Ketubot 105a (קה.) — the Talmud in English

Hanan says:

She takes an oath at the end,

when they hear that he has died and she comes to collect her ketuba, she must swear that she has nothing of her husband’s property in her possession.

But she does not take an oath at the beginning,

when she comes to collect her maintenance.

The sons of the High Priests disagreed with him and said: She takes an oath at the beginning and at the end.

Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said—

In accordance with their words.

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well

in that

she takes an oath only at the end.

Gemara:

And we raise a contradiction,

between our Mishna and the words of a beraita.

As it was taught:

There were three judges of robbery in Jerusalem: Admon ben Gadai, Hanan the Egyptian, and Hanan ben Avishalom.

1.

There is a difficulty: three

judges mentioned by the beraita

against

the two judges mentioned by our Mishna.

2.

There is a difficulty

with our Mishna, which says that there were in Jerusalem “judges of

decrees,” as opposed to

the wording of the beraita, which says that there were “judges of robbery.”

The Gemara resolves the first contradiction:

Granted, three against two—

there is no difficulty,

because only the two judges

whom the tanna counted

were

taught

in our Mishna, whereas the third judge,

whom he did not count, was not taught

in our Mishna. The tanna of the beraita, however, taught him as well.

But “judges of

decrees”

or

judges of

robbery—

there is a difficulty!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Therefore our Mishna called the judges of robbery “judges of decrees,” because

they

were

decreeing decrees [

penalties, as payment exceeding the basic liability ]

for robbery—

and

as it was taught

in tractate Bava Kamma [58b], concerning the liability that the owner must pay for damage caused by his animal: They decreed that he pay more than the damage it caused:

In a case where an animal entered the property of the injured party and

cut off

the top of a

sapling [

a young tree ]—

Rabbi Yosei says: The judges of decrees in Jerusalem say:

The payment for damage caused by cutting off the top of a

one-year-old sapling is

two silver coins.

And for cutting off a

two-year-old sapling—

four silver coins.

The Gemara brings another contradiction between our Mishna, which says that there were two judges of decrees in Jerusalem, and another beraita, which says that there were three judges of decrees there—

And we raise a contradiction,

from that which was taught:

There were three judges of decrees in Jerusalem: Admon, Hanan, and Naḥum!

Rav Pappa said: Who is the tanna

who taught in the beraita that there was a third judge in Jerusalem named

Naḥum?—

It is Rabbi Natan.

As it was taught: Rabbi Natan says: Naḥum the Mede, too—

was one of the judges of decrees in Jerusalem.

But

however,

the Sages did not concede to him

Rabbi Natan; rather, in their view there were only two judges, Admon and Hanan.

And we challenge this:

But

if

there are no more,

were there no additional judges?

But Rabbi Pinḥas said that Rabbi Oshaya said: There were three hundred and ninety-four courts in Jerusalem,

and there were in it

a corresponding number,

the same number,

of synagogues. And corresponding to them, study halls.

And corresponding to them, בתי

scribes!

And we answer: Indeed,

judges—

there were very many.

And when we say

two or three,

we

mean

the judges who issued decrees.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said: The judges of decrees in Jerusalem would receive a salary of ninety-nine maneh—

from the chamber’s contribution.

They did not want—

they would increase their payment.

And we inquire about this:

“They did not want”!

Could it be

that

we are dealing with

judges

who are wicked,

who did not want this sum, which was extremely large, but wanted an even larger sum?!

Rather,

Rav Yehuda said as follows:

If it did not suffice,

if this sum was insufficient for their livelihood, then

even though they did not want

an increase in their payment,

they would increase it for them.

Karna [

the name of a tanna ] when two litigants would ask him to judge and decide the claims between them,

would take

an equal payment from both parties for the hearing and the judgment—

a coin [

currency ]; he would take

from

the one who was

vindicated

in the judgment

a coin,

and he would take

from

the one who was

liable

in the judgment—

and he would judge their case.

He would then judge between them.

The Gemara wonders:

How did

Karna

do this?

But it is written [Exodus 23]:

“And you shall not take

a bribe”!

And if you would say,

perhaps you would resolve this by saying that

this applies

when there is a prohibition for a judge to take money from the litigants in order to hear their case and issue their judgment, only

where he does not take

the judge

from both of them,

meaning that he does not take equal payment from both for the hearing, but only from one of them; therefore there is concern

lest he come to incline

the

judgment

in that person’s favor.

Whereas

Karna, since he took from both of them—

he would not come to incline the judgment,

he would not come to incline the judgment in favor of either one of them.

This is not a resolution!

Since

even

if

he would not come to incline the judgment—

is it permitted,

is there permission to take payment for the hearing and the judgment—

but it was taught

in a beraita that it is forbidden to take a bribe in every circumstance—

As it was taught: This is what the Torah said:

“And you shall not take

a bribe.”

If it is to teach that one may not

take a bribe in order

to vindicate the liable party or to find the innocent party liable—

it has already been stated [Deuteronomy 16]:

“You shall not pervert

judgment”!

Rather, even to vindicate the innocent party and find the liable party liable, the Torah said: “And you shall not take

a bribe”!

And we answer:

This applies

where he takes

the money

as a bribe.

But

Karna—

he took it as a fee.

He took the money as payment for issuing the judgment, and not as a bribe to incline the judgment.

But the Gemara still asks:

And as a fee—

is it permitted

for a judge to take money from the litigants?

But we learned: One who takes payment to judge—

his judgments are void!

And we answer:

This applies

when it is forbidden for a judge to take payment, when he takes the money as

“payment for the judgment,”

meaning that he demands payment from them for issuing the judgment between them. But

Karna—

he took compensation for the time from which he was idle.

He took compensation for having been prevented from working during the hearing, and did not take payment for the hearing itself.

And we ask:

And compensation for time from which he was idle—

is it permitted?

But it was taught: A judge who takes payment to judge is disgraceful, but if

he took it,

his judgment is a valid judgment.

And the Gemara analyzes this:

What are the circumstances?

What case is being discussed here?

If you say,

that he took

payment for the judgment,

the difficulty is: Is it possible that

his judgment is a valid judgment?

But it was taught: One who takes payment to judge—

his judgments are void!

Rather,

it must be that he took

“compensation for time from which he was idle,” and

it teaches

in the beraita that

“the judge is disgraceful”

when he does this. If so, how did Karna take compensation for his time from which he was idle?

And we answer:

This applies

when the matter is disgraceful, when the judge takes compensation for time from which he was idle for

idleness that is not evident,

when it is not apparent that he was prevented from another occupation.

Whereas

Karna—

payment for

evident idleness he would take.

For he would examine the wine in the wine-press, and they would give him a coin.

Karna was an expert at testing wines by smelling them. He would say which barrel of wine was destined to spoil and turn sour soon, in which case they would sell it and not lose its value, and which would not turn sour but would remain sound. This occupation was constantly available, and they would give him a coin for it; therefore it was evident that while he was judging, he was then idle from his occupation. It was permitted for him to take from the litigants compensation for his time from which he was idle.

And we find that it is permitted for a judge to take compensation for time from which he was idle when it is demonstrably compensation for such idleness,

as in the case of Rav Huna—

when a case would come before him, he would say to them

Rav Huna would say to the litigants:

“Give me someone to draw water for me in my place,”

give me someone who will draw water and irrigate my fields in my place,

“and I will judge your case.”

Since you are not providing someone to take my place, you must pay me compensation for my time from which I am idle, as I will have to hire someone to draw the water in my place while I occupy myself with issuing the judgment between you.

Rabbi Abbahu said: Come and see how blinded are the eyes of those who accept bribes

from seeing correctly—

For when

a person feels pain in his eyes,

he

gives money to a physician,

and

it is uncertain

whether he

will be healed, and uncertain whether he will not be healed.

But

if

they—the judges—take a peruta and blind their eyes,

it is certain.

As it is stated: [Exodus 23]

“For a bribe

blinds the eyes of the perceptive.”

blinds those who see.”

The Sages taught: [Deuteronomy 16]

“For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise

”—a

kal va-chomer for fools.

“And perverts the words of the righteous

”—a kal va-chomer for the wicked.

And we ask:

Is it possible

that

fools and wicked people are fit to judge?

Are they fit to serve as judges?!

Rather,

necessarily,

this is what it is saying:

“For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise”—

even a great sage who takes a bribe does not depart from the world without blindness of the heart.