Keritot 28a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: One who renders the Temple impure

a person who entered the Temple while impure inadvertently [for which he brings an ascending-and-descending offering] and was

wealthy, who set aside a nest

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for his ewe,

that is, while he was wealthy he set aside the offering of a poor person instead of the offering of a wealthy person, which he was obligated to bring.

And he became poor,

even so, he cannot now sacrifice the nest that

since it was rejected,

the nest having been rejected from sacrifice at the time of its setting aside, for he was then wealthy and could not discharge his obligation with the offering of a poor person—

it shall be rejected

from sacrifice forever.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Infer from this

from Rabbi Oshaya

three

three matters:

Infer from this: living creatures can be rejected

so that even if the rejection from sacrifice occurred while it was still alive, and it again became fit for sacrifice, it is rejected forever.

And the sanctity of value rejects

from the altar forever. For even if the rejection was only with regard to sanctity of value, as here, where when the wealthy person consecrated the birds, only sanctity of value took effect upon them, nevertheless we say that because the birds were not fit as an offering for him, it is rejected from the sanctity of the altar forever, even after he became poor and it became fit to be sacrificed for him. And we do not say that sanctity of value is not strong enough for an item to be disqualified on account of rejection.

And an original rejection is a rejection.

For even if it was rejected from the beginning of its consecration, the law of rejection applies to it.

And we do not say that rejection applies only to something that was initially fit and was afterward rejected. This is a dispute in tractate Sukkah.

Rav Ukva bar Hama raised an objection:

It was taught:

One who sets aside a female animal for his Paschal offering before Passover [

and a female is not fit for a Paschal offering]—

it shall graze until it becomes blemished

until a blemish occurs in it,

and it shall be sold, and with its value he shall bring

a male

Paschal offering.

If it gave birth to

the female

a male [

before it grazed]—

it shall graze

the offspring

until it becomes blemished, and it shall be sold, and with its value he shall bring a Paschal offering.

But he himself may not be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, since he comes by virtue of the rejected sanctity of his mother.

Rabbi Shimon says: He himself shall be sacrificed as a Paschal offering.

Infer from this

from Rabbi Shimon that

living creatures are not rejected,

and therefore he himself is sacrificed as a Paschal offering; and this is difficult for Rabbi Oshaya?

And we answer:

They said: The school of Rabbi Oshaya spoke—

according to the Rabbis,

who hold that he himself may not be sacrificed as a Paschal offering because living creatures are rejected.

And Rabbi Shimon

indeed

holds that living creatures are not rejected.

For it was taught: If one of them died

of the two goats of Yom Kippur after lots had been cast for them and it had been determined which was for the sake of God and which was for Azazel—

he brings

the

other

of the one that remains; that is, he brings another goat in place of the dead one,

without a lottery.

And he pairs it with the first one; and if the first one is the goat for the sake of God, they sacrifice it. Although when its fellow died it was rejected from sacrifice because it had no partner, it again becomes fit afterward when its partner joins it,

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

Evidently he holds

Rabbi Shimon:

living creatures are not rejected!

And

it also emerges from his words that

the lottery is not indispensable

for the goats of Yom Kippur, for here he brings one of them without a lottery.

Rav Hisda said: The nests

of two turtledoves or two young pigeons that one who requires atonement and the like brings

are not designated

which of them is an olah and which is a sin offering,

except either through the owner’s purchase

when the owner said at the time of purchasing them that this one would be for an olah and that one for a sin offering,

or through the kohen’s performance,

for if the owners did not specify at the time of purchase, then even if they specified afterward, they are not thereby designated, and the kohen may change them and perform whichever one he wishes as an olah and whichever as a sin offering.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: What is Rav Hisda’s reason? For it is written

concerning a woman after childbirth:

“And she shall take two turtledoves

or two young pigeons, one for an olah and one for a sin offering”; and concerning the kohen’s performance it is written:

“And the kohen shall perform

the one as a sin offering and the other as an olah.” This indicates that the designation of olah and sin offering does not take effect upon them except

either through the owner’s purchase or through the kohen’s performance.

He raised an objection:

It was taught: It is written, “And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the lot came up for the sake of God, and

make it a sin offering.”

And we expound from “make it a sin offering” that specifically

the lot

is what

makes it a sin offering, and it is not

the calling of the

name that makes it a sin offering!

For if he did not cast lots for them but merely gave the goats names, saying about one that it would be for God and about the other that it would be for Azazel, the goats are not thereby designated; rather, he casts a lot for them. And if the lot differs from the designation by name, one follows the lot.

And a kohen does not make it a sin offering

through his performance; rather, a lottery is specifically required.

One might have thought: if “and make it a sin offering” had not been written, I could say by a kal va-chomer that the calling of the name also establishes the designation. For

that if “and he shall make it a sin offering” had not been written, I could have said by an a-fortiori inference that verbal designation also establishes the status.

is it not a logical inference: just as where the lot does not consecrate,

such as with other offerings, where if he took two lots, on one of which “sin offering” was written and on the other “olah,” and placed them upon the animals, they were not thereby designated, but he may change them, nevertheless

the name consecrates,

for after calling it an olah or a sin offering, he may not change its designation;

where the lot consecrates,

in the case of the goats of Yom Kippur,

is it not logical that the name should consecrate? Scripture therefore says, “And make it a sin offering”.

This teaches you that only

the lot makes it a sin offering, but the name does not make it a sin offering.

And we conclude the objection:

It teaches “name” as analogous to “lot.” -

Just as a lot,

where it consecrates,

is neither through purchase nor through performance,

for the time of the lottery is neither the time of purchase nor the time of performance,

so too

the calling of the

name,

where it consecrates, namely with other offerings, including nests,

also consecrates neither through purchase nor through performance. And this is a refutation of Rav Hisda?

when it consecrates. This is a refutation of Rav Ḥisda.

And we answer:

Rabba said: This is what it is saying: Just as where the lot does not consecrate

even if the lottery was performed

at

the time of

the owners’ purchase

of the

owners

or

at the kohen’s performance,

nevertheless

the name consecrates, either through the owners’ purchase or through the kohen’s performance,

as in the case of nests,

here,

with the goats of Yom Kippur,

where the lot consecrates

even

not through purchase and not through performance, is it not logical that the name should consecrate, either through purchase or through performance? Scripture therefore says, “And make it a sin offering.”

This teaches you that only

the lot makes it a sin offering, but the name does not make it a sin offering.

He raised an objection:

It was taught:

One who renders the Temple impure, a poor person who set aside money for

the purpose of

his nest and became wealthy,

and after he became wealthy divided the money into two,

and said: These

shall be

for my sin offering and these for my olah,

and he did this because he erred, for now he is obligated in the offering of a wealthy person, and in the offering of a wealthy person there is no olah offering, but only an animal sin offering—he

adds

to the money

and brings his obligatory offering

namely, the animal for his sin offering

from the money for his sin offering,

from the money upon which he called the name “sin offering.”

But he does not add and bring his obligatory offering from the money for his olah

for he cannot change the money designated for an olah and purchase a sin offering with it [and this money goes for freewill offerings].

But here, where there is neither purchase nor performance

at the time when he said about the money that it would be for a sin offering and an olah, for he said this about it after setting aside the money,

and it teaches: He brings his obligatory offering from the money for his sin offering, but he does not add and bring his obligatory offering from the money for his olah.

Thus the calling of the name establishes the designation even not at the time of purchase or performance. And this is difficult for Rav Hisda? And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said: Can you understand it?

And is this

teaching

this

a properly formulated one?! For it teaches, “and he became wealthy,”

and afterward

“and he said”

about the money.

But Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: One who renders the Temple impure, a wealthy person who brought the offering of a poor person, has not discharged his obligation!

If so, how does his statement, made after he became wealthy, establish the money for an olah? For now he is not fit for an olah offering even after the fact?!

Rather, what have you to say?

That this beraita is corrupt, but this is what one must say:

“For he had already said it from the time of his poverty!”

While he was still poor, he said concerning the money that it should be for a sin-offering and for a burnt-offering, for at that time it was still fit for a burnt-offering. If so,

here too

Rav Hisda will say that one must say:

“For he had already said it from the time of his designation!”

For at the time of designating the money, he said concerning it that it should be for a sin-offering and for a burnt-offering, since the designation of the money is like the time of taking the bird-pair, and therefore they become fixed then as a sin-offering and a burnt-offering.

And we raise an objection:

And according to Rav Haga, who said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya

that a wealthy person who brought the offering of a poor person

has fulfilled

after the fact—

what can be said?

For according to his view, there is no need to emend the beraita, but one may leave the version “and he became wealthy and said,” since even after he became wealthy he can designate the money for a burnt-offering, because after the fact he fulfills his obligation with the offering of a poor person. And the difficulty returns to its place: how was the money fixed after its designation, since that was neither the time of taking nor the time of making?

And we answer:

Teach: “And afterward he took and said” [the way of the tannaim is to omit one word through forgetfulness. Rashi, Yoma].

For he took birds from the money that he had designated, and at the time of taking he said concerning them that they should be for his sin-offering and for his burnt-offering.

[In Yoma 41b the Gemara asks: if so, that which it says, “he adds and brings his obligation from the money of his sin-offering,” necessarily means that he redeems the bird that he took for a sin-offering, but birds have no redemption. And see there what the Gemara answered, and see here in the Shitah Mekubetzet, section 17].

He raises an objection:

We learned in tractate Nega'im:

“A poor person afflicted with leprosy who brought the offering of a wealthy person has fulfilled his obligation”.

But a person afflicted with leprosy who is

wealthy and brought the offering of a poor person has not fulfilled his obligation.

A refutation of Rav Haga, who said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya

that even a wealthy person who brought the offering of a poor person has fulfilled his obligation?

And we answer:

He can say to you

Rav Haga:

“It is different with regard to a person afflicted with leprosy, for the Merciful One excluded him,”

as it is written,

“This

shall be the law of the person afflicted with leprosy.”

For it implies: this and not another.

And we raise an objection:

If so, even a poor person afflicted with leprosy who brought the offering of a wealthy person likewise has not fulfilled his obligation,

for it is written, “This”?!

And we answer:

No! The verse restored him

for it is written

“law.”

For it implies one law for all persons afflicted with leprosy, that they all fulfill their obligation with one offering. And since one verse excludes and one verse includes, it is reasonable to establish the inclusion with regard to a poor person who brought the offering of a wealthy person, and the exclusion with regard to a wealthy person who brought the offering of a poor person, for one ascends in holiness and does not descend.

And it was taught

as an unchallenged statement:

“Law”—

to include a poor person afflicted with leprosy who brought the offering of a wealthy person, that he has fulfilled his obligation. One might have thought even that a wealthy person who brought the offering of a poor person has fulfilled his obligation; the verse says, “This.”

And we raise an objection to Rav Haga, who said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya:

And let us derive from it

that, just as in the case of a person afflicted with leprosy, so too in the case of one who defiled the Sanctuary, a wealthy person who brought the offering of a poor person has not fulfilled his obligation?

And we answer:

The verse says

with regard to a person afflicted with leprosy:

“And if he is poor and his hand cannot afford.”

And we exclude from the word “he,” which implies he and not another, that specifically

a wealthy person afflicted with leprosy who brought the offering of a poor person has not fulfilled his obligation.

But a wealthy person who defiled the Sanctuary and brought the offering of a poor person has fulfilled his obligation 101 .

I kazalos' by, v sootvetstvii s etimi dvumya prichinami, bogataya rozhеница, prinesshaya zhertvu bednoy, po mneniyu vseh ne ispolnila obyazannost'. Ved' vsezhzhenie iz skota rozhеницы trebuet libatsiy [smotri Maase ha-Korbanot 2:2]. I podobno tomu, bednaya rozhеница prinosit odnu vmesto odnoy: ptich'ye vsezhzhenie vmesto vsezhzheniya iz skota, kak obyasneno vyshe v Gemare. Soglasno etomu, smysl slova «on» v tom, chtoby isklyuchit' tol'ko te zhertvy, kotorye ne podobny zhertvam metzora.

Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says: Lambs precede goats everywhere.

For the Torah wrote lambs before goats everywhere.

One might have thought

that the Torah placed them first

because they are

the lambs

superior to them,

and accordingly, one who vows to bring a burnt-offering is required to bring a lamb?

The verse says: “And if he brings a lamb as his offering for a sin-offering,”

while immediately before it is written, “And he shall bring his offering, a she-goat, for his sin.” Thus, here he placed the goat before the lamb—

this teaches that both are equivalent!

And whichever of them he wishes, he may bring for his offering.

Turtledoves precede the young pigeons everywhere

in the Torah.

One might have thought: because they are superior to them?

The verse says: “And a young pigeon or a turtledove for a sin-offering.”

Here the verse placed the law of the pigeon before the turtledove—

this teaches that both are equivalent!

And anyone who vowed a bird may bring whichever of them he wishes.

The father precedes the mother everywhere

in the Torah.

One might have thought: because honoring the father is greater than honoring the mother?

The verse says: “A man shall fear his mother and his father.”

Here it placed the mother before the father—

this teaches that both are equivalent! But the Sages said

that indeed, with regard to receiving reward, both are equal, for he receives reward for honoring his mother as for honoring his father, but with regard to the honoring itself,

the father precedes the mother everywhere, because he and his mother are obligated in honoring his father.

For the woman too is obligated in honoring her husband [according to Rabbenu Gershom].

And likewise with regard to Torah study.

That is,

if the son achieved precedence over the teacher,

who merited to teach him most of his wisdom,

the teacher precedes the father everywhere

that he is to be given precedence in returning his lost property, redeeming him from captivity, sustaining him, and unloading his burden,

because he and his father are obligated in honoring his teacher,

for the father too is obligated to honor a Torah scholar.

Gemara: The Sages taught: The Temple courtyard cried out four cries

that was in the Temple—

One cry: “Remove from here the sons of Eli, Hophni and Phinehas, who defiled the Sanctuary!”

As it is written, “who lie with the women who served at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”.

Kak napisano: «kotorye vozlezhali s zhenshchinami, sobravshimisya u vhoda v Svyatilishche» .

The second cry: “Open the gates, and let Johanan son of Nadvai, the disciple of Pinkai, enter, so that he may fill his belly from offerings of Heaven!”

So that they would not come to the state of notar.