Ketubot 105a — the Talmud in English

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She shall swear at the end,

when they hear that he died, and she comes to collect her ketuba, she must swear that she has nothing in her possession from her husband's property.

But she shall not swear at the beginning,

when she comes to collect her maintenance.

The sons of the High Priests disagreed with him and said: She shall swear at the beginning and at the end.

Rabbi Dosa ben Hyrkanus said—

In accordance with their words.

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan spoke well

that

she shall swear only at the end.

Gemara:

And we raise a contradiction,

for there is a contradiction between our Mishna and the words of a beraita.

For it was taught:

There were three judges of robberies in Jerusalem: Admon son of Gadai, Hanan the Egyptian, and Hanan son of Avishalom.

1.

It is difficult: three

judges mentioned by the beraita,

against

the two judges mentioned by our Mishna.

2.

It is difficult

that our Mishna states that there were in Jerusalem “judges of

decrees,”

against the wording of the beraita, which states that there were in it “judges of robberies.”

And the Gemara answers the first contradiction:

Granted, three against two—

it is not difficult,

because only the two judges

whom he counted

the tannai

taught

in our Mishna, whereas the third judge,

whom he did not count, he did not teach

in our Mishna. And the tannai of the beraita taught him as well.

But “judges of

decrees”

or

judges of

robberies—

it is difficult!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Our Mishna therefore called the judges of robberies “judges of decrees,” because

that

they

would decree decrees

[penalties, as payment greater than the obligation]

for robberies—

And

as it was taught

in tractate Bava Kamma, concerning the obligation that the owner must pay for damage caused by his animal, that they decreed upon him to pay more than what he damaged:

An animal that entered the domain of the injured party and

broke off

the head of a

sapling

[a young tree]—

Rabbi Yose says: The judges who decree decrees in Jerusalem say:

The payment for damage caused by breaking off the head of a

one-year-old sapling is

two silver coins.

And for breaking off a sapling

two years old—

four silver coins.

And the Gemara brings another contradiction between our Mishna, which says that there were two judges of decrees in Jerusalem, and another beraita, which says that there were three judges of decrees there—

And we raise a contradiction,

from that which was taught:

There were three judges of decrees in Jerusalem: Admon, Hanan, and Nahum!

Rav Pappa said: Who is the tannai,

who is the tannai who taught in the beraita that there was in Jerusalem a third judge called

Nahum?—

It is Rabbi Natan.

For it was taught: Rabbi Natan says: Nahum the Mede too—

was among the judges who decreed decrees in Jerusalem.

And

however,

the Sages did not concede to him

Rabbi Natan, but in their view there were only two judges, Admon and Hanan.

And we challenge this:

And

if

there are no more,

were there no additional judges?

But Rabbi Pinḥas said that Rabbi Oshaya said: There were three hundred ninety-four courts in Jerusalem.

And there were in it

corresponding to them,

in that number,

synagogues. And corresponding to them, study halls.

And corresponding to them, houses

of scribes!

And we answer: Indeed,

judges—

there were many.

And when we say

two or three—

we

judges

who decree decrees are speaking of.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said: The judges who decree decrees in Jerusalem would receive their wages, ninety-nine maneh—

from the chamber donation.

They did not want—

they would add to them.

And we examine this:

“They did not want”!?

Could it be,

whether

with

judges

who are wicked we are dealing,

who do not want this sum, which is a very high sum, but want a higher sum!?

Rather,

so Rav Yehuda said:

If it was insufficient,

if this sum was not sufficient for their livelihood, then

even though they did not want

an increase in their wages—

they would add to them.

Karna

[the name of a tannai] when two litigants would ask him to judge and decide the claims between them,

would take

he would take equal payment from both sides for the hearing and the judgment—

a sitra

[a coin], he would take

from

the one who was

entitled

in the law,

and a sitra

he would take

from

the one who was

liable

in the law—

and he would judge their case,

and then he would judge between them.

And the Gemara wonders:

And how did he act

Karna

thus?

But it is written

[Exodus 23]

“And a bribe you shall not take”!?

And if you would say,

perhaps you will wish to answer and say that

these words

that it is forbidden for a judge to take money from the litigants in order to judge them and decide their case apply only

where he does not take

the judge

from both of them,

that he does not take money equally from both of them for the hearing, but only from one of them, and therefore there is concern

lest he come to incline

to incline

the judgment

in his favor.

But

Karna, since he took from both of them—

he would not come to incline the judgment,

he would not come to incline the judgment toward one of them.

This is not an answer!

Since

even

also

when he does not come to incline the judgment—

is it permitted,

is there permission to take payment for the hearing and the judgment—

But it was taught

in a beraita that it is forbidden to take a bribe in every matter—

For it was taught: This that the Torah said

“And a bribe you shall not take” —

what does it come to teach?

If it is to teach that one may not

take a bribe in order

to acquit the liable one and not to find the entitled one liable—

it has already been stated

[Deuteronomy 16]

“You shall not pervert judgment”!

Rather, even to acquit the entitled one and find the liable one liable, the Torah said, “And a bribe you shall not take”!

And we answer:

These words

that it is forbidden for a judge to take money from both sides apply

where he takes

the money

as a bribe.

But

Karna—

he would take it as payment.

He took the money as payment for deciding the case and not as a bribe to incline the judgment.

But the Gemara still raises an objection:

And as payment—

is it permitted

for a judge to take money from the litigants?

But we learned: One who takes payment to judge—

his judgments are void!

And we answer:

These words

that it is forbidden for a judge to take payment when he takes the money as

“payment for the judgment,”

when he demands from them payment for deciding the case between them. But

Karna—

he would take payment for lost time.

He would take compensation for having been idle from his work during the hearing, and did not take payment for the hearing itself.

And we wonder:

And payment for lost time—

is it permitted?

And it was taught: Disgraceful is the judge who takes payment to judge, except that

if he took it,

his judgment is a judgment.

And the Gemara infers:

What are the circumstances?

How is this matter speaking?

If you say,

if it is said that he took

payment for the judgment,

it is difficult: Does

his judgment count as a judgment?

But it was taught: One who takes payment to judge—

his judgments are void!

Rather,

it necessarily speaks of a case where he took

“payment for lost time,”

and it teaches

in the beraita that

“the judge is disgraceful”

who does this; if so, how did Karna take payment for lost time?

And we answer:

These words

that the matter is disgraceful when the judge takes payment for lost time for

unproven lost time,

where it is not evident that he is idle from another occupation.

But

Karna—

payment for

proven lost time he would take.

For he would test wine in a wine-barge, and they would give him a zuz.

For Karna was an expert in examining wines by smelling them, and he would say which barrel of wine was destined to spoil and become sour soon, and then they would sell it and not lose its value, and which one would not become sour but was destined to endure. And this work was constantly available, and they would give him a zuz for it; therefore it was evident that when he was judging, he was then idle from his work. And he was permitted to take from the litigants payment for his lost time.

And we find that it is permitted for a judge to take payment for lost time where it is proven as payment for lost time,

as in the case of Rav Huna—

when a case would come before him, he would say to them

Rav Huna to the litigants:

Give me a man who will draw water for me in my place,

give me a man who will draw water and water my fields in my place,

and I will judge the case for you.

And since you do not appoint a person in my place, you must pay me for my lost time, for I will have to hire a person in my place to draw the water, and I will engage in deciding the case between you.

Rabbi Abbahu said: Come and see how blinded are the eyes of those who accept bribes

from seeing correctly—

For when

a person feels pain in his eyes,

he

gives money to a doctor,

and

it is uncertain

whether he

will be healed, and it is uncertain whether he will not be healed.

And

if

they themselves accept a shaveh peruta, and blind their eyes,

certainly.

As it is stated:

[Exodus 23]

“For the bribe—

blinds the clear-sighted.”

The Sages taught:

[Deuteronomy 16]

“For the bribe blinds the eyes of the wise”—

a kal va-chomer for fools.

“And perverts the words of the righteous”—

a kal va-chomer for the wicked.

And we wonder:

Is it so

whether

fools and wicked people are fit for judgment?

Are they fit to be judges!?

Rather,

necessarily, that

this is what it says:

“For the bribe blinds the eyes of the wise”—

even a great sage who takes a bribe does not depart from the world without blindness of the heart.