”

to the side during intercourse, and therefore you did not feel the resistance in that place when you opened the passage?

I shall give you a parable. To what may this be compared?

To a person who was walking in the deep darkness of night,

and reached the closed entrance of his house. There was something at the entrance blocking direct entry, but if one tilted the obstructing object to the side, it was then possible to enter through the opening without obstruction.

Therefore, if, without noticing,

the person tilted

the obstructing object to the side—

he found

the opening

open,

and was able to enter through it without obstruction.

But if he

did not tilt

the object blocking entry—

he found it locked,

and until he tilted the obstructing object to the side, he could not enter.

So too, it is possible that, without noticing, you tilted it to the side at the beginning of intercourse, thereby opening the passage, and afterward you were able to enter through it without obstruction or resistance. Therefore, it seemed to you that the passage had already been open at the beginning of intercourse.

There are those who say

that it is not common for a person to have intercourse while tilting it without intending to tilt it. Rather,

this is what he said to him:

“Perhaps you intentionally tilted it

at the beginning of intercourse,

and

then

you uprooted the grass and crossed over?” This is a parable: You uprooted the door together with its bolt in one motion.

It is a parable: You uprooted the door at once together with its bolt.]

That is, perhaps you intended to have intercourse at the beginning while tilting it to the side and with force. The passage then opened through the forceful sideways tilting, and afterward you no longer felt any resistance during intercourse; therefore, it seemed to you that the passage had been open before intercourse.

I shall give you a parable. To what may this be compared?

To a person who was walking in the deep darkness of night,

and reached his house, where something at the entrance was blocking his way in—

if he

tilted

it to the side

intentionally,

forcefully moving the object that was preventing him from entering,

he found

the entrance

open.

But if he

did not tilt it intentionally—

he found

the entrance

locked.

The Gemara now brings several cases in which a man claimed that he had not found blood during the first marital intercourse:

A.

There was a certain man who came before Rabban Gamliel bar Rabbi.

He said to him: “My teacher, I had intercourse and found no blood.”

She said to him: “My teacher, I was a virgin

when he had intercourse with me.”

He said to them: “Bring me that cloth,”

the garment on which she had been penetrated!

They brought him the cloth, soaked it in water, washed it, and found several drops of blood on it.

He said to him: “Go and enjoy your purchase.”

Huna Mar, son of Rava of Parzikya, said to Rav Ashi: “We too should do this!”

Let us wash the cloth to remove the dirt on it, to ascertain whether there is blood on it.